This book presents an historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed by Meinong and a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists in Graz at the turn of the 19th century. Adhering closely to original texts, the contributors explore Meinong's roots in the school of Brentano, complex theories such as the theory of intentional reference and direct reference, and ways of developing philosophy which are closely bound up with the sciences, particularly psychology. Providing a faithful reconstruction of both Meinong's contributions (...) to science and the school that arose from his thought, this book shows how the theories of the Graz school raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered off limits. (shrink)

An important platitude about prudential rationality is that I should not refuse to sacrifice a smaller amount of present welfare for the sake of larger future benefits. I ought, in other words, to treat my present and future as of equal prudential significance. The demands of prudence are less clear, however, when it comes to one’s past selves. In this paper, I argue that past benefits are possible in two ways, and that this fact cannot be easily accommodated by traditional (...) approaches to prudential rationality. Against univocal accounts of prudential rationality, I hold that the possibility of past benefits suggests that a bias toward the present and future is defensible when it comes to some welfare goods, but that prudential reasons are temporally neutral between when it comes to the success or failure of one’s long-term projects. (shrink)

We examine the problem of generating definite noun phrases that are appropriate referring expressions; that is, noun phrases that (a) successfully identify the intended referent to the hearer whilst (b) not conveying to him or her any false conversational implicatures (Grice, 1975). We review several possible computational interpretations of the conversational implicature maxims, with different computational costs, and argue that the simplest may be the best, because it seems to be closest to what human speakers do. We describe our recommended (...) algorithm in detail, along with a specification of the resources a host system must provide in order to make use of the algorithm, and an implementation used in the natural language generation component of the IDAS system. (shrink)

University of Alberta Forthcoming in Utilias Consider Lives for Headaches: there is some number of headaches such that the relief of those headaches is sufficient to outweigh the good life of an innocent person. Lives for Headaches is unintuitive, but difficult to deny. The argument leading to Lives for Headaches is valid, and appears to be constructed out of firmly entrenched premises. In this paper, I advocate one way to reject Lives for Headaches; I defend a form of lexical superiority (...) between values. Based on an inquiry into the notion of human well-being, I argue that no amount of headaches is sufficient to outweigh the disvalue of the loss of a good life. Though this view has been thought subject to devastating objections, these objections are not dispositive against the form of value superiority I advance here. (shrink)

This paper explores a form of communion between persons that the philosophy of value has a tendency to ignore. In discussions of interpersonal relationships and experiences, focus is almost always directed to the phenomenon of friendship and family: two or more individuals that share a history, have longstanding relationships of mutual care. Friendship is said, among other things, to be of intrinsic value, to directly benefit the friend, to generate special obligations, and to yield advances in a person’s virtue. But (...) friendship constitutes a small fraction of the valuable interactions we have with others. Friendship is compatible with, but is not necessary for, what we might call “fellowship": the experience of being _with_ others (whether or not one has any deeper personal relationship with said others). In this paper, I provide an account of the nature of fellowship, and explore its evaluative merit. I argue that there are good reasons to think that, like friendship is often taken to be, fellowship is of intrinsic value, and should be counted as part of the pantheon of robust human goods. (shrink)

Miller, D., G. Nadathur, F. Pfenning and A. Scedrov, Uniform proofs as a foundation for logic programming, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 51 125–157. A proof-theoretic characterization of logical languages that form suitable bases for Prolog-like programming languages is provided. This characterization is based on the principle that the declarative meaning of a logic program, provided by provability in a logical system, should coincide with its operational meaning, provided by interpreting logical connectives as simple and fixed search instructions. The (...) operational semantics is formalized by the identification of a class of cut-free sequent proofs called uniform proofs. A uniform proof is one that can be found by a goal-directed search that respects the interpretation of the logical connectives as search instructions. The concept of a uniform proof is used to define the notion of an abstract logic programming language, and it is shown that first-order and higher-order Horn clauses with classical provability are examples of such a language. Horn clauses are then generalized to hereditary Harrop formulas and it is shown that first-order and higher-order versions of this new class of formulas are also abstract logic programming languages if the inference rules are those of either intuitionistic or minimal logic. The programming language significance of the various generalizations to first-order Horn clauses is briefly discussed. (shrink)

The rise of physicalism and naturalism, the development of cognitive science, and the explosion and popularization of knowledge about animal behavior has brought us to see that most of the properties that were once thought to distinguish humans from other animals are shared with other animals. Many people now see properties that are morally relevant to how it is permissible to treat animals, such as sentience, as widely distributed. Agency, however, is one area in which the retreat from human uniqueness (...) is halting. In this essay I suggest that we should feel the same pressure to bring together accounts of human and animal agency that we feel with respect to sentience and other such characteristics. I go on to diagnose the resistance, and briefly sketch how things might look if we were to see agency as continuous. (shrink)

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects (...) commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias. (shrink)

This paper considers a pair of mutually puzzling first-order intuitions: a case in which it seems both supererogatory for an agent to perform a specified act, and also seems as though were that act not performed, this would have been a failure of moral obligations. I argue that these intuitive reactions are difficult to dislodge and resist accommodation by standard accounts of supererogation. I then argue that this puzzle motivates a new form of supererogatory action: action that, though morally required, (...) is responding to moral circumstances or facts that the ordinary upright agent would typically overlook. (shrink)

The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief is refuted in two famous counterexamples by Edmund L. Gettier. Roderick M. Chisholm has attempted to rescue a version of the traditional conception by distinguishing between defective and nondefective kinds of justification, and redefining knowledge more specifically as nondefectively justified true belief. Chisholm's revised definition avoids Gettier's counterexamples, but goes too far in the opposite direction, imposing conditions that are too narrow and not jointly necessary for knowledge. Chisholm's definition excludes some (...) claims that intuitively constitute genuine knowledge1 by entailing that if a true belief is invalidated as knowledge when defectively justified by a total body of evidence that also makes evident at least one false proposition, then no knowledge whatsoever can be supported by the same evidence. An alternative analysis of knowledge is proposed, according to which the potential loophole between the state of affairs that justifies belief in a proposition, and the state of affairs that makes the proposition true, permitted by the traditional concept of knowledge and discovered by Gettier's counterexamples, is closed by redefining knowledge as semantically‐epistemically evidentially relevant justified true belief. (shrink)

This article explores the carnal dimensions of existence through ethnographic research in a mixed martial arts club. Mixed martial arts (MMA) is an emergent sport where competitors in a ring or cage utilize strikes (punches, kicks, elbows and knees) as well as submission techniques to defeat opponents. Through data gathered from in-depth interviews with MMA practitioners and participant observation in an MMA club, I elucidate the social processes that are integral to the production of an MMA fighter habitus. I examine (...) how body techniques are learned and become attached to the identity of mixed martial arts fighters. Using Crossley’s concept of reflexive body techniques, I examine how MMA fighters engage in body callusing through use of reflexive body techniques thereby allowing them to withstand the rigors of the sport. (shrink)

There is a crisis in America revolving around social and political life that the contributors to this volume believe has provoked a renewed attention to the issue of community in political thought. That attention is found most prominently in the "communitarian" movement, but it also finds expression in the views of the prominent political thinkers of our time.

The possibilities are explored of considering nothing as the intended object of thoughts that are literally about the concept of nothing first, and thereby of nothing. Nothing, on the proposed analysis, turns out to be nothing other than the property of being an intendable object. There are propositions that look to be both true and to be about nothing in the sense of being about the concept and ultimate intended object of what is here formally defined and designated as N-nothing. (...) We have been thinking about it already in reading and understanding the meaning of this abstract. Nothing nothings, we shall assert in all seriousness and with a definite formally definable literal meaning. The concept of N-nothing in that sense is a concept with identity conditions like that of any entity, the difference being that the concept of N-nothing is a nonentity and nonexistent intended object. (shrink)

I consider three conditions to explain the emergence of scientific philosophy in Austrian thought at the turn of the century, concentrating on Vienna and Graz as distinct centers of philosophical development: An outlook that seeks philosophical truth in sound reasoning, combined with a commitment to developing and practicing a methodology that is not essentially dependent on any particular culture's literary–philosophical traditions; The desire to transcend national boundaries in the pursuit of philosophical understanding, as manifested in international professional conferences, publications, and (...) training of international students; and Cultural infrastructure that sustains ambitious philosophical projects, including tangible assets like financial resources, established educational institutions and communication networks, but also less conspicuous elements, such as, among others, a political environment of open inquiry, a relatively free press, community support for the enhancement of learning, and participation in an international language of science. (shrink)

Climate change has become the most pressing moral and political problem of our time. Ethical theories help us think clearly and more fully about important moral and political issues. And yet, to date, there have been no books that have brought together a broad range of ethical theories to apply them systematically to the problems of climate change. This volume fills that deep need. Two preliminary chapters--an up-to-date synopsis of climate science and an overview of the ethical issues raised by (...) climate change--set the stage. After this, ten leading ethicists in ten separate chapters each present a major ethical theory and discuss the implications of that view for how we decide to respond to a rapidly warming planet. Each chapter first provides a brief exposition of the view before working out what that theory "has to say" about climate change and our response to the problems it poses. Key features: - Up-to-date synopsis of climate science - Clear overviews of a wide range of ethical theories and perspectives by leading experts - Insightful discussions of the implications of these theories and perspectives for our response to climate change - A unique opportunity to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of various ethical viewpoints. (shrink)

El contraste que habitualmente se establece entre el Utilitarismo y la teoría de la virtud queda en entredicho en este ensayo. El Utilitarismo puede encamar cualquier conducta, ya que implica que deberíamos mentir, engañar, robar y aun apropiamos de Aristóteles, si con ello vamos a ocasionar los mejores resultados. En algunas situaciones y en algunos mundos posibles, lo mejor se obtendría centrándonos en los rasgos de carácter. El Cambio Medioambiental Global nos lleva al estudio de los caracteres, puesto que en (...) este caso los mejores resultados se obtienen, generalmente, al disociar nuestro comportamiento del de los demás. Por ello, en este caso y en este mundo, los utilitaristas deberían ser teóricos de la virtud. (shrink)

The use of medical records in research can yield information that is difficult to obtain by other means. When such records are released to investigators in identifiable form, however, substantial privacy and confidentiality risks may be created. These risks become more common and more serious as medical records move to an electronic format. In 1996, the state of Minnesota enacted legislation with respect to consent requirements for the use of medical records in research. This legislation has been widely criticized because—it (...) is claimed—it creates an unnecessary impediment to research. In this article, we show that these arguments rest upon misinterpretation and/or misrepresentation of the 1996 legislation. A consent requirement had actually been present in Minnesota since 1976 (though codified in a patient rights statute rather than a privacy statute). The 1996 law does not require specific consent, as often claimed, but rather only a general authorization. The campaign against the Minnesota legislation appears to have been motivated by concern with respect to the then impending federal privacy rule. The HIPAA rule, as enacted, is in fact less stringent with respect to consent than the Minnesota consent law. On the other hand, the Minnesota consent law has not been effectively applied or enforced. As we change the way we manage sensitive medical information, new efforts are needed to provide protection against the confidentiality risks in research. Patient consent is an important tool in this regard. New instrumentalities are needed to solicit and document consent. (shrink)

Background: There is limited research on brain lesions in children with cerebral visual impairment of heterogeneous etiologies and according to associated subtyping and vision dysfunctions. This study was part of a larger project establishing data-driven subtypes of childhood CVI according to visual dysfunctions. Currently there is no consensus in relation to assessment, diagnosis and classification of CVI and more information about brain lesions may be of potential diagnostic value.Aim: This study aimed to investigate overall patterns of brain lesions and associations (...) with level of visual dysfunction and to compare the patterns between the classification subgroups in children with CVI.Methods: School-aged children with CVI received ophthalmological and neuro-psychological/developmental assessments to establish CVI-related subtyping. Other pediatric information was collected from medical records. MRI scans were coded according to a semi-quantitative template including brain regions and summed for total scores. Non-parametric analyses were conducted.Results: 28 children had clinical brain MRI scans available [44% of total sample, Group A n = 16, Group B n = 12]. Total brain scores ranged between 0 and 18 and were widespread across regions. 71 per cent had post-geniculate visual pathway damage. The median total brain and hemisphere scores of Group B were higher than subgroup A but differences did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant associations were found between brain scores and vision variables.Conclusion: This study found a spread of lesions across all regions on the brain scans in children with congenital CVI. The majority had damage in the postgeniculate visual pathways and visual cortex region suggesting this is an area of interest and potentially informative for diagnosis. However the subtyping classification did not show differences in number or region of lesions though the trend was higher toward Group B. This study confirms the complex diffuse and variable nature of brain lesions in children with congenital CVI, many of whom have other neurological impairments. (shrink)

Excerpt from: Hull, D. L.. Review: Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution:\nHuman Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford:\nClarendon Press. 1997. cloth 19.99. British Journal for the Philosophy\nof Science, 49, 511-14.

This article considers the psychology of meditation and other introverted forms of mystical development from a neo-Piagetian perspective, which has commonalities with biogenetic structuralist and neurotheological approaches. Evidence is found that lines of meditative development unfold through Patañjali’s stages at different rates in an echo of the unfolding of lines of cognitive development through Piaget’s stages at different rates. Similar factors predicting the degree of independence of development apply to both conventional cognitive and meditative contents. As the same brain and (...) the same nervous system are involved in both cognitive developmental psychology and meditation there are likely to be commonalities between conventional psychological and transpersonal development. Neo-Piagetian transpersonal psychology predicts a variable landscape of spiritual development across traditions and individuals, in line with variability in the cultural learning environment. (shrink)

This special issue is a refreshing contrast to the intuitively influential notion of language as an internal system. This internal approach to language is going strong in some segments of the cognitive sciences. As an assumption, internalism drives much empirical work on language, and it is the basis of prominent theories of language – its nature (e.g. an internalised computational system), its evolution (e.g. a single still-unknown mutation), and its function (e.g. thinking, not communication). -/- Radical fundamentalist versions of these (...) theories are no longer in the main stream, however, despite the attention they may garner by forceful exposition (e.g. Chomsky 2011a). A fuller canvassing of the cognitive sciences – obviously outside the scope of the current presentation – would probably reveal that most researchers, even those who study aspects of language isolated in individual participants, would allow for an intrinsic social characteristic to language. I would go so far as to guess that they would place this social character on explanatory par with other structural or information-processing features that are studied in the lab. And despite what is averred by Chomsky (2011a), this social character in human cognition has been proposed in many domains, from vision (Balcetis & Lassiter 2010) to memory (Barnier et al. 2008). Humans are intrinsically social in a way that distinguishes them from any other primate species, and this sociality seems to be weaved into many cognitive processes (Castiello et al. 2010; Tomasello 2009). -/- But “social” is not the same thing as “distributed,” by the content of this issue. The latter may subsume the former. The distributed approach discussed in this special issue is not “simply” social – it does not just propose an added static feature of any synchronic language context (as noted in Jennings & Thompson this issue). The approach instead regards this social characteristic as just one part of a broader dynamic distributed process that constitutes language, through different kinds of inter-individual coordination at many levels of spatial and temporal scale (Cowley this issue; Fusaroli & Tylén this issue). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Marxist studies of schools have overlooked the power of intentional explanations to explain schooling practices and policies. This oversight is at least in part due to many radical analyses failing to distinguish between explaining the acquisition and persistence of beliefs and determining the social consequences that follow from acting on beliefs. I further contend that radical researchers examining schooling practices must develop a more rigorous and refined conception of capitalist class interests.