Scholars of Late Antiquity have explored rhetorical constructions of the Christian life from many different angles, yet they have not done so in the context of public bathing culture. This article explores the polyvalent ways in which baths and bathing culture were used in rhetorical constructions of the Christian life in Late Antiquity, and how, in turn, this discourse structured Christian communities ideologically and affected the attitudes and practices of the laity. Since bathing culture was intimately associated with the Roman (...) body, self, and personal appearance, it was implicated in rigorist Christian discourse quite commonly. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that Late Antique Christians, especially rigorists, wrote about baths and bathing because it was an important element in constructing a framework for an idealized Christian life and maintaining meaningful divisions within the Christian oikoumene based on ascetic practices and spirituality. But these writings should not be taken as an accurate reflection of social practice or mentalities concerning bathing in Late Antiquity, although certain changes, which reflect the importance of the ideal among the laity, are notable. In the end, Late Antique Christians emerge here as quite Roman in the manner in which they cared for their bodies, personal appearance, and health. And public bathing culture allows us to glimpse the rich social mosaic of Late Antiquity vividly. (shrink)

The characteristic holistic features of the quantum theoretic formalism and the intriguing notion of entanglement can be applied to a field that is far from microphysics: logical semantics. Quantum computational logics are new forms of quantum logic that have been suggested by the theory of quantum logical gates in quantum computation. In the standard semantics of these logics, sentences denote quantum information quantities: systems of qubits (quregisters) or, more generally, mixtures of quregisters (qumixes), while logical connectives are interpreted as special (...) quantum logical gates (which have a characteristic reversible and dynamic behavior). In this framework, states of knowledge may be entangled, in such a way that our information about the whole determines our information about the parts; and the procedure cannot be, generally, inverted. In spite of its appealing properties, the standard version of the quantum computational semantics is strongly “Hilbert-space dependent”. This certainly represents a shortcoming for all applications, where real and complex numbers do not generally play any significant role (as happens, for instance, in the case of natural and of artistic languages). We propose an abstract version of quantum computational semantics, where abstract qumixes, quregisters and registers are identified with some special objects (not necessarily living in a Hilbert space), while gates are reversible functions that transform qumixes into qumixes. In this framework, one can give an abstract definition of the notions of superposition and of entangled pieces of information, quite independently of any numerical values. We investigate three different forms of abstract holistic quantum computational logic. (shrink)

The title is meant to emphasize the immense loss of status I take logic to have undergone in recent decades, and to suggest something about its causes. The loss is most obvious in the context of higher education, where almost no post-secondary institutions now have effectual general requirements in standard formal logic, as that was easily understood thirty or more years ago. Courses in so-called 'critical thinking' are, with rare and noble exceptions, only a further illustration of the point, for (...) many of them, if not most, say nothing at all about logical form and formal logic, and proceed as if thought and discourse could be critically understood and appraised in total ignorance of their formal aspects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’AutrécourtDallas G. Denery IIChristophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00.Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the Medieval Hume" by one of his first (...) modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a long way towards recovering Nicholas's very real contributions to fourteenth-century intellectual life.Any attempt to interpret Nicholas's thought runs up against one significant problem—few of his works survive. All that remains are a fascinating and lengthy (not to mention, confusing and unfinished) work of natural philosophy, Exigit ordo, and several letters touching on issues in epistemology, cognition, and logic. As a result, even situating Nicholas's thought within the proper intellectual currents of the first decades of the fourteenth century has proven difficult. Whose work influenced him? Who were the objects of his criticism? What were his motives? Until recently, most scholars have attempted to trace the influence of William Ockham on Nicholas's thought. Drawing from recent work on the University of Paris during the fourteenth century, Grellard not only downplays Ockham's influence on Nicholas, but also Nicholas's membership in the faculty of theology. Rather, he stresses Nicholas's ongoing involvement in the arts faculty, where he continued to teach even as he studied for his degree in theology. This has two significant consequences. First, it allows Grellard to treat all of Nicholas's writings as contributions to the practice of natural philosophy. Indeed, in his compelling first chapter, Grellard contends that the initial sections of the Exigit, in which Nicholas famously condemns scholastic Aristotelianism as nothing more than an institutionalized pedagogy of error and untruth, must be read as a plea for a distinction between philosophy and theology, between speculation and faith. Even if Nicholas was not alone at the time in pushing for these distinctions (Ockham and John Buridan had argued along similar lines), Grellard demonstrates that Nicholas's approach was certainly the more radical and extreme. Second, the shift in focus from theology to arts brings with it a shift in Nicholas's most important interlocutors. To begin, Aristotle and Averroes become constant background forces in Nicholas's thought. Moreover, as the final section of Grellard's work makes clear, many of Nicholas's ideas are most usefully understood in light of writings of two other arts masters, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme, rather than in the context of debates among his contemporaries in the theology faculty. [End Page 119]These initial interpretive decisions shape the overall structure of Grellard's book, which moves, in three parts, from a deft analysis of Nicholas's theory of evidence and probability to his account of the objects of cognition and, finally, to a comparison of Nicholas's and Buridan's epistemological theories. Unlike so many prior studies that begin with Nicholas's famous critique of a fellow theologian's cognitive theories, thereby framing Nicholas's project in terms of theological debates concerning the intuitive cognition of non-existents and God's ability to cause false visions, Grellard begins with Nicholas's positive theory of knowledge. This effectively sidesteps the entire question of Nicholas's skepticism, a question Nicholas himself explicitly tried to avoid. Nicholas comes across as a philosopher keenly aware of the limits of human cognition, yet eager to develop a viable and wholly rational epistemology within those limits. Those limits, Grellard makes clear, have everything to do with appearances, with what we can rationally and legitimately infer about the world based upon what we see... (shrink)

The current work takes a phenomenological approach to investigating the role of guilt in a sample of persons diagnosed with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder . The role of guilt in OCD has been frequently noted in the literature, although infrequently studied as a factor in its own right. Typically, those studying OCD have found positive correlations between questionnaire measures of guilt and self-reported symptoms of OCD. Those working with sufferers have also found that OC clients in therapy report feelings of guilt with (...) respect to their symptoms. The present work investigates, in a qualitative way, the meaning of guilt for those with OCD. The presumed role of guilt is examined descriptively, with an eye to developing a more complete understanding of the relationship between feelings of guilt and OC symptoms in a sample of sufferers. Nine participants were recruited, and were interviewed using an unstructured approach. In terms of analysis, emphasis was placed on understanding the experience of guilt and OC symptoms as both were lived by sufferers, with a focus on the personal significance of guilt for study participants. Fifteen descriptive guilt/OCD themes were derived from interviews across the nine participants. Themes revealed a variety of connections that sufferers made between feelings of guilt and symptoms of OCD. A common description of the experience was also derived. The results suggest that the role of guilt in OCD is highly interpersonal in nature, and that feelings of guilt may precede, motivate, as well as be a consequence of, OC symptoms. The role of guilt for any given sufferer may also be highly idiosyncratic. (shrink)

Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledge--as a publicly available resource for living--has disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main (...) developments in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophy's role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forces--in other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willard's former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willard's project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life. (shrink)

This essay explores the preferences, anticipations and expectations of the elderly regarding the role of family members in making health care decisions for them should they become decisionally incapacitated. Findings are presented from a series of in-depth interviews of men and women aged 67–91 years. Following a discussion of the uncertain legal status of familial surrogate decision-making, we argue that the family unit's autonomy is sufficient to justify the elderly's preferred reliance on their own family. Further, we suggest that social (...) and legal policy changes should facilitate, rather than impede, familial decision-making. (shrink)

Most theories and models of memory are based on two assumptions that contain theoretical problems. These problems are reflected in the memory-trace paradox, which consists in believing that the past is contained in the memory trace, and in the fallacy of the homunculus, which consists in assuming the existence of an unconscious intentional subject. We will discuss these and present an alternative hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality. This holds that consciousness is not a unitary dimension, but (...) is the set of distinct and original modes to address the object. Among the modes of consciousness, a distinction is made between Knowing Consciousness (KC) and Temporal Consciousness (TC). KC describes the mode of addressing the object in order to know it. TC describes the mode of consciousness that temporalizes its object according the subordinate structures of temporality, the past, the present and the future. Finally it is shown how the hypothesis accounts for a variety of memory disorders and phenomena while avoiding the memory- trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus. (shrink)

Nigel Biggar argues against ‘dirty hands’ reasoning for two reasons. The first is that dirty hands reasoning is paradoxical. The second is that ‘dirt’ in dirty hands is often—and wrongly—conceived as guilt. According to Biggar, the dirt should instead be understood as regret. In this article, I defend dirty hands reasoning against both criticisms. On the one hand, I argue that dirty hands reasoning is not necessarily paradoxical. On the other, I argue that, because guilt, more than regret, is meant (...) to motivate the agent we should prefer a prima facie interpretation of the ‘dirt’ in dirty hands as guilt instead of regret. (shrink)

HAYEK ON LIBERTY, 2ND ED. by John Gray. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. $29.95.

Radical feminist Carla Lonzi is regarded as a founding mother of Italian feminism in the early 1970s. Italian feminists look at her diaries and pamphlets as historical testimony, or as tools of self-identification. Very little work engages Lonzi’s feminist thought in its critique of psychoanalytic constructs of female sexuality, such as the forced sexual coincidence between vaginal sexuality and masculine pleasure. While reappropriating the clitoris as the site of female autonomy, Lonzi invents the ‘donna clitoridea,’ whose authenticity opposes heteronormativity. This (...) article examines Lonzi’s theory of the clitoris and the donna clitoridea, arguing that Lonzi’s clitoris is not so much a site of pleasurable authenticity, but a phallic instrument of domination among women. (shrink)

Dallas G. Denery - Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrecourt - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 119-120 Christophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00. Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the (...) Medieval Hume" by one of his first modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a... (shrink)