Several contributions in the book show how these principles apply to contemporary problems and moral issues.

Voluntary management standards for social and environmental performance ideally help to define and improve firms’ related capabilities. These standards, however, have largely failed to improve such performance as intended. Over-emphasis on institutional factors leading to adoption of these standards has neglected the role of firms’ existing capabilities. External pressures can drive firms to adopt standards more than their technical capacity to employ them. This can lead to problems of “fit” between institutional requirements and a firm’s existing capabilities . We describe (...) a conceptual model that considers the impact of an interaction between a firm’s institutional requirements and its existing capabilities on standards failure. We suggest solutions that align institutional requirements to appropriate governance forms as a means to improve standards success. We contribute to theory by describing the role of firms’ internal capabilities to the success of voluntary management standards and the reliability of self-regulation generally. (shrink)

I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in (...) a very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s (2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to (...) be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we show that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal – but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush's (Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of 'evidence' but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush's (...) own two criteria of evidence to be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we argue that attempts to reconcile Roush's arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush's two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal—but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence. (shrink)

Everyone has mixed feelings about the future, especially about the many powerful technologies changing our world – and us as well. Trash TV excites us with visions of bionic limbs for the helpless, robot puppies craving attention but never messing the carpet, painless laser dentistry, clones, and weird genetic hybrids.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Peculiarly Favored Condition of GeneticsJames J. Lee, PhD (bio) and Damien Morris, MSc (bio)Turkheimer and Greer (2024) (henceforth “T&G”) make some fair points about problems in the scientific profession, including the regrettable tendency to promise practical applications of research that then never materialize. However, T&G’s sustained critique of a body of work associated with one particular researcher to make these general points struck us as uncharitable. More (...) pressingly, we feel that the far-reaching conclusions that T&G attempt to draw from the results they review from the Spit for Science (S4S) cohort are unjustified and risk misleading readers that psychiatric and behavioral genetics is in a parlous state.T&G state that S4S “produced a clear answer to the question it was designed to address,” namely, that its results “unambiguously contradict the hypothesis that alcohol-related behaviors have a meaningful genetic basis.” But S4S cannot possibly have provided affirmative evidence for the null hypothesis, because as a single cohort it lacked the statistical power to do so. Elsewhere T&G acknowledge that the sample size of S4S does not suffice for many purposes; they cannot have it both ways. When GCTA has been applied to samples of greater size, it has unambiguously supported the hypothesis that alcohol-related behaviors have a meaningful genetic basis. The UK Biobank yielded estimates exceeding 0.10 for the contribution of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) with minor allele frequency of greater than 0.05 to the heritability of drinks per week, estimates more than ten times their standard errors (Liu et al., 2019).This heritability contributed by common variants is sometimes called “SNP heritability,” and T&G disparage it for the alleged “disadvantage of being substantially smaller” than “twin and family heritabilities.” Nowhere do T&G consider what the precise numbers actually mean—an approach that can be hazardous to your scientific health, as the late John Loehlin might have said. Let us, then, consider these numbers. Under a model of pure neutrality, SNP and pedigree narrow-sense heritabilities should be fairly close, essentially as a result of factors p(1 − p) canceling in the multiplication of the numbers of SNPs to be found at a given allele frequency by the average heritability contributed per SNP (Hill, 2010). If SNP and pedigree heritabilities are not close, then natural selection must have been acting on [End Page 441] the trait, preventing new mutations of large effect from becoming common and thereby concentrating heritability at allele frequencies lower than those typically studied in genome-wide association studies (GWAS). This deduction has been abundantly confirmed: the tendency of GWAS SNPs to reside in evolutionarily conserved regions (Finucane et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2019), the younger age of GWAS SNPs when compared to control SNPs of comparable frequencies (Gazal et al., 2017), the discovery of several rare variants with larger effects than those observed in typical GWAS (Barton et al., 2021; Chen et al., 2023; Marouli et al., 2017), the directly measured deleterious fitness effects of mutations in evolutionarily constrained genes (Gardner et al., 2022), and the substantial additional genetic variance accumulated when rare variants are included in GCTA-type studies, sometimes enough to close the gap between SNP and pedigree heritabilities (Evans et al., 2018; Jang et al., 2022; Pathan et al., 2024; Wainschtein et al., 2022).The genetic architecture of a typical quantitative trait consists of many sites across the genome that can mutate to affect it, numbering potentially in the millions (Agarwala et al., 2013; Zeng et al., 2021), of which those that are common SNPs have very small effects as a result of selection. This is the message, but T&G seem to find fault with the messenger, painting “tiny” effect sizes as an embarrassment to the field of behavioral genetics as a whole. We prefer to view the finding of high polygenicity as a revelation about nature, rather than as a debating point. What is this finding telling us? If one takes the action of stabilizing selection as the initial assumption (Uyeda et al., 2011), then the extreme polygenicity revealed by GWAS becomes part of the answer to the question regarding how traits can... (shrink)

Fiona Allon writes that “ home, now more than ever, is seen as firmly connected to the world of politics and economics, as actively shaped and defined by the public sphere rather than existing simply as a refuge from it.” 1 From this perspective, claims to home as they are located in a relationship to claims of both national and local belonging are often a contested site within Australia, where notions of who is seen to be at home in Australia (...) are constantly being challenged and reworked. Structured around the desire amongst white people to retain Australia as a “white nation,” claims to home may be seen as operating in complex ways in regards to the rights that arise from the ongoing existence of Indigenous sovereignties, and the politics surrounding levels of immigration from groups of people perceived as belonging to minority racial groups. In this context, the notion of home is frequently drawn upon in relation to both how people perceive the way in which they, and others, belong in a country, and this raises questions surrounding who is legitimately able to call Australia home. Such discourses of home evoke feelings of ownership in people who feel that they have a legitimate claim to a country for reasons primarily of race or location of birth. In Australia, despite the powerful presence and voice of Indigenous peoples, popular perceptions of the country tend to place such homely rights firmly in the laps of white people, who, through images of white nuclear families in front of white picket fences, perceive themselves as already and rightfully at home in Australia. Yet such conceptions of Australia are not accepted without struggle. Notions of home are very much contested, especially in terms of Indigenous sovereignty and non-white immigration, both of which question the legitimacy of a normatively white Australia. Such ideas of home as being a contested space in which issues of national belonging are played out in Australia were seen quite clearly in relation to the 2005 Cronulla riots, in which thousands of white Australians gathered around Cronulla beach, shouting at and threatening those located as “Lebanese Muslim” people. The people involved in the riots made it quite clear that whilst Australia was a home for them, it ought not to be home to people who were identified as Lebanese Muslims. Such racist opinions exemplified the fact that Australia is seen to be a white country, and therefore as a legitimate home to white people rather than to non-white minority groups or even to Indigenous Australians. This is discussed in more detail later in this paper. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive analysis of the royal and princely courts of Europe as important places of Enlightenment. The households of European rulers remained central to politics and culture throughout the eighteenth century, and few writers, artists, musicians, or scholars could succeed without establishing connections to ruling houses, noble families, or powerful courtiers. Covering case studies from Spain and France to Russia, and from Scandinavia and Britain to the Holy Roman Empire, the contributions of this volume examine how Enlightenment (...) figures were integrated into the princely courts of the Ancien Régime, and what kinds of relationships they had with courtiers. Dangers and opportunities presented by proximity to court are discussed as well as the question of what rulers and courtiers gained from their interactions with Enlightenment men and women of letters. The book focusses on four areas: firstly, the impact of courtly patronage on Enlightenment discourses and the work as well as careers of Enlightenment writers; secondly, the court as an audience to be catered for by Enlightenment writers; thirdly, the function of Enlightenment narratives and discourses for the image-making of rulers and courtiers; and fourthly, the role the interaction of courtiers and Enlightenment writers played for the formulation of reform policies. (shrink)

Psience Fiction: The Paranormal in Science Fiction Literature is a book that really needed to be written. In an abundance of hubris I once played with the idea myself (and I was probably not alone in the thought). But now Damien Broderick has done it, and much better than I could have even approximated. Given his background as a science fiction literary critic and author himself, no other writer could be better-equipped. Psience Fiction is exactly the right title to (...) encapsulate Broderick’s chosen topic. As he notes in one passage, his purpose here is to explore “the varied representations of the paranormal in science fiction” (p.68)–though by paranormal he refers neither to ghosts nor mediumship nor UFO-related phenomena, but strictly to “paranormal” as it relates to putative mental powers that transcend the scientifically-presumed, neuro-physical limits of our minds and brains. He refines that still further in noting that what he wants to consider is “...the give and take between the science fiction paranormal and the real-world kind, tested and tallied by psi researchers” (p.5). This book is probably most easily described as a book of book reviews (though a few relevant short stories are also considered). Authors covered run the gamut from Olaf Stapledon, E.E. “Doc” Smith, James Blish and Theodore Sturgeon to Zenna Henderson, John Wyndham, Robert Heinlein, Ann McCaffery, Octavia Butler, and John Brunner, plus many more. For a literary work to be included, it must incorporate some aspect of psi as an integral plot element; a mere mention of extrasensory perception or psychokinesis does not suffice. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application (...) of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to "bidding markets," network industries, and two-sided markets.ContributorsMark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. WerdenPaolo Buccirossi is Director and Founder of Lear, a research center and an economics consulting firm in Rome, and has worked as an economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority. (shrink)

The malign figure of the Antichrist endures in modern culture, whether religious or secular; and the spectral shadow he has cast over the ages continues to exert a strong and powerful fascination. Philip C. Almond tells the story of the son of Satan from his early beginnings to the present day, and explores this false Messiah in theology, literature and the history of ideas. Discussing the origins of the malevolent being who at different times was cursed as Belial, Nero or (...) Damien, the author reveals how Christianity in both East and West has imagined this incarnation of absolute evil destined to appear at the end of time. For the better part of the last two thousand years, Almond suggests, the human battle between right and wrong has been envisaged as a mighty cosmic duel between good and its opposite, culminating in an epic final showdown between Christ and his deadly arch-nemesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism and the Idea of Human Rights:Resonances and Dissonances1Perry Schmidt-LeukelIn 1991 L.P.N. Perera, Professor of Pāli and Buddhist Studies in Sri Lanka, published a Buddhist commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this commentary Perera tries to show that, in the Pāli canon, i.e. the canonical scripture of Theravāda Buddhism, for every single article of the Human Rights Declaration a substantial parallel or at least a statement (...) with a similar tendency can be found. Indeed, says Perera, Article 1, which affirms the dignity and rights of all humans, "is in complete accord with Buddhist thought, and may be said to be nothing new to Buddhism in conception" (Perera 1991:21). In contrast, the Buddhist Peter Junger, Professor of Law at the University of Cleveland, Ohio, judged in 1995 that... though followers of Buddhist traditions do value most, if not all, of the interests underlying the rhetoric of human rights, they may not have much use for the label itself, which is, after all, a product of the traditions of Western Europe and the parochial histories of that region.(Junger 1998: 56)Junger goes on to say that "the concept of human rights is not likely to be useful in...following the Buddha Dharma" (Junger 1998: 55).Thus Perera and Junger agree that the content of the various human rights is acceptable for Buddhists. However, they disagree strongly in their evaluation of the idea of human rights in itself. In this respect Damien Keown has rightly argued that the crucial question on 'Buddhism and Human Rights' is not so much whether Buddhism can accept any particular human right but rather whether the idea of human rights as such can find a philosophical justification within the "overall Buddhist vision of individual and social good" (Keown 1998: 24).It is this problem that I would like to pursue in this paper. In the first part I will sketch some basic characteristics of the idea of human rights. In the second part I will point out what resonances this idea finds in Buddhism or by which Buddhist concepts the human rights idea can be justified. And finally, in the third part, I will deal [End Page 33] with the question of potential dissonances between the idea of human rights and Buddhist concepts.On the Nature of Human RightsWith the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the various subsequent human rights conventions the rights of individuals were for the first time inscribed into international law, which had previously recognised only collectives as legal subjects. By formulating universal rights as valid for every individual human being regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth, etc. the Universal Declaration points to the most important feature of the idea of human rights: the protection of the individual or, to be more precise, the protection of the individual against powerful institutions of the state, society, religion or others. It is individual self-determination and free agency that are protected through human rights. Human rights define the minimum of what is necessary in order to guarantee the freedom of individual agency and the freedom of self-determination. By the definition of inalienable rights,2 the idea of human rights sets limits to those collectives and institutions in which we usually live, limits which for the sake of the basic liberty of the individual are not to be transgressed. Michael Ignatieff summarises this understanding of human rights with the words: "rights exist to protect individuals" (Ignatieff 2001: 67), and "they are worth having only if they can be enforced against institutions like the family, the state, and the church" (Ignatieff 2001: 66f.). Therefore "moral individualism" is "the core of the Universal Declaration" (Ignatieff 2001: 66).It is true that the further development of the human rights debate, particularly within the context of the United Nations, has led to an extension of the idea of human rights to collective rights and collective legal entities by including among human rights, for example, a nations' right to self-determination and the right to peace and the right to development. However, in my opinion it would be highly... (shrink)

Issues such as abortion, embryo research and euthanasia have been discussed exhaustively from the standpoint of Western philosophy and religion, but so far the voice of Buddhism has been little heard in the debate. Although widely respected for its benevolent and humanistic values, Buddhism has not so far shown how its ethical principles can be applied in a consistent manner to contemporary moral dilemmas. Drawing on both ancient and modern sources, this book sets out the basis of a Buddhist response (...) to the major ethical questions posed by modern medicine. (shrink)

The article starts by offering a definition of fake kindness focused on the dissociation between the behavioural components of kindness and the intent to sincerely pay some heed to the needs of others. Using the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu, this definition is then used to articulate how fake kindness can be conceptualized as a specific form of symbolic violence. Such a view allows explanations as to how and why the prevalence and effectiveness of fake kindness vary according to microsociological (...) norms and values. The generic definition and conceptualization of fake kindness as a form of symbolic violence are then used to discuss how nursing’s enthrallment with the concept of caring and its operationalization as a moral compass likely fosters the growth of fake kindness within the profession. In this view, the institutional enforcement of propriety and well-behaved professionalism is more likely to lead to toxic environments than to healthy workplaces. We hope that being able to understand how professional norms and institutional rules are sometimes turned into social tools to enforce obedience and existing hierarchies can empower victims of those phenomena to resist them more effectively. It might also contribute to increasing the awareness of well-meaning nurses or people in position of authority who have been socialized in environments where fake kindness is normalized. (shrink)

Les émotions sont souvent considérées comme un puissant marqueur de genre, jouant un rôle central dans les délimitations culturelles et sociales du masculin et du féminin. Depuis la théorie antique des tempéraments, en effet, le masculin est du côté des émotions chaudes et sèches (colère, fureur, hardiesse, haine), le féminin, du côté des émotions froides et humides (modestie, douceur, crainte, pudeur, compassion, langueur). Dans le monde occidental, on considère aussi que les émotions sont d...

In this book the author considers data from both early and later schools of Buddhism in an attempt to provide an overall characterization of the structure of Buddhist ethics. The importance of ethics in the Buddha's teachings is widely acknowledged, but the pursuit of ethical ideals has up to now been widely held to be secondary to the attainment of knowledge. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of ethics the author argues against this intellectualization of Buddhism and in favour of a (...) new understanding of the tradition in terms of which ethics plays an absolutely central role. In the course of this reassessment many basic concepts such as karma, nirvana, and the Eightfold Path, are reviewed and presented in a fresh light. The book will be of interest to readers with a background in either Buddhist studies or comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a growing interest in Buddhism, and it continues to capture the imagination of many in the West who see it as either an alternative or a supplement to their own religious beliefs. Numerous introductory books have appeared in recent years to cater to this growing interest, but almost none devotes attention to the specifically ethical dimensions of the tradition. For various complex cultural and historical reasons, ethics has not received as much attention (...) in traditional Buddhist thought as it has in the West. Written by Damien Keown, one of the few experts worldwide who specializes in the area, Buddhist Ethics illustrates how Buddhism might approach a range of contemporary morals ranging from abortion to euthanasia, sexuality to cloning, and even war and economics. (shrink)

N'ayant pas suivi le chemin de l'épistémologie qui s'imposait à lui après avoir étudié la médecine et la philosophie, F. Dagognet peut être considéré comme un précurseur de l'anthropologie des sciences. Il résiste au classement dans un domaine particulier des connaissances en les faisant communiquer.

Introduction to “postcolonial Ricoeur”, French version.

Summary‘Among the fine arts, I clearly see something to say only about architecture, sculpture, painting. As for music, dance […], I see nothing’. Tocqueville's observation in the Rubish for the second volume of Democracy in America is not only startling, but theoretically important: it ratifies the liberal (and nowadays oft-assumed) separation between musical life and political constitution. This, however, should give us cause to wonder. While in America, Tocqueville and Beaumont had multiple occasions to hear music in public festivals and (...) private spaces. Though other European and highbrow observers also declared American music to be ‘in its infancy’, music nonetheless played a significant part in antebellum social and political life. Nor was Tocqueville insensitive to sound in his relation to others. Indeed, Tocqueville perhaps saw in the demise of music as the art of ‘making harmony’ a symptom of the democratic era. However, like Montesquieu, Tocqueville refused to consider music a constitutive principle of democratic regimes—including in the context of Ancient Greek political theory. In doing so, Tocqueville sharply dissociated himself from republican political theory, but failed to raise the question of music's contribution to the culture and exercise of freedom in the modern era. (shrink)

Damien Tissot | : Les mouvements féministes transnationaux se sont développés ces dernières décennies pour éviter les impasses des logiques de revendications nationales, internationales et pour combattre de manière générale la rhétorique de l’universel. Afin de lutter contre la mise en place de discours hégémoniques dont le pouvoir est souvent hérité d’une histoire coloniale et patriarcale, les théoriciennes des mouvements féministes transnationaux ont souvent cherché à définir les conditions d’une politique de la traduction qui permettrait de lutter contre la (...) mise en place d’un discours de l’universel, unifié et dominant. Une politique de la traduction semble alors recouvrir deux choses. Elle désigne tout d’abord les implications politiques de la pratique de la traduction. Elle désigne ensuite la traduction en tant que paradigme pour penser le politique, compris comme l’ensemble des implications politiques du rapport à l’autre. C’est dans ce cadre que l’oeuvre de Ricoeur propose des solutions théoriques importantes. Sans renoncer à la catégorie de l’universel, Ricoeur la pense « en traduction ». Ses propositions théoriques permettent ainsi de réconcilier les critiques théoriques qui ont été adressées à l’universalisme, notamment par les féministes, avec le projet d’une politique féministe de la traduction. Or cette réconciliation passe, dans l’oeuvre de Ricoeur, par la formulation d’une véritable éthique de la traduction, au coeur de laquelle se trouve une éthique de la sollicitude à rapprocher des éthiques du care. Cet article se propose de montrer comment la mise en oeuvre d’une éthique de la traduction fondée sur des valeurs de caring et de sollicitude permet de repenser une politique féministe de la traduction ouverte sur l’universel. Après avoir montré comment le féminisme transnational s’est construit contre l’universel, cet article explore la possibilité de penser celui-ci « en traduction », pour articuler une politique et une éthique de la traduction dont les termes peuvent être définis avec Ricoeur par un principe d’hospitalité qui trouve son complet déploiement dans une éthique du care. | : In the last few years, transnational feminist movements have developed considerably in order to avoid national and international political strategies and, more broadly, to challenge claims of universalism. In order to fight the hegemonic discourses that have been inherited from a colonial and patriarchal past, theorists of feminist transnational movements have accessed possibilities offered by the politics of translation. The politics of translation refers to the political implications of translating, but also to translation as a paradigm for conceiving of “politics”—namely, rights, policy, or institutions. Using translation as a paradigm would, according to this claim, put into question unified, dominant, and universalistic claims. In this context, Ricoeur provides us with important theoretical solutions. Not only does he maintain the concept of universality, but he moreover offers a useful framework in which to conceive of it as “in translation.” Therefore, Ricoeur reconciles the feminist critiques of the universal with the feminist project of thinking through of a politics of translation. In Ricoeur’s theory, this reconciliation is elaborated within an ethics of translation based on an ethics of care, or solicitude. This article explores the ways in which an ethics of translation based on the values of caring and solicitude allows us to conceive of a politics of translation that includes a renewed concept of the universal. First, I will show how transnational feminism has developed against the idea of the universal. Second, I will suggest that we can define the universal “in translation” to think through both a politics and an ethics of translation. Third, I will sketch the outlines of this ethics of translation, which, while maintaining the possibility of the universal, includes a principle of hospitality, which is fully developed through an ethics of care. (shrink)

Este artigo sublinha, em primeiro lugar, as divisões historiográficas que conduziram alguns pesquisadores a abordar a espiritualidade e a liturgia das ordens militares sem mesmo suspeitar da riqueza das imagens atestas nos espaços das comendadorias. Por seu lado, certos estudos conduzidos pelos historiadores da arte sobre os conjuntos pictóricos conservados nas capelas conventuais ignoravam largamente o contexto histórico e as características do monasticismo militar. À escala da França atual, se propõe a seguir um balanço, necessariamente provisório, do _corpus_ iconográfico, atestado (...) entre o século XII e o início do XIV, para as igrejas do Templo e do Hospital. O inventário dos lugares de imagens conservados não apenas é provisório, mas assaz pouco significativo, pois ele reflete, sobretudo, o estado da pesquisa – que tende mais a privilegiar o Templo – e que novas descobertas podem sempre aumentar o _corpus_ conhecido. De um ponto de vista cronológico, se resta traços relativamente esparsos das decorações ornamentais da segunda metade do século XIII, um número não negligenciável de decorações figuradas conservadas se concentra no último terço do século XIII. Estes lugares de imagens têm apresentado especificidades ligadas à originalidade da vida regular que era seguida no seio das comendadorias? Em outros termos, as ordens militares foram portadoras de uma cultura visual ou de um pensamento figurativo próprios? (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de donner une interprétation dialogique de la logique temporelle standard. Dans ce cadre, nous utiliserons les langages hybrides dont Patrick Blackburn s’est servi pour caractériser la logique modale comme logique dialogique.

Ever since UFOs were first spotted in the sky in 1947, many theories have sought to explain these apparitions that defy science. Some of them lend weight to conspiracy theories. Even though there is a wide spectrum of conspiracies involving a certain amount of people and organizations, the purpose of this article will be to follow one particular author’s point of view, Jimmy Guieu’s, namely because of the global approach that he favors. Guieu, a pioneer of ufology, followed its evolution (...) up until his death in 2000 and tried, through his many works, to offer some enlightening information on UFOs. Ranging from Black-out to the secret government embodied by the MJ-12, he patiently assembled the pieces of a puzzle whose final product takes the form of “romans-vérité”. Although he remains a rather marginal author, some approaches similar to Jimmy Guieu’s can be seen on television in widely distributed productions; this will allow us to put forward the existence of a recurrent narrative structure in the alien conspiracy theory. (shrink)

At Argonautica 4.12–13, Medea, frightened and on the point of fleeing her home, 2 is compared to a young deer.

In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the playwright depicts the punishment of Prometheus by the tyrannical Zeus. Zeus’ subordinates understand his tyranny to be characterized by an absolute freedom of action. Yet the tyrant’s absolute freedom as ruler is called into question by insecurity of his position and by his dependence on Prometheus’ knowledge. We find in the Prometheus Bound a model of tyrannical rule riddled with contradictions: The tyrant’s claim to total control and absolute freedom is in tension with a reality (...) characterized by insecurity, impotence, and constraint. We contrast this model of rule with the model found in Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens, in which the King, agreeing to be bound by the wishes of his subjects, nevertheless preserves for himself a certain freedom of action that the tyrannical ruler lacks. (shrink)

The purpose of the present two studies was to investigate whether in framing messages that target salient beliefs of youth, the type of goal framed matter to promote physical activity participation among low-active adolescents. More specifically, the main trial compared the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic-goal framing messages alongside planning to a control condition on low-active adolescents’ physical activity, intention, attitude, and exercise goals, and examined the potential meditational effect of these variables between condition and PA. Low-active students from fifteen (...) classes were assigned to one of these three conditions. PA was assessed using an accelerometer, and the socio-cognitive mediators were measured at baseline and post-test, and the intention was measured again at follow-up. Results showed that compared to adolescents in the CC group, those in the experimental conditions did not do more moderate PA, but carried out more light PA, and yielded an increase in attitude and intention. Mediational analysis revealed no significant effect of the potential mediators. (shrink)

Despite the very obvious differences between looking at Manet’s _Woman with a Parrot_ and listening to Elgar’s Cello Concerto, both experiences provoke similar questions in the thoughtful aesthete: why does the painting seem to express reverie and the music, nostalgia? How do we experience the reverie and nostalgia in such works of art? Why do we find these experiences rewarding in similar ways? As our awareness of emotion in art, and our engagement with art’s emotions, can make such a special (...) contribution to our life, it is timely for a philosopher to seek to account for the nature and significance of the experience of art’s emotions. Damien Freeman develops a new theory of emotion that is suitable for resolving key questions in aesthetics. He then reviews and evaluates three existing approaches to artistic expression, and proposes a new approach to the emotional experience of art that draws on the strengths of the existing approaches. Finally, he seeks to establish the ethical significance of this emotional experience of art for human flourishing. Freeman challenges the reader not only to consider how art engages with emotion, but how we should connect up our answers to questions concerning the nature and value of the experiences offered by works of art. (shrink)

This paper defends a reading of eikasia—the lowest kind of cognition in the Divided Line—as a kind of empirical cognition that Plato appeals to when explaining, among other things, the origin of ethical error. The paper has two central claims. First, eikasia with respect to, for example, goodness or justice is not different in kind to eikasia with respect to purely sensory images like shadows and reflections: the only difference is that in the first case the sensory images include representations (...) of value properties. Second, eikasia is not the bare awareness of images or simply a label for an error (mistaking image for original) but a kind of empirical, image-confined cognition, and one that has an important part to play in characterising the cognitive abilities of the non-rational parts of the soul. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing tendency to interpret Diderot as a radical who first put into question absolutism in the Encyclopédie and then became a fierce opponent of any kind of ‘despotism’, even the ‘enlightened’ one, and a fervent partisan of democratic revolutions in the 1770s. It is argued here that the narrative that cuts Diderot’s life into different phases obscures continuities in his political thought, and misrepresents partly the political vision he had in the 1770s. Diderot’s (...) political thought may have been more coherent than usually acknowledged, and this coherence is to be found in his ideal of a paternalistic monarchy taking advice from its subjects and respecting their rights, that is the constitution of the realm. This idea is not to be mixed up with a democratic programme of government by the people, nor with the endorsement of political change via a revolution. Rather, when towards the end of his life Diderot lost hope that the constitutional order of the French monarchy would be respected, he both feared civil war and hoped that these tumults might bring about the regeneration of the French monarchy. This vision derived from a classical cyclic view of history. (shrink)

Part 1 What Do Teachers Need to Know? Part 2 What Makes a Good Teacher? Part 3 Being a Teacher?