What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? (...) Is truth the constitutive norm of belief? Does aiming at truth bring in a normative dimension to the nature of belief? How can the aim of truth guide the formation of our beliefs? In what ways do partial beliefs aim at truth? Is truth the aim of epistemic justification? Last but not least, is it knowledge rather than truth which is the fundamental aim of belief? In recent years, pursuing these questions has proved extremely fertile for our understanding of a wide range of current issues in philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, and meta-ethics. The Aim of Belief is the first book to be devoted to this fast-growing topic. It brings together eleven newly commissioned essays by leading authors on the aim of belief. Contributors: Jonathan Adler, Krister Bykvist, Timothy Chan, Pascal Engel, Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi, Michael Hicks, Paul Horwich, David Papineau, Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Ralph Wedgwood, Åsa Wikforss, Daniel Whiting. (shrink)

Previous research has demonstrated how emotion resembling cues in the face help shape impression formation. Perhaps most notable in the literature to date, has been work suggesting that gender-related appearance cues are visually confounded with certain stereotypic expressive cues. Only a couple studies to date have used computer vision to directly map out and test facial structural resemblance to emotion expressions using facial landmark coordinates to estimate face shape. In one study using a Bayesian network classifier trained to detect emotional (...) expressions structural resemblance to a specific expression on a non-expressive face was found to influence trait impressions of others. In another study, a connectionist model trained to detect emotional expressions found different emotion-resembling cues in male vs. female faces. Despite this seminal work, direct evidence confirming the theoretical assertion that humans likewise utilize these emotion-resembling cues when forming impressions has been lacking. Across four studies, we replicate and extend these prior findings using new advances in computer vision to examine gender-related, emotion-resembling structure, color, and texture and their impact on gender-stereotypic impression formation. We show that all three are meaningfully related to human impressions of emotionally neutral faces. Further when applying the computer vision algorithms to experimentally manipulate faces, we show that humans derive similar impressions from them as did the computer. (shrink)

The type of processing of numerical dimensions varies greatly and is governed by context. Considering this flexibility in tandem with a fuzzy demarcation line between automatic and intentional processes, it is suggested that testing the effect of notation should not be confined to automatic processing, in particular to passive viewing. Recent behavioral data satisfying the authors' stipulations reveal a considerable, though perhaps not exclusive, core of common abstract processing.

In this article I deal with the topic of perceptual self-awareness, focusing on whether a plausible account of sensory self-perception having exterior sensations as its objects requires sensible species representing these acts. I first introduce Aristotle’s two distinct views from On the Soul and On Sleep and Waking as defining the scholastic status quaestionis, then bring in Francisco Suárez’s, Bartholomeo Mastri’s and Bonaventura Belluto’s, and Hugh McCaghwell’s accounts. I show, first, that Suárez’s view, which cannot be substantiated by Scotus’s littera, (...) is rejected by Mastri/Belluto and by McCaghwell in one of his conclusions. Second, I argue that McCaghwell’s second tenet is to be assessed as Suarezian. This shows that Suárez’s philosophy of perception was positively received also by seventeenth-century Scotists. (shrink)

I argue that the separation of the conjoined Attard twins of Manchester was not morally justified as it involved intentionally internally affecting (“invading”) the body of the weaker twin without permission and without any advantage to her.

By speaking directly to the students in a personal tone, this text invites students to get excited about philosophy and to explore how philosophy affects them. Fourteen lively chapters take students deep into the world of philosophical thinking and challenge them to ponder life's big questions.

Worlds Apart is concerned with one of the new futures of anthropology, namely the advances in technologies which r eate an imagination of new global and local forms. It also analyses studies of the consumption of these forms and attempts to go beyond the assumptions that consumption either localises or fails to effect global forms and images. Several of the chapters are written by anthropologists who have specialised in material culture studies and who examine the new forms, especially television and (...) mass commodities, as well as some new uses of older forms, such as the body. The book also considers the ways in which people are increasingly not the primary creators of these images but have become secondary consumers. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo tem por objetivo apresentar o tema da corrupção, a partir da filosofia política de Enrique Dussel. No marco dos movimentos críticos que emergem no chamado Sul Global, a produção teórica de Dussel busca desenvolver uma estrutura que possibilite a crítica ao que denomina como fetichização do poder. Esse conteúdo é abordado como fundamento da corrupção das instituições que, despercebido pela tradição filosófica moderna, implica uma teoria política que legitima o poder corrompido. Na argumentação aqui concretizada, será (...) exposta a arquitetônica da política dusseliana, distinguindo os conceitos de potentia e potestas. Estes, por sua vez, permitem a diferenciação entre o uso delegado do poder e a execução corrompida do poder. Em seguida, será explicitado o movimento que Dussel assume da crítica de Marx à economia política, para, então, indicar o conteúdo material a partir do qual a constituição crítica de uma nova teoria política deve ser desenvolvida - inspirado em experiências políticas latino-americanas.: The purpose of this article is to present the theme of corruption, based on Enrique Dussel’s political philosophy. Under the scope of the critical movements that emerge in the so-called Global South, Dussel’s theoretical production aims to develop a structure that makes it possible to criticize what he calls the fetishization of power. The fetishization of power is presented as a foundation for the corruption of institutions that, unnoticed by the modern philosophical tradition, implies a political theory that legitimizes corrupted power. In our argument, we will expose the architecture of Dusselian politics, distinguishing the concepts of potentia and potestas. These concepts, in turn, allow for the differentiation between the delegated use of power and the corrupt execution of power. Then, we will make explicit the movement that Dussel assumes from Marx’s critique of political economy to indicate the material content from which the critical constitution of a new political theory must be developed - content that is inspired by Latin American political experiences. (shrink)

Shortly after the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was constituted in 2010 and days before the commission members were to join a conference call to discuss possible topics for their deliberation, Craig Venter held a press conference announcing that his lab had created a synthetic chromosome for a species of mycoplasma and had inserted this genetic material into organisms of another species of mycoplasma (the genes of which had been deactivated), transforming the host species into the donor (...) species. While not overtly claiming to have “created life in the test tube,” Venter's publicity seemed cleverly designed to provoke the media into reporting his discovery in just that way. The resulting uproar caused President Obama to give his new bioethics commission the assignment of investigating the ethics of the emerging field of synthetic biology. The commission went right to work. It formed working groups to deliberate about parts of the report, feeding ideas and language to the staff members who would do the actual writing, and then present the working group suggestions to the commission as a whole for public deliberation at open meetings. One of those working groups was charged with coming up with ethical principles that would guide the analysis. Having served as a member of that working group, I report here on the process by which these principles emerged and reflect upon the suitability of that process for the work of public bioethics commissions. (shrink)

In Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 2, Sartre analyzes a boxing match in light of a typology of violence. He suggests that individual conflicts incarnate broader forces of structural violence. He distinguishes between incidents of incarnating violence in terms of their broader social effects, as either alienated – commoditized or “mystified” and rendered illicit – or emancipatory – embedded in a collectively willed political project. This conceptualization is used to analyze two films, Aronofsky’s The Wrestler and McQueen’s Hunger. The Wrestler (...) is an excellent meditation on the ways in which the violence of the oppressed is alienated in contemporary U.S. culture, whereas Hunger gestures toward the possibility of emancipatory violence. The article finally considers the act of watching these films as a Sartrean incarnation of violence. (shrink)

Are there universal transcendent features that any natural language must possess in order to provide for its human speakers adequate means of expression and of communication of their conceptual thoughts? As Frege, Austin and Searle pointed out, complete speech acts of the type called illocutionary acts, and not isolated propositions, are the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of language. Thus it is in the very performance of illocutionary acts that speakers express and communicate their thoughts. For (...) this reason, speech act theory contributes to the theory of linguistic universals in formulating the necessary and universal laws governing the successful performance and satisfaction of illocutionary acts in language use and comprehension. I will argue that the logical form of illocutionary acts imposes certain formal constraints on the logical structure of a possible natural language as well as on the mind of competent speakers. In particular, certain syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features are universal because they are indispensable. Moreover, in order to perform and understand illocutionary acts, competent speakers and hearers must have certain mental states and abilities which are in general traditionally related to the faculty of reason.Há características transcendentes universais que qualquer linguagem natural tem que possuir para fornecer meios adequados de expressão e de comunicação de pensamentos conceituais aos seus falantes humanos? Como Frege, Austin e Searle mostraram, atos de fala completos do tipo denominado atos ilocucionários, e não proposições isoladas, são as unidades primárias de significado no uso e compreensão da linguagem. Assim, é no exato desempenho dos atos ilocucionários que os falantes expressam e comunicam os seus pensamentos. Por esta razão, a teoria dos atos de fala contribui para a teoria dos universais lingüísticos, formulando as leis necessárias e universais que governam o desempenho bem-sucedido e a satisfação dos atos ilocucionários no uso e compreensão da linguagem. Eu argumentarei que a forma lógica dos atos ilocucionários impõe certas restrições formais na estrutura lógica de uma possível linguagem natural como também na mente de falantes competentes. Em particular, certos aspectos sintáticos, semânticos e pragmáticos são universais porque eles são indispensáveis. Além disso, a fim de desempenhar e entender os atos ilocucionários, os falantes e ouvintes competentes têm que ter certos estados mentais e habilidades que estão, em geral, tradicionalmente relacionadas à faculdade de razão. (shrink)

The topic of my dissertation is satire. This seems to excite many people, and over the past four years I have heard many variations of a similar refrain: “Oh, wow. You’re studying satire? That’s very topical. You must have a lot of material to work with.” There is a way in which this is true, though I suspect in a way that diverges from the way that most of my interlocutors believed. I suspect that the material they imagined me to (...) be working with was the output of Donald Trump, first a candidate for and now holder of the office of President of the United States. That is not the material I find interesting. More interesting to me is their statement. It evinces a number of beliefs that I find interesting, chief among them that Trump makes the current period particularly apt for satire, as if a doddery and incompetent ruling class is somehow a recent phenomenon. And I suspect that underneath this belief in the aptness of satire is a belief in the power of satire. Satire is somehow how people are going to strike back at the vice-governed fools who rule us. Those beliefs are the material I want to work with. This is my interest in satire, then: not so much what it is about satire that makes it powerful, but what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful? And what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful when there is pretty powerful evidence that it is not? Unfortunately, here is where I run into the problem that in a very important way I do not have a lot of material to work with. There is not an awful lot on satire within the analytic tradition: outside of a few references to satire, analytic discussions of satire are limited to two short articles. Accordingly, I have taken the task of my dissertation to be to create an account of satire that helps to bring forward why satire is a thing that people can imagine to be powerful, that they can imagine to be politically effective. My dissertation will effectively have two halves, one where I build my account and one where I begin to apply it. The purpose of applying my account, which will comprise the final two chapters, will not be to show its implications so much as how it can be used. My goal will not so much be to give definitive answers about the nature of satire, but rather to give a demonstration of how my account facilitates engaging questions about the role of satire in social and political context. (shrink)

According to Fink, self-reference is one of the distinct features of philosophy. This isn’t merely restricted to her referring to herself thematically. Self-reference is also the key feature of philosophy’s principles, inasmuch as any principle has to be a principle for the very philosophical position explicating this principle. Thus, in my article I will look at four ways in which Fink addresses the self-referential structure of philosophy: Firstly, I will recapitulate Fink’s concept of a “meontic” philosophy. Secondly, I will link (...) this “meontic” philosophy with Fink’s reading of Hegel’s concept of theophany, tracing it back to neoplatonic tradition. Thirdly, I will follow Fink’s reading of Hegel as it transforms his former phenomenological approach into a speculative dialectics of a metaphilosophy of philosophical principles. In a fourth and last step, I will try to give a sketch of Fink’s “phenomenology of the absolute” which combinesHusserl, Heidegger, and Hegel into a speculative phenomenology. (shrink)

In _The Smile of Tragedy_, Daniel Ahern examines Nietzsche’s attitude toward what he called “the tragic age of the Greeks,” showing it to be the foundation not only for his attack upon the birth of philosophy during the Socratic era but also for his overall critique of Western culture. Through an interpretation of “Dionysian pessimism,” Ahern clarifies the ways in which Nietzsche sees ethics and aesthetics as inseparable and how their theoretical separation is at the root of Western nihilism. (...) Ahern explains why Nietzsche, in creating this precursor to a new aesthetics, rejects Aristotle’s medicinal interpretation of tragic art and concentrates on Apollinian cruelty as a form of intoxication without which there can be no art. Ahern shows that Nietzsche saw the human body as the vessel through which virtue and art are possible, as the path to an interpretation of “selflessness,” as the means to determining an order of rank among human beings, and as the site where ethics and aesthetics coincide. (shrink)

A survey with readings in critical theory, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalytic feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism. Aimed at students and scholars interested in an overview of movements in continental philosophy in the past century.