Curiously, while the efficacy of the arts for the development of multicultural understandings has long been theorized, empirical studies of this effect have been lacking. This essay recounts our combined empirical and philosophical study of this issue. We explicate the philosophical considerations that shaped the development of the arts course we studied, which was grounded in rather traditional humanist educational thought, informed by Deweyan considerations for pedagogy and multiculturalism. We also provide an overview of the course and of the study (...) design: the ways in which the course worked to teach aesthetic theory through a combination of popular and canonical works, and the ways in which it sought to instill a sense of cross-cultural appreciation and solidarity among students through the inclusion of art from different cultures and generations. We then share our research findings and our return to the realm of philosophy to interpret them. Our postcolonial analysis incorporates emerging discussions of the arts as a tool for resistance and dialogue within the system of public education, and revisit and reconsider the very concept of education for pluralistic democracy. This approach problematizes traditional conceptions of pluralism, in which an attempt is made to dissolve difference in a common understanding, and instead advocates that works from among the contemporary popular arts and works drawn from the artistic “canon” alike must be considered and employed for their instrumental value to the educational process—especially for their ability to prompt an intersubjectivity that is accompanied by a heightened awareness of difference. (shrink)

This article discusses two essays, one by Beauvoir and the other by Levinas, both titled "An Eye for an Eye" after the passage from Leviticus. Beauvoir and Levinas disagree on how to assess the severity of crimes and on how to address crimes when they do occur. I trace these specific differences between them back to differences in their overarching philosophical positions. I then conclude by suggesting that Beauvoir and Levinas, through the way they define crimes, indirectly provide us with (...) similar and very powerful conceptions of what it means to be human. -/- . (shrink)

In Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous author, uses images drawn from biological life as metaphors to illustrate the life of faith. Silentio begins in the preface by equating the life of faith with a biological lifetime. He then traces this lifetime in detail, beginning with childhood in the "Exordium" and concluding with marriage and parenthood in "Problema III". The process of biological development from child to adult parallels the development of the self from spiritual childhood to mature (...) faith. Silentio uses this parallelism to present his own account of the nature of the individual, and to critique the very different account which he finds in Hegel, the church, and his age. (shrink)

In 2021, the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Children’s Hospital Association declared a national emergency in child and adolescent mental he...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 55-64 [Access article in PDF] Delusions and Discourse:Moving beyond the Constraints of the Modernist Paradigm David J. Harper This special issue provides a good opportunity to reflect on the range of views about delusions,1 and it is good to see all the authors taking the issue of how to approach this topic seriously. Here I wish to argue that the traditional psychiatric (...) view of delusions is problematic. In the first half of this article I will group my comments on the issues raised by the papers by Klee and Bayne and Pacherie together as I think that, for their differences, they share modernist philosophical assumptions. I will argue that the modernist paradigm runs into considerable problems in considering beliefs felt by some to be unusual and I will go on to argue that we need to move beyond this paradigm and embrace different approaches, of which the work by Georgaca is an exemplar. The Trouble with (traditional Views of) Delusions The traditional psychiatric view of delusion has come under increasing attack over recent years. As Georgaca has noted, a number of problems with the assumptions in definitions of delusion can be identified when they are viewed from a social constructionist perspective (Georgaca 2000, 2004; Harper 1992, 1996; Heise 1988). For convenience I will group these under four main headings. They Are Based on a Naively Realist View of the World The criterion of inaccuracy or falsity implies that deciding on the veracity of a belief is a relatively unproblematic matter. However, the reality of claims does not always seem so important in judgments about whether a belief is delusional or not. For example, there is little evidence that mental health professionals systematically investigate the basis for people's beliefs; rather, they decide whether a belief is plausible. Thus Maher has argued that the assessment of the plausibility of beliefs is "typically made by a clinician on the basis of "common sense," and not on the basis of a systematic evaluation of empirical data" (1992, 261). He notes that it is not "customary to present counterevidence to the patient; it is not even common to present vigorous counterargument" (1992, 261) and there appears to be some empirical evidence of this (McCabe et al. 2002). Here then, we begin to see [End Page 55] how psychiatry, while claiming to have the power to judge the truth of beliefs on the basis of its status as an empirical scientific discipline, can be seen to make judgments on the basis of common sense and taken-for-granted social and cultural assumptions.Some commentators have suggested that delusions should be identified less by whether they seem to accord with reality but more by whether a person gives evidence for their belief (Gillett 1995; Spitzer 1990). However, this seems to be based on an idealized view of how people manage their beliefs in everyday life. For example, I would question how many of us have evidence for many of the beliefs (e.g., political, ethical, religious, etc.) we hold dear; indeed it would be hard to think of what evidence we could have for some of them (e.g., religious and ethical beliefs). Some recent work has suggested that the diagnosis of delusion is made on the basis of how people with delusions talk and interact; for example, some have argued that they do not appear to appreciate the hearer's point of view (Palmer 2000). However, here and in previous work, Georgaca (2000, 2004) has shown that people with delusions are able to talk about and negotiate disagreements about their beliefs and that many disputes of fact cannot be settled in conversation. People Said to Have Delusions Are Seen to Vary in the Conviction With Which Those Beliefs Are Held There is evidence that people considered to be deluded vary in the conviction with which they hold beliefs (Garety 1985) and can also be persuaded to modify their beliefs if this is conducted in a sensitive and collaborative manner (e.g., Chadwick, Birchwood, and Trower 1996). This... (shrink)

Tippett is often cast as a composer with a strong visionary streak, but what does that mean for a twentieth-century artist? In this multi-faceted study, David Clarke explores Tippett's complex creative imagination - its dialogue between a romantic's aspirations to the ideal and absolute, and a modernist's sceptical realism. He shows how the musical formations of works such as The Midsummer Marriage, King Priam, and The Vision of Saint Augustine resonate with the aesthetic and theoretical ideas of key figures (...) in modern Western culture - some known to have been influential to the composer, others not usually associated with him. Analyses of late works such as the Triple Concerto and Byzantium also speculate on Tippett's sexuality as a critical element in his creative and political consciousness. (shrink)

Philosophers in the tradition of Berkeley say that the first step in gaining knowledge from perception is to report or describe one's perceptual data, or that which one sees ‘immediately'. Further, perceptual data are existing things of some sort, and always are exactly as they appear to be since, as H. H. Price says, “in the sphere of the given … what seems, is”. However, these two claims about perceptual data are sometimes incompatible, as the following case shows. Suppose a (...) man looking at a speckled hen reports that it has many speckles but is not able to report the exact number of speckles it has. If above is correct, the man's perceptual datum, as opposed to the physical hen itself which he sees—according to Berkeleians—in a merely indirect sense, would have to be indeterminate in character. Yet we assume that everything which exists ) is and has to be completely determinate. A person's knowledge is indeterminate if he knows that the planet Mars has either two or three satellites and doesn't know which. But Mars itself at any moment has to have some definite number of satellites. (shrink)

Over the fourteen years that we have been publishing Comparative and Continental Philosophy, we have shared five Special Issues with our readers. The first was published in our seventh year and was...

Not always, concludes this C.P.A. who asks that laymen be critical.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Inversion Argument The Costs‐of‐Dominance Argument The Distraction Argument Defining Discrimination.

« Cet article se propose de revenir, en s’appuyant sur des documents d’archives inédits, même en Allemagne, sur le chapitre que Günther Anders consacre au jazz dans le tome 1 de L’Obsolescence de l’homme. Voyant dans le jazz l’ analogon d’une machine destinée à dresser les corps, il ne le confie ni à une philosophie de la musique ni à une sociologie de la musique, mais à une critique de la technique. Si ce texte de 1956 repose sur une analyse (...) de la machine-jazz du swing qui peut parfois sembler injuste, les notes inédites révèlent en revanche un véritable intérêt pour le be-bop.». (shrink)

Channeled entities, like Seth and Michael, maintain that your inner consciousness utilizes expectations to create your life.

A defense of P.F. Strawson's view of asymmetrical dependency between objects and events. (Events are dependent on objects, not the other way around) put forth in his _Individuals_. I defend Strawson's view against a critique in "Strawson on Ontological Priority" by J.M.E. Moravscik. In doing so I critique Moravscik by drawing a distinction between ontological and conceptual dependencies. This was a chapter of my senior thesis published in an undergraduate journal and should probably only be read if you need a (...) good laugh. Published in an undergraduate conference journal Aporia. (shrink)

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of aggression (...) and wars of aggression. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus early modern just war theorists’ views of just cause. Section 6 explores various theories of what exactly makes aggressive war so evil that it belongs in the pantheon of core crimes, side by side with genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. The basic question is whether aggression is fundamentally a crime against states, a crime against human rights, or a crime against peace itself. I reject the first, statist, version, and endorse the human rights version. I examine three versions of the view that aggressive war is fundamentally about its human costs: that aggressive wars lead to atrocities (Trainin); that aggressive wars lead more generally to unjustified killings (Dannenbaum); and that aggressive wars lead to both unjustified killings by the aggressor, and to unnecessary killings that include the justified killings of aggressors’ troops by defenders (Mégret). As for crimes against peace, I argue that this theory of aggression’s evils comes in two “flavors,” one of which has justly been criticized by postcolonial writers, and one of which I think is legitimate. The former originates in Judge Pal’s famous dissenting opinion in the IMTFE, and argues that criminalizing aggression is a move by colonial powers to freeze the oppressive status quo. The more legitimate version is that in an age of catastrophically destructive weapons, the risks of escalation in armed conflict –the threat that conflicts will spiral into world wars–are simply too great in human terms. Thus, the legitimate version of “crimes against peace” is part and parcel of the human rights analysis. The final sections break new ground. Section 7 considers whether aggression is solely a leadership crime. Everyone agrees that it would be wrong to punish ordinary soldiers for the crime of aggression launched by their leaders. The questions is why, and it is not easy to answer. Examining it brings us to a contemporary dispute over which leaders can be prosecuted: only those who control or direct the aggressive policies (as per the ICC’s Rome Statute), or others as well, who “shape or influence” the policy without necessarily directing it (as the customary rule used to be formulated). I argue against any narrowing of the leadership clause. Section 8 explores the “paradox of immunity”: Under the legal principle of sovereign immunity, apex leaders are immune from prosecution in the courts of another state. But under the narrow leadership clause, only apex leaders can be prosecuted. Here I argue for a surprising conclusion: that in fact there never was a customary rule of immunity for the crime of aggression. If so, the paradox of immunity disappears. This resolution also helps cut the Gordian knot of a current debate about whether a relatively small subset of states (the EU, perhaps) can form an aggression tribunal and call it “international.”. (shrink)

Ofrezco una exposición, tanto apreciativa como crítica, de la interpretaciónpropensista de la probabilidad que Karl Popper introdujo en 1957 y desarrollóen numerosas publicaciones durante los 35 años siguientes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 3-12 [Access article in PDF] Monotheistic Violence David Lochhead Vancouver School ofTheology While Israel was staying at Shittim, the people began to have sexual relations with the women of Moab. They invited the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods. Thus Israel yoked itself to the Baal of Peor, and the LORD's anger was (...) kindled against Israel. The LORD said to Moses, "Take all the chiefs of the people, and impale them in the sun before the LORD, in order that the fierce anger of the LORD may turn away from Israel." And Moses said to the judges of Israel, "Each of you shall kill any of your people who have yoked themselves to the Baal of Peor." (Num. 25:1-5) This is the first of two stories told in Numbers 25. In the second, an Israelite brings a Midianite woman into the camp as the sentence is being carried out. In response, one of the Israelites, a man named Phinehas, a grandson of Aaron the priest, takes a spear and follows the couple into a tent, where he slaughters them both. God commends this act of butchery with these words: "Phinehas son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the Israelites by manifesting such zeal among them on my behalf that in my jealousy I did not consume the Israelites. Therefore say, 'I hereby grant him my covenant of peace. It shall be for him and for his descendants after him a covenant of perpetual priesthood, because he was zealous for his God, and made atonement for the Israelites.'" (Num. 25:11-13)The account of these incidents is an unsophisticated one. God is portrayed, in an anthropomorphic way, as violently egocentric. The punishment exacted for offending God is crude and barbaric. This is a god who demands violence and commends violence when it is performed in his cause. This is a god who is intensely competitive toward the other gods and who treats vindictively anyone who has commerce with them.Because of the unsophisticated terms in which this story is told, it is easy enough to dismiss a text like this as a crude expression of ancient Hebrew religion that the Judeo-Christian tradition has long since transcended. I want to take a somewhat different perspective and argue that the violence expressed in this text, albeit in a more subtle and spiritualized way, has persisted in the Christian tradition.The violence of Numbers 25 has the following characteristics. First, it is ordered [End Page 3] and justified in terms of an exclusive loyalty to a single deity. Secondly, it expresses a religious xenophobia. This xenophobia is religious, cultural, and sexual. The transgression of the loyalty to God is attributed to the presence of foreign women. In short, the text is chauvinist and misogynist.It is common to distinguish between henotheism and monotheism. Henotheism is the worship of a single god in distinction from other gods. Henotheism does not deny the existence of other gods. It focuses its attention and devotion on only one of those gods. Thus henotheism might also be described as monolatry--the worship of one god among many. Monotheism, by contrast, acknowledges the existence of only one god.Given this contrast, we can say that Numbers 25 is a henotheistic text. That is, Yahweh, the god who leads the Israelites out of Egypt and toward the Promised Land, acknowledges the reality of the other god--here the Baal of Peor--by the intensity of his anger. The worship of the Moabites is taken very seriously. Those who participate in the Moabite cult actually yoke themselves to this other god. The coincidence of the sexual liaison with Moabite women and the worship of the Moabite god expresses something of the intimacy of the relationship in which the Israelite men are understood to participate. It is the assumed reality of the Moabite deity that makes it necessary for Yahweh to demand that the offenders be impaled in the glaring light of the desert... (shrink)

In Paradise Wild, David Oates addresses this and many other provocative questions as he explores the persistent myth of Eden from several different angles. As a lifelong mountaineer and reader of nature literature, as a scholar, as a descendant of naturalist William Bartram, and as a gay ex-Baptist who took to the mountains to test his masculinity, Oates has thought deeply about how nature and culture interact in our lives and about the contemporary debate over wilderness and environment. Paradise (...) Wild brings all these elements together in a lively, genre-hopping book that will move readers emotionally and intellectually, at the same time that it contributes to the ongoing debate in scholarly and environmental circles over the meaning of "nature" and "wilderness." Paradise Wild tells stories, explores major scholarship and literature of nature, and analyzes how the misapplied myth of Eden has mired Americans in a hopeless "Paradise Lost" mentality that belies the true, ever-present wildness in our lives. Oates argues that mourning for a lost paradise is a dead end that cannot help us combat the real damage we're doing to ourselves and the rest of the world. He proposes a healthy re-mythologizing of the Eden story as a way of celebrating "wildness" -- the Eden in each moment and in each cell, that cannot be lost. His book is about welcoming that wildness into the midst of daily life. This bold and original work will appeal to general readers as well as to scholars and students with an interest in environmental literature and philosophy, nature writing, cultural studies, and queer studies. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas’ earliest development of thought is presented here as a phenomenological endeavor, i. e. in its relation to Husserl and Heidegger as well as in its own effort to give an appropriate philosophical account of,things themselves‘. The latter task is shown to have a transcendental dimension as it is a self-awareness of conscious life in which the faithful analysis of concrete phenomena and the concept of this life itself have to be brought into attunement. The perspective of Levinas’ phenomenological (...) gaze is then presented in these terms and shows two fairly distinct stages. Up to the mid-1930s Levinas appears as a follower of Martin Heidegger, when he advocates an appropriate approach to being in all its richness and therefore criticizes Husserl’s alleged intellectualism. Later, with a radicalized perspective, Levinas’ own philosophical project advocates an appropriate account of the problem of radical alterity beyond experience and phenomenology.He therefore criticizes both Husserl and Heidegger and remodels phenomenology so that it can adequately,understand‘ radical alterity and at the same time confine itself before it. (shrink)