Objectives The study uses a qualitative empirical method to define Health Research for Development. This project explores the perspectives of stakeholders in an international health research partnership operating in Ghana and Tanzania. Methods We conducted 52 key informant interviews with major stakeholders in an international multicenter partnership between GlaxoSmithKline and the global health nonprofit organisation PATH and its Malaria Vaccine Initiative program,. The respondents included teams from four clinical research centres and various collaborating partners. This paper analyses responses to the (...) question: What is Health Research for Development? Results Based on the stakeholders’ experience the respondents offered many ways of defining Health Research for Development. The responses fell into four broad themes: i) Equitable Partnerships; ii) System Sustainability; iii) Addressing Local Health Targets, and iv) Regional Commitment to Benefit Sharing. Conclusion Through defining Health Research for Development six key learning points were generated from the four result themes: 1) Ensure there is local research leadership working with the collaborative partnership, and local healthcare system, to align the project agenda and activities with local research and health priorities; 2) Know the country-specific context - map the social, health, legislative and political setting; 3) Define an explicit development component and plan of action in a research project; 4) Address the barriers and opportunities to sustain system capacity. 5) Support decentralised health system decision-making to facilitate the translation pathway; 6) Govern, monitor and evaluate the development components of health research partnerships. Overall, equity and unity between partners are required to deliver health research for development. (shrink)

Abstractβ‐Catenin/CTNNB1 is critical for leukemia initiation or the stem cell capacity of several hematological malignancies. This review focuses on a general evaluation of β‐catenin function in normal T‐cell development and T‐cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia (T‐ALL). The integration of the existing literature offers a state‐of‐the‐art dissection of the complexity of β‐catenin function in leukemia initiation and maintenance in both Notch‐dependent and independent contexts. In addition, β‐catenin mutations are screened for in T‐ALL primary samples, and it is found that they are rare (...) and with little clinical relevance. Transcriptional analysis of Wnt family members (Ctnnb1, Axin2, Tcf7, and Lef1) and Myc in different publicly available T‐ALL cohorts indicates that the expression of these genes may correlate with T‐ALL subtypes and/or therapy outcomes. (shrink)

Recent studies reported the development of psychological distress symptoms in patients who recovered from COVID-19. However, evidence is still scarce and new data are needed to define the exact risk and protective factors that can explain the variability in symptoms manifestation. In this study, we enrolled 257 patients who recovered from COVID-19 and we evaluated the levels of psychological distress through the Symptoms Checklist-90-R scale. Data concerning illness-related variables were collected from medical records, while the presence of subjective cognitive difficulties, (...) both before and after the illness, as well as the level of the cognitive reserve, were assessed over a clinical interview. Results revealed that being female and reporting the presence of subjective cognitive difficulties after COVID-19 were associated with higher levels of psychological distress. At the same time, being admitted to the hospital and having a high CR were protective factors. Adding new information to this emerging research field, our results highlight the importance of a complete psychological and cognitive assessment in patients with COVID-19. (shrink)

«Quando entro in una macelleria, mi stupisco sempre di non esserci io, lì appeso, al posto dell’animale». Così il pittore Francis Bacon in una conversazione con David Sylvester, che Mauro Carbone riprende e discute nel volume agile e prezioso, che qui presentiamo, dedicato alla nozione di “carne”. Una nozione che, pur antichissima nella storia della cultura europea, torna d’attualità nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo con la fenomenologia e con il suo progetto di ricondurre l’esperienza,...

«Quando entro in una macelleria, mi stupisco sempre di non esserci io, lì appeso, al posto dell’animale». Così il pittore Francis Bacon in una conversazione con David Sylvester, che Mauro Carbone riprende e discute nel volume agile e prezioso, che qui presentiamo, dedicato alla nozione di “carne”. Una nozione che, pur antichissima nella storia della cultura europea, torna d’attualità nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo con la fenomenologia e con il suo progetto di ricondurre l’esperienza,...

First published in 1961. Foreword by Arthur Kemp. Includes bibliographical references.

This chapter explores Michel Foucault's contribution to a critical assessment of modern and contemporary psychiatric practice. It focuses firstly on the History of Madness : the social, political, cultural, epistemological construction of the object "psychiatric patient" and "psychiatric pathology"; the gradual historical shift from "madness" to "psychiatric pathology" and its social and epistemological consequences; the horizons and limits of the romantic task Foucault assumes on this basis ; the critique Jacques Derrida formulated about this project, and particularly about Foucault's reading (...) of Descartes. Secondly, it examines Foucault's course on Psychiatric Power, focusing on the sociopolitical consequences of this medicalization process: i.e., the construction of the object "psychiatric patient" as "disciplinated bodies", and the general context of this anthropological metamorphosis Foucault studied in his books Discipline and Punish, The Will to Knowledge, and in his course Naissance de la biopolitique. (shrink)

International book reviews Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11007-010-9162-5 Authors Federico Leoni, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy Journal Continental Philosophy Review Online ISSN 1573-1103 Print ISSN 1387-2842.

Merleau-Ponty’s article, “La guerre a eu lieu”, contains, as has been said, a kind of new phenomenology of perception. Its research question could be formulated as follows. What prevented German-occupied France from perceiving the enemy as an enemy for so many months or years of alienating cohabitation? The “drôle de guerre” would, among other things, be linked to this singular perceptual impasse. An impasse that is as dramatic as instructive, since it shows that war and politics have nothing to do (...) with handling the friend/enemy dialectical opposition Carl Schmitt situated at the center of his philosophy. Rather, they have to do with handling an adialectical field in which that opposition is not yet delineated and perceptible, but is rather evolving in a continuity and ambiguity that constitute the real (and in this sense immoral) matter of politics and war. (shrink)

This article examines Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an “ontological psychoanalysis” and extends it in a close dialogue both internal to Merleau-Ponty (his reflection on fetishism and the Kleinian partial object, the phenomenology of hallucination, his dissolution of ontology and the resolution of the flesh in a framework of events or a becoming of becomings) and external to Merleau-Ponty: on the one hand, with Lacan and his Seminar X (the idea of the object little-a, its possible double reading as object-divergence and as (...) event of divergence always in progress); and, on the other hand, with the Bergson of Matter and Memory (his idea of the image in itself: in Lacanian language, a kind of splinter of the real, without relation, autistic, hallucinatory) and with the Bergsonian idea of philosophical gesture (that Merleau-Ponty himself takes up, as we know, in In Praise of Philosophy). The guiding idea is that a psychoanalytic process is an experimental ontology: experimentation with being and of being, and with a being that is the result of its own staging [mise en expérience], in its own becoming through experience and experimentations, in its own future as divergence and its own movement of diverging. And the idea is also that philosophy, or at least a certain idea of philosophy, that of Merleau-Ponty’s Praise, proceeds in the same direction.L’article interroge l’idée merleau-pontienne d’une « psychanalyse ontologique » et la prolonge dans un dialogue serré interne à Merleau-Ponty (sa réflexion sur le fétichisme et sur l’objet partiel kleinien, la phénoménologie de l’hallucination, la dissolution merleau-pontienne de l’ontologie et la résolution de la chair dans une trame d’événements ou un devenir de devenirs) et externe à Merleau-Ponty : d’un côté avec Lacan et son Séminaire X (l’idée d’objet petit a, sa double lecture possible comme objet-écart et comme événement d’un s’écarter toujours en cours) ; de l’autre côté avec le Bergson de Matière et mémoire (son idée d’image en soi : en langage lacanien, une sorte de scheggia de réel, sans relation, autistique, hallucinatoire) et avec l’idée bergsonienne de geste philosophique (que Merleau-Ponty lui-même reprend, comme on le sait, dans Eloge de la philosophie. L’idée directrice est qu’un parcours psychanalytique est une ontologie expérimentale : une expérimentation avec l’être et de l’être, et avec un être qui résulte de sa propre mise en expérience, dans son propre devenir par l’expérience et par les expérimentations, dans son propre advenir comme écart et son propre mouvement d’écartement. Et aussi, que la philosophie, ou au moins une certaine idée de la philosophie, celle de l’Eloge merleau-pontien, procède dans la même direction.L’articolo muove dall’idea merleau-pontyana di una “psicoanalisi ontologica” interrogandola e prolungandola in uno stretto dialogo interno a Merleau-Ponty (la sua riflessione sul feticismo e sull’oggetto parziale kleiniano, la fenomenologia dell’allucinazione, la dissoluzione merleau-pontyana dell’ontologia e la risoluzione della carne in una trama di eventi o un divenire di divenire) ed esterno a Merleau-Ponty: da un lato con Lacan e con il suo Seminario X (l’idea di oggetto a piccolo, la sua doppia lettura possibile come oggetto-scarto e come evento di uno scartarsi sempre in corso); dall’altro con il Bergson di Materia e memoria (la sua idea di immagine in sé: lacanianamente, una sorta di scheggia di reale, irrelato, autistico, allucinatorio) e con l’idea bergsoniana di gesto filosofico (che lo stesso Merleau-Ponty riprende, com’è noto, in Elogio della filosofia). L’idea guida è che un percorso psicoanalitico sia un’ontologia sperimentale: un esperimento con l’essere e dell’essere, e con un essere o di un essere risolto nel suo proprio sperimentarsi, nel suo proprio divenire per esperienze ed esperimenti, nel suo proprio accadere come scarto e nel suo proprio scartarsi. E che la filosofia, o almeno una certa idea di filosofia, quella dell’Elogio merleau-pontyano, proceda in analoga direzione. (shrink)

The article outlines a meditation on the strategic structure of space, on the tactical definition of the relations of interiority/exteriority, on the processual nature of identifications – i.e. on the way an event summons the subject within a group while drawing both the subject as belonging to the group and the group as belonging to that subject. Two texts guide this reflection: ‘Space’ by Georges Bataille and The Groupist by Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares.

The article examines the main features of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature and, more specifically, the reasons that led it to some consonance with that of the young Simondon. At the center of this recognition, the question of processuality and the pre-Socratic suggestions about a philosophy of the elements. The aim is to derive a need, which, if it remained unfulfilled in Merleau-Ponty, was instead expressed in Simondon and in many contemporary philosophies of nature, e.g. that of Bruno Latour, to whom (...) some space is devoted. That is, the need to bring into focus that substantial indiscernibility between nature and technique, which becomes an evidence if one enters into the idea of process. It is to the ethical and political consequences of this indiscernibility that the article’s conclusions are dedicated. More precisely, these conclusions suggest that only a thought of the indiscernibility between nature and technology has ethical and political consequences, i.e. allows the design of a system of regulations capable of concretely and sustainably modulating the human impact on the planet. (shrink)

Este trabalho parte de algumas considerações das perspectivas antropológicas de Paulo Freire e John Dewey, tomando o primeiro autor como um leitor do segundo, pelo menos por via indireta através de Anísio Teixeira, focalizando basicamente duas noções fundamentais: o inacabamento freiriano e o crescimento deweyano. Discutindo detalhes e consequências teóricas desses conceitos para a educação, utilizamos as críticas dos autores em relação à educação bancária e/ou tradicional para apresentar os argumentos que foram elaborados em favor de uma nova educação. Foi (...) nesse contexto de discussão que as implicações pedagógicas para a infância foram consideradas. This paper presents some considerations from the anthropological perspectives of Paulo Freire and John Dewey, taking the first author as a reader of the second one, at least by indirect means of Anísio Teixeira, and it focuses basically two fundamental notions: Freire’s incompleteness and Dewey’s growth. Discussing details and consequences of these theoretical concepts for education, we considered the criticisms of the authors in relation to banking education and / or traditional education in order to present the arguments that were drawn up in favor of a new education. It was in this context of discussion that the pedagogical implications for children were considered. (shrink)

O presente artigo pode ser justificado como um breve panorama do debate entre modernidade e pós-modernidade em suas implicações ao campo da educação e formação humana, diante da emergência de nova humanidade, fruto do capitalismo tardio, com suas promessas não cumpridas, diante da colonização de todas as esferas, inclusive da própria educação. Assim, este trabalho visa a traçar alguns contornos do complexo liame entre modernidade e pós-modernidade, bem como a concepção de homem decadente, por um lado, e de homem emergente, (...) de outro, ante essa nova condição geracional. Para tal, o trabalho se constitui de uma pesquisa de metodologia teórico-conceitual, propondo-se como uma contribuição ao recorrente questionamento sobre a relevância das metanarrativas na formação humana, tomando como autores “estelares” Kant e Nietzsche, justificando, inclusive, uma espécie de pré-história do debate entre os metarrelatos. Daí, portanto, as escolhas conceituais deste artigo, que se deu por agenciamentos que possibilitassem a defesa de uma concepção vitalista, inerentemente criativa, como uma disciplina do pensamento indispensável a uma humanidade que se queira para além da mera reprodução erudita, do cinismo mercadológico ou, ainda, dos desígnios tecnocientíficos e rudeza materialista-determinista que rondam o tempo presente. Portanto, o artigo sugere que o novo paradigma em construção, ao se pautar por uma nova lógica, nos possibilita, considerando as críticas à modernidade, dar vazão a novo horizonte ético, que considere o homem em sua integridade. Ou seja, compreendido como “sujeito peninsular”, e não, como sonhava a modernidade, como homem “insular”, tido como sobrenatural, desenraizado do corpo e da natureza. Palavras-chave: Formação humana. Educação. Modernidade. Pós-modernidade. (shrink)

Resumo: Identificamos tensionamentos na confluência das ações filosóficas entre ensino de filosofia e pesquisa. Destacamos o movimento permanente dos filósofos na produção de conhecimento, haja vista que há forte tendência a um ensino dinâmico e continuamente revisado pelos achados providos pela pesquisa e adequado ao contexto escolar. Vislumbramos nesse encontro polos muitas vezes díspares, principalmente, pelo fato de a pesquisa filosófica frequentemente encontrar barreiras nas atividades de ensino, e vice-versa. Porém, entrevemos possibilidades de interações entre ensino de filosofia e pesquisa. (...) O primeiro, por exemplo, oferece problemas importantes à pesquisa enquanto esta retribui com sugestões e respostas, o que, no conjunto, pode resultar num desenvolvimento incomum ao campo da filosofia. Além da produção de conhecimento, ressaltamos contribuições nessa parceria como: importante divulgação da filosofia pautada em um saber melhor embasado, contribuição na formação das pessoas e de um projeto de nação avesso à pobreza de argumentação e ajuizamento daqueles que foram alijados desses ensinamentos. A aproximação do ensino e pesquisa em filosofia provoca busca da segunda a tomar o primeiro como seu objeto de interesse e, no panorama da complexidade do campo, tornar a filosofia do ensino de filosofia espaço fecundo para produção de conhecimento e ação impactantes nos contextos escolares. Palavras-chave: Ensino de Filosofia; Pesquisa; Produção de Conhecimento Teaching Philosophy and Research: field of tensions, collaboration and knowledge production Abstract: We identified tensions at the confluence of philosophical actions between teaching philosophy and research. We highlight the permanent movement of philosophers in the production of knowledge, given that there is a strong tendency towards a dynamic teaching and continuously reviewed by the findings provided by the research and appropriate to the school context. In this meeting, we envision poles that are often disparate, mainly because philosophical research often encounters barriers in teaching activities, and vice versa. However, we glimpse possibilities of interactions between teaching philosophy and research. The first, for example, poses important problems to research while it responds with suggestions and answers, which, on the whole, can result in an unusual development in the field of philosophy. In addition to the production of knowledge, we highlight contributions in this partnership such as: important dissemination of philosophy based on a better-grounded knowledge, contribution to the formation of people and a project of a nation averse to the poverty of argumentation and judgment of those who were excluded from these teachings. The approximation of teaching and research in philosophy provokes the search for the second to take the first as its object of interest and, in the context of the complexity of the field, to make the philosophy of teaching philosophy a fertile space for the production of knowledge and impacting action in school contexts. Key-words: Teaching Philosophy; Research; Knowledge Production Enseñanza de la Filosofía y Investigación: campo de tensiones, colaboración y producción de conocimiento Resumen: Identificamos tensiones en la confluencia de acciones filosóficas entre la enseñanza de la filosofía y la investigación. Destacamos el movimiento permanente de los filósofos en la producción de conocimiento, dado que existe una fuerte tendencia hacia una enseñanza dinámica y continuamente revisada por los hallazgos que brinda la investigación y adecuada al contexto escolar. En este encuentro visualizamos polos muchas veces dispares, principalmente porque la investigación filosófica muchas veces encuentra barreras en la actividad docente, y viceversa. Sin embargo, vislumbramos posibilidades de interacciones entre la enseñanza de la filosofía y la investigación. La primera, por ejemplo, plantea importantes problemas a la investigación mientras responde con sugerencias y respuestas, lo que, en conjunto, puede resultar en un desarrollo inusual en el campo de la filosofía. Además de la producción de conocimiento, destacamos aportes en esta alianza como: importante difusión de la filosofía basada en un conocimiento mejor fundamentado, aporte a la formación de personas y proyecto de nación adversa a la pobreza de argumentación y juicio de aquellos que estaban excluidos de estas enseñanzas. La aproximación de la enseñanza y la investigación en filosofía provoca la búsqueda de que la segunda tome a la primera como su objeto de interés y, en el contexto de la complejidad del campo, hacer de la filosofía de la enseñanza de la filosofía un espacio fértil para la producción de conocimiento y acción impactantes en los contextos escolares. Palavras-clave: Enseñanza de la Filosofía; Búsqueda; Producción de Conocimiento Data de registro: 20/01/2023 Data de aceite: 24/01/2024. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a “experiência” deweyana considerando a estética, pois experienciar no âmbito das relações humanas é mais do que a simples atividade do corpo desvinculado do espírito, não ocorrendo também apenas na dimensão intelectual. O autor defende a extensão da experiência estética a toda experiência humana, como também analisa as questões relativas à arte. Ao aproximar ciência, arte, filosofia e educação, Dewey trata de uma das suas preocupações: os dualismos, perniciosos à experiência integrada – educativa – em seu percurso (...) para a consecução e a consumação, mas não meramente para a chegada a um fim ou cessação. (shrink)

The present work intends to focus the child in the context of what is understood of childhood today, a concept which is overlapped in the net of relations of a world geared to an exacerbated production, to the banality of knowledge and reflexive activities, to a promptness and to human relations not much solid and based on values marked by the fragility of which is acquired by idioms and by mass standards. Looking for an alternative to interrupt the strength of (...) mechanisms of an education inspired on the “paradigm standard of the pedagogic normal practice” , Lipman proposes an “educative model ruled in reflexive practice”, maintained in his revised edition of Thinking in Education , in which philosophy distinguishes itself with an unique and necessary participation of the child from the moment they enter school. It is obvious that this suggestion is based on a different conception of childhood. The philosopher is disturbed by that prescriptive perspective that indicates, for the youngest, restrictions in order to be surprised by the things and by the situations that has been shown to them, lessening in that way, the taste for questioning and the search for meaning in their experiences. (shrink)

Il saggio intende sviluppare una fenomenologia della violenza, a partire dagli Scritti di Franco Basaglia, che ha studiato il problema della violenza nell’istituzione psichiatrica e ha riflettuto sulla questione in una prospettiva fenomenologica. La sua tesi fondamentale è stata che la violenza dell’istituzione consista in una sostituzione e in un’alienazione. Il corpo vissuto, l’identità originaria di una persona, le sue esperienze e i suoi pensieri sarebbero rimpiazzati da quelli dell’istituzione, che diverrebbe così il ‘corpo’ di quella persona. La fenomenologia di (...) Basaglia traccia quindi, al seguito di Husserl, un’opposizione netta tra esperienza vissuta e istituzione, soggettività e segno sociale, identità privata e marca culturale. Possiamo tuttavia accogliere questa opposizione tanto semplice e trasparente? E in caso negativo, se la violenza non potesse essere descritta come la semplice irruzione dell’istituzione nello spazio del soggetto, se questa irruzione dell’Altro fosse anzi costitutiva del soggetto stesso, come pensare la violenza? Come definire una ‘politica’ di questa violenza originaria?This essay tries to develop a phenomenology of violence. Its approach is based on the Writings of Franco Basaglia, who studied the phaenomenon of violence in the psychiatric institutions and reflected on this issue from a phenomenological point of view. His main theses was that institutional violence means substitution and alienation. The lived body, the originary identity of a person, his experiences and thoughts are replaced by those of the institution. The institution itself becomes the ‘body’ of that person. Basaglia’s phenomenology thus traces, with Husserl, a neat opposition between lived experience and institution, subjectivity and social sign, private identity and cultural mark. Can we trust this simple and transparent opposition? And if violence cannot be described as an irruption of the institution in the subject’s space, if this irruption of the Other is constitutive of the subject itself, how to define violence? And how to define a ‘politics’ of this originary violence? (shrink)

This article aims through a study of the epigraphy of Pope Damasus, to reconstruct the ideal society that was shown to the pilgrim who went to the loca sanctorum in the Urbs. Taking into account the pastoral, political and ideological elements of Damasian epigraphy, it shows that the choice of martyrs and subjects which were celebrated responded to the increasing numbers of nobles within Roman Christian society after the peace of Constantine. Damasus tried to accommodated himself to the sensibilities of (...) the minor aristocracy of Rome and the emerging clergy, without renouncing its hierarchical organization of the Church in line with the social and ecclesial tendencies of the second half of the fourth century, when Roma christiana came into being. (shrink)

This article examines Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an “ontological psychoanalysis” and extends it in a close dialogue both internal to Merleau-Ponty (his reflection on fetishism and the Kleinian partial object, the phenomenology of hallucination, his dissolution of ontology and the resolution of the flesh in a framework of events or a becoming of becomings) and external to Merleau-Ponty: on the one hand, with Lacan and his Seminar X (the idea of the object little-a, its possible double reading as object-divergence and as (...) event of divergence always in progress); and, on the other hand, with the Bergson of Matter and Memory (his idea of the image in itself: in Lacanian language, a kind of splinter of the real, without relation, autistic, hallucinatory) and with the Bergsonian idea of philosophical gesture (that Merleau-Ponty himself takes up, as we know, in In Praise of Philosophy). The guiding idea is that a psychoanalytic process is an experimental ontology: experimentation with being and of being, and with a being that is the result of its own staging [mise en expérience], in its own becoming through experience and experimentations, in its own future as divergence and its own movement of diverging. And the idea is also that philosophy, or at least a certain idea of philosophy, that of Merleau-Ponty’s Praise, proceeds in the same direction.L’article interroge l’idée merleau-pontienne d’une « psychanalyse ontologique » et la prolonge dans un dialogue serré interne à Merleau-Ponty (sa réflexion sur le fétichisme et sur l’objet partiel kleinien, la phénoménologie de l’hallucination, la dissolution merleau-pontienne de l’ontologie et la résolution de la chair dans une trame d’événements ou un devenir de devenirs) et externe à Merleau-Ponty : d’un côté avec Lacan et son Séminaire X (l’idée d’objet petit a, sa double lecture possible comme objet-écart et comme événement d’un s’écarter toujours en cours) ; de l’autre côté avec le Bergson de Matière et mémoire (son idée d’image en soi : en langage lacanien, une sorte de scheggia de réel, sans relation, autistique, hallucinatoire) et avec l’idée bergsonienne de geste philosophique (que Merleau-Ponty lui-même reprend, comme on le sait, dans Eloge de la philosophie. L’idée directrice est qu’un parcours psychanalytique est une ontologie expérimentale : une expérimentation avec l’être et de l’être, et avec un être qui résulte de sa propre mise en expérience, dans son propre devenir par l’expérience et par les expérimentations, dans son propre advenir comme écart et son propre mouvement d’écartement. Et aussi, que la philosophie, ou au moins une certaine idée de la philosophie, celle de l’Eloge merleau-pontien, procède dans la même direction.L’articolo muove dall’idea merleau-pontyana di una “psicoanalisi ontologica” interrogandola e prolungandola in uno stretto dialogo interno a Merleau-Ponty (la sua riflessione sul feticismo e sull’oggetto parziale kleiniano, la fenomenologia dell’allucinazione, la dissoluzione merleau-pontyana dell’ontologia e la risoluzione della carne in una trama di eventi o un divenire di divenire) ed esterno a Merleau-Ponty: da un lato con Lacan e con il suo Seminario X (l’idea di oggetto a piccolo, la sua doppia lettura possibile come oggetto-scarto e come evento di uno scartarsi sempre in corso); dall’altro con il Bergson di Materia e memoria (la sua idea di immagine in sé: lacanianamente, una sorta di scheggia di reale, irrelato, autistico, allucinatorio) e con l’idea bergsoniana di gesto filosofico (che lo stesso Merleau-Ponty riprende, com’è noto, in Elogio della filosofia). L’idea guida è che un percorso psicoanalitico sia un’ontologia sperimentale: un esperimento con l’essere e dell’essere, e con un essere o di un essere risolto nel suo proprio sperimentarsi, nel suo proprio divenire per esperienze ed esperimenti, nel suo proprio accadere come scarto e nel suo proprio scartarsi. E che la filosofia, o almeno una certa idea di filosofia, quella dell’Elogio merleau-pontyano, proceda in analoga direzione. (shrink)

A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within the transcendental space of what we could call an event. Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within the transcendental space of what we could call an event. Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)

A meditation on specularity as paradigms of a theory of experience which informs every field of philosophy and human sciences, including contemporary neurosciences. And a meditation, starting from neurosciences and mirror neurons, on the different readings of this paradigm of specularity and specularization. In particular, on that “second” reading of specularization, which suggests that the mirror is not an instrument of representation but of expression, not a device of adaquation but of creation. It is an hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty, facing the (...) very same problems contemporary neurosciences are confonted to, reactivates in an increasingly systematic way in his later years, drawing from a tradition which we try here to reconstruct. From Merleau-Ponty to Bergson, from Bergson to Leibniz, this second reading of specularity contains a possibility which is still fruitful and which neurosciences themselves could adopt in order to reconsider in a new perspective the evidences they have considered until now from the point of view of a first reading of specularity. This second reading of specularity suggests that it is not so much necessary to explain how one subject comprehends the other, but how both subjects are comprehended within the transcendental space of what we could call an event. Empathy is not so much a syntonization among subjects, but subjects are a partial and local desyntonization of that empathic system we should place as the beginining and not at the end of the process. Consciousness does not represent the other consciousness, but they express in a simultaneous and specular diffraction the fundamental unity of an event which is every time unique and impersonal. (shrink)