What is Life? This is the question asked by Denis Noble in this very personal and at times deeply lyrical book. Noble is a renowned physiologist and systems biologist, and he argues that the genome is not life itself: to understand what life is, we must view it at a variety of different levels, all interacting with each other in a complex web. It is that emergent web, full of feedback between levels, from the gene to the wider environment, (...) that is life. (shrink)

What is Life? To answer this question, Denis Noble argues that we must look beyond the gene's eye view. For modern 'systems biology' considers life on a variety of levels, as an intricate web of feedback between gene, cell, organ, body, and environment. He shows how it is both a biologically rigorous and richly rewarding way of understanding life.

Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In (...) a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. (shrink)

There has recently been much interest in the role of attention in controlling action. The role has been mischaracterized as an element in necessary and sufficient conditions on agential control. In this paper I attempt a new characterization of the role. I argue that we need to understand attentional control in order to fully understand agential control. To fully understand agential control we must understand paradigm exercises of agential control. Three important accounts of agential control—intentional, reflective, and goal-represented control—do not (...) fully explain such exercises. I argue that understanding them requires understanding how deployments of visual attention implement flexible occurrent control, or a capacity to flexibly adjust the degree of control that individuals exercise over their actions. While such deployments of attention are neither necessary nor sufficient for exercising agential control, they constitute an attentional skill for controlling action, understanding which is central to fully understanding agential control. We can appreciate its centrality if we appreciate that this attentional skill for controlling action is plausibly crucial to acting non-negligently. (shrink)

Good explanations are not only true or probably true, but are also relevant to a causal question. Current models of causal explanation either only address the question of the truth of an explanation, or do not distinguish the probability of an explanation from its relevance. The tasks of scenario construction and conversational explanation are distinguished, which in turn shows how scenarios can interact with conversational principles to determine the truth and relevance of explanations. The proposed model distinguishes causal discounting from (...) causal backgrounding , and makes predictions concerning the differential effects of contextual information about alternative explanations on: (a) the kind of mental models constructed; (b) belief revision about probable cause; and (c) the perceived quality of a focal explanation. Four experiments are reported that test these predictions. The significance of the notion of explanatory relevance for research on causal explanation is then discussed. (shrink)

Several notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between [Formula: see text] principles have been studied. This paper contributes to the program of analyzing the behavior of versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and related principles under these notions. Among other results, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an instance of RT[Formula: see text] all of whose solutions have PA degree over [Formula: see text] and use this to show that König’s Lemma lies strictly between RT[Formula: see text] and RT[Formula: see (...) text] under one of these notions. We also answer two questions raised by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer on comparing versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and of the Thin Set Theorem with the same exponent but different numbers of colors. Still on the topic of the effect of the number of colors on the computable aspects of Ramsey-theoretic properties, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an [Formula: see text]-coloring [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] such that every [Formula: see text]-coloring of [Formula: see text] has an infinite homogeneous set that does not compute any infinite homogeneous set for [Formula: see text], and connect this result with the notion of infinite information reducibility introduced by Dzhafarov and Igusa. Next, we introduce and study a new notion that provides a uniform version of the idea of implication with respect to [Formula: see text]-models of RCA0, and related notions that allow us to count how many applications of a principle [Formula: see text] are needed to reduce another principle to [Formula: see text]. Finally, we fill in a gap in the proof of Theorem 12.2 in Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman. (shrink)

April 15, 2024: This article published in Early View in error. The article will republish shortly.

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

In 1484, humanist philosopher and theologian Marsilio Ficino published the first complete Latin translation of Plato's extant works. Students of Plato now had access to the entire range of the dialogues, which revealed to Renaissance audiences the rich ancient landscape of myths, allegories, philosophical arguments, etymologies, fragments of poetry, other works of philosophy, aspects of ancient pagan religious practices, concepts of mathematics and natural philosophy, and the dialogic nature of the Platonic corpus's interlocutors. By and large, Renaissance readers in the (...) Latin West encountered Plato's text through Ficino's translations and interpretation. -/- In Plato's Persona, Denis J.-J. Robichaud provides the first synthetic study of Ficino's interpretation of the Platonic corpus. Robichaud analyzes Plato's works in their original Greek and in Ficino's Latin translations, as well as Ficino's non-Platonic writings and correspondence, in the process uncovering new aspects of Ficino's intellectual work habits. In his letters and works, Ficino self-consciously imitated a Platonic style of prose, in effect devising a persona for himself as a Platonic philosopher. Plato's dialogues are populated with a wealth of literary characters with whom Plato interacts and against whom Plato refines his own philosophies. Reading through Ficino's translations, Robichaud finds that the Renaissance philosopher seeks an understanding of Plato's persona(e) among all the dialogues' interlocutors. In effect, Ficino assumed the role of Plato's Latin spokesperson in the Renaissance. -/- Plato's Persona is grounded in an extensive study of scholarship in Renaissance humanism, classics, philosophy, and intellectual history, and contextualizes Ficino's intellectual achievements within the contemporary Christian orthodox view of Platonism. Ficino was an influential figure in the early Italian Renaissance: the key intermediary between Greek and Latin, and between manuscript and print, giving voice to Plato and access to the ancient frameworks needed to interpret his dialogues. (shrink)

One of the most influential recent accounts of attention is Wayne Wu’s. According to Wu, attention is selection-for-action. I argue that this proposal faces a dilemma: either it denies clear cases of attention capture, or it acknowledges these cases but classifies many inattentive episodes as attentive.

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of the criticism that Stumpf address to Husserl's phenomenology in Ideas I. My presentation is divided into four parts: I briefly describe the relationship between Stumpf and the young Husserl during his stay in Halle (1886-1901); then I will comment Stumpf's remarks on the definition of Husserl's phenomenology as descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations; in the third part, I examine Husserl's notice in section 86 of Ideas I (...) where he compares his own terminology to that of Stumpf; finally I comment on Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in his last book Erkenntnislehre. (shrink)

This paper explores two models using which we might understand Heidegger's notion of ‘Eigentlichkeit’. Although typically translated as ‘authenticity’, a more literal construal of this term would be ‘ownness’ or ‘ownedness’; and in addition to the paper's exegetical value, it also develops two interestingly different understandings of what it is to have a judgment of one's own. The first model understands Heideggerian authenticity as the owning of what I call a ‘standpoint’. Although this model provides an understanding of a number (...) of key features of authenticity, it also invites an important objection—which I call ‘the closure objection’—that can be found in, for example, the work of Steven Galt Crowell and Tony Fisher. Although I argue that this objection can be met, the response for which it calls reveals that the feat of authenticity as understood through the standpoint model rests upon a further feat, and one which may itself have a stronger claim to be identified with Heideggerian authenticity. I develop this thought, introducing what I call the ‘all-things-considered judgment model’ of authenticity, the basis of which lies in, among other sources, Heidegger's appropriation of themes from Aristotle's discussion of phronesis. I explain the exegetical benefits of adopting this model and consider some objections that it invites, before closing with a discussion of how the two models understand the notion of ‘a judgment of one's own’. (shrink)

This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness and avoids most of the criticisms generally directed to them. This (...) article is divided into eight parts. The first two sections expound the basic outline of Rosenthal's theory, and the third summarizes the principal objections that Rosenthal addresses to Brentano, which I, then, examine in sections 4 and 5. In sections 6 and 7, I discuss Brentano's principle of the unity of consciousness, and in section 8, I consider the scope of the changes that Brentano brings to his theory of consciousness in his later writings, which follow the 1874 publication of Psychology. I then draw the conclusion that Brentano's theory rests on a view of intransitive and intrinsic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Soul springs from Intellect, Intellect springs from the One. But quite how does the sensible world arise? A pair of almost successive treatises points to the answer. A lower manifestation of soul `makes' or `gives birth to' what is variously described as `non-being', `utterly indefinite' and `utterly dark', before covering what she has made with form, specifically the form of `body', and before `entering rejoicing' into the object that, by its reception of form, has been made ready to receive her (...) and that, as the `dwelling place' of soul, will be none other than the visible cosmos. A pair of earlier, again almost successive treatises, spells out the implication. The matter of the sensible world, covered with at least a minimum of form, is described as a `corpse adorned'. The same object, but prior to its `adornment', prior therefore to its appearance as a `body' that is a `corpse', and prior to any `indwelling' of soul, is specifically said to be `non-being' and the `darkness of matter', a transparent allusion to the product of soul in the two later treatises. The soul's making of `darkness', so we may infer, is a making of `matter', the final act in the drama by which everything that exists, including the material substrate of the world we see and feel around us, stems ultimately from the One. (shrink)

My aim in this study is to show that the philosophical program elaborated by Brentano in his Psychology is largely indebted to the research conducted by Brentano on British empiricism and Comte's positive philosophy at Würzburg. This research represents the starting point of, and backdrop to, the project for philosophy as science, which is at the heart of his Psychology, and sheds new light on the philosophical stakes of many debates he leads in that work. Furthermore, Brentano's research informs us (...) about his philosophical preoccupations during the Würzburg period, and simultaneously provide us with a new perspective on the evolution of his thought from his habilitation at Würzburg in 1866 to his arrival in Vienna in 1874. In this study, I propose to examine some of the factors that motivated Brentano's interest in Comte's philosophy and to evaluate the influence that the latter exerted on Brentano's thought during the Würzburg period and beyond. (shrink)

From an enactive approach to human activity, we suggest that the use of appearance-enhancing drugs is better explained by the sense-making related to body image rather than the cognitive evaluation of social norms about appearance and consequent psychopathology-oriented approach. After reviewing the main psychological disorders thought to link body image issues to the use of appearance-enhancing substances, we sketch a flexible, dynamic and embedded account of body image defined as the individual’s propensity to act and experience in specific situations. We (...) show how this enacted body image is a complex process of sense-making that people engage in when they are trying to adapt to specific situations. These adaptations of the enacted body image require effort, perseverance and time, and therefore any substance that accelerates this process appears to be an easy and attractive solution. In this enactive account of body image, we underline that the link between the enacted body image and substance use is also anchored in the history of the body’s previous interactions with the world. This emerges during periods of upheaval and hardship, especially in a context where athletes experience weak participatory sense-making in a sport community. We conclude by suggesting prevention and intervention designs that would promote a safe instrumental use of the body in sports and psychological helping procedures for athletes experiencing difficulties with substances use and body image. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de montrer l'influence que la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte a exercée sur la pensée du jeune Brentano durant la période de Würzburg (1866-1874). J'examine d'abord quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont amené Brentano à s'intéresser à la philosophie de Comte et je résume, dans un deuxième temps, les grandes lignes de l'article de Brentano sur Comte dont la version française est reproduite dans ce numéro. Dans la troisième partie de cette étude, je commente brièvement quelques (...) passages de la Psychologie d'un point de vue empirique où Brentano discute de thèmes comtiens. Je conclue cette étude par quelques remarques sur les traces laissées par le positivisme de Comte dans l'œuvre de Brentano. (shrink)

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...) remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence – the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene – can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view – ‘mnemonic immersivism’ – has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering. (shrink)

Three‐ to 4‐month‐old infants show asymmetric exclusivity in the acquisition of cat and dog perceptual categories. The cat perceptual category excludes dog exemplars, but the dog perceptual category does not exclude cat exemplars. We describe a connectionist autoencoder model of perceptual categorization that shows the same asymmetries as infants. The model predicts the presence of asymmetric retroactive interference when infants acquire cat and dog categories sequentially. A subsequent experiment conducted with 3‐ to 4‐month‐olds verifies the predicted pattern of looking time (...) behaviors. We argue that bottom‐up, associative learning systems with distributed representations are appropriate for modeling the operation of short‐term visual memory in early perceptual category learning. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy during the Halle period (1886-1901). I shall first track the sources of Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. I shall then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to Lotze in his early work and research manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the third section, I examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s antipsychologistic turn (...) in the mid-1890s. The fourth section is a commentary on Husserl’s manuscript entitled “Microcosmus,” to which he explicitly refers in his Prolegomena, and which he planned to publish as an annex of his Logical Investigations. This work contains a detailed analysis of the third book of Lotze’s 1874 Logic. The last section examines Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism in his Prolegomena, which I discuss through the lens of Stumpf’s critique of psychologism in his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge”. I argue that Stumpf’s early works on this topic make it possible to establish a connection between Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas and Husserl’s antipsychologism. My hypothesis is that Stumpf’s analyses represent the background of Husserl's critique of logical psychologism in his Logical Investigations. I shall conclude this study by showing that Husserl’s position with respect to Lotze’s philosophy remains basically unchanged after the publication of his Logical Investigations, and that Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze pertains, in the final analysis, to the absence of a theory of intentionality in Lotze’s philosophy. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 1, pp 46 - 107 The present paper discusses the question of Marsilio Ficino’s lost translations of Proclus’ _Elements of Physics_ and _Elements of Theology_. It reviews all known evidence for Ficino’s work on the _Elements of Physics_ and _Elements of Theology_, examines new references and fragments of these texts in Ficino’s manuscripts, especially in his personal manuscript of Plotinus’ _Enneads_, and studies how they fit within the Florentine’s philosophical oeuvre. The present case studies of (...) manuscript evidence demonstrate how Proclus accompanied Ficino from his early ‘scholastic background’ through to his mastery of the Platonic tradition late in his career, especially, as is shown, in his study of Pseudo-Dionysius and Plotinus. Despite the fact that scholarship at times pits scholasticism and Renaissance Platonism against each other, in this sense Proclus—largely due to the _Elements_—bridges the two cultures. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...) so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. (shrink)

In this response, we reiterate the importance of development (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic) in the understanding of a complex cognitive skill – analogical reasoning. Four key questions structure the response: Does relational priming exist, and is it sufficient for analogy? What do we mean by relations as transformations? Could all or any relations be represented as transformations? And what about the challenge of more complex analogies? In addressing these questions we bring together a number of supportive commentaries, strengthening our emergentist (...) case for analogy (in particular with insights from comparative psychology), and review new supportive evidence. We also rebut those commentaries that ignore development at their peril. Along the way, we revisit the main assumptions underlying the analogy as relational priming (ARP) account of analogy, clarifying and elaborating as necessary. (shrink)

Brentano clearly asserts, in his Vienna lectures of 1887–1888, that his descriptive psychology is an a priori or “exact” science. Since he rejects Kant's idea of a synthetic a priori, this means that the descriptive psychologist's laws are analytic. My aim in this paper is to clarify and discuss this view. I examine Brentano's epistemology in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and then its later developments. I conclude with a difficulty inherent in Brentano's psychological approach to a priori knowledge.

Global climate change is one of the most daunting ethical and political challenges confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. The intergenerational and transnational ethical issues raised by climate change have been the focus of a significant body of scholarship. In this new collection of essays, leading scholars engage and respond to first-generation scholarship and argue for new ways of thinking about our ethical obligations to present and future generations. Topics addressed in these essays include moral accountability for energy consumption and (...) emissions, egalitarian and libertarian perspectives on mitigation, justice in relation to cap and trade schemes, the ethics of adaptation and the ethical dimensions of the impact of climate change on nature. (shrink)

This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf's evaluation of Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf's reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his "pure" phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre, (...) directs toward to the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl's self-criticism regarding the Cartesian aproach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf's criticism and partly confirms the latter's diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to difference-based models of causal judgement, the epistemic state of the agent should not affect judgements of cause. Four experiments examined opportunity chains in which a physical event enabled a subsequent proximal cause to produce an outcome. All four experiments showed that when the proximal cause was a human action, it was judged as more causal if the agent was aware of his opportunity than if he was not or if the proximal cause was a physical event. The first (...) two experiments showed that these preferences could not be explained in terms of differences in perceived conditional probability, social controllability or perceptions of the causal sequence as forming a single unit. The third experiment showed that awareness affected the perceived deliberateness with which the action brought the outcome about but not its perceived voluntariness. The fourth experiment showed that... (shrink)

Avant l'âge des Lumières, on tolérait mal la religion des autres, ou alors avec réticence, comme une anomalie qu'il fallait souffrir sans l'accepter. La "tolérance des Modernes", élaborée par de grands penseurs comme Locke et Voltaire, renversait la perspective : elle mettait en place un système harmonieux de coexistence paisible entre les groupes les plus divers, tout en prônant de nouveaux droits la liberté de conscience et la liberté d'exercer sa religion dans l'espace public. Cette nouvelle conception n'allait pas de (...) soi. Elle donne à voir des éléments précurseurs en des lieux aussi divers que l'Empire ottoman et le ghetto de Venise. Après de nombreuses querelles politiques et théologiques, elle s'est enracinée en Hollande, en Angleterre, en France et dans les colonies d'Amérique. Denis Lacorne observe les manifestations les plus récentes de la tolérance dans le monde contemporain, il en analyse les usages et les limites, qu'il s'agisse des symboles religieux, de monuments, de manières de s'habiller, de ce qu'il est permis de dire et de proférer. De l'Europe au Nouveau Monde, les territoires de la tolérance n'ont cessé de s'étendre, des déistes aux athées, des baptistes aux quakers, des sikhs aux musulmans. Aujourd'hui la tolérance demeure une vertu contestée : le retour du religieux, la montée des fanatismes menacent le projet émancipateur des philosophes. Faut-il imposer des bornes à la liberté d'expression? Doit-on tolérer les ennemis de la tolérance? Pour y répondre, il nous faut redécouvrir cette grande tradition afin de mieux la défendre."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

I suggest that contemporary economics shares many of the characteristics of methodological behaviourism in psychology, with its emphasis on the influence of motivation, learning, and situational incentives on behaviour, and minimal interest in the details of the cognitive processes that transform input (information) into output (behaviour). The emphasis on these characteristics has the same strengths and weaknesses in economics as in behaviourist psychology.

Hintikka makes a distinction between two kinds of games: truthconstituting games and truth-seeking games. His well-known game-theoretical semantics for first-order classical logic and its independence-friendly extension belongs to the first class of games. In order to ground Hintikka’s claim that truth-constituting games are genuine verification and falsification games that make explicit the language games underlying the use of logical constants, it would be desirable to establish a substantial link between these two kinds of games. Adapting a result from Thierry Coquand, (...) we propose such a link, based on a slight modification of Hintikka’s games, in which we allow backward playing for ∃loïse. In this new setting, it can be proven that sequent rules for first-order logic, including the cut rule, are admissible, in the sense that for each rule, there exists an algorithm which turns winning strategies for the premisses into a winning strategy for the conclusion. Thus, proofs, as results of truth-seeking games, can be seen. (shrink)

En deux parties: pensée logico-mathématique et psychologie; pensée logico-mathématique et sciences cognitives.

L’origine et les modalités de développement des premières sociétés agricoles du Nord-Est des Balkans entre la fin du VIIe et le VIe millénaires demeurent encore très controversées. Le site d’Uğurlu sur l’île de Gökçeada au Nord-Est de la mer Égée apporte un éclairage nouveau sur cette question. À ce jour, 24 lames et 4 autres éléments dans un silex jaune miel à points blancs d’origine vraisemblablement septentrionale ont été découverts dans cet établissement. L’analyse de ces objets et des lames en (...) particulier montre que par leur technique, leur morphologie, leurs modalités d’approvisionnement et leur retouche, elles sont totalement assimilables aux «lames de Karanovo » des sites contemporains de Thrace bulgare et des régions voisines. Toutefois, leur rareté, les autres composantes de l’industrie lithique et surtout l’appartenance d’Uğurlu à la sphère ouest-anatolienne indiquent que le site ne s’inscrit que de manière marginale dans la sphère techno-économique de Thrace bulgare et dépend surtout d’autres systèmes techno-économiques. (shrink)

A remarkable volume, the Russian avant-garde and radical modernism brings together the most significant movements and figures in Russian experimental art, cinema and literature of the early twentieth century (both pre-Soviet and Soviet) and presents them in commentary by leading scholars in the field" -- p. [4] of cover.

La présente étude vise à identifier et à clarifier quelques aspects centraux de la critique de la psychologie de Natorp dans la VeRecherche logique de Husserl. Après avoir ramené l’argumentation de Husserl à quatre objections principales, nous montrons qu’elles ont toutes pour enjeu l’idée d’une psychologie empirique de style brentanien. Nous commentons sur cette base deux questions parmi les plus significatives soulevées par la controverse Husserl-Natorp : la nature de la différence entre le psychique et le physique et la possibilité (...) d’objectiver les contenus phénoménaux — en clarifiant en quel sens les deux auteurs y apportent des réponses diamétralement opposées. L’article s’achève par quelques remarques sur les faiblesses de la conception de Natorp.The aim of this essay is to identify and to analyze some key aspects of Husserl’s critique of Natorp’s psychology in the fifth Logical Investigation. After dividing Husserl’s argumentation into four main objections, we show that what is at stake in all of them is the idea of an empirical psychology in Brentano’s style. From that perspective we comment two of the most significant questions raised by the Husserl-Natorp debate : the nature of the difference between psychical and physical, the possibility of objectifying phenomenal contents. We then attempt to clarify in what sense Husserl’s and Natorp’s answers to these two questions are diametrically opposed. We conclude by some remarks on the intrinsic weaknesses of Natorp’s approach. (shrink)

The authors analyze Takhtajan's system of classification of the Angiosperms in relation to the principles of evolutionary and cladistic systematics. It is shown that Takhtajan belongs to the evolutionary school: he identifies the ancestors of some taxa, he accepts polytomous branching and he groups taxa on the basis of primitive as well as derived character states. Takhtajan's notion of weighted similarity does not appear to be based on objective criteria, when determining the weight and evolutionary status of characters.After a summary (...) of the modifications brought out by Takhtajan in his 1980 version, the weak and strong points of evolutionary systems as a whole are emphasized. In these, the delimitation of taxa and their filiation are difficult to refute since they do not rely on precise criteria, which would ensure continuity and uniformity within a given system. However, these systems have some flexibility, which allows them to incorporate readily new information, a feature unfortunately missing in cladistic classifications. In fact, while it does have weaknesses from a theoretical point of view, the system of Takhtajan gives us an idea of flowering plants phylogeny that appears to be one of the most complete at the present time from both analytical and synthetic standpoints. (shrink)