A business entity established and owned by a village is designed to support the community in meeting their daily needs, enhancing their knowledge, and providing business and employment opportunities. This requires an institution capable of managing these activities effectively. The institution in question must be able to generate profits because the potential within a village is intended to promote the welfare of the local community. This study examines village institutions functioning as economic entities, commonly known as Village-Owned Enterprises (BUMDes). The (...) study also explores the legal status of these entities and their role in implementing programs aimed at building a prosperous society. The research findings confirm that BUMDes, as regulated by Government Regulation Number 11 of 2021 and the Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration Number 3 of 2021, have legal entity status. This means that these institutions are recognized and regulated by law, allowing them to engage in business activities legally, while also being responsible for adhering to applicable laws and regulations. The village government wholly owns these business institutions, and their mission is to manage and develop the village's economic potential. Additionally, BUMDes are intended to create jobs, enabling village communities to meet their basic needs, increase their income, and advance the local economy. The legal framework governing these institutions must be a focus for stakeholders to ensure the creation of legal justice, certainty, and benefits. (shrink)

Denis Diderot’s ideas about war and peace crystalize many of the contradictions in the world that he identified. On the one hand, war is a natural product of contradictions between natural law and human developments. On the other hand, it can and should always be subject to moral judgment based on a wide-ranging knowledge of history and context. War can be good if it eliminates tyranny, and bad if it limits freedom, equality, and prosperity. Peace can be good if (...) it cultivates the latter, and bad if it freezes inequality. Diderot never allows himself to rest on universal judgments for all times and all places, but insists upon never-ending comparisons and contrasts between the moral world and the natural world. Philosophical materialism provides the basis for his understanding of the world, but morals provide the instruments of judgment. (shrink)

What is Life? To answer this question, Denis Noble argues that we must look beyond the gene's eye view. For modern 'systems biology' considers life on a variety of levels, as an intricate web of feedback between gene, cell, organ, body, and environment. He shows how it is both a biologically rigorous and richly rewarding way of understanding life.

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? Neuroconstructivism is a pioneering 2 volume work that sets out a whole new framework for considering the complex topic of development, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational work, and neuroimaging.

Parmi les notes laissées par le jeune Descartes (1619-1621), on en trouve une qui attribue à l’imagination des poètes des pensées plus profondes et plus frappantes que celles qu’on trouve chez les philosophes. On s’interroge ici sur la portée à attribuer à cette note et sur ce que deviendra chez Descartes la « force de l’imagination ». Jusqu’en 1629, plusieurs textes évoqueront la même espèce de force, en relation avec les premiers âges de la culture. Si, dans la suite de (...) l’œuvre, l’idée d’une imagination productrice semble s’effacer, il y a lieu d’estimer que son pouvoir a été transféré à l’ingenium lui-même, dont le rôle dans la pensée en général devrait être reconsidéré. (shrink)

No one will deny that the history of the last two centuries is incomprehensible without some insight into the meaning of nationalism. In the modern world, references to ‘nation’ and ‘national feelings’ are political forces of the first order that have played a much greater role than have references to other ideas that had raised expectations among political thinkers. Nevertheless, it is not a simple matter to define nation and nationalism; the terms have a weak analytical and explanatory power. We (...) lack a definition that would allow us to determine unequivocally and objectively whether or not we have to do with a nation. Many objective criteria for identification are proffered individually or in combination. None, however, has been consistently satisfactory.A first superficial examination shows that nationalism has a chameleon-like character. It is presented, and we experience it, as a liberating force freeing individuals and peoples from social and political serfdom. Linked to this liberal ‘Risorgimento-nationalism’, which coincided with the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, was the hope for a better future, for economic prosperity and for the reification of such universal values as human rights, equality, justice and the constitutional democratic rule of law. Yet nationalism has also appeared to include an imperialistic tendency towards domination, belligerent aggression and expansion, racism and exclusion, authoritarianism and rightist radicalism, a blind and infatuated cult of ones’ own. International conflicts were fought and legitimized in the name of nations’ ‘natural’ borders, in terms of return to the homeland, of irredentism.Seen thus, there seems to be two nationalisms: one liberal, liberating nationalism of peoples and another official or state nationalism that proceeds from the nation state and serves its needs. The question is whether this superficial distinction gains any insight. Often, once national liberation has been accomplished and the nation state established, nationalism of peoples is mobilized by and for state nationalism. Nor should we forget that the nationalism of peoples has from the start the establishment of its own nation state as its goal. From this it is evident that our understanding of nationalism is hindered by its seldom being observable in a pure state. It is nearly always linked to other political, social, and religious ideas and values which in turn strengthens its grasp on hearts and minds. (shrink)

Though Heidegger’s Being and Time is often cited as one of the most important philosophical works of the last hundred years, its Division Two has received relatively little attention. This outstanding collection corrects that, examining some of the central themes of Division Two and their wide-ranging and challenging implications. An international team of leading philosophers explore the crucial notions that articulate Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, including death, anxiety, conscience, guilt, resolution and temporality. In doing so, they clarify the bearing of (...) Division Two’s reflections on our understanding of intentionality, normativity, responsibility, autonomy and selfhood. These discussions raise important questions about how we may need to rethink the morals of Division One of Being and Time , the broader project to which that book was devoted, the shaping influence of figures such as Aristotle and Kierkegaard, as well as Heidegger’s relationship with his contemporaries and successors. Essential reading for students and scholars of Heidegger’s thought, and anyone interested in key debates in phenomenology, ethics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of mind. Contributors: William Blattner, Clare Carlisle, Taylor Carman, Steven Galt Crowell, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Sophia Dandelet, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, Jeffrey Haynes, Stephan Käufer, Denis McManus, Stephen Mulhall, George Pattison, Peter Poellner, Katherine Withy, Mark A. Wrathall. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The “sharp dialectician” (Freud) and “genial master” (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the “grandfather of phenomenology” (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher “in the best sense of this term” (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano’s philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. (...) 3). Two further sections of the volume deal with the posterity of his philoso¬phy: in section 4, the legacy of his account of sense perception and feeling is discussed, while the history of Brentano’s unpublished manuscripts is discussed in section 5. This section also presents an edition of a manuscript from 1899 on relations, along with the letters from Brentano to Marty which discuss this manuscript. The last part of section 5 contains the text of a public lecture given by Brentano on the laws of inference. (shrink)

Kant’s ethics conceives of rational beings as autonomous–capable of legislating the moral law, and of motivating themselves to act out of respect for that law. Kant’s ethics also includes a notion of the highest good, the union of virtue with happiness proportional to, and consequent on, virtue. According to Kant, morality sets forth the highest good as an object of the totality of all things good as ends. Much about Kant’s conception of the highest good is controversial. This paper focuses (...) on the apparent conflict between Kant’s claim that we are autonomous, and passages in which he seems to suggest that we require belief in the possibility of the highest good to motivate moral action. I distinguish three distinct versions of these problematic claims that seem to be present in Kant’s texts: that the highest good serves as (1) a motivational supplement to respect for the moral law, (2) a fundamental spring of right action, and (3) a condition of the bindingness of moral requirements. I argue that the texts are better interpreted to yield alternatives to (2) and (3) that do not conflict with our autonomy. I also argue that, properly understood, (1) does not conflict with our autonomy. In arguing for the last claim, I explore Kant’s notion of radical evil and its implications for human agency and virtue. (shrink)

Comment penser la métaphysique en protestant? Le parent pauvre de la Réforme et de la modernité méritait qu'on s'y attarde. Pour la première fois, et de manière originale et profonde, Denis Müller, expert reconnu de l'éthique, vient lui donner ses lettres de noblesse. Cette pensée exhumée par le biographe intellectuel de Calvin et de Barth se découvre alors terrestre, proche de la création et de la vie pratique ; elle anime d'un feu nouveau les notions d'existence, de raison et (...) de transcendance. Ce sont elles qui, dans cette nouvelle approche, s'en trouvent explorées, questionnées et revisitées. Avec pour paradoxale pierre angulaire, la tristesse. Quel trésor cache en effet la mélancolie? Convoquant tour à tour les figures de Vincent Van Gogh, d'Arthur Rimbaud, de James Joyce, puisant dans les productions artistiques le ressort de cette métaphysique subversive, cet ouvrage est une invitation à l'introspection pour penser l'expérience universelle de l'existence. Et s'ouvrir à son secret. Un immense traité de vie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ralegh and the Punic WarsCharles G. Salas“For he doth not feign, that rehearseth probabilities as bare conjectures....”Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the WorldThe Secret HistoryIn 1603 Sir Walter Ralegh was judged guilty of treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London to await execution. The wait was a long one —execution did not take place until 1618—giving this artful courtier, warrior, poet, and poseur time to script new (...) roles for himself. The most memorable of these was historian, and the stage on which he performed was the entire world. Universal history had been a time-honored genre in England, but never had there been so remarkable a performance by a native son as Ralegh’s The History of the World (1614). In five books Ralegh offered to king and country his interpretation of events from Creation to 168 bc. Book V, last and lengthiest of the entire work, deals in large part with the struggle between Rome and Carthage. The story of that struggle is Ralegh’s most mature historical writing and the most revealing of himself, for when he gave up his plan to carry his history into modern times, the Punic Wars became the context for things about the present that he was loath to leave unsaid.Despite its length (about a million words) and premature ending, the History was an enormous success with a public eager to possess the meaning of it all. Oliver Cromwell particularly liked the way it followed “the strange windings and turnings of Providence”; 1 no doubt he found Ralegh’s emphasis upon the Providential control of events reassuring. For Ralegh claimed to show how “kings and kingdoms have flourished and fallen, and for what virtue and piety God made prosperous, and for what vice and deformity he made wretched both the one and the other.” 2 In fact what Ralegh showcased [End Page 195] were the acts of a vengeful, Old Testament God more concerned with punishing monarchical sins than with making monarchs prosperous, and the History was temporarily suppressed by James for being “too saucy in censoring princes.” 3If the king did not like what he saw in the History, the king’s critics did; and Ralegh, never a friend to Puritan or republican in his lifetime, became a hero to both as a pious author and victim of Stuart tyranny. Those sympathetic to the Stuarts, like Alexander Ross, Chaplain to Charles I, saw Ralegh rather differently; but the popularity of the man and his History could not be denied. Ross himself profited from that popularity by doing both an abridgment and a continuation of the History as well as Som Animadversions and Observations upon Sir Walter Raleigh’s Historie of the World. Wherein his mistakes are noted, and som doubtful passages cleered (1653). Many of these animadversions were directed at Ralegh’s treatment of the Punic Wars. Ross recognized that “mistakes” and “doubtful passages” there formed a pattern: “Sir Walter cannot look upon the Roman Glorie with but a squint eye”(8), he complained. But did he also recognize the reason for that squint eye, that Ralegh kept one eye on the past and the other on the present? That many of those “doubtful passages” were in fact strategic elements in a campaign (based on parallels) against Rome, against James, and against James’s ministry? Had this been obvious to Ross, he still would not have said so. Writing under Cromwell, he could no more afford to complain explicitly about abuse of James than Ralegh, writing under James, could afford to make the abuse explicit.Parallels—implicit or imagined—are part and parcel of Ralegh’s providentialism. In brief: God controls events, God does not change, events do not change. This is not to say that Ralegh believed that God’s control was transparent, that God couldn’t change, or that free will did not exist. Ralegh did not solve the great problems of theology. 4 What he is sure about is that the same sins continue to be punished just as they have always been: “So also hath God punished the same and the like sins in all after-times, and... (shrink)

The relevance of this topic is due to the processes of INDUSTRY 4.0, which takes place in a new industrial revolution and requires the formation of a new management theory as a factor in creating an environmentally balanced and socially oriented economy, aimed at increasing the welfare of the population and improving the environmental performance. The purpose of the study is the conceptualization of the new theory of management as a factor in the creation of an environmentally balanced and socially (...) oriented economy, and the methodology of analysis. Objectives of the study : using the methodology of system analysis, to form a new management theory as a factor in the formation of an environmentally balanced and socially oriented economy in the conditions of Industry 4.0, as the current management paradigm is deeply constrained. Analysis of recent research and publications, which launched the solution to this problem. Works by Macston Graham and Randers Jorgen. "In search of prosperity. Managing Economic Development to Reduce Unemployment and Climate Change " and Meadow Donnelly, Meadow Denis, Rangers Jorgen. "The limits of growth. 30 years later " discusses the challenges facing the developed world today, including steady unemployment, growing inequality of property, and rapid climate change. Until today, most of the solutions to these problems were politically unacceptable for a world focused on short-term benefits and a desire for continued economic growth. The scientific novelty of the research is to identify the problems of interaction between man, society, nature in the conditions of INDUSTRY and the conditions for their overcoming, which contribute to the formation of a new theory of management as a factor in creating an environmentally balanced and socially oriented economy. The results of the study: the conditions for the formation of a stable society, based on which the creation of an environmentally balanced and socially oriented economy; the definition of sustainable development of society and the mission of a new management theory are revealed, which should change the dominant social philosophy, which is based on the paradigm of how people look at the world. Conclusion - the basis of the new theory of management - the improvement of the world, challenging many economic and managerial concepts of INDUSTRY 4.0, which are based on "the limits of growth". (shrink)

The paper aims to reflect upon the significance of interrelationship of ethics and business in multinational corporate world. The issue of focus is: Which is appropriate course for pursuing business without ethics or business with ethics? To arrive at a just resolve, the paper attempts to see the pros and cons of introducing ethics into business. The pivotal problem seems to lie with regard to the concept of 'profit making' in business. Business corporates are apprehensive of not being able to (...) earn 'maximum'-profit if business activity is pursued with moral considerations. On the other hand, those who argue for ethics in business emphasize that ethical values are prior to 'maximization' of profit making. On their view, the point of emphasis is that it is after-all human beings for which business activity is carried out. As such, business (must) is to 'serve' them rather than make them 'suffer'. By the term 'human beings', we mean here the concept of 'society' and not 'individual'-in-isolation from other individuals. Nevertheless, to mean this, it is not to deny the fact that individual is a species of society. Also, it is defensively argued that the apprehension that ethical behaviour negatively affects profit making in business is not true on the ground that contrarily in fact ethical attitude is really consistent with rather than obstructive to business pursuit for a healthy society and abhyudaya (i.e., for rise and prosperity for all). Hence the case for ethics in business. (shrink)

Jeffrey conditioning tells an agent how to update her priors so as to grant a given probability to a particular event. Weighted averaging tells an agent how to update her priors on the basis of testimonial evidence, by changing to a weighted arithmetic mean of her priors and another agent’s priors. We show that, in their respective settings, these two seemingly so different updating rules are axiomatized by essentially the same invariance condition. As a by-product, this sheds new light on (...) the question how weighted averaging should be extended to deal with cases when the other agent reveals only parts of her probability distribution. The combination of weighted averaging and Jeffrey conditioning is a comprehensive updating rule to deal with such cases, which is again axiomatized by invariance under embedding. We conclude that, even though one may dislike Jeffrey conditioning or weighted averaging, the two make a natural pair when a policy for partial testimonial evidence is needed. (shrink)

Michael Psellos ist ein Philosoph, der wie kein anderer für die byzantinische Epoche steht. Das Denken dieses Großintellektuellen – der in subtilen Auseinandersetzungen mit antiken und spätantiken Positionen in Theologie, Ontologie und Ethik eine selbständige christliche Philosophie formuliert – findet in diesem Band erstmalig eine monographische Gesamtdarstellung. Die Arbeit liefert durch ihren systematischen Charakter, durch die Einbeziehung bisher nicht interpretierter Texte, durch die Darlegung der bisherigen Forschungsergebnisse und durch die Aufdeckung von Traditioinslinien eine wichtige Grundlage für die weitere Erforschung der (...) byzantinischen Philosophie. (shrink)

Throughout his ministry, Jesus spoke frequently and unabashedly on the now-taboo subject of money. With nothing good to say to the rich, the New Testament -- indeed the entire Bible -- is far from positive towards the topic of personal wealth. And yet, we all seek material prosperity and comfort. How are Christians to square the words of their savior with the balances of their bank accounts, or more accurately, with their unquenchable desire for financial security? While the church has (...) developed diverse responses to the problems of poverty, it is often silent on what seems almost as straightforward a biblical principle: that wealth, too, is a problem. By considering the particular context of the recent economic history of Ireland, this book explores how the parables of Jesus can be the key to unlocking what it might mean to follow Christ as wealthy people without diluting our dilemma or denying the tension. Through an engagement with contemporary economic and political thought, aided by the work of Karl Barth and William T. Cavanaugh, this book represents a unique and innovative intervention to a discussion that applies to every Christian in the Western world. (shrink)

My working hypothesis is based on the project of a theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre) at the very beginning of the Prolegomena and it consists in conceiving this theory of science as the program which insures their cohesion to the whole of the Investigations in this work. In order to test this hypothesis, I will first examine the different steps which led to the project of a theory of science in the pre-phenomenological period. I will secondly expound the guidelines of the (...) theory of science, insisting in particular on its relation to pure logic. In the third section, I will attempt to define the function of the theory of knowledge and of phenomenology in such a programme. I will conclude with some remarks on the fate of this theory of science after the Logical Investigations. Most of Husserl’s allusions to the theory of science, be it in his lecture notes, the manuscripts that were written after 1901 or other works published during Husserl’s lifetime, seem to suggest that the theory of science kept on assuming the very role it was playing in Husserl’s seminal work: the theory of science provides its basis to Husserl’s philosophical agenda. (shrink)

Liberal political theory is all too familiar with the divide between classical and welfare-state liberals. Classical liberals, as we all know, insist on the importance of small government, negative liberty, and private property. Welfare-state liberals, on the other hand, although they too stress civil rights, tend to be sympathetic to “positive liberty,” are for a much more expansive government, and are often ambivalent about private property. Although I do not go so far as to entirely deny the usefulness of this (...) familiar distinction, I think in many ways it is misleading. In an important sense, most free-market liberals are also “welfare-state” liberals. I say this because the overwhelming number of liberals, of both the pro-market and the pro-government variety, entertain a welfarist conception of political economy. On this dominant welfarist view, the ultimate justification of the politico-economic order is that it promotes human welfare. Traditional “welfare-state liberals” such as Robert E. Goodin manifestly adopt this welfarist conception. But it is certainly not only interventionists such as Goodin who insist that advancing welfare is the overriding goal of normative political economy. J. R. McCulloch, one of the great nineteenth-century laissez-faire political economists, was adamant that “freedom is not, as some appear to think, the end of government: the advancement of public prosperity and happiness is its end.” To be sure, McCulloch would have disagreed with Goodin about the optimal welfare-maximizing economic policy: the welfarist ideal, he and his fellow classical political economists believed, would best be advanced by provision of a legal and institutional framework — most importantly, the laws of property, contract, and the criminal code — that allows individuals to pursue their own interests in the market and, by so doing, promote public welfare. In general, what might be called the “classical-liberal welfare state” claims to advance welfare by providing the framework for individuals to seek wealth for themselves, while welfarists such as Goodin insist that a market order is seriously flawed as a mechanism for advancing human welfare and, in addition, that government has the competency to “correct market failures” in the provision of welfare. (shrink)

The primary concern of this paper is Hume's account of the moral difference between humans and other animals. In order to clarify this difference Hume's views regarding reason, sympathy, and human sentiment are examined. The purpose of this investigation is threefold. First, Hume's position on the moral difference between humans and other animals is clarified. It is argued that this difference is properly traced to Hume's account of the sentiment of humanity. Second, Hume is defended against the claim that his (...) position on this matter is inconsistent. Third, it is argued that Hume's theory of morality leaves open the possibility that some earthly species other than our own may be properly understood as moral. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 DAVID HUME'S INVISIBLE HAND IN THE WEALTH OF NATIONS THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF MORAL INFORMATION Introduction The thesis I shall defend is that there are systematic aspects of Adam Smith's economics which make little sense when read in isolation from a literature in which David Hume provides the signal contributions. Consequently, parts of Hume's own work are stripped of meaning, isolated as they are from later developments. The (...) puzzles about Smith's analysis which I find illuminated by Hume's are the following: 1. Why does Smith both defend the importance of economic growth for the material of well-being of the working class and claim that property originates as spoil, impoverishing the working class? After all, in the classical system the existence of property is one requisite for economic growth. 2. Why does Smith exalt the assumption of self-interested behavior in private activity but claim that irrationality dominates the political process? 3. Why does Smith deny the importance of benevolence in Wealth of Nations and insist on the importance of morality Sentiment morality in Theory of Moral its?3 The three questions have a common feature: they are related to the question of how public goods are provided. The particular public good in question is the institution of private property. As with all true I am obligated to the Center for Study of Public Choice for generous support of my research. Suzanne Levy gets the credit for the extent to which this approaches English. I have benefited from acute comments from Charles Rowley and Charles Griswold. The errors and obscurities which remain are solely my responsibility. Ill public goods, society considered as a whole benefits from having such an institution, but each individual considered separately can gain by anti-social behavior.4 Public goods provide a considerable difficulty for any social institution; neither competition in the market nor government requests that individuals reveal how much they wish to be taxed are certain to be efficient. There are aspects of the classical economic analysis which stress the importance of moral information as a partial solution to the public goods problem. By "moral information" I only require that the theory is employed as a guide and that if an individual acts contrary to the theory, this choice is not cited as "falsifying" the theory. Rather, something is said to be "wrong" or "wicked" about the choice.6 Much of modern economic analysis assumes that individuals have perfect information; this postulate rules out any significant role for moral information in the provision of the public goods. To avoid assuming away such a role for morality, we will drop the perfect information assumption and then examine if we can make sense of the classics' attack on the public goods problem. Of course, the specification that individuals see their own interests very poorly is consistent with Smith's general approach. The technique employed below is to look at the issue which Hume and Smith addressed as a problem in modern economics. The key difficulty is to determine under what conditions moral information could guide individuals with very imperfect perceptions to maximize their utility. In particular, suppose we find that moral guidance tells an individual how efficiently to produce. Is this morality self-enforcing or are resources required to persuade people to act in accord with these teachings? If resources are required, we will not pay much attention to just how this persuasion 112 is provided, e.g., whether we tell people that theft is "evil" or whether we hang a few thieves. General production theory tells us we probably will do both, but this is a separate issue. The argument to be advanced is that moral information has self-enforcement properties in private activities but these properties are missing in public activities. In this account, then, real resources will be required for implementing the morality. This consideration in turn raises an interesting issue. If the government expends these resources, what reason is there to believe that they will be provided to serve the public interest and not the interest of the government? Is it possible that the government can prosper by keeping people ignorant or by giving them advice... (shrink)

How can we argue, from neural facts, that representational states exhibit some specific representational structure? This paper approaches the question through a case study on the priority map-mechanism that underlies our capacity to orient visual attention. Computational models from cognitive neuroscience describe this mechanism as operating over neural topographic structures. These neural structures exhibit the functional profile of topographic representational structure. I argue that this fact warrants attributing topographic structure to the priority map mechanism’s representational states.

By the 1940s, the Municipal Council of Nairobi had enacted a host of By-Laws to control the presence of Africans, especially women, and had set up several agencies to implement them. Consequently, women street vendors were not only denied access to legal trade, but remained unwanted in the town except under very special circumstances. Nonetheless, pushed by their adversity, a number of them resorted to illegal hawking and demonstrated their resilience against the odds. However, as the hawkers’ earnings subsidised the (...) colonial low wage migrant labour system, it became difficult for the colonial administration in Nairobi to resolutely stamp out their activities, especially in Eastlands. Besides, by the end of the 1940s, the Council’s fight against hawking had slackened owing to unsustainable expenses. This paper examines the effect of colonial repression of African women street traders in Nairobi’s Eastlands area in the 1940s. Using the Gender and Development perspective along with data mainly from libraries, archives and oral sources, it interrogates the women’s attractions to Nairobi and the logic behind their street trading activities. It also examines the colonial dynamics that exploited the attitudes and beliefs of African male elders to validate the colonial government’s gender marginalisation policies against women, particularly the hawkers. The paper concludes that the gender-based constraints against African women traders notwithstanding, propelled by need, the women irrepressibly struggled to find space in the prosperous economy of Nairobi in the 1940s. Keywords Racism, gender discrimination, patriarchy, street trading, hawkers, licensing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendence and Violence: The Encounter of Buddhist, Christian, and Primal TraditionsSarah K. PinnockTranscendence and Violence: The Encounter of Buddhist, Christian, and Primal Traditions. By John D'Arcy May. New York: Continuum, 2003. 225 + xi pp.In popular media, religion appears as a dangerous social phenomenon with explosive potential. The investigation of transcendence as a source of violence is particularly timely in light of America's war on terrorism targeting extremist (...) Islam. However, this negative dimension of religion is nothing new. Over the course of history, hostility [End Page 231] and killing are intimately connected with religious divisions. The irony of religious violence as a betrayal of religious ethical ideals is both obvious and inescapable.Approaching this hot topic from the perspective of religious imperialism, John D'Arcy May examines violence perpetrated by the Christian and Buddhist traditions against indigenous religions. His investigation covers damaging evidence against these two universalizing traditions using geographically specific case studies in Asia and the Pacific Rim. Situating Christianity and Buddhism in parallel as religions of transcendence, he compares how indigenous localized religions were overpowered by expansionist universalizing religions, although not eradicated. Into his historical narrative, he weaves his personal encounters with otherness growing up in Australia while virtually oblivious to the oppression of Aboriginals by white settlers, and as a Roman Catholic doing ecumenical work in Papua New Guinea for four years.May opens the book with bold admission of the failures of European Christianity, evidenced in anti-Judaism and Holocaust genocide, and Theravada Buddhism's violent involvement in Sri Lanka's civil conflict between Singhalese nationalists and Hindu Tamils. The reader is led to expect elaboration on the moral failings of Christianity, and this proves true; however, May's examination of the Buddhism's expansion and endorsement of violence tempers the tendency to single out Christianity as uniquely imperialist. He suggests that transcendence itself can cause hierarchy and oppression.Part I of the book focuses on Christianity and violence. Chapter 1 studies how European Protestant and Catholic settlers to Australia treated the Aboriginal peoples. The story is grim. Using a psychoanalytic framework, May interprets the European vilification of Aboriginals as stemming from the repression of the primal other, and the repression of bio-cosmic religion in favor of transcendence. Constructively, he proposes that Aboriginal peoples can offer theological insights about the ontology of sacred space. Christians should not only seek reconciliation in society, but also consider new perspectives on the sacred in nature drawn from the dreaming of Aboriginal religious lore.In chapter 2, May deals with colonization in the Melanesian Islands of the Pacific Ocean, concentrating on Papua New Guinea. In the indigenous religions of Melanesia, the prosperous community is the measure of religious rectitude, while misfortune is explained by the breaking of taboos and the revenge of enemies or evil spirits. After European colonization, "cargo cults" arose among the islands that promised abundant material goods possessed by European settlers by means of religious rituals and magic. Surprisingly, May points out the positive impulses at the root of these cargo cults that are typically viewed as detrimental and even outlawed outright by local governments for their harmful social impact. At bottom, he argues, cargo cults reflect a positive religious aspiration for wholeness and healing in this life that is a counterpoint to the spiritualization of salvation by European Christianity.May tries to avoid idealizing these primal cultures and their religious insights; nevertheless, he finds them instructive for Christian theology. Native religions in both Australia and Papua New Guinea offer models of immanence that emphasize the religious value of nature and just relationships. It should be mentioned that [End Page 232] there is some nuance to this conclusion. For instance, Melanesian religion is portrayed as less exemplary than Australian aboriginal religion. But May's main point is that violence on a global scale is validated by Christian notions of transcendence that deny the material aspirations of the indigenous community, and promote a superiority that wreaks violence among indigenous peoples. Hopefully, intercultural theology will allow Christians to appreciate the Aboriginal respect for sacred geography and the Melanesian quest for the flourishing of one's local community.Christianity and Buddhism are treated... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The present article aims at setting the issue of the relationship between Buddhism and science in a historical and philosophical frame wider than that one taken into account by the international scholarship so far. The historical point of view allows us to conclude that the narrative that connects Buddhism with science is not based on features intrinsic to Buddhist thought. In fact, such narrative prospered thanks to the development of a dialectic, typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, between (...) science and religion. The philosophical point of view allows us to conclude that such narrative is backed by a metaphysical-like thought that denies the specificity of both science and Buddhism. RESUMO O presente artigo pretende enquadrar a questão do relacionamento entre budismo e ciência num âmbito histórico e filosófico mais amplo do que foi levado em consideração até agora pela scholarship internacional. A perspectiva histórica permite concluir que a narrativa que liga budismo e ciência não é baseada em características intrínsecas ao pensamento budista, mas floresceu em dependência do desenvolvimento da dialética religião-ciência dos séculos XVIII e XIX. A perspectiva filosófica, em contrapartida, permite concluir que essa mesma narrativa é sustentada por um pensamento de cunho metafísico e cientista, que nega a especificidade tanto da ciência quanto do budismo. (shrink)

Given a class $$\mathcal {C}$$ of models, a binary relation $$\mathcal {R}$$ between models, and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and the modal algebra of the theory of $$\mathcal {C}$$ in L where the modal operator is interpreted via $$\mathcal {R}$$. We discuss how modal theories of $$\mathcal {C}$$ and $$\mathcal {R}$$ depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness, and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories for the submodel and the quotient (...) relations. We prove a downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order language expanded with the modal operator for the extension relation between models. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 181-196 [Access article in PDF] Bookmarks What is Genius? Denis Dutton There's a school of thought which holds that there's nothing much of interest that can be said about genius. The root idea is older than Kant, but it was well summarized by him: genius is a natural endowment, deep, strange, and mysterious, at least with respect to putative explanations. Schubert can get (...) up in the morning and before lunch knock off five songs that captivate us hundreds of years later. There's no way for us to account for this, and we ought not to expect, Kant claims, that genius can explain itself either: Schubert doesn't have a clue how he does it.Yet trying to figure out how creative geniuses do it remains a permanent source of fascination, most of it fairly naïve. When the ingénue reporter is sent out by the City Editor to interview the famous, crusty old novelist, the first question is normally, "Where do you get your ideas?" Of course, if the novelist knew that, he'd not be likely to blab it in the press. Kant's point is that he cannot really know; no one can. Monroe Beardsley relays a story about Picasso, who claimed to suffer from "an indigestion of greenness" from walking in the woods on a summer's day: "I must empty this sensation into a picture," Picasso said. "Green dominates it. The painter paints as if in urgent need to discharge himself of his sensations and his visions." Beardsley observes that green indigestion could have been even more plausibly used to "explain" a red painting ("I needed an antidote to all that green"), or a pen-and-ink drawing ("I needed to get away from color"), or anything else. There is in this a general point about why we are so often disappointed by interviews with artists. The artist can do; the artist can't explain how. [End Page 181]It does not follow, however, that nothing of interest can be learned, at least at a descriptive level, about genius. Dean Keith Simonton has spent most of a career looking at the subject as a psychologist, and his Origins of Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity (Oxford University Press, $27.50) ties together much of his research and that of others in a way that extends thinking on genius far beyond armchair meditations or mere platitudes. At the heart of Simonton's project are two very different ideas: first, he argues that evolution and processes of natural selection provide illuminating models to explain the existence and operation of creative genius in the sciences and the arts. Second, he propounds a rather more dubious thesis, that the process of natural selection itself is an adequate model for understanding genius at work, that the history of human ideas demonstrates a kind of secondary evolution. To these hypotheses, Simonton adds a further Darwinian overlay: he returns repeatedly to the personality and biography of Charles Darwin himself as the paradigm of a life of creative genius. While this has the advantage of anchoring the discussion, giving it a kind of ostinato ground, it diverts Simonton from the manifestations of genius, especially artistic genius, which do not resemble Darwin's personal example.Creative genius is defined by Simonton as the capacity to originate scientific discoveries, artistic works, technical inventions, or engage in political leadership, in a manner that achieves what is conventionally termed eminence. The eminent person creates, discovers, or invents something that passes the test of time and, like the similar test devised by Hume to mark out artistic greatness, appeals to cultures beyond that of the original act of creation. It is not hard for the philosophically trained reader to devise counter-examples to Simonton's general theses, but the value of his book does not require a rigorous definition at the outset. Whatever genius is, and however we might dispute it, there is no doubting that Leonardo Da Vinci, Shakespeare, Newton, and Einstein count as creative geniuses in Simonton's sense. High raw IQ is frequently associated with genius... (shrink)

The term ‘Central Asia’ has been in use for 150 years, yet it is only since the collapse of the Soviet Union and, more recently, growth in awareness and concern about international terrorism, particularly in the USA, that the countries of Central Asia have become significant players on the international political stage. Denis Sinor describes the historical, cultural and linguistic backgrounds of the newly independent republics of the area: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan.

Une question très discutée chez les interprètes de Wittgenstein est celle de savoir comment comprendre le paradoxe au sujet des règles dont il parle dans le paragraphe 201 des Recherches philosophiques. Ilécrit: ‘Notre paradoxe était le suivant: une règle ne pourrait déterminer aucune conduite parce que n'importe quelle conduite pourrait être mise en accord avec la règle’. Un peu plus haut, il faisait dire à son interlocuteur: ‘“Mais comment une règle peut-elle m'apprendre ce que je dois faire en ce point? (...) Peu importe ce que je fais, cela pourra s’ accorder suivant une interprétation ou une autre avec la règle “’. (shrink)

In this article we argue for the necessity of a new double alliance between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (through embodied theory) onthe one hand, and between phenomenological pedagogy and the embodiment paradigm on the other. We strongly believe that phenomenological pedagogyshould enter into dialogue with the cognitive sciences movement called “Embodiment” in order to renew its educational theories and practices. Indeed, thenew suggestions about the mind that come from the embodiment paradigm can already have a huge impact on learning and (...) education, but a relatively structured “pedagogy of consciousness” is still missing. This topic will be discussed with a special focus on body and embodied consciousness, which nicelybrings together these different traditions. Finally, an actual example of how the embodiment paradigm and phenomenological pedagogy can converge will be presented through the practice of meditative experience. (shrink)

The holistic view of the Universe is a very promising approach. The necessity of such a view is shown by the teaching of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, a German physicist and philosopher. If we accept Panpsychism as the best alternative to Materialism and Dualism, we should take the holistic view seriously. Panpsychism and Holism combined lead to the Idea of Cosmopsychism. If we consider the Universe as a holistic Quantum System, we should ask, what causes the collapse of its wavefunction? (...) I offer four possible answers and I tend to divine consciousness, which brings the collapse of the wavefunction of our Universe. (shrink)

For many economists, including those who have made the most marked contribution to the development of the discipline, their work has to be understood in the context of the rhetorical strategy they were pursuing – what they wanted to persuade us of and how they wanted to do it. The paper identifies two fundamental rhetorical strategies of laissez-faire resting on entirely distinct ontological foundations. What distinguishes these two strategies is the way they articulate the individual with the general interest, how (...) they relate the micro to the macro. The two strategies discussed in the paper are characterised by the stance they take on a fundamental ontological issue, the way in which the things which appear to us in the world are related to the things or matters which compose them. A reductionist approach suggests that we can understand an entity at one level as a congeries. An entity in this view is just an aggregate of entities at a lower, substrate level – a purely external unity. The properties and behaviour of an entity can then be understood in terms of the properties and behaviour of the constituent lower-level components, taken in isolation. In this approach, phenomena at some level are regarded as having just the qualities enjoyed by its lower-level, substrate elements, writ large. The contrary, holistic, stance is to view the qualities of phenomena at one level as emergent at that level, and to assert that an entity can be understood as a product of the inter-relations between its component parts. We have, then, a pair of contrasted approaches: a polarity which is productive in the study of schools of thought, of competing methodologies, and of rhetorical strategies in economics. The paper applies this approach to the work of Smith, Keynes, Hayek, Lucas and Friedman. (shrink)