Until recently, few people would have doubted that the idea of distributive justice is old, indeed ancient. Several authors have now challenged this assumption. Most prominently, Samuel Fleischacker argued that distributive justice originates in the eighteenth century. If accurate, this would upset much of what we have taken for granted about an important part of the history of Western political thought. However, the thesis is manifestly flawed; and since it has already proven influential, it is important to set the record (...) straight. We will focus on the principle of extreme necessity, developed in twelfth- and thirteenth-century canon law, and subsequently adopted in civil law. Despite its immense importance for the history of political thought, the principle is barely known, and much less discussed. We briefly characterize the main tenets of the principle and show that it meets all the criteria to count as a principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

Open Access: This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker (...) have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed. (shrink)

Criticism can sometimes provoke defensive reactions, particularly when it implicates identities people hold dear. For instance, feminists told they are upholding rape culture might become angry or upset, since the criticism conflicts with an identity that is important to them. These kinds of defensive reactions are a primary focus of this paper. What is it to be defensive in this way, and why do some kinds of criticism, or implied criticism, tend to provoke this kind of response? What are the (...) connections between defensiveness, identity, and active ignorance? What are the social, political, and epistemic consequences of the tendency to defensiveness? Are there ways to improve the situation? (shrink)

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad (...) hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized. (shrink)

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism. I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we (...) have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open-mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value-change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think. (shrink)

There are many good reasons to learn about the lives of people who have less social privilege than we do. We might want to understand their circumstances in order to have informed opinions on social policy, or to make our institutions more inclusive. We might also want to cultivate empathy for its own sake. Much of this knowledge is gained through social scientific or humanistic research into others' lives. The entitlement to theorize about or study the lives of marginalized others (...) is often granted under the presumption of academic freedom. This paper will not question whether academic freedom licenses us to do so in the first place ; instead, I will... (shrink)

Many criticisms of epistemic logic have centered around its use of devices such as idealized knowers with logical omniscience and perfect self-knowledge. One possible response to such criticisms is to say that these idealizations are normative devices, and that epistemic logic tells us how agents ought to behave. This paper will take a different approach, treating epistemic logic as descriptive, and drawing the analogy between its formal models and idealized scientific models on that basis. Treating it as descriptive matches the (...) way in which some philosophers, including one of its founders, Jaako Hintikka, have thought about epistemic logic early in its history. Further, the analogy between the two fields will give us a way to defuse criticisms that see epistemic logic as unrealistic. For example, criticizing models of epistemic logic in which agents know all propositional tautologies as being unrealistic would be like criticizing frictionless planes in physics for being unrealistic. Each one would certainly be an unsuitable model for studying some kinds of phenomena, but is entirely appropriate for others. After outlining the analogy between epistemic and scientific models, we will discuss some ways in which idealizations are used by different research programs in epistemic logic. (shrink)

The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by (...) a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called "Benacerraf's Problem", which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf's problem. (shrink)

Dedekind's major work on the foundations of arithmetic employs several techniques that have left him open to charges of psychologism, and through this, to worries about the objectivity of the natural-number concept he defines. While I accept that Dedekind takes the foundation for arithmetic to lie in certain mental powers, I will also argue that, given an appropriate philosophical background, this need not make numbers into subjective mental objects. Even though Dedekind himself did not provide that background, one can nevertheless (...) be found in the work of the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer on mathematical concept formation. (shrink)

What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, developing our own account, offering two reasons for our account, and meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.

Janice Moulton's “The Adversary Method: A Philosophical Paradigm” articulated several criticisms of the popular idea of philosophy as adversarial debate. Moulton criticizes it on epistemic grounds, arguing that philosophy's overreliance on adversarial debate is to the detriment of its goals. Some, notably Trudy Govier, have argued in favor of at least a minimal adversariality, governed by norms of respectful argumentation. This paper suggests that Govier's faith in these norms is misplaced, because it neglects the social circumstances of the arguers. While (...) some authors have argued that politeness and aggression apply differently to those of different genders, this paper extends that analysis to social identities other than gender. In fact, given certain assumptions about the philosophy of language, engagement in polite adversarial debate may not even be possible for people occupying certain social locations. (shrink)

Using a cross-modal semantic priming paradigm, both experiments of the present study investigated the link between the mental representations of iconic gestures and words. Two groups of the participants performed a primed lexical decision task where they had to discriminate between visually presented words and nonwords (e.g., flirp). Word targets (e.g., bird) were preceded by video clips depicting either semantically related (e.g., pair of hands flapping) or semantically unrelated (e.g., drawing a square with both hands) gestures. The duration of gestures (...) was on average 3,500 ms in Experiment 1 but only 1,000 ms in Experiment 2. Significant priming effects were observed in both experiments, with faster response latencies for related gesture–word pairs than unrelated pairs. These results are consistent with the idea of interactions between the gestural and lexical representational systems, such that mere exposure to iconic gestures facilitates the recognition of semantically related words. (shrink)

Although women have long been participants in martial arts and other contact sports, the introduction of a women’s division in the Ultimate Fighting Challenge in 2012 brought women in combat sports into the media spotlight in an arguably unprecedented way. Yet, the increasing acceptance of women’s participation in combat sports does not necessarily mean that these sports are equally accessible to people of all genders. This article, extending insights from Iris Marion Young’s “Throwing Like a Girl,” will argue that the (...) modalities of feminine bodily existence pose barriers to women’s success in combat sports. Young discusses ways in... (shrink)

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields - some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might prohibit having certain inquiring attitudes (“norms of restriction”), while ignoring those that might require having them (“norms of expansion”). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields—some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

It is a commonly held view that Dedekind's construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind's philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which (...) predicativity restrictions ought to be applied; another is to take seriously his remarks about the reals as things created by the cuts, instead of considering them to be the cuts themselves. This can lead us to make finer-grained distinctions about the extent to which impredicative definitions are problematic, since we find that Dedekind's use of impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified by his philosophical views. (shrink)

Budaya massa, dalam pengertian sederhana adalah “karya kreatif yang dimassalkan, yang diproduksi secara masif, yang ditunjang teknologi dan industri tinggi [...] termasuk model pakaian, fashion, film, televisi, musik pop, lifestyle atau gaya hidup” (hlm. xiii-xiv). Agama, atau lebih tepatnya “tafsir atas agama, atau tafsir atas ajaran agama” (hlm. xiv) dapat menjadi tema karya kreatif itu. Contohnya, terutama, sinetron-sinetron religi bernuansa Islami yang sekarang ini semakin banyak tampil pada layar televisi, tanpa menunggu bulan istimewa Ramadhan. Selain itu, agama juga dapat menjadi (...) sensor untuk menentukan karya kreatif yang pantas dimassalkan lewat media elektronik maupun media cetak. sense yang digunakan oleh para penyensor adalah moral dan ajaran agama, yang dalam keyakinan mereka harus dijaga. Para penyensor ini bukan hanya lembaga sensor, melainkan juga kelompok- kelompok yang menyebut diri pembela agama tertentu. Lembaga sensor menyampaikan larangan; kelompok-kelompok ini menyerukan protes. Mengemban misi menjaga moral dan ajaran agama, para penyensor dan pemrotes lebih sering mengajukan argumen sensor yang tidak masuk akal (doesn’t make sense) alias “ajaib” (hlm. 163) dan konyol. Lebih ajaib dan konyol, mereka, yang mengaku menjunjung agama dan moral, tidak punya sense mengenai ketidakadilan, khususnya yang dialami wanita. Produk budaya massa yang menciptakan image negatif wanita dibiarkan menjejali benak masyarakat. Wanita harus dikendalikan sebab ia binal, nakal—dengan cara diambil hak atas tubuhnya, dibung- kam suaranya, dipermalukan di hadapan publik, dan kalau perlu dira- jam oleh massa, yang adalah laki-laki dan (sama-sama) wanita. Ketidakadilan terhadap wanita, yang dipublikasikan oleh budaya massa dan ajaran agama menjadi sorotan utama Veven Sp. Wardhana di dalam buku ini. Dipublikasikan di sini berarti ditampilkan di ruang publik supaya diterima sebagai sesuatu yang wajar dan sewajarnya oleh masyarakat. Perempuan: seksualitas, sunat, syahwat; Puanografi: Yang Bukan Perempuan (Tak) Ambil Bagian; Televisi dan Fashionista atawa Perempuan Nista; Perempuan di Layar Televisi: Dari Losmen sampai sinema Relijius; dan Catatan sipil, Media Hiburan, dan Fatwa Haram adalah lima judul yang paling sarat dengan gugatan Wardhana atas perlakuan tidak adil terhadap wanita di negeri ini.................. Pembaca perlu mengingat bahwa buku ini merupakan kumpulan delapan belas tulisan Wardhana dari berbagai waktu dan ruang publi- kasi. Oleh sebab itu, ada beberapa pembahasan dan contoh kasus yang muncul berulang-ulang, antara lain, mengenai sensor film Yang Muda Yang Bercinta (1977) karya Sjuman Djaya dan isu perkawinan Bambang- Halimah. Dengan demikian, kedelapan belas judul pada buku tidak merepresentasikan sebuah rangkaian pemikiran yang sistematik. Na- mun, hal ini tidak mengurangi nilai karya Wardhana, tidak pula menum- pulkan kritiknya terhadap keempat penguasa ruang publik: budaya massa, agama, kapitalisme, dan politik. Akhirnya, menyajikan karyanya kepada masyarakat, Wardhana mengajak setiap warga negara ini untuk bersikap kritis terhadap karya- karya kreatif yang dipublikasikan lewat media cetak dan media elek- tronik. Masyarakat tidak perlu menunggu pemerintah dan para kreator budaya massa mengubah haluan dari pembodohan ke pencerdasan. Masyarakat sendiri harus mampu menghentikan proses pembodohan dengan menyeleksi bacaan dan tontonan yang mereka sajikan, dan me- milih hanya yang mencerdaskan dirinya. (Yap Fu Lan, Program studi Ilmu Pendidikan Teologi, FKIP, Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya, Jakarta). (shrink)

Alan Richardson’s short book on the history and significance of logical empiricism not only illuminates the importance of logical empiricists’ projects, but also tells us something useful about the ways we choose to do philosophy in the first place. The book’s primary task is providing us with a critical re-evaluation of the legacy of logical empiricism; in doing so, it raises several important metaphilosophical questions. In this article, I will outline three such issues that I think Richardson’s piece brings out (...) and consider some of their impacts on philosophical practice. First, there is the question of philosophical canons and how we teach the history of philosophy. A second related question is how we classify and understand philosophical positions and movements. And the last question I will discuss through logical empiricism is the extent to which we should and can view academic work as morally and politically neutral. (shrink)

Just north of the Arctic Circle sits Kotzebue, a town of the Inupiat people that has endured for over a century. In this compelling visual essay, Dennis Witmer captures scenes on its Front Street, the main thoroughfare whose buildings have evolved from the sod huts of Native cultures to permanent wood and concrete edifices. From front yards with parked snow machines to townspeople peacefully strolling down sidewalks, the striking black-and-white images in Front Street, Kotzebue offer a thought-provoking view of (...) life in the Arctic and people’s methods of coexisting with the brutality of nature. (shrink)

This study aimed at determining B.S. Biology students’ comprehension of the Bioethics principles and conviction schemas towards bioethical issues; as well as at identifying predictors for comprehension of bioethical principles and convictions and creating model constructs of predictors which are fit for the data. One-hundred sixteen Filipino Biology majors were pre and post-tested for comprehension of bioethics principles and convictions towards bioethical issues. Predictors for comprehension and convictions among personal and family background factors, global and primary personality factors, and mental (...) ability were identified through step-wise multiple regression. Constructed path models were tested for goodness of fit using Structural Equation Modeling. Results showed that case study discussion and the bioethics course had positive effects on comprehension of the bioethics principles and on convictions towards bioethical issues. Predictors for comprehension of Bioethics principles before intervention were verbal ability, warmth, and exposure to media. Sex and openness to change were predictors for pre-convictions. Post-conviction predictors were anxiety, self-control, extraversion, liveliness, and perfectionism. Four out of five model constructs were accepted based on model fit criteria. In conclusion, personal factors, i.e., sex and personality factors are contributors in bioethical convictions; not cognitive factors like mental ability or comprehension of Bioethics principles; implying that bioethical convictions are already pre-conceived and that empathy-based experiences may strengthen convictions towards bioethical issues. (shrink)

I start with a critical discussion of some attempts to ground epistemic normativity in curiosity. Then I develop three positive proposals. The first of these proposals is more or less purely philosophical; the second two reside at the interdisciplinary borderline between philosophy and psychology. The proposals are independent and rooted in different literatures. Readers uninterested in the first proposal (and the critical discussion preceding it) may nonetheless be interested in the second two proposals, and vice versa. -/- The proposals are (...) as follows. First I argue that, among several ways in which the notion of curiosity might be used to delineate significant truths from trivial ones, a particular way is the most promising. Second, I argue that curiosity has some underappreciated epistemic roles involving memory. Third, I argue that curiosity has some underappreciated epistemic roles involving coherence. (shrink)

The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...) there is a question whether it is even possible for reasoning to begin in desire, a question arising from the nature of desire and its objects, which to my knowledge has not been articulated. If we can see how desire can provide the arche of action, then we can consider later, and from that vantage point, whether it is necessary that it should do so. It will, I think, be possible eventually to argue that if practical reasoning has the character it must have, if it can begin in desire, then its starting point can be nothing but desire. (shrink)

My article focuses on Le Théâtre existentialiste by Simone de Beauvoir, recently translated and published in the volume of the Beauvoir Series on her literary writings. The first part introduces the original sound recording of this text and the circumstances behind its possible production in New York City in 1947 and my discovery of it at Wellesley College in 1996. The second part analyzes the divisions of Beauvoir's remarks as she presents Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and their principal plays from (...) the period of the Occupation: The Flies, No Exit, and Caligula. The third part then evaluates certain of Beauvoir's key concepts in terms of how they were able to define adequately the substance of existentialist theater for a postwar American audience and whether they remain valid for a more contemporary theatrical public some six decades later. (shrink)

One of the most powerful arguments against socialism consists in the claim that it is incompatible with liberty. In the works of F.A. Hayek, this argument is developed in a sophisticated and systematic manner. Hayek’s attempt to prove the incompatibility of socialism and freedom relies on a concept of liberty that derives from the tradition of classical republicanism, and bears significant resemblance to the one used by current neo-republicans. To be free means not to be ruled in an arbitrary manner, (...) not to be ruled by people, but by laws. Socialism however, Hayek claims, implies the direct and discretionary rule of bureaucrats over the whole economy, and thereby violates liberty. The paper will examine this argument in detail, illuminate its connection to republicanism, and refute it. Such a refutation will not be directed against the concept of liberty employed by Hayek; instead, it will be shown that socialism properly implemented can conform to the demands of Hayek’s liberty. (shrink)

-/- Feminist philosophers Barrett Emerick and Audrey Yap bring theoretical arguments about personhood and moral repair into conversation with the work of activists and the experiences of incarcerated people to make the case that prisons ought to be abolished. They argue that contemporary carceral systems in the United States and Canada fail to treat people as genuine moral agents in ways that also fail victims and their larger communities. Such carceral systems are a form of what Emerick and Yap call (...) “institutionalized moral abandonment”. Instead, they argue that we should create communities of moral solidarity which open up space for wrongdoers to make up for their wrongs. -/- As part of this argument, the book directly addresses one of the paradigm cases of wrongdoing often used to justify carceral systems: rape. Carceral systems that treat perpetrators of sexual violence as irredeemable monsters both obscure the reality of sexual violence and are harmful to everyone involved. -/- As an alternative to carceral systems, Emerick and Yap argue for an orientation towards justice that is grounded in moral repair. This incorporates elements of restorative justice, mutual aid, and harm reduction. Instead of advocating for one specific and universal approach, the authors argue for multigenerational collective action that aims to build resilient communities that support the wellbeing of everyone. (shrink)

This paper extends several themes from recent work on norms of assertion. It does as much by applying those themes to the speech act of asking. In particular, it argues for the view that there is a species of asking which is governed by a certain norm, a norm to the effect that one should ask a question only if one doesn’t know its answer.

When a person commits a testimonial injustice, the unjust thing they do consists in their reaction to an assertion (theorists diverge on the details; paradigmatically the relevant unjust thing consists in prejudicially refraining from believing the assertion). Whatever reactions to questions are analogous to these reactions to assertions, those things are "interrogative injustices". I explore some models of those things and apply them to some non-ideal cases. One of the models appeals to mental states like curiosity and wonder, telling us (...) that interrogative injustice occurs when hearers prejudicially refrain from adopting those mental states. Other models appeal to common conversational goals – these goals including the answering of questions. On these models, interrogative injustice occurs when a person asks a question, and another person prejudicially blocks the answering of that question from joining the common goals. Or, if they don’t block said answering, perhaps they believe that it should be thus blocked. Or perhaps they merely resist the question, not fully blocking its answering from joining the common goals but instead pushing back against it in some other way. Or perhaps they merely believe that they should resist the question. I endorse a pluralism on which each of these things can be an interrogative injustice. (shrink)

According to the modal interpretation, the standard mathematical framework of quantum mechanics specifies the physical magnitudes of a system, which have definite values. Probabilities are assigned to the possible values that these magnitudes may adopt. The interpretation is thus concerned with physical properties rather than with measurement results: it is a realistic interpretation. One of the notable achievements of this interpretation is that it dissolves the notorious measurement problem. The papers collected here, together with the introduction and concluding critical appraisal, (...) explain the various forms of the modal interpretation, survey its achievements, and discuss those problems that have yet to be solved. Audience: Philosophers of science, theoretical physicists, and graduate students in these disciplines. (shrink)

Is it possible to measure psychological attributes like intelligence, personality and attitudes and if so, how does that work? What does the term 'measurement' mean in a psychological context? This fascinating and timely book discusses these questions and investigates the possible answers that can be given response. Denny Borsboom provides an in-depth treatment of the philosophical foundations of widely used measurement models in psychology. The theoretical status of classical test theory, latent variable theory and positioned in terms of the underlying (...) philosophy of science. Special attention is devoted to the central concept of test validity and future directions to improve the theory and practice of psychological measurement are outlined. (shrink)

(2008). 2007 AESA Presidential Address Conflict of the Faculties: Democratic Progressivism in the Age of “No Child Left Behind”. Educational Studies: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 94-113.