Christian Protestants typically affirm both the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith. Yet these two commitments generatean apparently self-destructive dilemma—one I call the dilemma of sanctification. The prima facie puzzle can be resolved in at least three ways. In this paper, I articulate the dilemma of sanctification in some detail and offer an argument against a widely-held Protestant solution I call provisionism. This constitutes indirect support for the solution I find most (...) promising, namely, a doctrine of purgatory. I close by sketching a model of purgatory consistent with Protestant soteriology. (shrink)

False dilemma is a specific form of reasoning : despite the fact that it is based on a deductively valid argument form, it is rightly depicted as fallacy. A systematic exposition of false dilemma is missing in theoretical approaches to fallacies. This article formulates six criteria for a well-grounded exposition of a fallacy, suggesting also a systematic exposition of false dilemma. These criteria can be used to both explain, and categorise, the various false dilemma fallacies. The (...) article introduces distinction between four types of false dilemma : False quandary, Defeasible sound quandary, False obstruction and Defeasible sound obstruction. The types of criticism appropriate for each variant of false dilemma are suggested. Being able to discover false dilemma in situations when it is important to make good and free choices is a significant dimension of critical thinking. It may liberate us from accepting the consequences that necessarily follow from prearranged alternatives, when these are not the only alternatives possible. It may also liberate us from refraining from actions on the basis of obstructive disjunctive statements. In that respect, the faculty of critical thinking directed at uncovering reasoning based on false dilemma may also initiate the discovery of new alternatives, or discover the ways of unifying seemingly opposing alternatives. Thus, a well-developed ability to understand the tricky argumentative moves of false dilemma may be a good step towards initiating some features of creative thinking. (shrink)

This paper examines the tension between creative destruction—an inherent feature of capitalist economies—and the ideal of autonomy. Creative destruction is vital for economic growth, but it undermines the conditions necessary for autonomy by disrupting individuals’ ability to plan their lives. This creates a dilemma: we must either abandon the ideal of autonomy or economic growth. The paper explores potential regulatory strategies to mitigate the impact of disruptive innovation on life plans, but argues these ultimately fail. It then proposes a (...) novel conception of autonomy consistent with capitalist creative destruction. With artificial intelligence poised to initiate unparalleled creative destruction, understanding this dilemma and potential solutions is crucial from an ethical perspective. The paper contends its revised conception of autonomy offers a path forward amidst transformative technological change. (shrink)

The central dilemma for Chinese science and technology (S&T) policy is how to reform and improve such policies without the deleterious interventions of the past. In a centralized S&T system, government intervention has proved at times disruptive and even destructive to efforts at national economic advancement. The historical processes within China have produced an S&T system with enormous potential but plagued by difficulties in investment strategies and capacity for innovation. Simply put, investment levels have been low, and the (...) capacity to generate more funding is lacking. How to improve the situation and confront the competitive challenges posed by a more transparent international economic system are considered in the last part of the article. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pickel and Rabern (2016) argue that a dynamic Tarskian semantics resolves Fine’s antinomy of the variable without the radical consequences for semantics proposed by Fine (2003, 2007). While Pickel and Rabern’s basic insight—a parameter of discourse context that tracks occurrences of variable-binding expressions—is important, I will argue that their own Tarskian theory faces a destructive dilemma: either their theory does not resolve Fine’s antinomy as they propose, or their theory does not reflect the intuitive (...) motivation for what they call structured meanings. I suggest that in response to this dilemma we should reject one of the principles that generates Pickel and Rabern’s version of the antinomy. Here Pickel and Rabern’s insight has surprising, but salutary, foundational consequences for semantics. (shrink)

Many of the problems we face can usefully be modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas. All the standard game-theoretic solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games. But too often some aspects of our social interaction are as much obscured by, as illuminated by, game theory. Removing some of the epistemic constraints often accepted by game theorists will enable us to distinguish between productive and destructive prisoners’ dilemmas. Doing so is an important step in understanding the nature (...) of some of our social problems. (shrink)

As environmental and conservation efforts increasingly turn towards agricultural landscapes, it is important to understand how land management decisions are made by agricultural producers. While previous studies have explored producer decision-making, many fail to recognize the importance of external structural influences. This paper uses a case study to explore how consolidated markets and increasing corporate power in the food system can constrain producer choice and create ethical dilemmas over land management. Crop growers in the Central Coast region of California face (...) conflicting demands regarding environmental quality and industry imposed food safety standards. A mail survey and personal interviews were used to explore growers’ perceptions and actions regarding these demands. Results indicate that in many cases growers face serious ethical dilemmas and feel pressured by large processing and retail firms to adopt measures they find environmentally destructive and unethical. Future strategies to address environmental issues on agricultural landscapes should consider the economic constraints producers face and the role of large firms in creating production standards. (shrink)

Local food critics have recently argued that locavores, unaware of economic laws and principles, are ironically promoting a future characterized by less food security and more environmental destruction. In this paper, we critically examine the ways in which mainstream economics discourse is employed in arguments to undermine the proclaimed benefits of local food. We focus on several core concepts in economics—comparative advantage, scale, trade and efficiency—and show how they have been used to challenge claims about local food’s benefits in the (...) areas of economy, environment, food security, and food quality. After reviewing the arguments, we then evaluate some shortcomings that emerge from this reliance on economic logic and, importantly, we assess what local food proponents may take away from these critiques. We conclude by identifying several pathways for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Good Work:An Engaged Buddhist Response to the Dilemmas of ConsumerismDavid Landis BarnhillConsumerism is such an ingrained part of our culture, it is paradoxically difficult to avoid and easy to ignore. Sometimes it seems like the water we modern fish swim in.But the Buddhist call to awareness of our state of mind and the nature of reality leads us to reflect on it, to encounter it as directly as possible. (...) When we do, it is all too clear that consumerism goes directly against virtually everything Buddhism stands for. In thinking about a Buddhist response to it, what first comes to mind is the rich monastic tradition, with its trenchant analysis of the pervasiveness of desires, the ideal of life lifted free of craving, and the inviting simplicity of the communal life. But as an engaged Buddhist, I almost immediately feel that, compelling as it is, this monastic tradition is insufficient, particularly at a time when consumerism has become so devastating on a global scale. While the monastic tradition offers a model of a nonconsumer lifestyle, it does little to affect the industrialized world's accelerating exhaustion of natural resources. I sometimes put this point in mythical Buddhist imagery by saying that we live in a culture of hungry ghosts.1 But that would be optimistic. While hungry ghosts have a bloated stomach of insatiable cravings, their throats are as thin as pins. Modern culture has a gargantuan mouth and throat, and yet we still act as if our bellies are empty.So what can we as Buddhists do about such a destructive culture? Engaged Buddhism is a way of confronting social, political, and psychological poisons that threaten our world, and it offers an effective counter to consumer culture in at least three main ways. There is the extension of the Buddhist analysis of reality beyond the psychological and the metaphysical to the social, structural dimension of life of economic systems and political institutions. In the social context, the Buddhist truth of the mutual co-arising of phenomena takes on a more immense scope than the mere conditioning of consciousness, and a more concrete—and thus soiled—quality than Huayan Buddhism's mesmerizing metaphysics of Indra's net. The interpenetration of life (pratītya-samutpāda) includes billboards and boardrooms, peasants uprooted from their land as coffee is planted in their place. I live not just in interrelationship with the postglacial hills of Wisconsin but also with the mountains of toxins spewed [End Page 55] into the air to give us cheap, but very costly, energy. As Stephen Batchelor has said, "the contemporary social engagement of Dharma practice is rooted in awareness of how self-centered confusion and craving can no longer be adequately understood only as psychological drives that manifest themselves in subjective states of anguish. We find these drives embodied in the very economic, military, and political structures that influence the lives of the majority of the people on Earth."2 Engaged Buddhism gives us an incisive way to comprehend and critique our situation, and we stand on more solid ground as we view the vast and painful interconnections.Second, engaged Buddhism also can give us a vision of a social and political alternative, one that is based not on the three poisons of greed, hatred, and delusion but on generosity, compassion, and wisdom. But in doing so Buddhism must go beyond the limits of its own tradition and draw on the insights of contemporary social and environmental philosophies, from anarchism to bioregionalism. A creative merging of Buddhism and such ecosocial thought can help us work toward a modern life of communalism rather than consumerism, of contentment rather than self-perpetuating desire.3Third, engaged Buddhism gives us a basis for directly responding to a world of craving and suffering. Activism against the rising tide of consumerism—and against the social, political, and military structures and the deafening ideologies that support it—can emerge from a meditational steadiness. Contemplative activism avoids rage, burnout, and psychic numbness and allows us to meet greed and hatred with peace in a spirituality of resistance. Such a religiously based activism, however, needs to join hands4 with social philosophy and... (shrink)

The Arab Spring, with its calls for sweeping political change, marked the most profound popular uprising in the Middle East for generations. But if the nascent democracies born of these protests are to succeed in the absence of a strong democratic tradition, their success will depend in part on an understanding of how Middle Easterners view themselves, their allegiances to family and religion, and their relationship with the wider world in which they are increasingly integrated. Many of these same questions (...) were raised by Alexis de Tocqueville during his 1831 tour of America, itself then a rising democracy. Joshua Mitchell spent years teaching Tocqueville’s classic account, _Democracy in America, _in America and the Arab Gulf and, with _Tocqueville in Arabia_, he offers a profound personal take. One of the reasons for the book’s widespread popularity in the region is that its commentary on the challenges of democracy and the seemingly contradictory concepts of equality and individuality continue to speak to current debates. While Mitchell’s American students tended to value the individualism of commercial self-interest, his Middle Eastern students had grave doubts about individualism and a deep suspicion for capitalism, which they saw as risking the destruction of long-held loyalties and obligations. When asked about suffering, American students answered in psychological or sociological terms, while Middle Eastern students understood it in terms of religion. Mitchell describes modern democratic man as becoming what Tocqueville predicted: a “distinct kind of humanity” that would be increasingly isolated and alone. Whatever their differences, students in both worlds were grappling with a sense of disconnectedness that social media does little to remedy. We live in a time rife with mutual misunderstandings between America and the Middle East, and _Tocqueville in Arabia_ offers a guide to the present, troubled times, leavened by the author’s hopes about the future. (shrink)

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is based essentially (...) on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; commit to mutual contracts; keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Biological Weapons Convention Experiments of Concern Dual‐Use Research: The Ethical Issues Dissemination of Dual‐Use Research Results The Regulation of Dual‐Use Research An Independent Authority Conclusion.

This article discusses Ibn Sīnā’s reasons for upholding the eternity of the world in his major philosophical writings and the ensuing heated debate between his detractors (al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī) and supporters (al-Ṭūsī and al-Āmidī). I argue that notwithstanding the responses and surrejoinders it had elicited, Ibn Sīnā’s position on the issue is indeed coherent and irrefutable, since he distinguishes three modes of eternity, corresponding to the hierarchy of beings which he introduced, namely, (i) absolutely eternal (by virtue of itself); (...) (ii) relatively eternal (by virtue of something else); and (iii) not eternal both considered per se as well per aliud. With this distinction he evades both horns of the dilemma: either the universe is eternal or it is not eternal. On Ibn Sīnā’s account, therefore, the universe is both eternal and not eternal. It is eternal because the efficient cause that necessitates and sustains its existence is eternal, but also not eternal in view of its essential contingency. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1. General obligations. Conflicts of interest -- Uncompensated work -- Community service -- Pro bono work -- Living conditions -- Working conditions -- Layoffs -- Unequal pay -- 2. Obligations to the public. Repressive governments -- Corrupt politicians -- Public officials -- Public opinion -- Public bailouts -- Public reviews -- Public health -- Cultural differences -- 3. Obligations to the client. Self-destructive behavior -- Distrustful behavior -- Dishonest behavior -- Deceptive behavior -- Spendthrift behavior -- Solicitous (...) behavior -- Unrealistic expectations -- Manipulative situations -- 4. Obligations to the profession. Greed -- Insensitivity -- Jealousy -- Betrayal -- Treachery -- Unfairness -- Uncertainty -- Cheating -- 5. Obligations to colleagues. Office affairs -- Working hours -- Labor law violations -- Crediting coworkers -- Accommodating disabilities -- Firm bankruptcy -- Firm loyalties -- Untrustworthy colleagues -- 6. Obligations to the environment. Environmental hypocrisy -- Environmental conflicts -- Contextual conflicts -- Social justice -- Future generations -- Other species -- Reducing waste -- Reducing consumption -- Why ethics matters now. (shrink)

The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will (...) be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. (shrink)

Shortly before the end of his life, Cornelius Castoriadis turned to radical political ecology, which he seemed to consider the only way to de-colonize the technicist, capitalist imaginary ( imaginaire), into which the totality of modern philosophy and praxis is, to use a Heideggerian concept, (heteronomously) being-thrown. Castoriadis’ critique of the capitalist imaginary, the imaginary of the unlimited extension of rational mastery, is in a state of eclectic affinity with the unsurpassed critique of the autonomous Technique by the French theologian (...) and sociologist Jacques Ellul. Ellul had highlighted the necessity of demythologizing the spirit of technicism since the 1940s, when he was working on the uncontrollability of modern technology, which in his work is depicted as the societal manifestation of the Ge-stell. The Weberian ideal type of formal rationality runs through the critique of both thinkers. For Ellul, technology, or technique, is intrinsically rational. However, when technique is in contact with social and cultural milieus which belong to a non-technical formation and organization, paradoxes and irrationalities are inevitable. In turn, Castoriadis emphasizes the irrationality and autonomy that characterize the modern sphere of techno-science, which leads, with mathematical precision, to the ecological, and also the anthropological, destruction of the Anthropos. Therein lies the central problem of modernity’s technology. Is there a way out? Castoriadis envisions the foundation of a true democracy, nowhere near theocratic, which, nonetheless, must learn to limit itself politically and technologically. Ellul, on the other hand, highlights the ethics of non-power, an essentially spiritual and idealistic attitude that Hans Jonas will adopt a few years later, talking about the heuristics of fear. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one (...) can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life. On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it. (shrink)

B      opens his discussion of the problem of universals, in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, with a destructive dilemma: genera and species either exist or are concepts; but they can neither exist nor be soundly conceived; therefore the enquiry into them should be abandoned (In Isag. maior . ). Boethius’ strategy to get around this dilemma is well known. He follows the lead of Alexander of Aphrodisias, distinguishing several ways in which (...) genera and species can be conceived, and he argues that at least one way involves no falsity. Hence it is possible to conceive genera and species soundly, and Porphyry’s enquiry into them is therefore not futile after all (. ). Boethius thus resolves the second horn of his opening dilemma. Yet he allows the first horn of the dilemma, the claim that genera and species cannot exist, to stand. The implication is that he takes his arguments for this claim to be sound. If so, this would be a philosophically exciting and significant result, well worth exploring in its own right. Yet there is no consensus, either medieval or modern, on precisely what Boethius’ arguments are, or even how many arguments he offers, much less on their soundness. One reason for the lack.. (shrink)

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge (...) that it must be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

In this paper we propose to present from a new perspective some loci comunes of traditional logic. More exactly, we intend to show that some hypothetico-disjunctive inferences (i.e. the complex constructive dilemma, the complex destructive dilemma, the simple constructive dilemma, the simple destructive dilemma) and two hypothetico-categorical inferences (namely modus ponendo-ponens and modus tollendo-tollens) particularize two more abstract inferential structures: the constructive n-lemma and the destructive nlemma.

Everyone misses the point of Plato's cave. What a coincidence, because everyone also misses the point of BioShock. The moment one's interactivity with the game is revealed as a fake isn't the moment when one kills Andrew Ryan in a cutscene. It's what happens after that. Atlas tells to abort the self‐destruct sequence. One has the choice of whether to abort self‐destruct sequence or not, but, positioned as it is, that choice has been exposed as meaningless within the basic fabric (...) of game's mechanics. The non‐choice of disarming self‐destruct sequence ends up in the same place as the other, more famous ethical dilemma of BioShock; the choice of whether to harvest the Little Sisters or to save them. That's the part that everyone gets wrong where BioShock is concerned, and so it's the part where comparing the game to Plato's cave can really help get both of them right. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The destruction of the environment is a matter for moral concern and cannot be halted in the long term by appeals to human utility. However, the inadequacy and naïvety of humanist styles of ethical argument become apparent when attempts are made to extend them to environmental issues. They usually abstract certain supposed features of natural objects, e.g. sentience, and reify these as essential characteristics which operate to carry or ground ethical values. These arguments necessarily lead to the exclusion of (...) objects which are, in fact, ethically valued or entail an unacceptably expansive egalitarianism. Such egalitarianism is often followed by a return to human‐centred prejudices opposed to the originally stated aims of ‘biocentric’ethicists like Taylor. Similarly, those physical and ecological holisms which rely not upon shared ‘natural’features, but upon sharing in nature itself cannot solve this dilemma as they are incapable of explaining differential ethical values. The attempt to place boundaries on moral considerability should be abandoned in favour of an ethical pluralism which places emphasis on the context of valuations. (shrink)

The world population is growing, yet we continue to pursue higher levels of well-being, and as a result, increasing energy demands and the destructive effects of climate change are just two of many major threats that we face. Engineers play an indispensable role in addressing these challenges, and whether they recognize it or not, in doing so they will inevitably encounter a whole range of ethical choices and dilemmas. This book examines and explains the ethical issues in engineering, showing (...) how they affect assessment, design, sustainability, and globalization, and explores many recent examples including the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Dieselgate, 'naked scanners' at airports, and biofuel production. Detailed but accessible, the book will enable advanced engineering students and professional engineers to better identify and address the ethical problems in their practice. (shrink)

This paper discusses the critical necessity of teaching students about the social and ethical responsibilities of scientists. Both a university scientist and a middle school science teacher reflect on the value of teaching the ethical issues that confront scientists. In the development of the atomic bomb in the US-led Manhattan Project, scientists faced the growing threat of atomic bombs by the Germans and Japanese and the ethical issues involved in successfully completing such a destructive weapon. The Manhattan Project is (...) a prime example of the types of ethical dilemmas and social responsibilities that scientists may confront. (shrink)

Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement (those involving genetic engineering or pharmaceuticals) present a serious threat to humanity, since the fruits of such enhancement, accelerated scientific progress, will give the morally corrupt minority of humanity new and more effective ways to cause great harm. And yet it is scientific progress, accelerated by non-traditional cognitive enhancement, which could allow us to dramatically morally enhance human beings, thereby eliminating, or at least reducing, the threat from the (...) morally corrupt minority. I argue that this apparently intractable dilemma is less difficult to resolve than Persson and Savulescu suppose. Their analysis of non-traditional cognitive enhancement overstates the risks and undervalues the benefits that such enhancement might provide. Once the benefits are better described, it is clear that non-traditional cognitive enhancement could be the means of our survival, not of our destruction. (shrink)

Given the promise of stem cell therapies, scientists throughout the world are conducting stem cell research using various kinds of stem cells including human embryonic stem cells. However, HESC research is very controversial in some societies as the extraction of stem cells involves the destruction of the human embryo. The ethical concerns of this kind of research have led scientists to search for other methods to derive stem cells that do not involve the destruction of embryos. These different types of (...) stem cell research are said to sidestep the ethical dilemma associated with HESC research and so are considered as ethically acceptable ways to obtain stem cells; possibly, they may even mark the end of HESC research. However, each of these stem cell methods presents its own challenges, scientific and ethical, as this article explores. This paper examines the impact of the emergence of different types of stem cell research and discusses whether it is still necessary for scientists to conduct the contentious HESC research. (shrink)

Robots have been introduced into our society, but their social role is still unclear. A critical issue is whether the robot’s exhibition of intelligent behaviour leads to the users’ perception of the robot as being a social actor, similar to the way in which people treat computers and media as social actors. The first experiment mimicked Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiment, but on a robot. The participants were asked to administer electric shocks to a robot, and the results show that people (...) have fewer concerns about abusing robots than about abusing other people. We refined the methodology for the second experiment by intensifying the social dilemma of the users. The participants were asked to kill the robot. In this experiment, the intelligence of the robot and the gender of the participants were the independent variables, and the users’ destructive behaviour towards the robot the dependent variable. Several practical and methodological problems compromised the acquired data, but we can conclude that the robot’s intelligence had a significant influence on the users’ destructive behaviour. We discuss the encountered problems and suggest improvements. We also speculate on whether the users’ perception of the robot as being “sort of alive” may have influenced the participants’ abusive behaviour. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal Jonathan Pugh critiques the idea of intermediate ‘moral respect’ which some say is owed to embryos. This concept is inherent within the ‘principle of proportionality’, the principle that destructive research on embryos is permissable only if the research serves an important purpose. Pugh poses two specific questions to proponents of the idea of intermediate moral respect. This article argues that while the questions posed by Pugh are certainly pertinent to the debate, the (...) hypothetical responses he suggests to these questions do not quite get to the core of what is troublesome about the concept. The article suggests alternative responses to Pugh's questions in order to focus attention on more fundamental problems facing the idea of intermediate moral respect, while also pointing to how the intermediate moral respect proponent might best develop these responses. It goes on to argue that these hypothetical responses fail to answer convincingly the questions posed. More specifically, this article challenges two possible justifications for the distinct idea of intermediate moral respect, namely the argument from potentiality and an argument from the proportionality of fundamental moral status. The article also raises a dilemma inherent in the application of the principle of proportionality to cases involving beings to which intermediate moral respect is owed even where it is allowed, ex hypothesi, that both the category of intermediate moral respect and the general proportionality reasoning underpinning the principle of proportionality are basically cogent. This article thus develops and adds to the challenge laid down by Pugh to proponents of the idea of intermediate moral respect. (shrink)

The extreme skepticism that Hume’s dangerous dilemma introduces at the end of the first Book of the Treatise is deeply unsettling, in part because it seems to undermine Hume’s commitments to common life and philosophy, but also because Hume seems not to take its sweeping doubts seriously. He refuses to abandon his daily activities and philosophical pursuits, and he offers no clear account of what entitles him to sustain them. This paper explores a variety of tactics for addressing these (...) opposing elements of his thought. The most radical approach has Hume endorse nothing whatsoever in the Treatise, a maneuver that prevents any conflict between his doubts and his commitments from arising, though at a tremendous cost. A more charitable strategy allows Hume to speak with one consistent voice throughout the text by rejecting, repurposing, or restricting either his doubts or his commitments in a way that resolves the tension between them. Yet a third approach takes Hume to advance incompatible and irreconcilable positions but holds that the inconsistency in his thinking is not as destructive as it initially appears. None of the most promising ways of developing these proposals eliminates or satisfactorily eases the conflict in Hume’s work, and the enormous obstacles that they face give us little reason to hope for something better. (shrink)

Proportionality has long been considered a pillar of just war theory, requiring that the goods achieved in an action outweigh the collateral harms it causes. In this article, I argue that the in bello principle of proportionality cannot serve its intended function of limiting the destructiveness of actions during war. I illustrate the features of war that make the in bello proportionality constraint not merely impossible to follow, but perhaps even self-defeating. I conclude by suggesting ways in which theorists and (...) policymakers concerned with justice in war might attempt to respond to this dilemma. (shrink)

In organic farming animal welfare is one important aspect included in the internationally agreed organic principles of health, ecology, fairness and care (IFOAM 2006), reflecting expectation of consumers and farmers. The definition of organic animal welfare includes—besides traditional terms of animal welfare—‘regeneration’ and ‘naturalness’. Organic animal welfare assessment needs to reflect this and use complex parameters, include natural behaviour and a systemic view. Furthermore, various parties with seemingly conflicting interests are involved, causing ethical dilemmas, such as the use of nose (...) rings for outdoor sows (impaired animal welfare vs. destruction of humus). Solutions can only be found when foundational concepts are translated and applied to practical situations. On-farm animal welfare assessment and implementation of improvement strategies are increasingly relevant scientific areas. They combine on-farm welfare assessment, identification of key problem areas and connected risk factors. Constant communication between all parties is crucial for success. Animal health and welfare planning is one application of this approach, which was carried out on Austrian organic pig farms as well as organic dairy farms in seven European countries. The projects included welfare assessment, feedback and benchmarking as a tool for communication between farmers, advisors and scientists. Finally goals were set by the farmer and improvement strategies applicable to organic farming were implemented. This included prevention of disease by management strategies instead of routine treatment with pharmaceutical products. It appeared that next to problem structuring, multidisciplinary problem solving demands good communications skills to relate animal welfare science to value reflections. (shrink)

There are three kinds of nature singled out according to the physical contact with the man: “nature immune from man”, “nature touched by man”, and “nature transformed by man”. The latter type is of highest relevance for the man’s present dilemmas. The extrapolation of present tendencies of the man-nature relations is summarized in the two basic dilemma: ecological dilemma/either the development of the modern technologies or the destruction of human ecological environment/, and peace dilemma /either to continue (...) the nuclear arms race or the total nuclear disarmament/. There are four types of situations facing the man when avoiding the negative results of trends in the transformation of nature, which are linked with legal phllosophy. The man-nature relations are axiologically ambivalent because the transformed nature is the challenge, but calls for looking at nature as apart of our life, and to exist with it in in it. (shrink)

The first feature film made about the design and deployment of the atomic bomb, The Beginning or the End (1947), begins with fake newsreel footage depicting the burial in a time capsule of a copy of the film and a projector to show it on. The scene, with its funereal overtones yet grim optimism that, even in the face of catastrophic destruction, the germ of civilization will endure, recalls the ceremonies surrounding the interment of the Westinghouse time capsule at the (...) New York World’s Fair in 1939. Time capsules, this article argues, stand in a complex relation to war and temporality, seeking to at once anticipate and work through the challenge posed to futurity by the threat of global conflict. As a container, the capsule attempts to deliver and control the reception of a legible inventory of the present, yet the principle of selection and the impossibility of predicting how information might be received in the deep future – if it is received at all – threatens this aim. The dilemma faced by time capsule curators is, we argue with reference to William Burroughs’ and Brion Gysin’s so-called cut-up method of writing, one of control. By reading the time capsule through the cut-up, anticipated catastrophe can be seen to be functioning proleptically in the present and already active as a challenge to the capsule as proof against disaster. (shrink)

The most basic aim of the psychological and pedagogical advisory centre is providing the child and its family with support at every stage of the problems arising. The target of such centres is also undertaking preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, counselling and advisory actions. The profession of a diagnostic – therapeutic counsellor triggers ethical dilemma. Two parties meet and interact with each other in the relations occurring in such advisory centres – the counsellor and the person who needs advice and help. (...) To enable such a contact and make it effectively therapeutic instead of destructive, specialists employed in these centres have to be not only competent and highly qualified but also should possess a sufficient amount of knowledge about themselves, their system of values, opinions etc. (shrink)

This book review of Lieber and Press's “The myth of the nuclear revolution: Power politics in the atomic age" challenges the authors' position that nuclear weapons essentially have the same properties of conventional weapons. We argue that nuclear weapons alter warfare because they can end human civilization, and they pose a shared risk of mutual destruction.

Il y a trois défis pour la sécurité de l’Ouest. Le premier est que l’Ouest, comparé à l’Asie de l’Est, est en déclin. Dans vingt-cinq ans, la taille économique de la Chine continentale pourrait être supérieure à la taille du marché américain ; celle de l’Inde et de l’Indonesie être supérieure à la taille économique de l’Allemagne ; celle de la Corée du Sud excéder l’Angleterre ou la France ou l’Italie. Le second est la prolifération d’un savoir à doubleemploi et (...) le désastre économique de l’ex-Union Soviétique qui auront pour conséquence vraisemblable une prolifération du nucléaire. Le troisième concerne les changements de valeurs qui s’opèrent à l’Ouest et qui favorisent la formation de sociétés occidentales de moins en moins aptes à attaquer ou à se défendre. Mais la réduction du poids de l’Occident dans l’économie globale ne garantit plus que les efforts faciles l’emportent face aux défis du futur, qu’ils viennent des pouvoirs renforcés de l’Est asiatique ou des “desperados” islamiques. Ces défis ne seront vraisemblablement pas relevés au moyen de deux fausses prescriptions qui trouvent quelques faveurs en Europe Continentale. Premièrement, une grande partie de l’Europe de l’Ouest est lasse d’être confrontée à la “destruction créatrice” de ses emplois du fait de la concurrence de l’Asie de l’Est et désire ardemment le protectionnisme. Le remède protectionniste se bâtit sur un diagnostic grandement correct des problèmes occidentaux, mais il est tout de même dangereux si l’on met en perspective la morale, l’économie et la politique du pouvoir. Deuxièmement, certains Européens reconnaissent à juste titre que les grandes puissances historiques, comme la Grande- Bretagne ou la France ou l’Allemagne, n’ont plus une envergure suffisante pour être qualifiées de grandes puissances. Cependant, elles sousestiment la gravité et la vitesse du déclin de l’Occident. Une Europe définie par le noyau dur francoallemand deviendra trop étroite, avant même qu’elle ne soit établie dans cette structure. Vraisemblablement, même l’Union Européenne dans sa totalité sera trop petite avant qu’elle ne devienne une véritable communauté sur le plan sécuritaire. Au lieu de ces fausses prescriptions, cet article propose trois réponses aux dilemmes de l’Occident, ou encore trois façons de gérer le déclin de l’Occident. Premièrement, seule la coopération atlantique promet d’être une réponse efficace au dynamisme de l’Asie de l’Est et au déclin de l’Ouest. De plus, la coopération entre l’Amérique du Nord et l’Europe de l’Ouest a besoin d’être complétée par un nouvel engagement à l’égard d’une économie globale ouverte et d’une disposition à s’ajuster aux défis de celle-ci, afin de coopter l’Est asiatique dans une sphère globale de coprospérité. Cela doit vraisemblablement engendrer quelques coupes radicales dans l’Etat-providence. Deuxièmement, la prolifération nucléaire exige aussi une réponse. Il est concevable que la stratégie de défense contre la Chine soit encore plus difficile dans une vingtaine d’années qu’elle le fut contre l’Union Soviétique dans les années 1980. Mais cela ne devrait pas être une excuse pour ne pas construire des missiles de défense en réponse à ceux de l’Iran, de l’Irak, de la Lybie ou de l’Algerie. Troisièmement, les changements des valeurs en Occident semblent plus difficiles à traiter, mais ils renforcent la nécessité d’investir dans la coopération occidentale plutôt qu’uniquement européenne, la nécessité de coopter l’Asie de l’Est plutôt que de plonger dans une autre guerre froide, et la nécessité de contenir l’Etat-providence plutôt que de le développer. There are three challenges to Western security. First, compared to East Asia the West is in decline. In another twenty-five years, the economic size of Mainland China may exceed the size of the American market, India and Indonesia may exceed Germany, South Korea may exceed Britain or France or Italy. Second, the proliferation of dual use knowledge and the economic disaster in the former Soviet Union are likely to result in some nuclear proliferation. Third, value changes within the West will make Western societies ever less capable of deterrence and defense. But the reduced weight of the West in the global economy no longer guarantees that leisurely efforts succeed in meeting future challengers, whether from East Asian great powers or Islamic desperados. These challenges are unlikely to be met by two false prescriptions which enjoy some appeal in Continental Europe. First, much of Western Europe gets tired of observing the “creative destruction” of its jobs by East Asian competitors and longs for protectionism. The protectionist cure is built on a largely correct diagnosis of some Western problems, but nevertheless dangerous from an economic, moral, and power politics perspective. Second, some Europeans rightly recognize that historical great powers, like Britain or France or Germany, are no longer large enough to be great powers. But they underestimate the severity and speed of the decline of the West. A Franco- German core Europe will become too small, even before it is established. Conceivably, even the entire European Union will be too small before it becomes an effective security community. Instead of these false prescriptions this paper advocates three responses to Western dilemmas, or three modes of managing Western decline. First, only Atlantic cooperation promises to be an effective response to East Asian dynamism and Western decline. Moreover, cooperation between North America and Western Europe needs to be complemented with a renewed commitment to an open global economy and a readiness to adjust to its challenges, in order to coopt East Asia into a global co-prosperity sphere. This is likely to necessitate some radical cuts in the welfare state. Second, nuclear proliferation also needs some response. Conceivably, strategic defense is as difficult against China twenty years from now, as it was against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. But this should be no excuse for not building a missile and air defense against the likes of Iran, Iraq, Lybia, or Algeria. Third, the value changes within the West seem least tractable, but they reinforce the necessity of investing in Western rather than merely European cooperation, the necessity of coopting East Asia rather than stumbling into another Cold War, and the necessity for containing the welfare state rather than expanding it. (shrink)

What moral status should we attribute to stem cells? To answer this neglected question, we look in this essay at the properties of embryos and other entities that could develop into beings who have uncontested moral status, namely, adult humans. Our analysis indicates that those who grant moral status to embryos should also grant it to stem cells. This has implications that verge on absurdity, since even if we were to try to do what we can to protect these entities, (...) we would face the dilemma that the development of any embryo requires the destruction of other potential beings. We respond to objections, including the claim that the destruction of human embryos is wrong not because of the potential of human embryos but because human embryos are actual beings with a rational nature. We conclude that the more plausible position is to deny moral status to embryos, and thus to stem cells as well. (shrink)

What exactly are we conscious beings? Do we have immaterial souls, souls that are substances and can survive the destruction of our physical bodies? Richard Swinburne has recently given an affirmative answer to the latter question on the basis of a strikingly simple Cartesian argument. This paper shows why Swinburne’s argument ultimately fails, owing to an instructive dilemma concerning the logical possibility of conscious beings’ surviving bodily destruction. Perhaps we do have substantial immaterial souls, but Swinburne’s Cartesian argument, we (...) shall see, does not cogently deliver the conclusion that we do. (shrink)

We investigate the entrepreneurial opportunities and ethical dilemmas presented by technological turbulence. More specifically we investigate the line between Baumol’s [J. Polit. Econ. 98 (1990) 893] productive (e.g. innovation), unproductive (e.g. rent seeking) and destructive (e.g. criminal) entrepreneurship through three examples of Internet innovation – spam (destructive), music file sharing (unproductive), and Internet pharmacies (potentially productive). The emergence of accessible Internet technologies, under present norms, has created the potential for all three entrepreneurial activities. Because of the propensity for (...) self-serving biases and for bending the rules, the need for creativity in overcoming obstacles and overall liabilities of newness, entrepreneurs are likely to challenge established industrial morals and laws. Unlike new entrants, incumbents must abide by the currently accepted norms, and thus suffer from “liabilities of oldness”. The challenge for new entrants is to change sociopolitical legitimacy, whereas incumbents need to defend the established norms. We discuss competitive and other issues that result from technological turbulence and innovation. (shrink)

Existing approaches to campaign ethics fail to adequately account for the “arms races” incited by competitive incentives in the absence of effective sanctions for destructive behaviors. By recommending scrupulous devotion to unenforceable norms of honesty, these approaches require ethical candidates either to quit or lose. To better understand the complex dilemmas faced by candidates, therefore, we turn first to the tradition of “adversarial ethics,” which aims to enable ethical participants to compete while preventing the most destructive excesses of (...) competition. As we demonstrate, however, elections present even more difficult challenges than other adversarial contexts, because no centralized regulation is available to halt potential arms races. Turning next to recent scholarship on populism and partisanship, we articulate an alternative framework for campaign ethics, which allows candidates greater room to maneuver in their appeals to democratic populations while nevertheless requiring adherence to norms of social and political pluralism. (shrink)

Marxism, naturalism and existentialism see the need for philosophical anthropology. marx profited from feuerbach's vindication of the concrete human being, but added the dimension of revolutionary transformation of society. dewey accepted bacon's close knitting of man and nature, while closing any rifts among the values and aspirations in evolving society. sartre took a lucid atheism as his first premise, judged man's search after god as self-destructive, and was left with the dilemma that social existence is either futile or (...) to be dialectically interpreted. (shrink)

Las personas portadoras o enfermas del virus de inmunodeficiencia humana han experimentado consecuencias devastadoras en el plano personal, familiar y social desde la aparición de los primeros casos. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar el cumplimiento de los principios bioéticos, así como la repercusión derivada de las implicaciones éticas del actuar profesional con estos pacientes, lo cual demuestra la necesidad de vencer los tabúes y la discriminación que han sido objeto desde los inicios de la epidemia. Persons who are (...) carrier of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or persons who are sick have experienced destructive consequences in the personal, familiar and social spheres since the appearance of the first cases. The objective of this work is to analyze the fulfilment of the bioethical principles, as well as the repercussion derived from the ethics dilemma of the professional behaviour with these patients, what demonstrate the necessity of overcoming taboos and the discrimination they have suffered from since the beginnings of the disease. (shrink)

One of the main characteristics of this phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the resort by Palestinian groups to suicidal terror. This paper focuses on the unique nature of suicidal terror, since, I believe, it is this kind of terror that presents the most immanent threat to the foundations of politics and law in the free world. The article begins with a phenomenological exploration of the effect of suicidal terror on politics in Israel, inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt. (...) It presents the various manifestations of the suicidal terror as a new Paradigm of Violence. This new paradigm poses a great threat on politics: as the terrorists waive their effort to stay alive, deterrence becomes useless; the Israeli politics, in response, redraws the boundaries of the collective according to demographic lines; the feelings of helplessness reduces politics to personal tragedies giving up on normative arguments and long term policies. Compassion replaces persuasion. The attempt of an organized army to respond effectively to suicidal terror is ridden by the dilemma of effectiveness-legitimacy, that is, the more the response is effective, the more difficult it becomes to retain the distinction between the actions of the army and the actions of the terrorist. Moreover, during the attempt to bring the actions of the army to the review of the court, the legal system itself is infected by the same dilemma. The article examines the response of the Israeli Supreme Court to several petitions that questioned the legality of the means employed by the IDF in its fight against terror. These cases provide a unique opportunity to examine the way in which terror infiltrates into the very legal system that is called upon to respond to it, mainly by changing the legal language. The question that guides my discussion is what effect terror exerts on politics and law, and can law provide a way to resist the destructive influence of terror on the political system. (shrink)

A history of the Atomic Bomb from Marie Curie to Hiroshima. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds” — Oppenheimer quoting the Bhagavad Gita after witnessing the successful demonstration of the atom bomb. The bomb, which killed an estimated 140,000 civilians in Hiroshima and destroyed the countryside for miles around, was one of the defining moments in world history. That mushroom cloud cast a terrifying shadow over the contemporary world and continues to do so today. But how could this (...) have happened? What led to the creation of such a weapon of mass destruction? From the moment scientists contemplated the destructive potential of splitting the atom, the role of science changed. Ethical and moral dilemmas faced all those who realized the implications of their research. Before the Fall-Out charts the chain of events from Marie Curie’s scientific breakthrough through the many colourful characters such as Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer and Lord Rutherford, whose discoveries contributed to the bomb. The story of the atomic bomb spans 50 years of prolific scientific innovation, turbulent politics, foreign affairs and world-changing history. Through personal stories of exile, indecision and soul-searching, to charges of collaboration, spying and deceit, Diana Preston presents the human side of an unstoppable programme with a lethal outcome. (shrink)

Whether or not Marxism leads straight to authoritarianism and the destruction of individual liberty is a question which has long exercised both theorists and politicians. This paper deals with a narrower, though related issue: Is Marxism actually reconcilable with radical democracy, the type of democracy advocated by those, including Marxists, who berate the iniquities and hypocrisy of parliamentary liberalism? The answer, according to my paper, is no. The Marxist tradition contains four characteristic features which tend to contradict the participatory procedures (...) most Marxists profess to desire. These features are: (1) the view of Marxism as a science, yielding objective solutions to social and political dilemmas; (2) the messianic aspiration for a society of perfect unity; (3) the belief that human rights are not independent moral norms but so much bourgeois ?ideological nonsense? (Marx), expressing the antagonistic relationships of the capitalist regime; and (4) hostility to the market mechanism, which results in a preference for a totally planned economy. Marxism, unless revised beyond recognition, would seem, paradoxically, to be more congruous with the élitist, constricted type of democracy we have in the West than with the more egalitarian mode of decision?making defended in the writings of Marx himself. (shrink)

The author starts from the hypothesis that it is essential for the countries of the region to critically assess the synergy established between systemic, political corruption and a selectively weak,?devious? nature of the state. Moreover, the key dilemma is whether the expanded practice of political rent seeking supports the conclusion that the root of all corruption is in the very existence of the state - particularly in excessive, selective and deforming state interventions and benefits that create a fertile ground (...) for corruption? The author argues that the destructive combination of weak government and rampant political corruption is based on scattered state intervention, while also rule the parties cartel in the executive branch subordinate to parliament, the judiciary and the police. Corrupt exchange takes place with the absence of strong institutional framework and the precise rules of the political and electoral games, control of public finances and effective political and anti-monopoly legislation and practice included. Exit from the current situation can be seen in the realization of effective anti?corruption strategy that integrates preventive and repressive measures and activities and lead to the establishment of principles of good governance. (shrink)

This article responds to Nicholas Adams by exploring the affinities between his account and Hegel, with a particular focus on the dialectic of articulation. They seem to agree on the undermining effect of articulation and reflection on implicit commitments. However, Adams diverges from Hegel by questioning the consequence and supposed inevitability of this dialectical process. Whereas Hegel argues for the desirability of conscious articulation in the progress towards modernity, Adams contends that it is actually a destructive and oppressive process, (...) challenging Hegel’s Enlightenment optimism and Eurocentrism. Still, I suggest that Hegel’s concern for rational dialogue as an indispensable condition for modern life and community should be taken seriously. Scriptural reasoning, as discussed by Adams, provides a model how we can have a form of rational dialogue that escapes from the dilemma posed by the Hegelian dialectic, and that it may be possible to combine strong ethical commitments with an openness to pluralistic dialogue. (shrink)

Science fiction cinema proposal for Bioethic education Proposta do cinema de ficção científica para educar em Bioética Posthumanism state that technologies will eliminate aging, improve cognitive, physical and psychological skills and keep alive human minds by uploading them in machines as artificial intelligence. These beliefs, as constant features in science fiction films, could be useful to educate medical students in Bioethics. We propose some of these science fiction films related with technological changes of humans and the noxious consequences: Being turned (...) into a humanoid created by genetic engineering; a slave or a merchandize without rights; discrimination because of eugenesic genetic manipulation; and/or the creation of cyborgs of mass destruction. Also, the movies can show the reader issues of ethnic supremacy dilemmas, identity impersonate and ambition, impersonal intelligence and conscience and identity transpass after death. These films will help teachers to analyze with students the moral limits of science and technologies. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Alerm-González AJ, González-Pérez U. Propuesta del cine de ciencia ficción para educar en Bioética. Pers Bioet. 2019; 22: 14-33. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.1.2 Recibido: 10/11/2017 Aceptado: 20/10/2018. (shrink)

I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to environmental (...) ethics, since environmental damage is often the result of the accumulation of individually negligible effects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviews PASSION AND PARADOX L G Religious Studies / McMaster U. Hamilton, , Canada   @. Joan Cocks. Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton U. P., . Pp. . .; pb .. ccording to an ancient legend, four Rabbis ventured into the garden of Aphilosophy. One, it is said, went insane, another became a heretic, a third died and only the (...) fourth emerged unscathed. A modern variation of this story might go like this. Four or perhaps  philosophers entered the jungle of nationalism and for the most part went insane. There were those who embraced nationalism and consequently abandoned the universality of philosophy for the promotion of xenophobia, racism and even Nazism. Others remained internationalist and hence became futile—philosophical Canutes—commanding the raging beasts of nationality to be still. No one struggled harder with nationalism than Bertrand Russell. In , writing as an internationalist, he announced the demise of the principle of nationality only to see nationalisms explode in every region of the world (see his “National Independence and Internationalism”, Papers ). He opposed it relentlessly and without compromise until near the end of his life when he found himself endorsing wars of national liberation. Nationalism is often depicted as a howling beast. It would be better to think of it as an anaconda that wraps itself around everyone who ventures into its domain. Joan Cocks’ Passion and Paradox is an important book on nationalism and the intelligentsia. She traces the intellectual encounter with nationalism of a number of figures—Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Isaiah Berlin and the Scottish nationalist Tom Nairn, among others. All are exiles, most are Jews, and all try to hack their way through a jungle of conundrums of nationalist thought. Her accounts of these thinkers sometimes read like complex legal briefs, but are always illuminating. Though an internationalist, she sees the power of nationalist imperatives. Her approach to the contradictory strains of nationalism and hostility to nationalism echoes that of Hegel. She presents critical but sympathetic accounts of each side of the nationalist problematic and shows how their difficulties might be resolved in a higher synthesis. Alas! her resolution suffers from the unworldliness that she finds in other versions of internationalism. Her argument begins with a personal experience. In the early ’s she joined a group of Arabs and Jews against the Gulf War. In the course of their associ- Reviews  ation she learned that the Jews were all internationalists, while the Arabs were outspoken nationalists. This experience presumably demonstrated that a happy collusion of nationalism and internationalism was possible. But, of course, there was another side: those prosecuting the war she opposed were also nationalists. Her central thesis addresses the tragedy of opposition. It states that nationalism is “dilemmatic”, that is, that “all paths of thought obscured equally telling contrary thoughts; all courses of action were strewn with causes for regret and remorse” (p. ). The horns of the dilemma are the valid claims of the internationalist who sees the underlying self-destructive deep structures of nationalism on one side, and the claims of the national particularistic who is engaged in the compelling theatre of national liberation and the protection of local customs and roots on the other. Her book is an account of how her thinkers are framed by this dilemma, locked in by the imperatives of either side. In the period between the Gulf War and the composition of this book in  Cocks was able to observe what she identifies as the destructive logic of nationalism. The ’s were a period of postmodernist celebration of the local, a sensibility that helped to legitimate nationalism. The explosion of nationalism that followed the breakup of the Communist imperium was a time of liberation of the imprisoned nations—a springtime when it was good to be alive. But as the decade wore on the concealed pit bulls came out—in Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and elsewhere. In Cocks’ view nationalism showed an inner logic, of a sort that Russell called attention to in the early ’s—a logic that led from euphoria to self-destruction (see his Prospects). Her aim is to revive the half-remembered internationalist tradition as formulated by Marx and Luxemburg—but also to show... (shrink)