ZusammenfassungIn der Philosophie hat das Interesse an Wilhelm Dilthey in jüngster Zeit wieder merklich zugenommen. Man könnte geradezu von einer kleinen Dilthey-Renaissance sprechen. In der Theologie indes beginnt man sich erst langsam wieder auf sein Werk zu besinnen. Dabei hält es auch für sie wichtige Einsichten bereit. Dilthey ist vor allem deshalb interessant, weil es ihm gelingt, die Religionsthematik konsequent auf dem Boden eines interpretativen Kulturmodells zu entwickeln.

Diltheys Denken wird seit der zweiten H?lfte des 20. Jahrhunderts aus einer hermeneutischen, durch Gadamer bestimmten Perspektive beurteilt. Dilthey am Ma?stab der Hermeneutik zu messen bedeutet aber, seine grundlegend handlungstheoretische Einstellung auszublenden. Denn die?innere Erfahrung?, auf die bei der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften zur?ckgegangen wird, hat die Struktur von Handlung. Sie wird von Dilthey als?Zweckzusammenhang? bzw. auf einen Zweck gerichteter Funktionszusammenhang beschrieben, schlie?lich geht es dem Menschen schon auf der biologischen Ebene darum, triebhaft gesteuerte Bed?rfnisse durch entsprechende Handlungen (...) zu befriedigen. Das Erlebnis des zweckgerichteten psychischen Zusammenhangs gibt uns das Muster f?r das Verst?ndnis der Welt vor.?Verstehen? wird dem entsprechend von Dilthey als?Nacherleben? konzipiert. Naturalismus und Hermeneutik werden in diesem Konzept einander angen?hert. nema. (shrink)

Despite the usual genealogies of hermeneutics, Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey’s philosophy only deals marginally with hermeneutics. Nevertheless, this paper aims to shed light on elements in favour of an implicit continuity in hermeneutics from Dilthey to Heidegger. Against the general background of the conception of life as self-interpretation, which allows the ontological radicalisation of Dilthey’s hermeneutical concepts, some diltheyan historical and aesthetical paradigms prove to be at work in Heidegger’s first phenomenology of life. “Destruction” itself, the very core of Heidegger’s (...) concept of hermeneutics, can be partially traced back to diltheyan sources. (shrink)

In contrast to the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which maintains the interpretation of classical texts, I emphasize the role of images in our everyday understanding. I see the added value of images in the fact that they show the latent background, from which the manifest messages draw their actual significance. Before Thomas Mitchell’s “pictorial turn”, I referred to the iconic turn as “imagic turn” in order to emphasize the originary connection between images and magic rituals. The magical component of the (...) hermeneutic image is to the human ability to make something absent present. (shrink)

Die Dilthey-Forschung der letzten Jahre hat Dilthey tendenziell von dem Bild einer rein 'kontinentalen' Philosophie der Hermeneutik des Lebens weggerückt. Vielmehr war sein Wissenschaftsverständnis holistisch und einem umfassenden Erfahrungsbegriff verpflichtet. Statt Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften einander entgegenzusetzen, brachte er eine empiristisch eingestellte akademische Philosophie auf den Weg.

Die aus Überlegungen zur Kunst der Auslegung und zur Frage nach der Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften entstandene hermeneutische Bewegung ist dank Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer und Ricoeur zu einer universellen Philosophie der Interpretation ausgeweitet worden. Jean Grondin widmet sich in dieser Einführung den Ursprüngen der Hermeneutik, ihren wichtigsten philosophischen Vertretern und den Diskussionen, die sie hervorgerufen hat.

Handbuch Philosophie is a series edited by Elisabeth Ströker and Wolfgang Wieland, the purpose of which is to present various fields and themes in contemporary thought. The author of the present work, who teaches philosophy in Erlangen and Heidelberg, has previously published two books in the history and theory of interpretation. The study is divided into two parts: the first adopts a systematic approach to its theme; the second develops a historical perspective. Using the Gadamerian term "philosophical hermeneutics," the author (...) wishes to summarize three different fields or levels of questioning: the interpretation of texts, the understanding of human deeds and actions in general, and the idea of understanding as an ontological determination of man. The first level relates to the traditional art of hermeneutics as developed within theology and jurisprudence and, eventually, philology; the second refers primarily to the work of Dilthey and to different modern theories of human action and behavior; the third, finally, concerns the ontological turn that hermeneutics undergoes in Heidegger and Gadamer. Thus, "philosophical hermeneutics" is not the designation of a clearly delimited discipline, but the rather arbitrary name for a conglomerate of thinkers, questions, and disciplines which could be said to converge around the problem of human understanding. Ineichen's study is a handbook intended to serve as an introduction to this amorphous field. Despite its basically pedagogical intention, however, it is guided throughout by a highly critical spirit. (shrink)

English summary: Gadamer's main work, Truth and Method, will be published in 2010, exactly 50 years after the first edition, in a slightly corrected version as an inexpensive student edition. This is seen as one of the few standard works of German post-war philosophy which has achieved worldwide recognition. The huge reaction to this is surprising for many reasons, among other things because in this work an important new theory is presented in intimations only using the author's own conceptual instruments; (...) in fact the author is careful when touching on ancient themes in the philosophical approach to the world. The main question in the work is: What actually happens when we understand? Gadamer focuses on the historical dimensions of understanding, including his famous rehabilitation of prejudice. In addition to the systematic excursus, the book contains an intellectual history of hermeneutics, which is convincing in its virtuosity in dealing with a variety of inspirational figures such as Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger. The amiability and objectivity with which Gadamer invites his readers to a discussion are what account for the enormous influence of this exemplary textbook. German description: Wir sagen, dass wir ein Gesprach fuhren, aber je eigentlicher ein Gesprach ist, desto weniger liegt die Fuhrung desselben in dem Willen des einen oder anderen Partners. Was bei einem Gesprach herauskommt, weiss keiner vorher. Das Hauptwerk Wahrheit und Methode erscheint 2010, genau 50 Jahre nach der Erstausgabe, in durchgesehener und korrigierter Form als preiswerte Studienausgabe. Dieses Buch, das sein Autor erst im Alter von 60 Jahren schrieb, wurde zu einem Uberraschungserfolg der philosophischen Literatur. Als eines der wenigen weltweit anerkannten Standardwerke der deutschen Nachkriegsphilosophie wurde es in viele Sprachen ubersetzt.Die grosse Resonanz konnte aus vielerlei Grunden erstaunen, unter anderem weil hier nur in Andeutungen eine grosse neue Theorie mit eigenem begrifflichen Instrumentarium vorgestellt wird; der Autor umkreist vorsichtig uralte Themen des philosophischen Weltzugangs. Vor allem geht es um die Frage: Was geschieht eigentlich, wenn wir verstehen? Er stellt die geschichtliche Dimension des Verstehens in den Mittelpunkt, auch durch seine beruhmte Rehabilitierung des Vorurteils. Die systematischen Exkurse werden erganzt durch eine Geistesgeschichte der Hermeneutik, die in ihrer virtuosen Behandlung so unterschiedlicher Anreger wie Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl und Heidegger uberzeugt. Die Freundlichkeit und Sachlichkeit, mit der Gadamer seinen Leser ins Gesprach einladt, machen den Rang dieses vorbildlichen Lehrbuchs aus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das strukturierte Ganze: Studien zum Werk von Wilhelm DiltheyRudolf LuetheFrithjof Rodi. Das strukturierte Ganze: Studien zum Werk von Wilhelm Dilthey. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2003. Pp. 281. Cloth, €39,00.This book contains a collection of fourteen articles and essays by the well-known and highly respected German Dilthey scholar Frithjof Rodi. The majority of the texts were written between 1992 and 2002 but they have been revised and updated for publication (...) in this volume. All of the papers discuss the work of the German hermeneutic philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, but a variety of connected topics is also covered.The first two parts of the book contain articles analysing Dilthey's work in the two central areas of hermeneutics, especially the philosophical theory of historical knowledge, and aesthetics. While one of the central issues of Dilthey's hermeneutics is the reflection on the relation between life, history and historical knowledge, the core concepts of his aesthetics are "expression" and "vivacity" (Lebendigkeit). The two areas are connected via Dilthey's all-compassing interest in the structures of unities, be these forms of experiences or works of art. Dilthey's influential idea of a "dynamic unity" is discussed in the chapter entitled "Das Erlebnis: die 'dynamische Einheit'."The two other parts of the volume contain articles and essays by Rodi which refer to specific aspects of Dilthey's scholarly life and work and his position within nineteenth and early twentieth-century German philosophy, respectively. Although most of the articles in this book are strictly scholarly and document Rodi's thorough knowledge of every aspect of Dilthey's work, some of the essays in the third part are of a more polemical character. In one of these polemical essays Rodi fundamentally criticizes Hans Albert's concept of a "naturalistic" form of hermeneutics.The title of the collection draws on one of Dilthey's most important convictions to the effect that there are "different forms of unity," a conviction that is repeated in the title of the chapter: "'Der Zweck ist eben das strukturierte Ganze selbst.'" Although this article refers to the relevance of music in Dilthey's life and work, and although the concept of structured whole is itself taken from his [End Page 216] work on aesthetics, Rodi's claim is that this idea is relevant also to the other areas of Dilthey's philosophical endeavours, especially in his work on the hermeneutics of historical knowledge. The parts of the volume dedicated to this topic discuss very important issues, indeed: The critique of historical reason not only analyses different forms of structural unities, it also formulates many relevant distinctions within the concept of life, reminding us that Dilthey not only started his academic career as a theologian but that also as a philosopher he thought of "the divine in nature and history as an evident condition of thought and action" (10).One of Rodi's early books, entitled Morphologie und Hermeneutik (Stuttgart, 1969), discussed Dilthey's aesthetics within the context of Goethe's organolocical thinking. The first two chapters in part two try to correct some of the convictions formulated in this earlier book. In particular, Rodi now regards his use there of the term "morphology" as a confused running together of both Romantic and positivistic elements. The central issue of the chapter "Der 'schaffende' Ausdruck. Bemerkungen zu einer Kategorie des späten Dilthey" is a comparison between the concepts of hermeneutics formulated by Dilthey and Gadamer, respectively.The two chapters of part four, written in 1992 and in 2002, respectively, are dedicated to more specialized issues. The first of them, on "the intensity of life," refers to the relations of the "radical" work of Graf Yorck von Wartenburg to the thinking of both Heidegger and Dilthey, while the last chapter in the volume gives a detailed and inspiring interpretation of Bollnow's concept of "articulating decription" (artikulierende Beschreibung). A somewhat personal aspect of this last essay is the fact that here Rodi also reflects on the way in which Dilthey's philosophy influenced his own philosophical efforts and convictions: Rodi's philosophical mentor, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, was a student of Dilthey.The book also contains valuable supplementary material... (shrink)

Since 1968 there has been a renewal of interest in Dilthey which has revealed new facets of his work and shown the need for a fundamental revision of the prevailing general conception of Dilthey. In 1968 Peter Krausser, in Kritik der endlichen Vernunft. Diltheys Revolution der allgemeinen Wissenschafts- und Handlungstheorie, brought out the connection between his epistemological and social-hermeneutic concerns by isolating a theory of functional structure running through his work which was seen as an anticipation of a cybernetic (...) approach. Krausser concluded by contrasting this "structure-theory" favorably with contending positions in current debate, Adorno and Habermas, Gadamer, and Popper. In the same year Habermas devoted two chapters of Erkenntnis und Interesse to Dilthey. Although he related him rather exclusively to a theoretical grounding of "the Geisteswissenschaften", the effect of Habermas’ parallel treatment of Dilthey, Peirce, and Freud was to free Dilthey from the confines of his received image. This worked to undermine the tripartite division of natural, humanistic, and social science which Habermas adapted from Scheler. Just as Peirce’s ideas on the fixation of belief concern not only experimental method but the psychology of experience, so Dilthey’s grasp of the relation of lived experience, objectivation, and understanding bears directly on experience in the full practical sense. In 1969 Frithjof Rodi, in Morphologie und Hermeneutik. Dilthey’s Ästhetik, connected his more "humanistic" work with his interests in biology and physiology, complementing the formal continuity of "structure-theory" established by Krausser and reintegrating this with a more familiar Dilthey. More recently others, above all Manfred Riedel and Ulrich Herrmann, have made important critical and editorial contributions, relying like Krausser on their familiarity with unpublished manuscripts, including that of the second volume of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, which Rodi is currently editing, in collaboration with Johach, for publication as volumes 18 and 19 of the Gesammelte Schriften. The availability of these texts should consolidate the revolution of the conventional image of Dilthey, under way since 1968, and Johach’s book must be welcomed as an anticipation of that edition. (shrink)

Hermeneutik tarihsel süreç içerisinde hukuk, teoloji, tarih, sanat ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlarda farklı şekillerde tanımlanmış ve kullanılmış bir kavramdır. Bu doğrultuda, hermeneutiğin tam olarak belirlenebilmesi amacıyla, hermeneutik kelimesinin kökenine ve bu disiplinin tarihine mümkün olduğunca öz bir şekilde bakma gereksinimi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü hermeneutik disiplinini tek bir perspektiften değerlendirmek, onun temel gerçekliğini anlamamıza engel olacak çarpıtmaların gün yüzüne çıkmasına sebep olabilir. Genel anlamda bir ifadenin, anlamın, metnin ya da sanat eserinin belirli bir çerçeve içerisinde yorumlanması olarak (...) değerlendirilen hermeneutik, felsefe açısından varlığın oluş tarzı, sosyoloji açısından metodolojik problemlere yönelik bir çözüm, dini açıdan ise anlaşılması güç metinlerin anlamını gün yüzüne çıkaran yorum kuralları bütünü olarak tanımlanabilir (Audi, 1999: 377). Webster’in Uluslararası İngilizce sözlüğünde hermeneutik kavramı genel ifadesiyle yorumlama ve açıklamanın metodolojik ilkelerinin soruşturulması olarak tanımlanmakta iken, daha özel anlamda ise İncil’in çevirisinin yapılabilmesi için belirlenen genel prensiplerin incelenmesi olarak belirtilmiştir (Gove, 1971: 1059). Bu çalışmada, Auguste Comte’un öncülük ettiği pozitivist anlayışın öne sürdüğü ve desteklediği doğa bilimci yöntemin ve pozitivist tarih anlayışının, insanı ve yaşantısını doğru bir kavrayışla değerlendirme noktasında etkili olamadığı vurgulanacaktır. Pozitivist düşünce doğa bilimlerinin elde etmiş olduğu başarı ve kazanımlardan yola çıkarak dönemin bilim anlayışı konusunda belirleyici olmakla birlikte, ön plana çıkardığı bilimsellik modelinin ya da kriterinin bir sonucu olarak tinsel bilimlerin ya da beşerî bilimlerin doğasına uygun olmayan yöntemleri benimsemesi hususunda belirleyici bir unsur olmuştur. Böylece, doğa bilimleri söz sahibi olmadığı bir alan içerisinde parlatılarak, bilimsellik statüsü kazanabilme kaygısıyla tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel bir kriz içerisine sürüklemiştir. Bu çerçevede, hermeneutiğin zaman içerisindeki dönüşümünün zirve noktasında yer alan düşünürlerden biri olan Wilhelm Dilthey’in tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel açıdan karşı karşıya kaldıkları kriz durumundan çıkarmak amacıyla ileri sürdüğü hermeneutik yönteme ilişkin savlarını, hermeneutiğin tarihsel süreç içerisindeki kazanımlarından yola çıkarak tartışmak gerekmektedir. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Schwierigkeit, den Ertrag der Hermeneutik-Diskussion des vergangenen Jahrzehnts für die i.e.S. hermeneutischen Wissenschaften methodologisch fruchtbar zu machen, wird eine Grenzziehung nach zwei Seiten vorgenommen. Gegenüber der Semiotik, die auf verschiedenen Ebenen einer Pragmatik am Modell des zeichenvermittelten Handlungserfolgs orientiert bleibt und Zeichen primär als Handlungsmarken versteht, wird die reflexive Struktur der transfunktionalen Vergegenwärtigung abgeschlossener Handlungen und ihrer Handlungsspuren betont; gegenüber der philosophischen Hermeneutik Gadamers wird die Notwendigkeit des Rekurses auf das in der Dilthey-Schule herausgearbeitete Problem (...) der lebensimmanenten Reflexivität und des Zusammenhangs von Leben und Wissen in der Schicht der Erlebnisausdrücke betont. Die Leistung der transfunktionalen Vergegenwärtigung, in der sich das nicht-reflexive Actum zum Perfectum des Handlungsmals verwandelt, wird als epidigmatische Ausdrucksleistung verstanden, deren produktiv objektivierende Artikulation als kommunikative Synthesis bezeichnet wird. Ihr entspricht auf der Verstehensseite der ausdrucksvermittelte Nachvollzug einer nicht absehbaren Bedeutungsbeziehung, der handlungstheoretisch gesehen noch unterhalb der zeichenvermittelten, zielgerichteten Handlung liegt. Eine Funktionsbestimmung der hermeneutischen Wissenschaften hat bei einer Analyse des Kommunikationsmodells der epidigmatischen Ausdrücke einzusetzen, in der nicht nur ein neuer Aspekt ihrer Forschungsgegenstände, sondern in bestimmten Grenzen auch die Struktur ihrer eigenen Vergegenwärtigungsleistungen erkennbar wird. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Hermeneutical Turn in American Critical Theory, 1830–1860M. D. WalhoutLong considered an obscure province of biblical studies, hermeneutics is now familiar territory to American literary critics, along with phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, and the other European theories that have redrawn the map of American criticism in the past twenty-five years. The gradual transformation of hermeneutics into a theory of criticism, and ultimately into a comprehensive theory of the human sciences, (...) was the work of a series of great German thinkers, including Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. These figures were introduced (or reintroduced) to American critics by E. D. Hirsch, whose Validity in Interpretation (1967) “shattered,” in the words of Richard E. Palmer, “the splendid isolation of American literary criticism from hermeneutics.” Hailing Schleiermacher and Dilthey as the forefathers of “objective interpretation,” Hirsch dismissed Heidegger and Gadamer as prophets of subjectivism. For his part, Palmer strove to vindicate Heidegger and Gadamer as the true heirs of the hermeneutical tradition. Noting the difference between Hirsch’s understanding of hermeneutics and theirs, Palmer concluded,So the hermeneutical debate goes on. On the one side are the defenders of objectivity and validation, who look to hermeneutics as the theoretical source for norms of validation; on the other side are the phenomenologists of the event of understanding, who stress the historical character of this “event,” and consequently the limitations of all claims to “objective knowledge” and “validity.” 1Twenty-five years later this hermeneutical debate is still going on. [End Page 683]What Hirsch and Palmer did not realize is that they were reviving a debate over the nature of interpretation that dated from the late nineteenth century, when American literary criticism was undergoing professionalization. 2 As early as 1885, in the programmatic introduction to his book on Shakespeare as a dramatic artist, Richard G. Moulton had declared, “In the treatment of literature the proposition which seems to stand most in need of assertion at the present moment is, that there is an inductive science of literary criticism.” Moulton proceeded to lay down “a foundation axiom of inductive literary criticism: Interpretation in literature is of the nature of a scientific hypothesis, the truth of which is tested by the degree of completeness with which it explains the details of the literary work as they actually stand.” 3 Thirty years later Moulton repeated this axiom, insisting that “such inductive treatment constitutes the very alphabet of science.” 4 But Moulton’s determination to apply the logic of the natural sciences to the interpretation of literature was not without its critics. In 1900 the German-born philologist Julius Goebel began a valiant, if futile, effort to introduce the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey to his American colleagues. 5 Years later, in an article published in The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, Goebel drew on Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutik und Kritik (1838) to show “the possibility of attaining exact knowledge in the mental sciences without the aid of the scientific or laboratory methods.” 6 Later still, in an article on Dilthey published in the same journal, Goebel recalled how he had argued in an address to the Modern Language Association that criticism “had lost touch with the contemporary movements emphasizing the independence and importance of the mental sciences. What seemed to me needed above all was a reform of the method of interpretation for which Dilthey had set the example both in principle and practice.” 7 It was not until the late 1960s that Goebel’s project was finally revived.While Goebel may have been the first American literary scholar to use the word “hermeneutics,” the concept of interpretation had long been a part of American critical theory. In fact, what might be called the “hermeneutical turn” in American critical theory occurred well before the era of professionalization. [End Page 684] In order to trace this turn, we must recover the work of the amateur critical theorists of the antebellum era, including such forgotten figures as George Allen and Edwin Percy Whipple. Disciples of the Schlegels and Coleridge, these amateur theorists established the basic premises of the hermeneutical turn: that criticism is a science; that the critic must “reproduce” the author’s creative process; that... (shrink)

Ugledni mislitelji hermeneutičke filozofije Wilhelm Dilthey i Hans-Georg Gadamer okarakterizirali su Matiju Vlačića Ilirika kao klasika hermeneutičkog pristupa filozofiji. Taj sud dodatno dobiva na snazi jer su Dilthey i Gadamer okarakterizirani kao pristaše relativističke hermeneutike, dok je Vlačić inzistirao na adekvatnom razumijevanju i interpretiranju teksta. Uzevši u obzir da je za Vlačića ključno pravilo bilo da tekst treba tumačiti sukladno njegovu imanentnom smislu, razradio je dvije interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, presudne za daljnji razvoj i konstituiranje hermeneutike kao metode (...) razumijevanja, dok ga se po našemu sudu istodobno može smatrati i anticipatorom načela blagonaklonosti. Za objašnjenje složenog hermeneutičkog odnosa cjeline i dijelova teksta, Vlačić je kombinirao induktivno-sintetičku i deduktivnu metodu. Taj odnos predstavlja zahtjevan proces provedbe hermeneutičkog kruga u kojem je na djelu primjena modela koherentnosti istine u heurističkom postupku razumijevanja. Drugim riječima, radi se o postupnoj rekonstrukciji smisla teksta. Tijekom tog eksplanativnoga procesa postaje razvidno da je značenje pojedinih dijelova i manjih tematskih cjelina razumljivo tek iz strukture i kompozicije cjeline teksta i da postupna induktivno-sintetička rekonstrukcija smisla teksta pretpostavlja primjenu deduktivne analize. Nadalje, u heurističkom procesu iščitavanja teksta nužno je provjeriti kako se konzistentnost pojedinih odlomaka i cjelina teksta koherentno uklapa u širu cjelinu, a interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, pritom se ispostavljaju kao pouzdan organon u heurističkom procesu razumijevanja i objašnjenja teksta. U tom kontekstu je Vlačićev hermeneutički zahtjev za adekvatnom rekonstrukcijom smisla usporediv s načelom blagonaklonosti kako ga razumijeva Donald Davidson, postavljajući ga kao jedan od osnovnih pojmova svoje filozofije. Naime, Vlačić polazi od pretpostavke razložnosti govora i argumentacije, što podrazumijeva mogućnost hermeneutičke rekonstrukcije teksta i njegovog adekvatnog razumijevanja. Davidson je također, pomoću teorije triangulacije, pokušao pokazati kako objektivni svijet u jeziku komunikacije postaje intersubjektivni svijet razumijevanja i uvažavanja, čime zapravo želi pokazati da je naše razumijevanje izvanjskog svijeta uvjetovano zajedničkim sustavom znanja i modelom komuniciranja koji nikada ne može imati individualistička obilježja jer, jednostavno, participiramo u zajedničkom svijetu. Davidsonov koncept triangulacije na novi način je obilježio model hermeneutičke čestitosti koji je već zagovarao predstavnik prosvjetiteljske hermeneutike Georg Friedrich Meier. S obzirom na to da se problem antirealističkog pristupa ne može riješiti pozivanjem na kruti hermeneutički realizam ili objektivizam, ono što tekstom želimo pokazati jest da bi hermeneutiku, za razliku od npr. Rortyja, trebalo shvatiti kao interpretacijski konsenzus struke koji je uspostavljen u okvirima akademske zajednice. To je u skladu sa stavovima Paula Lorenzena, koje je u, pogledu akademskog konsenzusa s obzirom na interpretativnost, slijedio i Jürgen Habermas u izradi svoje teorije komunikativnog djelovanja. (shrink)

Obwohl Jaspers in seiner Philosophie Methoden und Motive der Phänomenologie Husserls und der Hermeneutik Diltheys aufgenommen hatte, hat er sich nicht besonders für die Leibphilosophie interessiert. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass der menschliche Leib in seinem Denken gar nicht vorkommt. Aber es handelt sich bei ihm jedoch nicht um ein Schlüsselthema, sondern um ein randständiges Phänomen. Der menschliche Leib ist bei Jaspers die vitale Basis der überlieferten Trias von Leib, Seele und Geist. Damit steht Jaspers in der klassischen (...) Traditionslinie des europäischen Denkens von Platon und Aristoteles bis zu Descartes und Kant. Anders als beim platonischen Sokrates gibt es bei Jaspers jedoch keine Herabsetzung des Körpers oder Abwertung des Leiblichen. Und anders als in der subversiven Tradition der empiristischen Skepsis gibt es bei ihm aber auch keine Vernachlässigung des Geistes. Im Vergleich des Menschen mit den Tieren ist der Geist nicht nur irgendein beliebiges, auf Sprache, Denken und Vernunft basierendes Merkmal, das den Menschen zufällig von den Tieren unterscheidet, sondern die wesentliche menschliche Eigenart, die es zu verstehen gilt, wenn man die spezifisch menschliche Art und Weise des Daseins in der Welt verstehen möchte, die Jaspers 'Existenz' nennt. Existenz zu verstehen ist die eigentliche Aufgabe der Philosophie, zumal die Wissenschaften dies nicht leisten können. (shrink)

Die Forderung einer Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft, von Husserl zum ersten Mal in dem bekannten Logosaufsatz erhoben, richtet sich nicht, wie meistens gedacht und auch von Dilthey selbst so verstanden ist, gegen den Historizismus von Dilthey, sondern vielmehr gegen dessen Identifizierung von Philosophie mit Weltanschauungsphilosophie und damit mit Weisheitslehre. Husserl hat vom Anfang an bis zum Ende seines Lebens sich der Herausarbeitung dieer Idee gewidmet und die Phänomenologie als Verwirklichung dieser Idee betrachtet. Dementsprechend soll man auch der geläufigen Auffassung zuwider (...) die Phänomenologie vor allem als Wissenschaftslehre auffassen und interpretieren. Die Ablehnung aller Weltanschauungsphilosophie ruft nicht nur das Problem hervor, wie Husserl sich verhält zur Metaphysik, sondern was er unter strenger Wissenschaft versteht. Einerseits ist nach ihm die Trennung und Unterscheidung von Philosophie und Weltanschauung oder Metaphysik in Übereinstimmung mit dem modernen Denken, das gerade erst dadurch zur Herausbildung einer Universitas von strengen positiven Wissenschaften (Mathematik, Naturwissenchaften, aber auch strengen Geisteswissenschaften) gekommen ist, andererseits steht aber seine Auffassung und Ausarbeitung von Philosophie als apodiktischer Wissenschaft im Gegensatz zum modernen Denken. Husserl betrachtet die Phänomenologie als die Realisierung der zuerst von Piaton gestellten Idee von Philosophie als einer endgültigen, einzigen und universalen Wissenschaft, welcher Descartes eine radikale Wendung in die Richtung einer egologischen Apodiktizität gegeben hat. Infolgedessen hat die transzendentale Phänomenologie auch die Aufgabe alle Einzelwissenschaften, sowohl die positiven Tatsachenwissenschaften als die positiven apriorischen, vernunftkritisch zu durchleuchten und dadurch zu Abzweigungen der Philosophie als universaler Wissenchaft zu machen. Wie dieses Verhältnis zwischen positiver Wissenschaft und Phänomenologie als strenger Wissenschaft gedacht werden muss, ist immer ein wichtiges Thema für Husserl gewesen. Die positiven Wissenschaften teilt Husserl ein in Tatsachenwissenschaften und apriorische Wissenschaften (Leibniz' Idee von Wissenschaft der Möglichkeiten kombiniert mit der Idee von invarianten Strukturen). Husserl ist nun der Ansicht, dass eine positive Tatsachenwissenschaft nur eine exakte und strenge Wissenschaft werden kann, wenn sie eine apriorische Wissenschaft neben sich zur Entwicklung bringt oder sich darauf stützen kann, wie es z. B. der Fall gewesen ist mit der empirischfaktischen Naturwissenschaft in Beziehung zu der Mathematik und der reinen Mechanik. Dasselbe Verhältnis soll man sich denken zwischen einer apriorischen (phänomenologischen) Psychologie, einer allgemeinen apriorischen Sprachwissenchaft und Historie und den dazu gehörenden empirischen Tatsachenwissenschaften. Philosophie und Wissenschaft sind für Husserl identisch mit Rationalismus. Dennoch unterscheidet er grundsätzlich zwischen positiver und transzendentaler Rationalität. Durch eine Verbindung von Rationalität und Verständlichmachung (die Methode des Verstehens der Geisteswissenschaften auf das höchste Niveau eines transzendentalen Verständnisses gebracht durch die konstitutive Phänomenologie) hebt die Phänomenologie als absolute Geisteswissenschaft den Gegensatz zwischen Natur-und Geisteswissenschaften auf und entwickelt sich zur sapientia universdis. Im dritten Teil kehrt der Autor zu der Frage zurück, ob Husserl immer die Trennung zwischen wissenschaftlicher Philosophie und Weltanschauung aufrecht erhalten hat auch in den Krisisabhandlungen. Im allgemeinen muss das bejaht werden. Noch in 1924 wird sogar die Frage erhoben, ob Kant, der doch auch Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft entwickeln wollte, wohl eine echte Philosophie gebracht hat und nicht darin verfehlt hat eben durch die Vermischung von wissenschaftlicher Philosophie mit Weltweisheit, die auch von ausserwissenschaftlichen Quellen schöpft, und durch den Mangel an dem Radikalismus der Apodiktizität. Husserl hat die Idee der Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft tatsächlich zur Ausführung gebracht als transzendentale Wissenschaft der Subjektivität d. h. als Deskription oder Hermeneutik des Bewusstseinslebens. Es gibt abo bei ihm eine Verbindung zwischen Wissenschaftslehre und Ratio oder Logos einerseits und Vernunft, Subjektivität und Leben andererseits. Der spätere Husserl hat diese Verbindung immer mehr vertieft in die Richtung einer wissenschaftlichen Lebensphilosophie mit Aufrechterhaltung der Idee der Philosophie als apodiktischer Wissenschaft. Er hat nicht nur den Objektivismus der positiven Wissenchaften zu erhellen und aufzuklären versucht von ihrem Ursprung aus der Lebenswelt, die auch ihr bleibender Boden ist, sondern in dem phänomenologischen Idealismus schliesslich als geistiger Weltanschauung die Lösung aller geschichtsphilosophischen und ethischen Probleme gesehen, die besonders durch die Krise der europäischen Kultur hervorgerufen sind. Die Urstiftung der Griechen und besonders vos Platon findet in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie ihre Endstiftung und in einer geschichtsphilosophischen Deutung des Sinnes der Geschichte, die nach Husserl notwendig universal-teleologisch sein muss, hat die Phänomenologie und die Geschichte der Philosophie die Aufgabe als Selbstverwirklichung der Vernunft zu fungieren (Husserliana VI, § 73). Die Philosophie als strenge Wisenschaft schafft die Möglichkeit dem menschlichen Sein und Werden apodiktische Ziele zu geben und sich berufen zu wissen zu einem Leben und Streben in der Apodiktizität d. h. auf Vernunft hin, was den Menschen allein „selig” machen kann. (shrink)

The philosopher and historian of culture Wilhelm Dilthey has had a significant and continuing influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy and in a broad range of scholarly disciplines. This volume is the third to be published in Princeton University Press's projected six-volume series of his most important works. Part One makes available three of his works on hermeneutics and its history: "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics" ; "On Understanding and Hermeneutics", based on student lecture notes, and the (...) "The Rise of Hermeneutics", which traces the history of hermeneutics back to Hellenistic Greece. All the addenda to this well-known essay are translated here, some for the first time. In them Dilthey articulates three philosophical aporias concerning hermeneutics and projects an ultimate convergence between understanding and explanation. Part Two provides translations of review essays by Dilthey on Buckle's use of statistical history and on Burckhardt's cultural history; an essay "Friedrich Schlosser and the Problem of Universal History;" and a talk recalling his early years as a student of Boeckh, Jakob Grimm, Mommsen, Ranke, and Ritter. It also contains the important historical essay "The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World," in which Dilthey reexamines the Enlightenment to show its significant contributions to the rise of historical consciousness. (shrink)

This volume provides Dilthey's most mature and best formulation of his Critique of Historical Reason. It begins with three "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," in which Dilthey refashions Husserlian concepts to describe the basic structures of consciousness relevant to historical understanding. The volume next presents the major 1910 work The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences. Here Dilthey considers the degree to which carriers of history--individuals, cultures, institutions, and communities--can be articulated as productive systems (...) capable of generating value and meaning and of realizing purposes. Hegel's idea of objective spirit is reconceived in a more empirical form to designate the medium of commonality in which historical beings are immersed. Any universal claims about history need to be framed within the specific productive systems analyzed by the various human sciences. Dilthey's drafts for the Continuation of the Formation contain extensive discussions of the categories most important for our knowledge of historical life: meaning, value, purpose, time, and development. He also examines the contributions of autobiography to historical understanding and of biography to scientific history. The finest summary of Dilthey's views on hermeneutics can be found in "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life." Here, Dilthey differentiates understanding relative to three kinds of manifestations of life. After giving his analysis of elementary understanding, he examines the role of induction in higher understanding and interpretation, and the relevance of transposition and re-experiencing for grasping individuality. (shrink)

Introduction to the Human Sciences carries forward a projected six-volume translation series of the major writings of Wilhelm Dilthey --a philosopher and historian of culture who has had a strong and continuing influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy as well as a broad range of other scholarly disciplines. In addition to his landmark works on the theories of history and the human sciences, Dilthey made important contributions to hermeneutics and phenomenology, aesthetics, psychology, and the methodology of the social sciences. The Selected (...) Works will make accessible to English-speaking readers the full range of Dilthey's thought, including some historical essays and literary criticism. The series provides translations of complete texts, together with editorial notes, and contains manuscript materials that are currently being published for the first time in Germany. This volume brings together the various parts of the Introduction to the Human Sciences published separately in the German edition. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi have underscored the systematic character of Dilthey's theory of the human sciences by translating the bulk of Dilthey's first volume and his important drafts for the never-completed second volume. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The translation of one of Dilthey's essays which aims at a bold synthesis of philosophic idealism with elements of religious psychology, historical methodology, and esthetics.

This is the fifth volume in a six-volume translation of the major writings of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and historian of culture who has had a significant, and continuing, influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy and in a broad range of scholarly disciplines. In addition to his landmark works on the theories of history and the human sciences, Dilthey made important contributions to hermeneutics and phenomenology, aesthetics, psychology, and the methodology of the social sciences. This volume presents Dilthey's principal writings (...) on aesthetics and the philosophical understanding of poetry, as well as representative essays of literary criticism. The essay "The Imagination of the Poet" (also known as his Poetics) is his most sustained attempt to examine the philosophical bearings of literature in relation to psychological and historical theory. Also included are "The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and its Present Task," "Fragments for a Poetics," and two final essays discussing Goethe and Hölderlin. The latter are drawn from Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, a volume that was acclaimed on publication as a classic of literary criticism and that continues to be a model for the geistesgeschichtliche approach to literary history. (shrink)

Perhaps no philosopher has so fully explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dilthey. His work, conceived overall as a Critique of Historical Reason and developed through his well-known theory of the human studies, provides concepts and methods still fruitful for those concerned with analyzing the human condition. Despite the increasing recognition of Dilthey's contributions, relati vely few of his writings have as yet appeared in English translation. It is therefore both timely and useful to have available (...) here two works drawn from different phases in the development of his philosophy. The "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), now translated into English for the first time, sets forth Dilthey's programma tic and methodological viewpoints through a descriptive psychology, while "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life" (ca. 1910) is representative of his later hermeneutic approach to historical understanding. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES Dilthey presented the first mature statement of his theory of the human studies in volume one of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Studies), published in 1883. He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we must eschew the metaphysical speculation of the absolute idealists while at the same time avoiding the scientistic reduction of positivism. (shrink)

This book completes a landmark six-volume translation of the major writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, a philosopher and historian of culture who continues to have a significant influence on philosophy, hermeneutics, and the theory of the human sciences. These volumes make available to English readers texts that represent the full range of Dilthey's work. The works in this volume present Dilthey's most deeply held views about philosophy and how it can guide human practices. System of Ethics argues that Humean sympathy motivates (...) us only externally and must be replaced with the internally motivated fellow-feeling of solidarity that respects others as ends in themselves. The Essence of Philosophy demonstrates how philosophy has developed from its traditional metaphysical role to the epistemological and encyclopedic functions that ground and order the natural and human sciences. The work also discloses an orientational function of philosophy that is explored further in "The Types of World-View and Their Development". Philosophical world-views are important in that they address the existential needs and riddles that grow out of life experience and are not solved by any of the sciences. In addition, the book features three other significant essays. "Present Day Culture and Philosophy" concerns the challenges to philosophy posed by contemporary culture. "Dream" is about the thinkers portrayed in Raphael's School of Athens and Dilthey's worries about them breaking up into three divergent groups. Finally, "The Problem of Religion" considers how religiosity can still inform lived experience in secular times. (shrink)

This volume provides Dilthey's most mature and best formulation of his Critique of Historical Reason. It begins with three "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," in which Dilthey refashions Husserlian concepts to describe the basic structures of consciousness relevant to historical understanding. The volume next presents the major 1910 work The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences. Here Dilthey considers the degree to which carriers of history--individuals, cultures, institutions, and communities--can be articulated as productive systems (...) capable of generating value and meaning and of realizing purposes. Hegel's idea of objective spirit is reconceived in a more empirical form to designate the medium of commonality in which historical beings are immersed. Any universal claims about history need to be framed within the specific productive systems analyzed by the various human sciences. Dilthey's drafts for the Continuation of the Formation contain extensive discussions of the categories most important for our knowledge of historical life: meaning, value, purpose, time, and development. He also examines the contributions of autobiography to historical understanding and of biography to scientific history. The finest summary of Dilthey's views on hermeneutics can be found in "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life." Here, Dilthey differentiates understanding relative to three kinds of manifestations of life. After giving his analysis of elementary understanding, he examines the role of induction in higher understanding and interpretation, and the relevance of transposition and re-experiencing for grasping individuality. (shrink)

'One may state Dilthey's significance in most general fashion by characterizing his work as the first thorough-going and sophisticated confrontation of history with positivism and natural science. Dilthey's sweep was universal: he strove to reduce to order the multifarious realms of knowledge, the conflicting traditions of cultural study, that he had embraced. Thus Dilthey laid out a program that no mortal - and certainly no one whose mind had been formed in the third quarter of the nineteenth century - could (...) hope to bring to completion. Yet despite its inconclusiveness, Dilthey's work exerted enormous influence. The distinction he had drawn between natural and cultural science became standard for historians and, to a lesser extent, for social scientists also. After Dilthey historians no longer needed to apologize for the "unscientific" character of their discipline: they understood why its methods could never be quite the same as those of natural science. And the contemporary tradition of intellectual history grew naturally out of Dilthey's teaching.' - H. Stuart Hughes. (shrink)