The three important target articles make a strong case for regarding racism as a public health crisis. Each calls for advocacy by the bi...

The Covid‐19 pandemic has concentrated bioethics attention on the “lifeboat ethics” of rationing and fair allocation of scarce medical resources, such as testing, intensive care unit beds, and ventilators. This focus drives ethics resources away from persistent and systemic problems—in particular, the structural injustices that give rise to health disparities affecting disadvantaged communities of color. Bioethics, long allied with academic medicine and highly attentive to individual decision‐making, has largely neglected its responsibility to address these difficult “upstream” issues. It is time (...) to broaden our teaching, research, and practice to match the breadth of the field in order to help address these significant societal inequities and unmet health needs. (shrink)

Most readers of Sartre focus only on the works written at the peak of his influence as a public intellectual in the 1940s, notably "Being and Nothingness". "Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts" aims to reassess Sartre and to introduce readers to the full breadth of his philosophy. Bringing together leading international scholars, the book examines concepts from across Sartre's career, from his initial views on the "inner life" of conscious experience, to his later conceptions of hope as the binding agent for (...) a common humanity. The book will be invaluable to readers looking for a comprehensive assessment of Sartre's thinking - from his early influences to the development of his key concepts, to his legacy. (shrink)

Letters commenting on Hardwig, J "Is There a Duty to Die?" with a reply to those letters by the author.

This article provides a brief review of Saybrook Review, Vol 6, No. 1, Spring 1986. Special issue: Extensions in Human Science Methodology guest edited by Donald E. Polkinghorne. This issue contains articles written by four of the faculty of the Saybrook Institute, all of which examine "the consequences of extending the criteria of science beyond the traditional objectivism-relativism dichotomy." Polkinghorne's lead article is a compelling and clear historical characterization of the place of human science in today's academic world. The second (...) is an article by Anthony Stigliano that proposes "an ontology for the human sciences" where research would be grounded in a language of description that is "incomplete, discontinuous, dialogal, and interlaced with different 'levels' of discourse". Jurgen Kremer's article reviews prevailing views of reason and truth, and makes a proposal "for the development of narratives of truths...that consciously include moral and aesthetic dimensions." The final article is by Marcia Salner and is a piece that explores the question of validity in human science research, paying particular attention to "the central role of linguistic communication as a major data source, and to the role of communal negotiation and juridical rules for dealing with conflicting interpretations." Together these articles make a positive advance toward the understanding of the context as well as consequences of an epistemological position that stresses contextual relativism and embraces methodological pluralism. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.4 (2000) 549-557 [Access article in PDF] Cato Orationes 66 and the Case Against M.' Acilius Glabrio In 189 B.C.E. J. Bradford Churchill THE RACE FOR THE CENSORSHIP of 189 became the setting for one of the most dramatic domestic political disputes of the early second century. 1 M. Porcius Cato (cos. 195) was seeking the censorship, and among his competitors was another homo (...) novus, M.' Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191). Now, Cato had served as tribunus militum under the consul Glabrio during the campaign of 191 against Antiochus III in Greece. Cato had led a flanking expedition to decide the battle at Thermopylae, at the conclusion of which the king's camp was invaded and plundered. 2 Cato said that after the battle, Glabrio had embraced him and cried out that neither he nor the Roman people could repay his good services. 3 Glabrio sent Cato home with news of the victory. 4Now, in the race for the censorship of 189, public opinion was inclining in favor of Glabrio because he had conducted a lavish distribution of congiaria--vessels, perhaps precious, filled with wine or oil. The nobles among the competitors took umbrage at his being preferred to them, and two tribunes, P. Sempronius Gracchus and C. Sempronius Rutilus, brought Glabrio to trial on the charge "that there was some amount of the royal money and booty taken in the camp of Antiochus which he had neither carried in the triumph nor deposited in the treasury." 5 Legates and military tribunes were called to testify, and most visible among them was Cato, who had a reputation for integrity, but [End Page 549] because he was testifying against an opponent in a political race, his influence was diminished. The substance of Cato's testimony, as Livy summarized it, was that he had seen some gold and silver vessels among the royal booty at the sack of the camp, and had not seen them in the triumph.Glabrio withdrew from the race after a fine had been proposed and twice argued, and the case lapsed. He vilified Cato as a perjurious hypocrite for attacking a fellow homo novus for something the nobles usually passed over in silence. 6We have a fragment of a speech Cato gave against Glabrio, and his trial is the only appropriate occasion which is known to us. The fragment itself is clearly designed to set up a contrast between Cato and Glabrio, but the text is corrupt. The codex Farnesianus of Festus has the following entry (Fest. p. 268L): Penatores: qui penus gestant. Cato adversus M.' Acilium quarta: "postquam nativitas ex navibus eduxi, non ex militibus atque nautis piscatores penatores fici, sed arum dedi." First there are several problems which are relatively minor and no longer yield much controversy. The word quarta indicates there were at least four speeches "against Acilius." More often than not, this is dismissed as a simple error. 7 The word nativitas is clearly foreign to the context, and was long ago emended to navitas, as a poetic and archaic variant on nautas. 8 The transmitted fici is regularly and reasonably emended to feci. 9 [End Page 550]The more difficult question centers on the phrase sed arum dedi. André Dacier, in an early modern edition of Festus (Amsterdam 1700), emended arum to aurum. 10 Much later, Theodor Mommsen offered the conjecture arma. 11 This is now the prevailing reading, accepted most significantly by Enrica Malcovati (1953, 39) in the authoritative edition of the Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta. 12 Maria Teresa Sblendorio Cugusi (1982, 77), following Lindsay (1913, 268), printed and obelized arum, but in her commentary (1982, 215) considered Mommsen's emendation preferable to Dacier's because the latter "appears inconsistent with the context." I intend to show that this is rather the opposite of the case, and we ought to accept Dacier's emendation. 13With Mommsen's conjecture, the passage reads: "When I brought sailors off the ships, I didn't make fishers and provisioners out of soldiers... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 279-289 [Access article in PDF] Dice and Facie: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1.7.23 And 9.4.39 J. Bradford Churchill In his discussion of orthography in book 1 of his Institutio Oratoria Quintilian mentions several examples of archaic spelling conventions, among them a practice of the Elder Cato, which I present here with readings I shall propose and defend during the course of this essay: (...) Non Cato Censorius dicam et faciam dice et facie scripsit eundemque in ceteris quae similiter cadunt modum tenuit? (Inst. 1.7.23 5 Cato, Inc. Lib. fr. 55 Jordan, p. 90) Dice et facie is the reading of one manuscript (N); two other manuscripts (BH) have dicae et faciae; the other major manuscripts (APMS) have the similar but obviously corrupt dice et face. The vast discrepancies between the readings accepted by various editors demonstrate the need for a clarification of the evidence: dice et facie; 1 dicem et faciem; 2 dicae et faciae; 3. 4 The reading dicae et faciae found its way into the most recent edition, the Oxford Classical Text of Michael Winterbottom ([1970] 1989). A close examination of the evidence will confirm that this is not the correct reading. It is time to put to rest a good deal of needless controversy by showing that Cato and his contemporaries used a distinct first-person form in the future indicative of the third conjugation and that they usually or always spelled the active form without the final -m. The reading dice et facie accepted by Radermacher (1959), Fierville (1890), and Halm (1869, 367) should stand. [End Page 279]A century ago (1898) Moore argued, in a brief note influential enough to be cited in Winterbottom's apparatus, that behind Quintilian's citation as preserved lies an innovative orthographical practice not otherwise attested. Moore constructed his hypothesis on the assumption that the variants adduced were simply different ways of spelling the forms dicam and faciam. 5 Cato was not satisfied, Moore proposed, simply to follow the usual practice of the time and omit spelling the final -m, which was in many environments only partly articulated. Since the -m did, however, have some impact on the sound, Cato invented a new custom, turning M on its side at the end of the word to indicate the nasal quality of the final vowel. This anomalous symbol was preserved by Quintilian but later misconstrued as E. In this way Moore attempted to render the otherwise nonsensical forms dicae and faciae comprehensible as textual corruptions of Cato's innovation.Klotz (1931) dealt in greater depth with the problem, and although his solution is almost certainly inadequate, he touched on most of the evidence needed to solve it. Because Quintilian quotes Cato's archaic spelling convention again in book 9 (Inst. 9.4.39) in a discussion of sounds which are not spelled, Klotz conjectured (142) that Verrius Flaccus had quoted Cato as a precedent for his own practice of indicating the attenuated pronunciation of an elided final -m by writing only the first half of the letter. So, Klotz's argument continues, it was from Verrius Flaccus (GL 7.80) that Messala drew the example, and from him Quintilian derived the extant version. The "half-M" was misconstrued by Quintilian as E, and so the textual tradition preserves what he wrote: dicae et faciae.Both Moore and Klotz have read Quintilian too narrowly. Each of their arguments is predicated on the assumption (in Moore's case) or argument (in Klotz's) that Cato's forms were morphologically identical to Quintilian's dicam and faciam. They dismissed the possibility that Cato was spelling forms distinct from the classical counterparts listed by Quintilian. This is not a surprising dismissal: among the examples cited by Quintilian, these are the only ones which turn out (if the current argument is accepted) to have been morphologically distinct from the [End Page 280] classical "equivalents." Nevertheless, a careful examination of all the evidence, and in particular a close reading of the cognate passage... (shrink)

Reviews the book, Reconsidering psychology: Perspectives from Continental philosophy edited by James E. Faulconer and Richard N. Williams . Reconsidering Psychology: Perspectives from Continental Philosophy, which raises some new issues, takes a look at some old issues from fresh perspectives, and examines avenues of Continental philosophy and psychology that have not yet received adequate attention. This is a remarkable text that not only takes the reader on a journey through new and exciting intellectual domains of post-Cartesian psychology, but invites the (...) reader to share in some rather compelling visions of psychology's place in history from the ten brilliant minds responsible for the individual chapters of the text. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 533 Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. By AMELIE OKSEN· BERG RORTY. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988. Pp. x & 378. This volume assembles essays written over a period of fifteen years (1973-1988), dealing with topics grouped into the following four areas: (1) persons and identity, (2) the nature of psychological activities, (3) problems in philosophy of mind such as fear, self-deception and akrasia, and (...) (4) issues of virtue and character in social context. Rorty's approach to these topics is governed by a " commitment to the primacy of the particular" (ix). Her style, consequently, is rich in detail, in the exhibition of differences between related issues (e.g., between personal identity and identity of human being), and in the dis· play of the importance of context for setting the philosophical problems concerning mind. Indeed, she writes: " If there were a great ontological table of contents, neither mind nor individ"Ual minds would be likely to appear on the list of independent substances " (5). Thus the collec· tion does not set out a substantial theory of mind; rather, it exhibits a set of commitments and preoccupations-in the author's words, " a point of view." The value of the collection lies in its wealth of discriminating exposition of intricately related issues, and in the display of a philosophical intellect whose consistency survives the strategic pre· disposition to analyze by distinguishing contexts. The first grouping of essays is "Persons and Personae." The title essay "Persons and Personae" (1987) argues that there is no over· arching synthesis that will reconcile the several concepts of a person. Rorty argues from the premise that any concept of person is rooted in and reflects the characteristic central activities of a society: "primary, privileged activities, the activities that are thought to express human excellence and tasks " (25). This unpacks into three parts: (1) that there is no such thing as the concept of a person; (2) that concepts of persons are always reflective of some particular society; and (3) that the element of a society that defines its concept of self will be its list of central human activities, be they religious, political, economic, or moral in nature. Rorty analyzes seven such concepts, and concludes by eschewing what she calls a "vulgar Wittgensteinian" approach; namely, simply advising philosophers to be cured of the yearning for one metaphysical concept of person. Instead, briefly, she acknowledges that yearning and recommends inquiry into its roots and recommends scrutiny of the various overlapping but uncoordinatable concepts of person in the various areas of life that give rise to them. In "The Transformation of Persons" (1973) she argues that the question " Is this the same person? " may have multiple admissible 534 BOOK REVIEWS answers. The question of personal identity through change has, she argues, typically given rise to either psychological, memory-based criteria, or to criteria based on reidentification of the same physical agent. Her claim is that either of these, pressed hard enough, presupposes the other. She dismisses the potentially dismal construal of this conclusion, holding that a recognition of the interdependence of psychological and physical criteria of identity is in fact beneficial, as both kinds of criteria tend to emphasize our notion of persons as (at least) the "irreducible units of responsible agency " (57). The argumentation supporting this contention of criterial interdependence is, however, thin. In "Persons, Policies, and Bodies" (1973) Rorty moves her concerns further toward the issues of responsibility. She examines the theory that a person is a locus of rational agency, that is, one who operates according to deliberately adopted policies that guide particular choices. She notes that if this theory holds, the concept of a person is conceptually distinct from the concept of an individual human being and from an individuated self as a subject of experience. But it does not hold, according to her, at least in any robust sense. She discloses difficulties in fleshing out the notions of choice and rational agency required by the theory, arguing that attempts to salvage it by resorting to rationality as a matter of degree or as a potential tend to vitiate the theory instead of saving it. Rather, her view is that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Theology.After Wittgenstein. By FERGUS KERR. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Pp. xii + 202. Fergus Kerr's Theology.After Wittgenste,in is written in the spirit of Wittgenstein's remark: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own!' If Kerr's book stimulates theologians to read Wittgenstein with sympathy and to reassess their practices in light (...) of his philosophical enterprise, his impact will not end with the waning of the fruitless wrangling over "Wittgensteinian fideism." Kerr offers a three-fold argument: (1) that Wittgenstein's life and philosophical practice evinced a religious sensibility deeply opposed to the Platonic and Cartesian substructures of modern theology; (2) that these substructures involve an " indifference to community and... antipathy to the body" (vii) which Wittgenstein strives to overcome; and (3) that with our liberation from the grip of the myth of the ·self as a private mental ego, we can set ·a new agenda for rearticulating the doctrines and problems of Christian theology. Kerr's approach is distinguished by two factors. First, he is entirely free of the disciple-like awe which has led many commentators to wrestle something profound and true out of every Wittgensteinian pronouncement. He writes: "Wittgenstein had thoughts that were deep, together with others that seem tentative, and even, to my mind, quite idiotic" (35). The fact that a writer sympathetic with -Wittgenstein can now feel free to acknowledge this opinion shows that with Kerr we are well beyond hagiography. Second, Kerr plunges into Wittgenstein from a review of the Cartesianism of modern theology. He reviews a wide spectrum of 20th century theologians and finds them infested with views about the self that stem from Plato and Descartes. Hence he comes at Wittgenstein with an interest in developing "a non-metaphysical understanding of the place of the self in nature and history," in overcoming antipathies toward the body and toward communities, and in " renouncing a certain nostalgia for spiritual purity " in the interest of tiaking a new look at theological issues (52). In remarks reminiscent of Keynes's unmasking of the origins of common sense, Kerr assures the reader that unless theologians explore the metaphysical substructures of their practiee and discourse, they will "remain prisoners of whatever philosophical school was in the ascendant 30 years earlier,... or 350 years earlier" (3). To make good on this claim he sketches " the modern view of the self in Descartes, Kant, James, and 837 338 BOOK REVIEWS Moore, and then traces this view in Rahner, and more briefly, Kiing, Cupitt, Ogden, and several other theologians. The main lineaments of this view are that the self is a privately, introspectively mental entity only unessent~ally related to the human body, that the self's epistemic. function consists in knowing an external reality, and that its moral role consists in an intensely private individualism. Correlated with each of these functions are, respectively, what Kerr calls "the absolute conception of reality" (the view that objectivity is the condition of valid knowl.edge and that objectivity requires the transcendence of every contingent, bodily, or community-based aspect of one's viewpoint), and the implication that the individual consciousness approximates "the actus purus of apophatic theology, i.e., God " (20). To clear the ground for a portrayal of "Wittgenstein's religious sensibility, Kerr offers a brief, accurate account of the mistake committed by apologists who have wished to deploy the concepts "language-game " and " form of life" to show that " religious talk supposedly constitutes a distinctive and autonomous 'language-game' which outsiders could not understand, let alone expose as incoherent or erroneous " (28). Kerr rig·htly argues that it is impossible to apply these central analytic tools to a large-scale phenomenon like religion. He finds Wittgenstein's own attitude towards religions far richer and subtler than "Wittgensteinian fideism." Was Wittgenstein religious~ Kerr concludes that he was: "While one cannot dispute Georg von Wright's judgment that he did not have a Christian faith, many passages in Culture and Value disclose a sympathetic and penetrating understanding of the matter that few Christians... could match" (36). That this understanding was at... (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo pretende discutir a representação da velhice na modernidade, tendo como objeto de análise uma cena da primeira temporada da série estadunidense The Crown. Nela o então primeiro-ministro Winston Churchill, ao completar 80 anos, se incomoda com um quadro em sua homenagem, no qual aparece retratado sem suavizar seus traços envelhecidos. Ao renegar sua imagem na tela, e nas discussões com o pintor ao longo da elaboração do quadro, Churchill percebe a sua fragilidade. Partindo da descrição (...) dessa cena fictícia, mas baseada em fatos reais, serão analisadas as representações da velhice masculina na modernidade, com o intuito de discutir o quanto a experiência etária se torna complexa no mundo capitalista, alterando o campo simbólico e dando novos significados para o papel do idoso na sociedade contemporânea. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the defection of nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo from Britain to the USSR in 1950 in an attempt to understand how government and intelligence services assess threats deriving from the unwanted spread of secret scientific information. It questions whether contingent agendas play a role in these assessments, as new evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened in the Pontecorvo case. British diplomatic personnel involved in negotiations with their US counterparts considered playing down the case. Meanwhile, the (...) press decided to play it up, claiming that Pontecorvo was an atom spy. Finally, the British secret services had evidence showing that this was a fabrication, but they did not disclose it. If all these manipulations served various purposes, then they certainly were not aimed at assessing if there was a threat and what this threat really was. (shrink)

In a 2015 Hastings Center Report essay, Robert Truog and his coauthors argued that the clinical ethics portion of medical education should cast both a wider and a finer net than is sometimes realized. Many of the morally important moments in patient care are missed if we teach only general moral principles, they held; we also need to give attention to an indefinite stream of “microethical” decisions in everyday clinical practice. In the current issue, Truog plays out a similar theme (...) as he discusses the moral significance of touching a patient and asks how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies may change this ancient part of the physician‐patient relationship. And one of the articles in this issue examines the significance of clinicians’ relationships with other clinicians. Donna Chen and colleagues propose, in effect, that “teamwork” has become part of the ethics of everyday clinical practice—a new addition to what Larry Churchill and David Schenck called the “healing skills.”. (shrink)

The greatest defender of democracy in the twentieth century could only say of it that it was a bad form of government, but better than any of the alternatives. It is thus a tribute to academic insularity that there can continue to be an academic discipline, subdiscipline, or interdiscipline devoted to "democratic theory." The major premise of "democratic theory" is that, contrary to the experience of Churchill and all other perceptive democratic statesmen, democracy can be viewed and justified without (...) reference to the circumstances in which it is found or to the available alternatives. On Justifying Democracy is a contribution to this dubious enterprise. (shrink)

Bioethics needs an expanded moral vision. It is now time for bioethics to take full account of the problems of health disparities and structural injustice that are made newly urgent by the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of climate change. Nancy M. P. King, Gail E. Henderson, and Larry R. Churchill make the case for a more social understanding and application of justice, a deeper humility in assessing expertise in bioethics consulting, a broader and more relevant research agenda, and (...) greater appreciation of the profound health implications of global warming. (shrink)

This book covers a crucial period for the development of state education in Britain; the advent of the comprehensive debate before and during the Second World War; the War years themselves and the 1944 Education Act; the post-War Labour Government; and Churchill's last government in a time of education expansion. From the 1960s, the focus shifted to questions of social deprivation and educational opportunities, secondary school selection, the debate on standards, Robbins and higher education, and the continuing theme of (...) the dominance of public schools. The book is divided into four sections, which are then divided into chapters. Each chapter takes as its main reference point a key issue within the chronological framework of the book, e.g. resistance to secondary education for all, politics and textbooks, multilateral and technical schools, pressure groups and the 1944 Education Act, Churchill and the Conservatives. Much new light is thrown on the topics by the author's use of new material and he has made a valuable contribution to the politics of education. (shrink)

Lasnik’s review of the Minimalist program in syntax [1] offers cognitive scientists help in navigating some of the arcana of the current theoretical thinking in transformational generative grammar. One may observe, however, that this journey is more like a taxi ride gone bad than a free tour: it is the driver who decides on the itinerary, and questioning his choice may get you kicked out. Meanwhile, the meter in the cab of the generative theory of grammar is running, and has (...) been since the publication of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures in 1957. The fare that it ran up is none the less daunting for the detours made in his Aspects of Theory of Syntax in 1965, Government and Binding in 1981, and now The Minimalist Program, in 1995. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, it seems like never in the field of cognitive science was so much owed by so many of us to so few. For most of us in the cognitive sciences this situation will appear quite benign, if we realize that it is the generative linguists who should by rights be paying this bill. The reason for that is simple and is well known in the philosophy of science: putting forward a theory is like taking out a loan, to be repayed by gleaning an empirical basis for it; theories that fail to do so are declared bankrupt. In the sciences of the mind, this maxim translates into the need to demonstrate the psychological, and, eventually, the neurobiological, reality of the theoretical constructs. Many examples of this process can be found in the study of human vision, where, as in language, direct observation of the underlying mechanisms is difficult; for instance, the concept of multiple parallel spatial frequency channels, introduced in the late 1960s, was completely vindicated by purely behavioral means over the following decade; see, e.g., [2]. In linguistics, the nature of the requisite evidence is well described by Townsend and Bever: “What do we test today if we want to explore the behavioral implications of syntax?. (shrink)

Lauris Kaldjian makes a strong case for respecting the role of conscience in the practice of medicine. His excellent book, Practicing Medicine and Ethics, presents an historically informed and carefully crafted explication of the role of conscience in Western ethics and its relevance for medical practitioners. The essay that initiates the discussion in this issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine is an equally well-written and lucid account of this important component of morality. But it is also worrisome in its (...) implications for insulating conscience from the other facets of moral thinking and feeling. The reasons Kaldjian's account is not finally compelling stem from his tethering conscience too... (shrink)

Phenomenology has remained a sheltering place for those who would seek to understand not only their own “first person” experiences but also the first person experiences of others. Recent publications by renowned scholars within the field have clarified and extended our possibilities of access to “first person” experience by means of perception (Lingis, 2007) and reflection (Zahavi, 2005). Teaching phenomenology remains a challenge, however, because one must find ways of communicating to the student how to embody it as a process (...) rather than simply to learn about it as a content area. Another challenge issues from the fact that most writings on applied phenomenology emphasize individual subjectivity as the central focus, while offering only indirect access to the subjectivity of others (for example, by way of analyzing written descriptions provided by the individual under study). While one finds in the literature of psychotherapy plentiful elucidations of the “we-experience” within which therapists form impressions of their clients’ experience, there is still need for a more thoughtful clarification of our rather special personal modes of access to the experience of others in everyday life. This paper will present “second person perspectivity” as a mode of resonating with the expressions of others and will describe class activities that can bring students closer to a lived understanding of what it means to be doing phenomenology in the face of the other. (shrink)

In Institutio oratoria 1,7,23 and 9,4,39 Quintilian quotes a somewhat idiosyncratic Catonian spelling for dicam and faciam. The manuscripts offer for the first passage both dicae / faciae and dice / facie as variants, whereas the second passage is corrupt, but in all probability has to be emended according to 1,7,23. Recently James Bradford Churchill and Wolfram Ax have advocated the spellings with -e. In contrast, this paper first argues on the basis of a thorough analysis of the two (...) passages for the readings dicae and faciae, which Quintilian believed Cato the elder to have written; secondly it is likely that Cato indeed had used these forms to render the weakened pronunciation of m, which sounded (as we may presume) like a weak e (something like a schwa) to him. Obviously, the exact pronunciation must remain uncertain. (shrink)

Game semantics extends the Curry–Howard isomorphism to a three-way correspondence: proofs, programs, strategies. But the universe of strategies goes beyond intuitionistic logics and lambda calculus, to capture stateful programs. In this paper we describe a logical counterpart to this extension, in which proofs denote such strategies. The system is expressive: it contains all of the connectives of Intuitionistic Linear Logic, and first-order quantification. Use of Lairdʼs sequoid operator allows proofs with imperative behaviour to be expressed. Thus, we can embed first-order (...) Intuitionistic Linear Logic into this system, Polarized Linear Logic, and an imperative total programming language.The proof system has a tight connection with a simple game model, where games are forests of plays. Formulas are modelled as games, and proofs as history-sensitive winning strategies. We provide a strong full completeness result with respect to this model: each finitary strategy is the denotation of a unique analytic proof. Infinite strategies correspond to analytic proofs that are infinitely deep. Thus, we can normalise proofs, via the semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 179 THE EARLY “IRON CURTAIN” Michael D. Stevenson Schulich School of Business, York U. / Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. Toronto, on m3j 1p3 / Hamilton, on l8s 4l6, Canada [email protected] Patrick Wright. Iron Curtain: from Stage to Cold War. Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2007. Pp. xvii, 488. isbn 978-0-19-923150-8. £18.99 (hb); £12.99 (pb). In his famous Westminster College (...) address on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill Wred one of the opening salvos of the Cold War by proclaiming that from “Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain” had been lowered across Europe. Patrick Wright’s intriguing and provocative book does not examine the phrase “iron curtain” in its popular Cold War context. Instead, he maintains that many characteristics of this metaphor, “including the pronounced sense of theatricality it would bring to international politics, were inherited from the period before the Second World War” (p. 18). Wright divides Iron Curtain into two primary chronological sections, the Wrst covering the period from 1914 to 1920. An iron curtain originally referred to the steel safety screen that descended in English theatres, beginning in the lateeighteenth century, to separate the audience from the often catastrophic Wres that broke out on the stage. The phrase entered the lexicon of international relations in January 1915 when British author and paciWst Violet Page (writing under the pseudonym Vernon Lee) published an article lamenting that “War’s cruelties and recriminations, War’s monstrous iron curtain” (p. 80) had alienated European nations such as England and Germany sharing a common cultural heritage. But the barrier quickly moved east in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution and “took the form not just of exaggerated political rhetoric, but of an economic blockade enforced by naval power” (p. 171), as the Allies sought to contain the infection of Bolshevism. Wright devotes most attention in this section to documenting the 1920 visit to Russia by the British delegation jointly sponsored by the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, which sought to penetrate the dense fog of Allied anti-Bolshevik propaganda and validate the delegation members’ own preconceived views about the nascent socialist utopia in Russia. British delegates witnessed images both of progress carefully stagemanaged by their hosts and of terrible economic dislocation and poverty caused by the Allied blockade and the civil war, which allowed the majority of them to return home to lavish praise on the Soviet experiment that would, in their minds, inevitably fulWl its potential once the Bolshevik government became stable. February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 180 Reviews 1 “The Future of Europe”, European AVairsz 1, no. 1 (April 1949): 3. The second section of Wright’s book examines Western reports of life behind the iron curtain between 1920 and 1939. Here, the author focuses heavily on the theatrical nature of Soviet attempts to create modern-day Potemkin villages that werez—zwith a limited number of exceptionsz—zaccepted as reality by an endless parade of left-wing visitors. A second British Trades Union Congress delegation in 1924, for example, received a dramatically embellished picture of Soviet economic progress that included a train journey past a long-abandoned factory belching smoke created by burning wet straw frantically provided by Russian peasants; the resulting report of the delegation “repeatedly collapsed into the most abject conformity with the Soviet view of reality” (p. 245). The most tragic examples of Western visitors’ blindness to the truth occurred during the 1930s famine deliberately induced by Stalin, and Wright exposes a wide cast of characters who adopted a blinkered view of conditions in the ussr. Among intellectuals, Wright documents the 1931 visit of George Bernard Shaw, who cavalierly dismissed reports of widespread food shortages while dining sumptuously in Moscow’s Hotel Metropole. Among journalists, Wright develops the case of Walter Duranty, the New York Timesz correspondent who knuckled under to demands of Soviet censors to produce sanitized accounts denying or ignoring the famine in order to protect his privileged place in that... (shrink)

Philosophical concerns about nuclear armaments raises questions about the logical and conceptual basis for deterrence theory as well as the effects of nuclear threats on our common humanity. Most philosophical concern centers around around the morality of nuclear deterrence. It is sometimes thought that the doctrine of just war can provide a moral justification for nuclear deterrence based on threats of massive retaliation. Ye attempts to apply the doctrine of just war lead to a moral dilemma: although nuclear deterrence seems (...) justified as self-defense, there are compelling reasons for concluding that threats of retaliation are immoral. Alternative deterrence policies might be thought to overcome the moral dilemma. However, counterforce strategy and anti-missile defense, as recently proposed by President reagan, must still depend upon immoral threats of retaliation. Proposals for a nonviolent national defense offer a possible solution, and serious attention should be given to claims that nonviolent defense is relevant in the nuclear age and would deter aggression. (shrink)