_Time and the Science of the Soul in Early Modern Philosophy_ traces the complex and productive connections established between time and the soul from late Aristotelianism to the natural and political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes.

(2012). Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 1207-1209. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.730982.

Summary Early modern philosophers discussed the question of time in a variety of contexts; an enduring theme is the connection between time and the rational powers of the human soul. However, authors from a variety of confessional and philosophical perspectives also considered how the passions of the soul engage both humans and animals with the temporal world. This article considers a debate about the connections between time and the passions between two French physicians, Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669) and (...) Pierre Chanet (c.1603–c.1660). The article explores the extent to which their background in late Aristotelian philosophy shaped this project, and its place within the broader transformation of the philosophy of time in the seventeenth century. Cureau and Chanet belong within a well-known early modern tradition of debates about animal reasoning, but their discussion of time and the passions is a significant yet neglected episode in the vernacularisation of scholastic and Aristotelian natural philosophy. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic and Aristotelian (...) contemporaries, the article attempts to problematize this notion of pay‐off from an historian's perspective. (shrink)

The Lives of the Ten Orators (), preserved in the manuscripts of Plutarch's Moralia but almost universally acknowledged not to be the work of Plutarch himself, have been much maligned by modern scholars, and the information they provide has been treated with extreme caution, not to say disdain. My purpose here is to demonstrate that the first of these biographies, the Life of Antiphon , repays close study and, far from being worthless, reliably preserves a tradition which provides useful material (...) on its subject. Some of what appears below is inevitably going over well-trodden ground, but there is, in my opinion, sufficient material in the Life which has been overlooked or misinterpreted to justify the following re-examination. (shrink)

(2012). THE FATE OF COMMENTARY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS, C.1550–1640. Intellectual History Review: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 519-536. doi: 10.1080/17496977.2012.725558.

This chapter examines the changes in the concept of substance and essence in British philosophy during the seventeenth century. It analyzes the roles played by substance and essence in different versions of scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy studied and taught during this period, and considers the criticism of Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyle, and John Locke on these issues. The chapter suggests that Hobbes, Boyle, and Locke engaged with the context of scholastic logic and metaphysics in their discussions of substance and their (...) attempts to reject and replace theories of substantial form. (shrink)

Early modern scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy is now a growing area of study. However, little attention has been paid to the structure and form of late Aristotelian texts, partly because they have often been seen as baroque and excessively intricate in construction. This article examines the role of structural and stylistic issues in the De anima commentary of the Jesuit author Hieronymus Dandinus, focusing particularly on the techniques he used to integrate knowledge from other disciplines and expand the familiar commentary (...) format. It argues that taking these issues seriously has important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of reading Aristotle in the early modern period. (shrink)

Mass-marketing frauds are on the increase. Given the amount of monies lost and the psychological impact of MMFs there is an urgent need to develop new and effective methods to prevent more of these crimes. This paper reports the early planning of automated methods our interdisciplinary team are developing to prevent and detect MMF. Importantly, the paper presents the ethical and social constraints involved in such a model and suggests concerns others might also consider when developing automated systems.

This volume inaugurates a new critical edition of the writings of the great English philosopher and sage Francis Bacon - the first such complete edition for more than a hundred years. It contains six of Bacon's Latin scientific works, each accompanied by entirely new facing-page translations which, together with the extensive introduction and commentaries, offer fresh insights into one of the great minds of the early seventeenth century.

This paper argues that existence claims for theoretical entities must be based on more than their role in one theory. The supplementary evidence should be either observation, whether direct or indirect, or the possibility of detaching the existence claim from one particular theory. A logical schematism for the latter type of support is developed.

In the course of his long development, Kant's concept of matter changed somewhat, while his concept of scientific explanation changed considerably. Both developments achieved a coherent integration in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Using this developmental background, the present paper argues that the Foundations should be interpreted as an attempted rational reconstruction of the mechanics of Newton and Euler. Kant attempted to do this by constructing a concept of matter that would confer a Leibnizian intelligibility on Newtonian mechanics, and (...) also accord with Kant's theories on the nature of concepts and their role in scientific explanation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Edward MacKinnon BORIS PASTERNAK'S CONCEPTION OF REALISM To desire truth is to desire direct contact with a piece of reality. To desire contact with a piece of reality is to love. —Simone Weil, The Needfor Roots According to czeslaw milosz, Boris Pasternak "did not pluck fruits from the tree of reason, the tree of life was enough for him. Confronted by argument, he replied with his (...) sacred dance." Pasternak's poetry, he concludes, is "antispeculative, anti-intellectual," and though he was compelled to make certain concessions in the course of writing Doctor Zhivago, speculative thought nonetheless remained for him a perennial and decided "adversary." ' However, the familiar and conveniently stark distinction between lyricist and thinker upon which such judgments depend is in fact both naive and tiresome since, plainly, creativity and reflection need in no way necessarily subvert one another. Accordingly, while it is indeed likely that the most valued feature of Pasternak's poetry and best prose is its detailed recording ofthe world's incessant change, of the magic and movement of weather and gardens, seasons and landscapes, Milosz is far from just in so readily and categorically dismissing any attribution of poetic thought to Pasternak. For as much as the whole of his poetry amounts to a celebration of life's small wonders, unrivaled in their greatness, there remains at bottom the inspiration of the thinker, of one who has seen and felt, but who at the same time has had to compile and consider in an attempt to make sense of the whole. As if in open challenge to Milosz, CM. Bowra notes that Pasternak's poetic sensibility is "both physical and intellectual." The mental states described in his poems, Bowra writes, "begin with sensations of the eye and ear but contain something else in their mental appreciation of the 211 212Philosophy and Literature situation," namely, his "gift for grasping abstract problems." 2 If Milosz remains unconvinced, and if Wladimir Weidle dismisses Pasternak's poetic thought as "puny and piteous," still more poets and critics have shared Bowra's view.3 Henry Gifford refers to Pasternak's "philosophical habit of mind," Ronald Hingley to the "pyrotechnics" ofhis "darting intellect," and Yury Lotman to his personal and "thoroughly professional philosophical culture." 4 In her review ofPasternak's My Sister, Life, meanwhile, Marina Tsvetaeva observes that "thought is what works in him, burrows in subterranean passages...." 5 And though Nadezhda Mandelstamclaims that the word of all poets "flows from a general, integrated view of the world," she acknowledges too that poets "vary in the range and depth of their understanding" and proceeds to cite Pasternak as her one example of a poet with a particularly unified worldview.6 If we were to agree with Francis Sparshott that "the fiercest hatreds spring from the closest relationships," we could assume in turn that the fundamental antagonism customarily alleged to obtain between the creative and critical faculties in fact indicates only some common, if confused, origin or inspiration.7 In creating, after all, it is predictable rather than idiosyncratic that the artist will be led to investigate the roots ofart within himself, tiiat he will be tempted by the urge to define, to entertain, that is, some rudimentary theory. And indeed, in Pasternak 's case, it is not simply a matter of his poetry and prose having been informed by certain tacit, if stray, aesthetic conceptions, but rather of his having supplemented his intensely thoughtful artwith aconcurrently developed theory. In this article, I want specifically to consider Pasternak's conception of realism, that standard of achievement which, according to his theory, constitutes the touchstone of all great art. In order more firmly to ground this notoriously vague and unwieldy notion, I will appeal not only to complementary theoretical conceptions of Pasternak's, but also to those central ideas advanced by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good. My intention will be to locate Pasternak's brand of realism within what I take to be an identifiable tradition, or at least a conspicuous and pervasive theoretical tendency, according to which the most crucial criterion of artistic realism is judged to be not any properly physical aspect ofthe completed work, and certainly... (shrink)

Aristotele. Science as a systematic explanation through causes.--Newton, I. Rules and reflections on scientific reasoning.--Carnap, R. Empiricism, semantics, and ontology.--Hempel, C. On the logic of explanation.--Nagel, E. The realist view of theories.--Quine, W. V. On the role of logic in explanation.--Harris, E. E. Method and explanation in metaphysics.--Einstein, A. Remarks on Bertrand Russell's theory of knowledge.--Sellars, W. The language of theories.--MacKinnon, E. Atomic physics and reality.--Bunge, M. Physics and reality.--Heelan, P. A. Quantum mechanics and objectivity.--Bibliographical essay (p. 285-301).

Rom Harré's proposed Copernican Revolution in the philosophy of science is a very ambitious undertaking. It challenges established views, proposes a radically new model for scientific explanation, and forces a rethinking of the foundations of the field. In his treatment of the natural sciences, Harré rejects all deductivist accounts of scientific explanation basically on the grounds that such accounts seriously distort the methods of explanation actually operative in science. In the social sciences Harré, in collaboration with Secord, rejects mechanistic, positivistic, (...) and behavioristic accounts of human behavior [5]. In place of these discarded interpretations he substitutes a new realism which stresses the role that models play in supplying accounts of observed patterns of phenomena in terms of the things and processes whose interactions are responsible for the manifest phenomena. This revolution, if successfully carried out, would indeed be a valuable contribution to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The tension that many early scientists experienced between a reliance on religious tradition as a source of truth and scientific methodology as a guide to truth eventually led to a clash between theists who claimed that the existence of the universe required a creator and non-theists, who insisted that recourse to a creator to explain why there is something perverts scientific methodology. The present paper defends the position that physics and its foreseeable cosmological extensions neither requires nor excludes either opposed (...) contention. Each has the status of an inference to the best explanation. This is developed in three stages. The first uses historical analysis to support the claim that the advancement of physics and cosmology do not rely on an appeal to supernatural forces. The second explains inference to the best explanation. The third shows how this accommodates these conflicting claims. An appendix examines an influential argument that the intelligibility of the universe requires a creator. (shrink)

Niels Bohr began his career with an attempt to give a correct descriptive account of the motion of electrons. When forced to abandon this interpretation, he adopted, but soon rejected, a hypothetical-deductive account. In his development of an interpretation for the new quantum theory Bohr began to concentrate on the way language functions to make descriptions possible. His later work on this problem and on the role of concepts in the foundations of science led him to anticipate some of the (...) basic ideas developed in Wittgenstein's Investigations. Bohr eventually saw his own analysis of the conditions of the possibility of unambiguous communication as the basis for making explicit the unity implicit in science. (shrink)

This article completes the study begun in I by a detailed consideration of errol harris's, "the foundations of metaphysics in science" and by an independent interpretation of the epistemological foundations of scientific theories. This is done in terms of two components labelled 'a physical language' and 'a mathematical language'. A physical language is conceived as a transformed extension of ordinary language which preserves its basic structural principles while modifying its descriptive metaphysics. The relation between such a physical language and a (...) mathematical system is explained by a correspondence between second order physical predicates and first order mathematical predicates. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The objectivity of physics has been called into question by social theorists, Kuhnian relativists, and by anomalous aspects of quantum mechanics. Here we focus on one neglected background issue, the categorical structure of the language of classical physics. The first half is an historical overview of the formation of the language of classical physics, beginning with Aristotle's Categories and the novel idea of the quantity of a quality introduced by medieval Aristotelians. Descartes and Newton at-tempted to put the new (...) mechanics on an ontological foundation of atomism. Euler was the pivotal figure in basing mechanics on a macroscopic concept of matter. The second scientific revolution, led by Laplace, took mechanics as foundational and attempted to fit the Baconian sciences into a framework of atomistic mechanism. This protracted effort had the unintended effect of supplying an informal unification of physics in a mixture of ordinary language and mechanistic terms. The second half treats LCP as a linguistic para-site that can attach itself to any language and effect mutations in the host without chang-ing its essential form. This puts LCP in the context of a language of discourse and sug-gests that philosophers should concentrate more on the dialog between experimenters and theoreticians and less on analyses of theories. This orientation supplies a basis for treating objectivity. (shrink)

The revolt against logical positivism within the philosophy of science has now lasted long enough to produce something of a counter-revolution. As the more strident charges (positivistic analyses misrepresent the most fundamental features of the scientific enterprise and have contributed little or nothing to its clarification) and counter-charges (any attempt to induce a philosophy of science from studies in the history of science rests on a massive genetic fallacy) gradually subside, critical interest is focussing on the presuppositions that guide and (...) structure various interpretations of science. Here epistemological positions, often implicitly assumed, play a pivotal role. In the present article we shall try to make different positions and presuppositions explicit by examining some current developments in the philosophy of science. This examination will be focused on, though not limited to, three recent books by I. Schefller, S. Körner, and E. Harris. (shrink)

This article clarifies Bohr's position by focusing on the work he did in nuclear physics and scattering theory.

The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the (...) peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims. (shrink)