This paper investigates Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ theory of representation, which is unique in that it introduces a method of ideation that is completely different from the one of transcendental phenomenology. Instead of separating the essence from the individual real entity through reduction, Conrad-Martius’ method of representation elucidates what constitutes the reality of the actual individual. In a representation, we can explore and play with our receptivity to the self-emergence of reality by observing the different ways in which our representations themselves appear (...) as real. I will discuss this access to reality as a realistic phenomenological method not just in terms of lived experience, but also as eidetic reduction. My thesis is that Conrad-Martius’ theory of representation allows for conceiving how essences, as the immutable features of reality beyond surface perception, can be addressed by intuition, viz. representation. In a second step, a shift in Conrad-Martius’ thinking towards the constitution of reality in itself is discussed based on her second major work, Realontologie. Thirdly, Conrad-Martius’ theory of representation is roughly contrasted with Husserl’s to further elucidate what constitutes the “really real” in her phenomenology beyond the simple alternative between idealism and realism. (shrink)

The critique of psychologism -- Phenomenology and other 'eidetic sciences' -- Phenomenology and transcendental philosophy -- The transcendental reduction -- The structure of intentionality -- Intuition, evidence, and truth -- Categorial intuition and ideation (eidetic seeing) -- Time-consciousness -- The ego and selfhood -- Intersubjectivity -- The crisis of the sciences and the idea of the 'lifeworld' -- Conclusion: mastering Husserl.

후설 현상학은 과연 교육학적인 요소가 있는가? 본 글은 이를 긍정하면서 후설 현상학이 어떠한 맥락에서 교육학적인지를 밝히려고 한다. 후설 현상학은 태도의 변화를 통한 인간성의 개조, 잠재된 인간성의 계발, 공동체적 존재로서의 개인의 인격성의 확립 등을 추구한다는 점에서 교육학적인 면모를 보인다. 이러한 후설 현상학의 교육학적 측면은 근대 독일 신인문주의의 도야(Bildung)로서의 교육관과 유사성을 보인다. 도야로서의 교육관은 개인의 인격을 중시하면서 각 개인에 내재된 잠재된 인간성이 스스로의 노력에 의해 계발되도록 하는데 교육의 목적을 둔다. 이때 도야로서의 교육관은 감성과 이성의 조화를 추구하면서 감성과 이성이 모두 어우러진 형태의 전인적인 (...) 교육론을 펼친다. 곧 교육에서 감성의 가치를 인정하면서 감성에 바탕을 둔 교육론을 전개하는 것이 특징이다. 그런데 후설의 교육관 또한 이와 유사하게 감정과 사랑에 바탕을 둔 윤리적, 인격적 존재를 추구하는 등 감성지향적인 교육관의 모습을 드러내고 있다. 즉, 그의 가치론과 생활세계론, 본질직관론은 감성에 바탕을 두면서 이성과의 조화를 통해 진리와 인격성을 추구하는 전인적 감성교육의 특징을 잘 보여주고 있다. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...) the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to use Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology for purposes of describing central features of competition. While not accepting all theoretical aspects of this methodology, I employ its central strategies to see how well it works. In carrying out the phenomenological analysis, I examine noetic and noematic correlates of competitive projects including the factors of plurality, normativity, disputation, temporality, and comparability. I finish by reviewing three forms of pseudo or defective competition. I conclude that eidetic analyses like (...) the one produced in this essay have utility in spite of their significant limitations. (shrink)

Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but not (...) about our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science. (shrink)

The aim of the study is to clarify the aesthetic concept of color perception from the phenomenological reasoning of Edmund Husserl. Today, the orientation diagram of the field of phenomenological research is formed in various zones: from theological to naturalistic. In which of these zones the structures of the phenomenological analysis of color are located is not an easy question. The coloristic region is constituted according to the degree of consciousness, including aesthetic consciousness. It is extremely difficult to meet with (...) the phenomenon of color, if only because its obviousness is fulfilled only by the fervor of the contemplative consciousness with its aesthetic pathos, a consciousness that distinguishes between, as it were, the reality of transcendent color and the aesthetic "continent of givens". We are talking, as Husserl would say, about the halo of consciousness, referring to the essence of perception performed in the mode of turning to the beauty of color. For the first time, approaches to the study of such a complex phenomenological topic as the description of a coloristic attitude, the eidetics of color experiences in Husserl's philosophy are outlined, the significance of its development for the comprehension of aesthetic and artistic consciousness is revealed. The main conclusions of the study are related to the philosophical interpretation of the idea of color as included in phenomenology in the experience of philosophical surprise, which turns into the acquisition of the essence of "phenomenological color" in general, and in aesthetics it is directly correlated with the appearance of its structures on the horizon of the harmonic synthesis of acts of perceptual performance in the imagination, "primordial giving visions" of color, with the creation of a picture coloristic impressions as cognitive emotions, reduced pure color perception, with an understanding of how art makes the very conditions of color visibility obvious, how its artistic synthesis is made, in the structure of which correlation analysis can see an analogue of a priori empiricism – this fundamental characteristic of purely Husserl synthesis and method revealed in domestic studies. (shrink)

This paper examines three propositions: “First to arise within intellectual awareness is the notion of Being”; the human being is defined as “the rational animal”; and knowing involves “the complete return of the subject into itself.” Its starting point is an examination of what seems trivial: the letter ‘F’ in ‘First.’ It involves eidetic recognition of the alphabet and is identically the same, not only in different times and places and in different type-faces or hand-written form, but in differing (...) media: visual, audile, tactual. And eidetic recognition is also involved in the terms into which the letters or sounds or embossings enter, each of which is definable in terms of other terms which, in turn, are definable in other terms until we see that the whole itself is articulated in terms of the interlacing of meanings. What grounds such recognition is the openness to the whole introduced by the notion of being. The unrestrictedness of the openness is paralleled by the coemergence of the principle of noncontradiction which governs coherent discourse. In both sensory presentation and intellectual apprehension we are outside our spatial inside, with the things manifest in the environment and in terms of the world of public meaning expressed in language. The second part of the paper traces the various options for understanding the notion of being in the history of Western thought: Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Spinoza, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract RepresentationKenneth BerryThere is a paradox in the relationship between Kandinsky's use of the terms, "abstract" and "concrete," which is presented in the expression, "Kandinsky's abstract representation." Thisexpression, while being apparently contradictory, may point to a feature underpinning Kandinsky's art, which is pivotal to a proper experience of his work, just as, in Christopher Middleton's view, a poetic language may be pivotal to the formation (...) of cultures.1 Art and cultural artifacts are vital to aesthetic experience and aesthetic education, and both the language of art and other languages are instrumental to this end. However, how may Kandinsky's mature abstraction, being in essence objectless, have any claim to representation, and consequently the higher cultural goals of aesthetic expression and the aesthetic enrichment of society?According to Thomas M. Messer, the position of centrality that Kandinsky has assumed in our understanding of modern art is largely due to his having brought to bear on his art, an instinctive awareness of what constituted the central aesthetic issues of his era.2 Kandinsky's writings in Concerning the Spiritual in Art elaborate on his aesthetic theories, and, in particular, [End Page 99] present the view that paintings should be looked at as a graphic representation of a mood rather than as a representation of objects. Messer observes that, for Kandinsky, abstraction, defined as a mode of painting extending beyond the depiction of recognizable objects, having gradually stripped itself of mimetic vestiges, thus becomes paramount. Michael Carter has similarly pointed out that with the pure forms of absolute abstraction, the non-objective colors and shapes of Kandinsky's paintings were regarded as distillations of the aesthetic properties of the artistic sign3 — separable from any referential aspect of art.4 This aesthetic aspect of Kandinsky's work, which became known as nonfigurative, nonobjective, or nonrepresentational,goes along with the cultural — and, as sculptor Anish Kapoor has remarked, "in the deepest, deepest depths of human history the cultural has always been a motivator of people," and has the power to transform society through finding visual equivalents for an emotional language.5Much has been written about Kandinsky's use of color, but perhaps the primary innovation that he made, as in the case of Barnett Newman, was in the field of drawing. Kandinsky was influenced by Gauguin's idea that drawing was an abstraction from memory after nature, just as Gauguin had been affected by the simplified contours and flattened forms of Puvis de Chavannes. Drawing did not come so easily to Kandinsky as color — he had to work harder at drawing, but in his early improvisations, forms and their outlines as graphic symbols came welling up from the unconscious, and eidetic motifs only had to be copied — almost as the art of calligraphy. Kandinsky's "organic" drawing developed as an urge to nonnaturalistic impulses, and during the period of Point and Line to Plane became almost a grammar of form, saved from mere pedantry by the living forces or visual tensions that made various kinds of line operate not just as contours but as dynamic or restful elements within themselves. In 1913, Kandinsky wrote in his "Reminiscences" that, "painting is a thundering collision of different worlds, intended to create a new world in, and from, their struggles with one another, a new world which is the work of art."6 It is clear from this that the Modernist work of art was intended to be a "new world" operating according to its own universal aesthetic laws.Kandinsky is not just a painter; he is also a visual poet. Poetry, according to Tony Curtis, involves the expression of the intensification of experience — the elevation of banal facts of life into something beyond the merely prosaic — something unique and perceptively heightened.7 It involves both imagination and poetic license to explore both ambiguity and paradox. As Scottish poet Norman MacCaig observed, poetry renders the ordinary extraordinary, seeing the unfamiliar in the familiar.8 Creative analogical thinking such as evinced in Kandinsky's art, often involves breaking free of a clichéd representation.Malcolm Budd has remarked that, in its most exclusive sense, a work... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Edmund Husserl’s Influence on Karl Jaspers’s Phenomenology”Jean Naudin (bio) and Jean-Michel Azorin (bio)Keywordsphenomenology, intentionality, intuition, empathy, ambiguitySchwartz and Wiggins’s paper clearly shows that Jaspers’s comprehensive psychiatry draws mainly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This thesis enters a current debate opened by Chris Walker and German Berrios about the influence of Husserlian philosophy on Jaspers’s work. This debate, which emerged at the end of the so-called decade of the brain, (...) could be considered perfectly obsolete. But its topicality relies on taking up the challenge of the scientific bases of comprehension in psychiatric experience. Wiggins and Schwartz perfectly achieve this aim by opposing a theory of seeing and a theory of thinking. Works such as Walker’s are grounded on thinking; they are works about theory. They are not works about experience, but rather epistemological or historical works. In contrast, Wiggins and Schwartz suggest to see, as Jaspers did, and not to think, following Husserl by grounding their psychopathology on intuition and presuppositionlessness. They emphasize Jaspers’s method of “making present” by doing a perfect analysis of the issues of translation of vergegenwärtigung as a co-experiencing of mental processes as if they were directly given. These main principles of direct-givenness, presuppositionlessness, and making present pull the Jaspersian concepts to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and seem like the foremost principle in Husserlian phenomenology: the intuition of the thing in itself. Whereas Jaspers refuted the principle of eidetic reduction, Wiggins and Schwartz clearly show how much he grounded on the basis of the concept of intentionality, discovered and enlightened during Husserl’s life within the horizon of phenomenological reduction. Actually, it seems that the authors take the side of Jaspers to better support their own vision of psychiatric experience, which they more explicitly argued in Husserlian terms of the later period in some other papers (Schwartz and Wiggins 1985; Wiggins and Schwartz 1988, 1991; Wiggins, Schwartz, and Northoff 1990). However, they take care here to struggle exclusively with the epistemological field of their opponents, considering only Jaspers’s own writings and the Husserlian texts that were accessible to Jaspers when he wrote his psychopathology. There is no room for Kant in Jaspers’s main [End Page 37] principles, and this assumption must lead us to consider the horizon opened by Jaspers, that is, the horizon of a science of meaning essentially built on the lived experiences and the bracketing of any kind of a priori. In contrast to the slight influence of Kant, one idea that emerges is that of the straight impact of Dilthey on both Jaspers and Husserl. We perfectly agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that Jaspers, grounding both on Husserl and Dilthey, arrives at a methodological principle that is all his own, by considering both the connections of the life-stories and the objectivity of symptoms. In other words, we can find the originality and maybe the astonishing modernity of Jaspers in his perfect description of the balance between comprehension and observation, between empathy and its limits, that are obviously found in psychotic processes.We thus focused our comments on the following critiques to Jaspers, although they were already well argued in the brief conclusion of Wiggins and Schwartz: (a) the issue of empathy, (b) the limits of Jaspersian phenomenology, and (c) the merits of its genuine ambiguity.The Issue of Empathy. Indeed we have no reliable scientific mean to guarantee the correctness of our intuitions of the other’s mental life, and this problem might lead one to globally reject the method. The discussion of this problem, classical in the Continental literature since the twenties, led the Continental psychiatrists to unfortunately abandon their own traditions. And it is surprising for a Continental psychiatrist to see this debate coming back into the English-speaking literature. When we address the issue of empathy, we have no easy means to abandon folk psychology. Using philosophical slang weakens the attempt to enlighten its foundations instead of describing its values. The suspicion regarding empathy is partially legitimated by the prejudices of Jaspers himself. As psychiatrists, we have to carry on the Jaspersian research by progressively abandoning it and coming back... (shrink)

Kurt Gödel began to study the philosophy of Edmund Husserl in 1959. In this paper I present an overview of central themes in Gödel’s study of Husserl’s phenomenology. Since many of Gödel’s ideas concerning Husserl were never put into a systematic form by Gödel himself, I quote fairly extensively in the paper from several sources in order to inform the reader of the nature of Gödel’s interest in Husserl. Gödel prepared one manuscript specifically on Husserl, as we will see below, (...) and many of Gödel’s comments on Husserl are included in the books of Hao Wang. I will also quote some relevant texts from the Gödel Nachlass. In accordance with these various sources, I provide a brief overview in a later section of the paper of Gödel’s interest in eidetic transcendental phenomenology as a new type of monadology. The relationship of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems to Husserl’s notion of ‘definite’ axiom systems is also discussed briefly. (shrink)

This book presents a systematic discussion of the development of Husserl’s concept of the a priori from his early and through his later writings. The chapters contained herein analyze the different phases and aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of the a priori in light of his twofold notion of reason, construed as both ontological and transcendental. Starting from the assessment of the introduction of the notion of a priori knowledge in the context of the Logical Investigations, this text uniquely explores its (...) development during the Göttingen years. It is at this time during his work on The Crisis of European Sciences, that Husserl comes to see the a priori as a criterion to interpret the history of philosophy, notably, modern philosophy. This book sheds light upon such concepts as: essence and eidos; ideation, eidetic attitude and eidetic reduction; as well as formal and material, innate and contingent a priori. The author argues that the a priori becomes for Husserl the expression of an ontological form of rationality, i.e., the rationality immanent to being. This book appeals to students and researchers working on Husserl and phenomenology. (shrink)

In this article I address the idea that in Husserl’s eidetic ontology all possibilities are fixed ‘in advance’ so that actual objects and events—despite their contingency—can only ever unfold possibilities that are ‘permitted’ to them by their essences. I show how this view distorts Husserl’s ontology and argue that this distortion stems from a misconstrual of the relations between essences and facts, and between ideal and real possibilities. These ‘local’ misconstruals reflect, I contend, a ‘global’ misunderstanding that mistakes descriptive (...) distinctions for ‘real’ separations, and that remains indebted to a non-Husserlian understanding of the a priori–a posteriori-distinction. In support of this argument, I first lay out the relevant objection to Husserl’s eidetics as I understand it. Then, I clarify the relation between ideal and real possibilities in the context of Husserl’s eidetics as I see it. Finally, I make a general point about the status of Husserl’s ontological differentiations ‘in the midst of life,’ namely in how what they differentiate is effective and (tacitly) manifest ever only as one moment (amongst many) of the complex whole that is a concrete life of consciousness. I end with some remarks on what this might mean for future phenomenological research on the imagination. (shrink)

With a myriad of others, Francis Crick has sought the nature of the soul in the observable functioning of the nervous system, beginning with seeing. In contrast, this paper explores the nature of the soul through the grounding of the act of seeing in the power of seeing as its “soul” and folds in the kinds of attention we pay through seeing. We begin with the eidetic characteristics of the visual field. We then explore three (...) theoretical positions on where what is seen presents itself: within the brain, on things, or between awareness and things. What makes possible the appearance of things is the self-presence of the seer revealed in the nature of touch which suffuses the functional, self-directive body. Objectifying the eyes by the ophthalmologist abstracts from their essential expressivity and from the speech that can explain that expression. In the situation of encounter, focus upon the empirical features breaks the character of the encounter where we live “outside” ourselves and within the space of common meaning expressed in language. Even in the empirical focus, the ophthalmologist recognizes, through her seeing, deviations from normality of functioning and uses techniques that follow from her having intellectually mastered the field of practice. As a native power, seeing is a universal orientation towards all instances of the colored kind, cutting through the problem of universals by finding them in powers and correlative kinds. Recognition of this is made possible by the functioning of the notion of Being that grounds both intellectual and volitional activities. A concluding section explores several tasks for neuro-psychological research and expands into the grounds of a general cosmology centered upon the free and intelligent commitment of neuro-psychologists. (shrink)

This book presents an exposition and criticism of Husserl's essential ideas, explaining what is defective and what meritorious in them and offering a philosophical program based on the merit. The author's aim is to provide a point of entry for the study of phenomenology. In the opening section he states the key concepts of The Idea, following Husserl's summary. These are: the contrasting notions of natural thinking and philosophical thinking; intentional immanence; the "pure seeing" of reflective cognition; and (...) class='Hi'>eidetic abstraction. He proceeds to a developmental reconstruction showing how these concepts grow out of one another. Intentionality, the active relatedness of consciousness to its object, is the foundation concept. By being aware of one's own intentionality and abandoning the natural standpoint, phenomenological reduction can be achieved and the universal experienced in eidetic abstraction. According to Pettit, the merit of Husserl's method is that it recalls philosophy to the self and to the evidence, i.e., to man as a conscious subject and to the obvious, incontestable data of consciousness. Phenomenology's defect is that, since every experience implicitly contains a description, the supposed eidetic experience is absurd. Philosophy should aim at explanation, i.e., at a non-reductive account of conscious experience, which makes the experience intelligible. Pettit concludes with a phenomenological program, listing the dimensions and types of human behavior and showing how the traditional divisions of philosophy fit into the classification. There is a bibliography but no index.--L. G. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 545 Congratulations to the publisher must be qualified only with regret that a work so valuable to students should be available only in a hardback edition costing nearly twenty dollars. Wabash College Crawfordsville, Indiana WILLIAM c. PLACHER God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion. By MEROLD WESTPHAL. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Pp. xiv+ 305. $27.50. At each stage of its history existential thought has (...) been deeply engaged with the phenomena of religion. However, the appeal to the existence has produced starkly opposed responses to the question of the significance of religion. The original and most obvious contrast is that between Kierkegaard and his near-conternpomry, Nietzsche. Where the first reflects on the existence of the " single one " as a way of defending religious consciousness against Hegelian rationalism; the latter makes a similar turn to existence (as the will to power of life) precisely in order to " unmask " the " lies " that tempt one to the religious life. Or, more recently, one could contrast the efforts of Marcel and Bultmann, who find in existential thinking the key to a deeper appreciation of traditional religiosity, with the resolutely atheistic project of Sartre, for whom "we are in a situation where there are only human beings," where "even if God existed it wouldn't make any difference." In spite of such controversy over the value of religion, the philosophical approach to religion in terms of existence has had the beneficial effect of shifting the locus of questioning from the cognitive status of religious utterances to the problem of the meaning of the religious life. An existentail approach does not exhaust itself in analyzing the evidential structure of propositions about God, the soul, etc., as though religion were simply a mode of cognition, but rather explores the question of "what it is (means) to be religious." In our own time Paul Ricoeur has taken up this issue in a way that seeks to do justice both to the critical moment in existential thought and to its promise of a deepened religious sensibility. Along with a "hermeneutics of suspicion" (grounded in the works of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) Ricoeur calls for a "hermeneutics of recovery " which would reinvest the " symbolism of the sacred " with a depth drawn from consciousness of our existential situation. It is in the horizon of this latter project that we may locate Merold Westphal's sig- 546 BOOK REVIEWS nificant contribution, God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion. This book, addressed to a general audience of believer and unbeliever alike, has many virtues. While it draws judiciously from the central works of existentialism and phenomenology, as well as from a wide variety of literature on the world's religions. it is written in clear and engaging prose, entirely free from tedious jargon. And while vYestphal's sympathies are clearly with those who find a continued vitality in religious eonsciousness today, his book is written in the spirit of inquiry; it gracefully avoids the twin dangers of polemics and devotionality. He is sensitive to objections without allowing them to paralyze his arguments, and he offers some bold, important generalizations without being blind to the limits of his evidence. Finally, the book contains original phenomenological investigations, striving after eidetic insight through study of personal experience, world literature, and (mostly standard) works on other cultures and their religious life (including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, various forms of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Amerindian religions). Because Westphal draws on such a diversity of materials, there are likely to be many points with which the specialist will take issue. But an ad.equate phenomenology of religion must tackle this diversity, and Westphal has certainly given us one of the most accessible examples of such an enterprise. Westphal's approach to the existential question-What does it mean to be religious ~-is phenomenolog'ical. This means, first, that we are interested in the significance of religion from the descriptive first person perspective of the believing soul. The believing soul (a term borrowed from Ricoeur) is not simply "one who believes or affirms this or that proposition," but one. "who sees things in a certain way" (257). vYe are concerned here with a form... (shrink)

Introduction. The technical art of cinematography is traditionally regarded as a synthetic unity of scientific and technological progress and creativity. The possibility of unlimited copying of movie plots makes it possible to extend the authority of cinema to broad areas of public attention and forms a mass man. At the same time, the fact that cinema is, first of all, an experiment with time, organized by technical means, remains behind the scenes. The purpose of the study. If the core issues (...) of humanity are centered on the problem of life and death, on the problem of mastering and overcoming time, then cinema clearly shows that humanity has a ready-made embodied model of its desire. Methods. The authors use a phenomenological method that allows one to see the temporal fabric behind the “opaque body” of cinema. The eidetic reduction to the foundations of the constructed film plot temporal reality is complemented by the structuralist method of analyzing technical devices and technological methods of the film industry. Scientific novelty of the research. The ontology of the technical art of cinema goes beyond rationality and pragmatics. By launching a special kind of experiment with time, cinema technologies allow the viewer to be present in the bifurcation moments of temporal metamorphoses that connect different temporal modes. The temporal fabric is subject to the plot logic. Results. In cinema, time is constructed by technical means. The nature of this construction allows us to see the layered structure of time, the intersections of time flows, influxes, reverse time orders and stops in time. The cinema technique clearly shows that time barriers are conditional. Conclusions. Cinema dissolves any empirical density, creating gaps in it and transitions to other worlds. The connection between the worlds is carried out by constructed time. Time is taken out of objects and, obeying the course of the narrative, expands the reality of the world. (shrink)

The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...) 1992). But where the former use phenomenology in the background as broad context and Dreyfus uses it primarily (though not exclusively) as a critique of conventional AI, Gallagher and Zahavi wish to indicate a positive and constructive place for it within cognitive science. They do not recommend that we simply accept pronouncements of thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau‐Ponty and apply them to questions of cognition, but that we use revised forms of phenomenology to illuminate dimensions of cognitive experience that are missing in current research. The book is presented as an “introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science” written from a phenomenological perspective. It seeks to justify the use of phenomenology in cognitive science by showing what kinds of questions it asks and answers, the variety of uses to which it has recently been put and the fruitfulness of some of its findings. The catalog of topics, for the most part, matches other introductions to the philosophy of mind, such as questions of method, consciousness, perception, intentionality, embodiment, action, agency and other minds. One issue presented here that is not generally dealt with in existing philosophy of mind and cognitive science texts is temporality, a mainstay of the continental tradition. After an introductory chapter that places phenomenology in the context of other approaches, the book lays out the main tenets of phenomenological method. Here, one encounters expected components of phenomenology: the epoché (described below), phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and so on. This traditional fare is soon followed by some potential surprises, namely, attempts to “naturalize” phenomenology, a few attempts to formalize it, and the emergence of ‘neurophenomenology’. Each of these is a bit surprising because Husserl was a vocal critic of naturalism, seeing transcendental phenomenology as an alternative to the empirical study of consciousness. He was also skeptical about the possibilities of mathematizing phenomenology. Gallagher and Zahavi acknowledge these points, but since they are not repeating history or undertaking exegesis, strict adherence to canonical phenomenology is not required. Naturalizing phenomenology means recognizing that “the phenomena it studies are part of nature and are therefore also open to empirical investigation” (p.. (shrink)

The volume under review here contains the first English translation of Edmund Husserl’s lectures on logic and theory of knowledge, delivered during the winter semester of 1906/07 in Göttingen. (The text of the lectures was first published as Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Vorlesungen 1906/07 in 1984 in the Husserliana series (Husserliana XXIV)). Husserl had taken a position at Georg August Universität in Göttingen in 1900, thanks in part to the efforts of Hilbert, and he was to remain there (...) until 1916. The 1906/07 lectures are of interest for several reasons. First, they fall midway between the publication of the first edition of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (LI) (1900/01) and his Ideas I (1913). In the LI Husserl characterizes his phenomenology as a form of descriptive psychology in the style of his teacher Franz Brentano but in Ideas I he presents for the first time in publication his new transcendental phenomenology in which we are to ‘bracket’ the ‘natural attitude’ on the basis of the so-called phenomenological epoché (or ‘reduction’). Ideas I provides a mature presentation of the basic ideas of transcendental phenomenology, but it is not a book on logic and mathematics. On the other hand, the LI are of course devoted to logic but not from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology. It is in 1906 and 1907 that this fundamental shift to transcendental phenomenology takes place, and the lectures under review here provide some of the earliest materials on Husserl’s new conception of the methodology of phenomenological investigation. When Gödel says in the quotation above that the LIhas no correct technique because it still adopts the ‘natural’ attitude it is to this shift that he is referring. It was Husserl’s transcendental eidetic phenomenology that Gödel thought would be promising in logic, the foundations of mathematics, and in philosophy itself. The 1906/07 lectures are also of interest for their clarification and extension of some of the central ideas on logic and mathematics that were presented in the LIand earlier writings. Of course they do not take up all of the topics treated in the nearly nine hundred pages of the LI but they do provide an overview of some of the central themes. They also introduce, relative to the LI, some new dimensions of Husserl’s thinking about the relation of logic and mathematics to metaphysics (see especially chapter 3 of the lectures and a number of the appendices that are included in the volume). (shrink)

In 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao instituted a “Harmonious Society” policy marking a new China’s approach toward development. This generated intense excitement among observers of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) who perceive an overlap in objectives between CSR and Harmonious Society and believe that Harmonious Society will lead to increased CSR engagement in China. However, there is little exploration of how Harmonious Society will contribute to increasing CSR engagement. This article seeks to explore whether Harmonious Society will meet this promise. It (...) does so by drawing up a list of actions that if taken by the government would increase the level of CSR in China and make Harmonious Society a relevant factor in the development of Chinese CSR. To do so, my article studies comparative literature on CSR development to develop a framework that divides causes of CSR in a country into environmental constraints and discretionary responses. Understanding what drives the development of CSR allows us to understand what measures the Chinese government can take to influence the level of CSR. Using this framework, my article suggests that Harmonious Society is unlikely to promote CSR in China’s growing private sector because policy measures that affect the “constraints” driving CSR are bounded by other political considerations. (shrink)

Studies have reported high rates of childhood maltreatment among individuals with drug addiction problems; however, investigation about the potentially protective factors to mitigate the effects of maltreatment experiences on motivation to engage in addiction treatment has received less attention. This study aims at exploring the mediating effects of forgiveness and self-efficacy on the association between childhood maltreatment and treatment motivation among drug addicts. A total of 360 male drug addicts were recruited from three mandatory inpatient rehabilitation centers in Malaysia. Participants (...) completed a package of self-report questionnaires including measures of childhood maltreatment experiences, forgiveness, self-efficacy, and motivation for treatment. The analysis conducted using the structural equation model revealed that childhood maltreatment significantly predicted lower treatment motivation, while forgiveness and self-efficacy played a fully mediating role regarding the effect of childhood maltreatment on treatment motivation. In conclusion, these findings suggest that combining the element of forgiveness and self-efficacy in treatment programs appears to benefit the drug addicts with childhood maltreatment history. (shrink)

In this book, I argue that Heidegger's ontology, far from supporting Nazi political ideology, was directly opposed to it. This in turn highlights his theory of human openness and Gelassenheit and forms the basis of a new political theory of community.

This paper examines a patient with borderline mental capacity, where the healthcare team is conflicted about how to proceed. This case demonstrates the complicated intersection between undue influence and mental capacity, allowing us to explore how the law is applied in clinical practice. Patients have the right to decline or accept medical treatments offered to them. In Singapore, family members perceive a right to be involved in the decision-making process for sick and elderly patients. Elderly patients, dependent on mainly family (...) members for care and support, sometimes submit to their overbearing influence resulting in decisions that fail to protect the patients’ own best interests. However, the clinicians’ own well-intentioned influence, driven by a desire for the best medical outcome can also be undue, and neither influence should seek to be a substitution for the patient’s decision. Following Re BKR [2015] SGCA 26, we are now obliged to examine how mental capacity can be affected by undue influence. A lack of capacity can be found when a patient fails to appreciate the presence of undue influence or is susceptible to undue influence due to their mental impairment causing their will to be overborne. This then paves the way for the health care team to decide based on best interests, because the patient is determined to be lacking in mental capacity. (shrink)

This paper makes three related points. First, Japan has played an instrumental role in helping to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia in ways deeper than scholarly literature on Asia's regional architecture has allowed. A key driving force behind Japan's contributions is the perceived utility of multilateralism in facilitating Japan's engagement of and/or balancing against China. Second, Japan has been able to achieve this because of the United States' support for Asian multilateralism and Japanese security interests. In (...) the immediate post-Cold War period, Japan facilitated US participation in regional arrangements such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. But Japanese ambivalence over its dependence on the United States was also apparent in Tokyo's attempts to exclude Washington from the newly formed East Asia Summit in late 2005, despite Japan's felt need to balance China. Japan's reliance on quiet diplomacy and an implicit regional leadership has equally been instrumental to its achievements in regional integration. Third, in the light of Japan's longstanding aim to become a normal military power and adopt a more assertive policy toward China, Japan‒US security ties are likely to deepen with negative consequences for Asian multilateralism. However, if its ties with China and South Korea worsen over their islands disputes in the East China Sea, Japan risks undermining its relations with the United States. How Japan balances its normalization with a continued engagement with multilateralism could be key to a stable and secure Asia. (shrink)

This book explores the resonances between Deleuze’s philosophy and a range of philosophical concepts in Buddhism. Focusing on this rarely examined relationship, this book gathers perspectives from scholars around the globe to explore the continuities and discontinuities between Deleuze’s and Buddhist thought. They examine immanence, intensity, assemblages and desire, and the concepts of ethics and meditation. This volume will prove to be an important resource for readers and scholars interested in philosophy, critical theory and comparative studies. They will find this (...) an engaging and invaluable examination of two different yet similar modes of thought. (shrink)

This paper examines the resonances between Deleuze's theory of subjectivity and the Buddhist view of subjectivity. Although much scholarship has been focused on Deleuze's theory of subjectivity, relatively little has been directed at a comparative study of how his theory of subjectivity resonates with the idea of de-centred subjectivity in Buddhist philosophy. In addition to this, the paper explores the ethical and political implications of such a notion of subjectivity. In the first part, it examines Deleuze's theory of subjectivity and (...) in the second part, it examines the theory of subjectivity in Buddhist philosophy. In the third part, it considers the ethical implications of the Deleuzian and Buddhist theory of subjectivity. (shrink)