Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

Neurons repeatedly exposed to similar perceptual experiences fire together and wire together to form ‘meaning kernels’ of concepts. Pulvermueller argues that abstract concepts may be devoid of meaning kernels, because the perceptual experiences that construct abstract concepts are subject to great variation and share few common features. Abstract concept are therefore grounded in the brain through features that belong to ‘meaning halos’, rather than to ‘meaning kernels’.

In this response to multidisciplinary commentaries on the target article, “Words in the brain's language,” additional features of the cell-assembly model are reviewed, as demanded by some of the commentators. Subsequently, methodological considerations on how to perform additional tests of neurobiological language models as well as a discussion of recent data from neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and other behavioral studies in speakers of spoken and sign languages follow. Special emphasis is put on the explanatory power of the cell-assembly model regarding neuropsychological double (...) dissociations. Future perspectives on neural network simulations, neuronal mechanisms of syntax and semantics, and the interaction of attention mechanisms and cell assemblies are pointed out in the final paragraphs. (shrink)

True, there may be two language-processing systems, lexicon and syntax. However, could we not say more than that they are computationally and linguistically distinct? Where are they in the brain, why are they where they are, and how can their distinctness and functional properties be explained by biological principles? A brain model of language is necessary to answer these questions. One view is that two different types of corticocortical connections are most important for storing rules and their exceptions: short-range connections (...) within the perisylvian language cortex and long-range connections between this region and other areas. Probabilities of neuroanatomical connections plus associative learning principles explain why different connection bundles specialize in rule storage versus exception learning. Linguistic issues related to language change and plural formation in German are addressed in closing. (shrink)

Müller's target article aims to summarize approaches to the question of how language elements (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) and rules are laid down in the brain. However, it suffers from being too vague about basic assumptions and empirical predictions of neurobiological models, and the empirical evidence available to test the models is not appropriately evaluated. (1) In a neuroscientific model of language, different cortical localizations of words can only be based on biological principles. These need to be made explicit. (2) Evidence (...) for and against word class differences could be evaluated more rigorously. (3) All (and only) humans are able to learn languages with complex syntactic structures; it is, therefore, not appropriate to deny innateness and universality of syntactic principles. The real question appears to be the following: Which neurobiological principles are the linguistic principles based on? (shrink)

Amit defines cell assemblies aslocal cortical neuron populationswith strong internal connections. However, Hebb himself proposed that cell assemblies are distributed over different cortical areas (nonlocal ortranscortical assemblies). We review evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting the assumption that cell assemblies are transcortical.

The cell assembly model of language posits that words are laid down in the cortex by discrete sets of neurons distributed over specific parts of the brain. The strong internal links of these “word webs” may not only bind articulatory and acoustic knowledge of a lexical item, they may also link word and meaning; for example, by connecting neuron populations related to word forms to those of actions and perceptions to which the words refer. Therefore, the cortical activation elicited by (...) words should reflect aspects of word meaning, a postulate that has received strong support from recent work using neurophysiological and metabolic imaging. Segalowitz & Lane make the point that this neurobiological model can also be used to predict reaction times in behavioral experiments, using the behavioral distinction between content and function words as an example. We acclaim their view, but warn that response times might be related to different mechanisms at the neuronal level, including the cortical distribution and internal connectivity of cell assemblies along with their mutual connections in the grammatical (syntactic and semantic) network. (shrink)

The HIT model comes close to a view suggested by Donald Hebb, that cognitive representations are organized as distributed neuron webs, cell assemblies, whose components are mutually connected and whose internal connections provide continuous information exchange among sub-components of the representation. Two questions are asked related to (1) the organization of internal connections of a concept representation and (2) the conditions under which information exchange between components are assumed in the HIT model.

Embodied theories of grounded semantics postulate that, when word meaning is first acquired, a link is established between symbol and corresponding semantic information present in modality-specific—including primary—sensorimotor cortices of the brain. Direct experimental evidence documenting the emergence of such a link, however, is still missing. Here, we present new neuroimaging results that provide such evidence. We taught participants aspects of the referential meaning of previously unknown, senseless novel spoken words by associating them with either a familiar action or a familiar (...) object. After training, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to analyze the participants’ brain responses to the new speech items. We found that hearing the newly learnt object-related word sounds selectively triggered activity in the primary visual cortex, as well as secondary and higher visual areas.These results for the first time directly document the formation of a link between the novel, previously meaningless spoken items and corresponding semantic information in primary sensory areas in a category-specific manner, providing experimental support for perceptual accounts of word-meaning acquisition in the brain. (shrink)

For some years there has been a controversy about whether brain state variables such as EEG or neuronal spike trains exhibit chaotic behaviour. Wright & Liley claim that the local dynamics measured by spike trains or local field potentials exhibit chaotic behaviour, but global measures like EEG should be governed by linear dynamics. We propose a different scheme. Based on simulation studies and various experiments, we suggest that the pointwise dimension of EEG time series may provide some valuable information about (...) underlying neuronal generators. (shrink)

This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

Causal finitism claims nothing can have an infinite causal history. An influential defense of this position uses infinity paradoxes to argue that, if causal finitism is false, several impossible scenarios would be possible. In this paper, I defend that theists should not be persuaded by this argument. If true, this is an important development, since causal finitism is often argued for by theists as a core premise in Kalam-style cosmological arguments for theism. I extend the same analysis to an argument (...) in favor of temporal finitism and conclude that my point may generalize to any reasoning of a similar structure. (shrink)

To date, few Norwegian clinical ethics committees (CECs) have included patients or next of kin in case discussions. In 2008, Rikshospitalet's (The National Hospital's) CEC began to routinely invite patients and relatives into case discussions. In this paper, we describe seven cases discussed by this committee in 2008. Six involved life and death decision-making in collaboration with the next of kin, while one related case did not include relatives. In our opinion, representing the patient's perspective was advantageous to the discussion (...) itself, to the conclusion made and to the next of kin's acceptance of the resolution. We believe that if the patient had been represented in the last case, the outcome might have been different. We conclude that successful patient involvement will rely on well-structured case discussions, an open atmosphere and good preparation and follow-up. (shrink)

The biological sciences study (bio)complex living systems. Research directed at the mechanistic explanation of the "live" state truly requires a pluralist research program, i.e. BioComplexity research. The program should apply multiple intra-level and inter-level theories and methodologies. We substantiate this thesis with analysis of BioComplexity: metabolic and modular control analysis of metabolic pathways, emergence of oscillations, and the analysis of the functioning of glycolysis.

Self-driving vehicles will need to make decisions that carry ethical dimensions and manufacturers have (the responsibility) to pre-determine this underlying, deliberate decision-making process. With the rise of self-driving vehicles, scholars have simultaneously started investigating what ethical theories should guide machine behavior, but have not concluded as to which theory should be preferred and adopted. We aim to address this matter by providing a holistic and analytical review of the autonomous driving ethics literature. Based on this review, we summarize the social, (...) moral/legal, and functional advantages and disadvantages of applying particular (traditional) ethical theories to the decision-making of self-driving vehicles. Furthermore, we derive an integrated model that shows how each identified ethical theory could be technically implemented and guide the decision-making of self-driving vehicles. Overall, this article aims to set the groundwork for reflected, successful integration of ethical behavior within self-driving vehicles and deduce an updated research agenda. (shrink)

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.

This is a first attempt at the philosophical articulation and projection of the Igbo concept of law and the role of law in the traditional environment. In the Igbo traditional setting, the rules of law are uncodified. The author, who teaches philosophy of law and logic at the University of Nigeria, defines the law of a given community as the body of rules recognised as binding by its members. On this concept of law, he has based his attempt to elucidate (...) the philosophical underpinning of those rules recognised in Igbo traditional legal system as law. Unless the philosphical foundation is understood, the traditional law, machinery for enforcement, and legislative and judicial processes may appear incomprehensible. The first part gives a descriptive insight into the moral, religious, socio-political and legal background of the Igbo. The second part is devoted to the fundamental questions concerning the concept of law, the various types of laws, the reciprocal influence between law and Igbo religion and the end of laws. Finally, the author examines the nature of right in Igbo traditional thought and locates the philosophical background. (shrink)

In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene (...) does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, “What is a biological function?”, we argue that the question “What is a gene?” could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it. (shrink)

Background Over the last years, there has been a growth in care solutions aiming to support home-dwelling persons with dementia. Assistive technology and voluntarism have emerged as supplements to traditional homecare and daycare centers. However, patient participation is often lacking in decision-making processes, undermining ethical principles and basic human rights. Research objective This study explores the perceptions of persons with dementia toward assistive technology, volunteer support, homecare services, and daycare centers. Research design A hermeneutical approach was chosen for this study, (...) using a semi-structured interview guide to allow for interviews in the form of open conversations. Participants and research context Twelve home-dwelling persons with dementia participated in the study. The participants were recruited through municipal daycare centers. Ethical considerations Interviews were facilitated within a safe environment, carefully conducted to safeguard the participants’ integrity. The Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics, Western Norway (Project number 2016/1630) approved the study. Findings The participants shared a well of reflections on experience and attitudes toward the aspects explored. They described assistive technology as possibly beneficial, but pointed to several non-beneficial side effects. Likewise, they were hesitant toward volunteer support, depending on how this might fit their individual preferences. Homecare services were perceived as a necessary means of care, its benefits ascribed to a variety of aspects. Similarly, the participants’ assessments of daycare centers relied on specific aspects, with high individual variety. Discussion and conclusion The study indicates that the margins between whether these specific care interventions were perceived as supportive or infringing may be small and details may have great effect on the persons’ everyday life. This indicates that patient participation in decision-making processes for this group is—in addition to be a judicial and ethical requirement—crucial to ensure adequate care and support. (shrink)

The emergence of artificially sentient beings raises moral, political, and legal issues that deserve scrutiny. First, it may be difficult to understand the well-being elements of artificially sentient beings and theories of well-being may have to be reconsidered. For instance, as a theory of well-being, hedonism may need to expand the meaning of happiness and suffering or it may run the risk of being irrelevant. Second, we may have to compare the claims of artificially sentient beings with the claims of (...) humans. This calls for interspecies aggregation, which is a neglected form of interpersonal aggregation. Lastly, there are practical problems to address, such as whether to include artificially sentient beings in the political decision-making processes, whether to grant them a right to self-determination in digital worlds, and how to protect them from discrimination. Given these, the emergence of artificially sentient beings compels us to reevaluate the positions we typically hold. (shrink)

The present article focuses on the idea that divine nature is prior to being. This idea was first articulated in John of Scythopolis’s commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius. It was adopted by Maximus Confessor and re-used in Meister Eckhart’s first Quaestio Parisiensis. The main tenet of this idea is that, if God is the origin of being, he must be more fundamental than being. Thus, being cannot be identical to divine nature. The conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of this (...) idea is that the importance that has been traditionally attached to the "Exodusmetaphysik" must be reconsidered, and that the pro-ontological conception of divine nature constitutes an autonomous tradition in Christian thought. (shrink)

Schelling's 1806 polemic against Fichte, and his last major work on the philosophy of nature. The heat of anger can concentrate the mind. Convinced that he had been betrayed by his former collaborator and colleague, Schelling attempts in this polemic to reach a final reckoning with Fichte. Employing the format of a book review, Schelling directs withering scorn at three of Fichte’s recent publications, at one point likening them to the hell, purgatory, and would-be paradise of Fichtean philosophy. The central (...) bone of contention is the understanding of nature: Fichte sees it as lifeless matter in motion, sheer opposition to be overcome, while Schelling waxes poetic in his defense of a living, organic nature of which humanity is a vital part. Indeed, we do not know ourselves without understanding our connection to nature, argues Schelling, anticipating many thinkers in contemporary environmental ethics. Dale E. Snow’s introduction sets the stage and explains the larger context of the conflict, which was already visible in the correspondence of the two philosophers, which broke off by 1802. Notes are included throughout the text, providing background information and identifying the many references to Fichte. Dale E. Snow is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Maryland and the author of Schelling and the End of Idealism, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

This article presents a novel perspective, arguing for a virtue-based weak version of political realism in Ottoman political thought (OPT). By recognizing realist elements in human nature and poli- tics in OPT tradition, we can gain a deeper understanding of the place of morality in politics. Challeng- ing the common sense understanding of morality that pervades all areas of politics, this paper provides compelling evidence to show how the understanding of the nature of politics in OPT was ever-chang- ing, singular, (...) and, to a certain extent, free of morality. This unique framing of politics and human na- ture in the OPT tradition makes it a realist one. Finally, I delve into the role of universals in explaining the intricate relationship between politics and morality through various analytical distinctions. (shrink)

Background Artificial intelligence-driven Clinical Decision Support Systems (AI-CDSS) are being increasingly introduced into various domains of health care for diagnostic, prognostic, therapeutic and other purposes. A significant part of the discourse on ethically appropriate conditions relate to the levels of understanding and explicability needed for ensuring responsible clinical decision-making when using AI-CDSS. Empirical evidence on stakeholders’ viewpoints on these issues is scarce so far. The present study complements the empirical-ethical body of research by, on the one hand, investigating the requirements (...) for understanding and explicability in depth with regard to the rationale behind them. On the other hand, it surveys medical students at the end of their studies as stakeholders, of whom little data is available so far, but for whom AI-CDSS will be an important part of their medical practice. Methods Fifteen semi-structured qualitative interviews (each lasting an average of 56 min) were conducted with German medical students to investigate their perspectives and attitudes on the use of AI-CDSS. The problem-centred interviews draw on two hypothetical case vignettes of AI-CDSS employed in nephrology and surgery. Interviewees’ perceptions and convictions of their own clinical role and responsibilities in dealing with AI-CDSS were elicited as well as viewpoints on explicability as well as the necessary level of understanding and competencies needed on the clinicians’ side. The qualitative data were analysed according to key principles of qualitative content analysis (Kuckartz). Results In response to the central question about the necessary understanding of AI-CDSS tools and the emergence of their outputs as well as the reasons for the requirements placed on them, two types of argumentation could be differentiated inductively from the interviewees’ statements: the first type, the clinician as a systemic trustee (or “the one relying”), highlights that there needs to be empirical evidence and adequate approval processes that guarantee minimised harm and a clinical benefit from the employment of an AI-CDSS. Based on proof of these requirements, the use of an AI-CDSS would be appropriate, as according to “the one relying”, clinicians should choose those measures that statistically cause the least harm. The second type, the clinician as an individual expert (or “the one controlling”), sets higher prerequisites that go beyond ensuring empirical evidence and adequate approval processes. These higher prerequisites relate to the clinician’s necessary level of competence and understanding of how a specific AI-CDSS works and how to use it properly in order to evaluate its outputs and to mitigate potential risks for the individual patient. Both types are unified in their high esteem of evidence-based clinical practice and the need to communicate with the patient on the use of medical AI. However, the interviewees’ different conceptions of the clinician’s role and responsibilities cause them to have different requirements regarding the clinician’s understanding and explicability of an AI-CDSS beyond the proof of benefit. Conclusions The study results highlight two different types among (future) clinicians regarding their view of the necessary levels of understanding and competence. These findings should inform the debate on appropriate training programmes and professional standards (e.g. clinical practice guidelines) that enable the safe and effective clinical employment of AI-CDSS in various clinical fields. While current approaches search for appropriate minimum requirements of the necessary understanding and competence, the differences between (future) clinicians in terms of their information and understanding needs described here can lead to more differentiated approaches to solutions. (shrink)