In moral and political philosophy, collective obligations are promising “gap-stoppers” when we find that we need to assert some obligation, but can not plausibly ascribe this obligation to individual agents. Most notably, Bill Wringe and Jesse Tomalty discuss whether the obligations that correspond to socio-economic human rights are held by states or even by humankind at large. The present paper aims to provide a missing piece for these discussions, namely an account of the conditions under which obligations can apply to (...) loose collections of agents that do not qualify as collective agents in their own right. I first explain the notion of joint obligations of loose collections of agents as opposed to collective obligations of collections of agents that are collective agents in their own right, and argue that the conditions under which agents can jointly have obligations are the conditions under which they are jointly able to do what is required. I then build on Virginia Held’s seminal work on the moral responsibility of “random collections” to develop such conditions for joint ability. My discussion shows that collections of individuals can more easily be subject to moral obligations than previously assumed. It also shows that putative joint obligations need to be carefully time-indexed, and that it is largely an empirical question whether a given collection can be subject to a moral obligation to perform a given joint action at a particular time. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore be morally worse than a corresponding misleading utterance. But, we argue, there are also cases in which the difference in commitment makes lying morally better than misleading, (...) as well as cases in which the difference is not morally relevant. This view conflicts with the two main positions philosophers have defended in the ethics of lying and misleading, which entail either that lying is in virtue of its nature worse than misleading or that there is no morally relevant difference between lying and misleading. (shrink)

Many philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and (...) Simion (in: Goldberg (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the engagement condition objection. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, one can make assertions without satisfying this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to coun- terintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions. Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion. (shrink)

What is political about political refugeehood? Theorists have assumed that refugees are special because their specific predicament as those who are persecuted sets them aside from other “necessitous strangers.” Persecution is a special form of wrongful harm that marks the repudiation of a person's political membership and that cannot—contrary to certain other harms—be remedied where they are. It makes asylum necessary as a specific remedial institution. In this article, I argue that this is correct. Yet, the connection between political membership, (...) its repudiation, and persecution is far from clear. Drawing on normative political thought and research on autocracies, repression, and migration studies, I show that it is political oppression that marks the repudiation of political membership and leads to various forms of repression that can equally not be remedied at home. A truly political account moves away from persecution and endorses political oppression as the normative pillar of refugeehood and asylum. (shrink)

Recently, Jennifer Saul (“Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, 2017; “Racist and Sexist Figleaves”, 2021) has explored the use of what she calls “figleaves” in the discourse on race and gender. Following Saul, a figleaf is an utterance that, for some portion of the audience, blocks the conclusion that some other utterance, R, or the person who uttered R is racist or sexist. Such racial and gender figleaves are pernicious, says Saul, because, (...) among other things, they can shift the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable to think or say. This paper expands on Saul’s picture in a threefold way: It is first argued that appeals to statistics can function as figleaves. It is then argued that—as far as figleaves go—there is reason to believe that statistics-as-figleaves are especially pernicious. Finally, the paper explores some strategies for counterspeech. (shrink)

The notion of “individuality” in Plotinus is one of the most discussed. Throughout the Enneads, the problem of the individual subject arises from the complexity in understanding the relation between man and soul. To the intelligible man, also known as the inner or first man, a second man is added, so that “we have come to be the pair of them” 14.28-30). This question has been extensively addressed from different angles that lead either to a purely structuralist solution, or to (...) its criticism and the search for a more stable definition of subjective identity. The thesis that we will defend in this article, and that will indicate our position in the debate, tries to give a new perspective of the issue alluding to the sphere of life and its forms. The continuity between the different men will be determined by the continuity between their different forms of life, a primary issue to which the problem of individuality and the different modes of consciousness are subject. (shrink)

For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic (...) arguments against his reductive approach to knowledge. We argue that a plausible interpretation of cognitive-science input concerning knowledge—even if one accepts that knowledge how is partly propositional—must involve an element of knowing how to act correctly upon the proposition; and this element of knowing how to act correctly cannot itself be propositional. (shrink)

Computational models have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents as they approximate epistemic rationality. This paper provides further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but it does not depend on limitations that extant models rely on, such as memory restrictions or biased evaluation of other agents’ testimony. Instead, deliberation is modelled through agents’ purposeful introduction of arguments and their rational reactions to introductions of others. This process induces polarisation dynamics on its (...) own. A second result is that the effect size of polarisation dynamics correlates with particular types of argumentative behaviour. Polarisation effects can be soothed when agents take into account the opinions of others as premises, and they are amplified as agents fortify their own beliefs. These results underpin the relevance of argumentation as a factor in social-epistemic processes and indicate that rising issue polarisation is not a reliable indicator of epistemic shortcomings. (shrink)

This paper examines the paradoxical transparency involved in training machine-learning models. Existing literature typically critiques the opacity of machine-learning models such as neural networks or collaborative filtering, a type of critique that parallels the black-box critique in technology studies. Accordingly, people in power may leverage the models’ opacity to justify a biased result without subjecting the technical operations to public scrutiny, in what Dan McQuillan metaphorically depicts as an “algorithmic state of exception”. This paper attempts to differentiate the black-box abstraction (...) that wraps around complex computational systems from the opacity of machine-learning models. It contends that the degree of asymmetry in knowledge is greater in the former than the latter. In the case of software systems, software codes are difficult to understand as only software experts with sufficient domain knowledge are equipped to formulate a sound critique. In contrast, the meanings of trained parameters in a machine-learning model are obscure even to the data scientists who configure and train the model. Hence, the asymmetry of knowledge lies only in how data examples are collected, the choice and configuration of machine-learning models, and the specification of features in model design. Under the trend of algorithmic decision-making proliferating with machine-learning heuristics, the paper contends that the more symmetric distribution of knowledge in machine learning could lead to a more transparent production process if proper policies are in place. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is booming, and AI ethics is booming with it. Yet there is surprisingly little attention paid to what the discipline of AI ethics is and what it ought to be. This paper offers an ameliorative definition of AI ethics to fill this gap. We introduce and defend an original distinction between novel and applied research questions. A research question should count as AI ethics if and only if (i) it is novel or (ii) it is applied and (...) has gained new importance through the development of AI. We argue that a lack of such a definition contributes to six disciplinary problems: ethics washing and lobbying, limited applicability, dilution of the field, conceptual bloating, costs of AI ethics, and an internal dispute. Based on our definition, we construct a methodological framework for AI ethics and show how it helps address these problems. (shrink)

Homologous recombination (HR) is required to protect and restart stressed replication forks. Paradoxically, the Mrc1 branch of the S phase checkpoints, which is activated by replicative stress, prevents HR repair at breaks and arrested forks. Indeed, the mechanisms underlying HR can threaten genome integrity if not properly regulated. Thus, understanding how cells avoid genetic instability associated with replicative stress, a hallmark of cancer, is still a challenge. Here I discuss recent results that support a model by which HR responds to (...) replication stress through replicative and repair activities that operate at different stages of the cell cycle (S and G2, respectively) and in distinct subnuclear structures. Remarkably, the replication checkpoint appears to control this scenario by inhibiting the assembly of HR repair centers at stressed forks during S phase, thereby avoiding genetic instability. (shrink)

This article revisits the question of how elegy was performed at the symposion, and argues that, rather thanbeing either musical or non-musical, elegy situates itself between speech and song. None of the passages in whichelegy mentions song are clearly self-referential: they tend to be generic, set in the future, concerned with otherperformers and other compositions or altogether too slippery in their language to pin them down. Moreover, there area number of elegiac pieces that appear designed to allow symposiasts to shift (...) from song to speech or speech to song,thereby introducing a new mode of performance, and so are themselves transitional. These observations about the wayelegiac texts position their own performance are complemented by considerations about their actual performance.Evidence both from ancient musicologists and from other tonal languages suggests that inbetween modes of deliverywere common in Greek poetry and the metrical shape makes elegy a prime candidate. The final section of the articleturns to the difficult term elegos in fifth-century drama. It argues that several of these passages draw on inbetweennessas one association of elegos and thus decreases the gap between elegos and surviving elegy. A coda points out that theelegiacs in Euripides' Andromache are a further example of elegy transitioning between two modes of performance. (shrink)

This paper is about what we call Deontically-flavored Nominal Constructions (DNCs) in English, such as "No ice cream" or "Dogs on leash only". DNCs are often perceived as commands and have been argued to be a type of non-canonical imperative, much like root infinitives in German or Russian. We argue instead that DNCs at their core are declaratives that cite a rule but can be used performatively in the right context. We propose that DNCs contain an elided deontic modal, i.e., (...) allowed, whose presence explains their distributional restrictions and interpretational properties. Among other things, we speculate on the licensing conditions of DNCs (the presence of 'only' or the negative determiner 'no'), suggesting that these are tied to the properties of discourses in which rules can be used naturally. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that we ought to have fewer children in order to reduce our contribution to climate change. Proponents of this view generally hold a moderate version of the view, according to which it is still permissible to have one or two children per couple. One recent exception is Chad Vance’s paper “Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds” in this journal, in which he argues that procreation is always, or almost always, morally impermissible. I argue, first, that Vance (...) is mistaken in conceding that his radical position holds only if individual acts of procreation can make a difference, rather than being only a causally insignificantly contribution to collective harm. Instead, given his assumptions, he should hold on to the radical view that we ought to have no children at all. Second, I argue against Vance’s strongest argument for his radical view. Vance argues that procreation harms others, and that obligations to avoid harming rule out the demandingness considerations that are used to support a permission to have one or two children. However, contrary to paradigmatic cases of harming, any procreation-related harms result not only from procreators’ actions, but also from our collective failures to rapidly reduce emissions. This complex causal structure undermines Vance’s rejection of demandingness considerations. I conclude that the moderate view that we may have one or two children per couple survives Vance’s criticism. (shrink)

McGarvey (Econometrica, 21(4), 608–610, 1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a relation induced by majority rule. We address the analogous issue for dominance relations of finite cooperative games with non-transferable utility (coalitional NTU games). We find any irreflexive relation over a finite set can be obtained as the dominance relation of some finite coalitional NTU game. We also show that any such dominance relation is induced by a non-cooperative game through β-effectivity. Dominance relations (...) obtainable through α-effectivity, however, have to comply with a more restrictive condition, which we refer to as the edge-mapping property. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Zur therapeutischen Versorgung depressiver Athleten kooperieren die Vereine und Verbände im Spitzensport häufig mit Psychotherapeuten. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die komplexen Sinnvorgaben therapeutischer Kommunikation zur Behandlung depressiver Spitzensportler mit Hilfe der neueren soziologischen Systemtheorie. Die freiwerdenden Erkenntnisse werden unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Kontextbedingungen in Sportorganisationen reflektiert. Aus Sicht der Sportvereine und -verbände erweist sich die psychotherapeutische Intervention bisweilen als ambivalenter Problemlösungsversuch: Indem Psychotherapeuten systemfremde Logiken einbringen und mit inkongruenten Perspektiven arbeiten, um den Leidensdruck des betroffenen Athleten zu beheben, (...) können sie aufseiten der Organisation durchaus Irritationen stiften und neue Probleme erzeugen. (shrink)

What is salvific community for Ignatius of Loyola? It is communion with Christ, a dynamic for which Ignatius used the expression ‹societies Jesu›. This wording has a revealing intertextuality. ‹Societas› is the Vulgate’s rendering of Pauline and Johannine koinōnia: «sharing in (Christ)». The NT overtones of the Ignatian experience of communion can be explored regarding a theology of relationship (person), of action (history) and of the Church (representation). Being a person is understood as being friend and servant, history as the (...) salvific kairos of Christ’s activity, and the Church as the communion representing him—each time a typically Christian conception deciding always for that option that cannot be generalised through abstraction. (shrink)

The article analyses the problems and possibilities in saying that Judaism, Christianity and Islam ‹have the same God›.

Language has been shown to influence the ability to form categories. Nevertheless, in most prior work, the effects of language could have been bolstered by the fact that linguistic labels were introduced by the experimenter prior to the categorization task in ways that could have highlighted their relevance for the task. Here, we compared the potency of labels to that of other non‐linguistic cues on how people categorized novel, perceptually ambiguous natural kinds (e.g., flowers or birds). Importantly, we varied whether (...) these cues were explicitly presented as relevant to the categorization task. In Experiment 1, we compared labels, numbers, and symbols: One group of participants was told to pay attention to these cues because they would be helpful (Relevant condition), a second group was told that the cues were irrelevant and should be ignored (Irrelevant condition), and a third group was told nothing about the cues (Neutral condition). Even though task relevance affected overall reliance on cues during categorization, participants were more likely to use labels to determine category boundaries, compared to numbers or symbols. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated and fine‐tuned the advantage of labels in more stringent categorization tasks. These results offer novel evidence for the position that labels offer unique indications of category membership, compared to non‐linguistic cues. (shrink)

en el presente artículo abordamos la cuestión de la naturaleza del símbolo en la filosofía de Jámblico a través del análisis del pasaje de De Mysteriis 2.11.20-41. este pasaje ha servido de apoyo a la exégesis que ve en el símbolo un elemento apartado del intelecto. Según esta lectura, el símbolo habría sido introducido por Jámblico para salvar la debilidad del alma humana ante lo divino. éste habría dejado de confiar en las capacidades del hombre, abriéndose al ámbito de la (...) teúrgia. éste marco de interpretación adolece, sin embargo, de importantes carencias a la hora de ofrecer una comprensión profunda y coherente del papel del símbolo en la filosofía de Jámblico. A partir del estudio de este pasaje, nos acercaremos a la naturaleza de lo simbólico, buscando abrir una vía de comprensión de su papel en el proceso epistémico que perfila Jámblico. la relación que guarda esta noción con el término νοερός será determinante para nuestro estudio. (shrink)

Nada más habitual que el hábito. Y, sin embargo, de seguir a Aristóteles, no existirían virtudes entre nosotros, o sea: aptitudes y habilidades que acaban por configurar la existencia humana. En este ensayo se examina el desarrollo dialéctico del hábito en Hegel, desde la Antropología hasta la Eticidad : en el plano individual, desde el estado fetal y el desvarío en el alma sentiente hasta el autosentimiento de sí y el nacimiento del Yo; en el plano colectivo, se atiende más (...) bien a la génesis del hábito y sus fautores: las corporaciones, las instituciones estatales y la opinión pública, hasta desembocar en el extraño estadio del hábito como deshabituación de todo hábito, en el fenómeno de la guerra. Se pone así de relieve el modo en que el hábito es el modo crucial de ser entre la individualidad animal y el cuerpo sociopolítico como aparato mecánico que promete vida y amenaza muerte. (shrink)

In order to theorize about the nature and scope of the philosophical reflection, philosophers have used a wide array of metaphors and analogies, from Plato's cave to Wittgenstein “family resemblances”. This paper reviews some of those metaphors and discusses what they show about the nature of philosophy, and most important, about the teaching of philosophy. It is not enough to be in favour of the presence of philosophical dialogue or to demand a specific philosophical subject matter in the curriculum of (...) formal or compulsory schooling. We need to offer a more precise description of the kind of philosophical learning we are proposing, and which educational goals we think that students can achieve if they are exposed to philosophical reflection all along their school life. Philosophical metaphors can help us to present the style of philosophical dialogue we want to implement in our class rooms in order to philosophy empower children in such a way the can think for themselves in a critical, creative and cooperative way. (shrink)

This paper examines the manner in which the early modern scholarly debate concerning the true age of the world was shaped by philological and text-critical scholarship on the work of the first-century Jewish historian Flavius Josephus. Traditionally, historians have earmarked the late seventeenth century as a time of uncertainty and crisis for biblical chronologists, as scholars became increasingly aware of corruptions within existing versions of scripture and of the manner in which scriptural chronology was contradicted by pagan sources. I hope (...) to show how, in response to these doubts, scholars during this period also developed a pronounced interest in the chronology – and consequently the textual history – of the first-century Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, whom scholars considered the oldest and therefore best surviving witness to the original state of the biblical text in the time of the Apostles. I have drawn two important conclusions from this development. Firstly, I show that the development of philological and text-critical scholarship on non-biblical texts was a direct result of theological issues relating to biblical authority and chronology. Secondly, I argue that this philological scholarship was key to undermining orthodox faith in the stability and reliability of the biblical text itself. (shrink)

Different languages present a variety of ways of talking about emotional experience. Very commonly, feelings are described through the use of ¿body image constructions¿ in which they are associated with processes in, or states of, specific body parts. The emotions and the body parts that are thought to be their locus and the kind of activity associated with these body parts vary cross-culturally. This study focuses on the meaning of three ¿body image constructions¿ used to describe feelings similar to, but (...) also different from, English ¿jealousy¿, ¿envy¿, and ¿covetousness¿ in the West African language Ewe. It is demonstrated that a ¿moving body¿, a pychologised eye, and red eyes are scripted for these feelings. It is argued that the expressions are not figurative and that their semantics provide good clues to understanding the cultural construction of emotions both emotions and the body. (shrink)

Editions and translations were a major part of the work of French philosophers in the 19th century. They were not considered trivial tasks but philosophical works unto themselves. In this article, I show that to be considered as such, it is necessary to identify the reasons that would spark an author’s interest in the text he was publishing and the effects he expected from its publication in the philosophical field. I focus on the case of Blaise Pascal in the second (...) half of the 19th century. My goal is to underline that the matter of Pascal’s inclusion or exclusion from the philosophical “canon” led two philosophers, who were hostile to his thought, to publish Pascal’s Pensées: Ernest Havet and Léon Brunschvicg. Their aim was not to declare themselves “against” Pascal but rather to integrate their edition of his texts into their own philosophical projects. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 239-263.

Within the broader horizon of asking about the relevance of the Reformation, or more particularly, Martin Luther’s thought, this paper first draws on the old debate whether there can be a Christian conception of tragic guilt by reconstructing an argument Giorgio Agamben develops against von Fritz’s denial of this possibility. The paper shows that Agamben makes a similar move as Protestantism by claiming that natura, which is always already spoiled by hamartia, is objective, naturaliter not personaliter. But in doing so, (...) he does not draw the proper consequences. He tries to re-inscribe this realization into a post-Thomist anthropology, thus not drawing the most radical conclusions necessary from the objectification of hamartia as natura, namely that natura is always already lacking and is itself in a sense an object as lack. This paper shows how this consequences is, on the contrary, developed in Martin Luther’s notion that the “whole of nature” is corrupted and in the ensuing totus-homo principle. To draw the delineation of the production of this lack, it is useful to draw on the notion of kerygma and its usage in both tragedy and the Pauline New Testament. With it, one can think of a repetition of the constitution of the subject through a “message” or “kerygma” that is heteronomous. What is left in and through this repetition can be viewed as “nothingness”, as is shown in the example of Martin Luther’s translation of the humilitas of Mary as “nothingness”. This product of kerygma is at the same time potentially the cause for another type of subjectivity, a comic subjectivity, yet one which carries the heritage of its tragic constitution with it. As a methodological consequence, this paper suggests that it is not possible to develop proper notions of the subject within contemporary debates without repeating or representing the event of the site of this potentially comic subjectivity within the early thought of Martin Luther. (shrink)

Der Autor untersucht, inwieweit es gemeinsame Argumente bei Carl Schmitt und dem «Feindstrafrecht» (Günther Jakobs) gibt. Zugleich arbeitet er die diametrale Position Hans Kelsens heraus und nutzt sie als Basis für eine Kritik. Dabei wird die Rolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ebenso betrachtet wie die Strafgesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung.

Propomos neste texto examinar o papel das disposições (Stimmungen), e, particularmente, das chamadas “disposições fundamentais” na construção da pergunta heideggeriana pela historicidade da história. Nós partimos da pergunta pela historicidade da história da filosofia para a análise do papel hermenêutico cumprido pela angústia na analítica da cotidianidade em Ser e Tempo, procurando esclarecer a conexão dessa disposição com o conceito de historicidade tal como tratado nessa obra. Em seguida, tratamos da maneira como são pensadas as disposições em Conceitos fundamentais da (...) metafísica, obra na qual Heidegger explicitamente pensa a disposição do tédio como característica de uma época. Uma vez que mostramos como podemos entender as disposições em geral em sentido historial, retomamos a análise da angústia, e, a partir da discussão de sua estrutura tal como apresentada em Ser e Tempo, perguntamos pela relação específica da angústia com a questão da historicidade, no que ela significa para o projeto de Ser e Tempo e para a obra posterior de Heidegger. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é a exposição de momentos chave da crítica schellingiana à filosofia idealista como forma de compreender o estatuto da filosofia positiva buscada por Schelling em sua obra madura. A crítica de Schelling, dirigida aos resultados negativos da filosofia formal de seus contemporâneos, é contraposta à busca pela positividade na natureza, na mitologia, na história, na religião, em vista da “natureza extralógica da existência”, que se rebela contra a conformação da totalidade do que pode ser conhecido a (...) uma ordem necessária. Embora o projeto da filosofia positiva seja elaborado a partir da década de 1820, já em suas primeiras obras encontramos elementos de sua crítica à pretensão de subsumir em um sistema filosófico a totalidade da realidade.Palavras-chave: Schelling. Idealismo alemão. Filosofia positiva. Sistema da filosofia. (shrink)

In this article we examine one of the viewpoints linked to Platonic dialectics which directly concerns the conformity of the polis : the underlying questioning which the modus operandi of dialectics applies to everyday life, to social conventions, formalities, and generally accepted beliefs. We focus here on the passage in the Republic 537e-539e where dialectics is intimately linked to refutation. This procedure, which leads to the development of the dialectic method, requires distancing from the everyday and unconsciously assumed viewpoint, exercising (...) critical consciousness. Plato explores the dangers of dialectics at the border between questioning the norm and assuming responsibility towards the polis. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo se analiza el origen del concepto denominado por Nietzsche: voluntad o instinto de conocimiento. Siguiendo al autor, se pretende mostrar cómo el impulso hacia el conocimiento no es meramente racional, sino fisiológico; y cómo, no obstante, a través del tiempo se ha perdido el origen vital de este impulso, el cual se ha utilizado para fines contrarios a la preservación de la vida. A manera de consideración final, se expone lo que parece ser una solución nietzscheana (...) para entender la finalidad del conocimiento, es decir, la argumentación a favor del conocimiento como un instinto o voluntad que impele a la superación en la existencia. (shrink)