From Soul to Self takes us on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies and physiological sciences. The contributors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think we are somehow unique and distinct.

It is shown that the 3-stratifiable sentences are equivalent in $\mathit{NFU}$ to truth-functional combinations of sentences about objects, sets of objects, sets of sets of objects, and sentences stating that there are at least $n$ urelements. This is then used to characterize the closed 3-stratifiable theorems of $\mathit{NFU}$ with an externally infinite number of urelements, as those that can be nearly proved in $\mathit{TTU}$ with an externally infinite number of urelements. As a byproduct we obtain a rather simple demonstration of (...) the consistency of 3-stratifiable extensions of $\mathit{NFU}$. (shrink)

Keywords Religious poem - Metaphysical poem.

This work examines and critically evaluates the proposal that phenomenal properties, or the subjective qualities of experience, present a formidable challenge for the mind-body identity theory. Physicalism per se is construed as being ontically committed only to phenomena which can be made epistemically and cognitively available in the third person; observed and understood from within an objective frame of reference. Further, the identity relation between the mental and the physical is taken to be strict identity; the mental phenomena in question (...) just are the physical phenomena on which, ex hypothesi, they supervene. The problem of phenomenal properties has two basic strands. The first is the problem of how they are causally related to the physical; if they are not physical phenomena, by what causal mechanism might they be related to physical phenomena? One of the motivating considerations which led to the identity thesis was that it appeared to remove this problem. Our interest, however, is in evaluating the arguments which purport to establish that phenomenal properties are, indeed, distinct from the physical. (shrink)

In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something 'in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to 'doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in (...) connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues. (shrink)

We characterize the notion of validity relatively to models, for comprehension axioms, containing gluts.

Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...) representation. (shrink)

This book from award winning author Dr. Larry Crabb seeks to think through a model of counseling which can be integrated into the functioning of the local church. It contains a chart appendix.

Counterexamples to reassurance relative to a relation between models of the logic of paradox are provided. Another relation, designed to fix the problem in logic without equality, is introduced and discussed in connection with the issue of classical recapture.

It is usually assumed that the only British Romantic writer who engaged meaningfully with German philosophy was S. T. Coleridge. This edition disproves that assumption.

In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that only a form of philosophizing that sprung from a deep commitment to the subject could ever hope for success. ‘All great problems,’ he wrote, ‘demand great love.’ He continued: It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning he is only able to touch them with the antennae of (...) cold, curious thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it, that much can be promised; for even if great problems should let themselves be grasped by them, they would not allow frogs and weaklings to hold on to them. Nietzsche went on to complain that, to his knowledge, no one had yet approached moral philosophy in this way: Why, then, have I never yet encountered anyone, not even in books, who approached morality in this personal way and who knew morality as a problem, and this problem as his own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion? Alex Voorhoeve run01.tex V1 - 07/29/2009 7:23am Page 16.. (shrink)

This paper compares two theories of the firm used to interpret firms’ corporate social strategies in order to derive new insights and questions in this research area. Researchers from many branches of strategic management agree that firms can strategically allocate resources in order to achieve both long-term social objectives and competitive advantage. However, despite some progress in investigating corporate social strategy, studies rely on fundamentally diverging theoretical approaches. This paper will identify, compare and begin to integrate two competing theories of (...) the firm implicit in corporate social strategy scholarship: the resource-based and behavioural theories of the firm. I discuss the implications of these two theories for both researchers and practitioners on key debates within corporate social strategy, and conclude by suggesting several fruitful avenues for future research based on the emerging integration of these two theories of the firm within the strategy literature. (shrink)

A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)

We advance the thesis that the method of experimental economics can make significant contributions to normative, as opposed to descriptive, business ethics. We contend that there are two basic ways in which experimental economics may make this contribution, and we exemplify these ways by pointing to experimental support of social contract theory as rational foundation for business ethics. These two ways are: (1) adding psychological realism; and (2) testing some quasi-empirical assumptions present in normative theory. In order to make good (...) our methodological claim, we first describe the methodological rules of experimental economics, distinguishing this method from other behavioral business ethics approaches. We also contemplate the possible objection that empirical methods cannot bear on normative ethics because there is no way of bridging the gap between descriptive theory (how people behave) and normative theory (how people ought to behave). (shrink)

"Il convient plutôt de s'attacher à ce que signifie : être un homme". Ce mot de Kierkegaard peut servir de fil conducteur à ces entretiens attachés à restituer le chemin de pensée de François Chirpaz. Un itinéraire philosophique s'efforçant de comprendre ce vivant que nous sommes, à travers la tradition des philosophes, bien sûr, mais également l'oeuvre littéraire, la psychanalyse ou le texte biblique. Mais toujours en le rapportant à la question de la vie et de son destin.

François Dagognet (1924-2015) nous a laissé une oeuvre immense et foisonnante : près de soixante-dix ouvrages, sur les thèmes les plus divers, de l'épistémologie à l'art contemporain, de la politique au droit, de l'argent à la morale, de la peau au trouble, sans oublier le paysage, ou l'agronomie, les déchets ou les musées, parmi bien d'autres sujets. Sa curiosité universelle et inassouvie égalait, voire dépassait, celle de son maître Bachelard. Montrer comment Dagognet a illustré l'épistémologie "à la française", et l'a (...) radicalement transformée en la faisant sortir de ses cadres traditionnels, tel est l'enjeu de ce recueil, issu d'un colloque en hommage à François Dagognet qui s'est tenu à l'Institut d'histoire et philosophie des sciences et des techniques de Paris 1, qu'il a un temps dirigé. Vingt-quatre auteurs, français et étrangers, de diverses générations et spécialités, font découvrir et discutent les positions de ce philosophe infatigable sur un large éventail de champs scientifiques et techniques : philosophie des sciences, biologie, médecine, neurologie, pharmacie, sciences de la terre, chimie, écologie, théorie des formes, informatique, art, droit et philosophie sociale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Keywords Religious poem - Metaphysical poem.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.