RésuméDans cet article, nous examinons le projet d'une critique de la raison historique mené par Wilhelm Dilthey et l'accusation d'historicisme portée contre lui par Heinrich Rickert. En comparant leurs tentatives respectives d'offrir un fondement philosophique aux sciences humaines, nous montrons que Dilthey et Rickert, en dépit de leurs divergences, convergent vers une réinterprétation productive de l'historicisme et conduisent à une reconfiguration de la relation entre philosophie et histoire. Cet article analyse trois implications théoriques et pratiques de l'historicisme : la mise (...) en valeur du particulier, le caractère historiquement situé du sujet connaissant et la primauté de la conscience historique. (shrink)

La vida de Siháb al-Din al-Suhrawardi es oscura. Datos aislados referentes a sus estudios, viajes y contactos se encuentran en breves noticias de los diccionarios biográ-ficos de los siglos xn y xm. Estas noticias permiten esbozar una biografía de al-Suhrawardi desde sus comienzos hasta la oposición de que fue objeto por parte de los Memas de Alepo y su trágica muerte, interpretada en el marco y el contexto de la ciu-dad. Todo este material de los diccionarios biográficos es sólo relativamente (...) fidedigno e incluso los textos contemporáneos incluyen datos erróneos. = Shiháb al-Din al-Suhrawardi's life is obscure. Some clues regarding his studies, travels and encounters are found in short biographical notices of the 12th and 13th centuries. These notices can provide the means to sketch al-Suhrawardi's biography: his early life, his coming to Aleppo, the mounting opposition of the Memas of Aleppo, and the final moments that led to his tragic death. The sociopolitical context of Aleppo provides a good framework for the interpretation of the data provided by the biographers. All these biographical works are, however, of relative reliability. Even the most contemporary texts are in fact not devoid of erroneous elements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comme Elle Respire:Memory of Breath, Breath of MemoryFrédérique Berthet (bio)Translated by David F. Bell (bio)La poésie est un système de respiration, c'est fait pour mieux respirer.[Poetry is a respiration system, it's made for breathing better.]—Erri De Luca- Stop!- What?- I can hear you breathing!...- Stop!- Breathing?- Yes!—Paul Thomas AndersonLittle paper-fish cutouts have been placed on the ground, on the carpet.We're in the reassuring '70s stylishness of a doctor's office. (...) The carpet is soft and glistens like in interior decoration magazines, it's with it, in. We couldn't care less about what Dyson vacuum cleaners and "purifiers" boast they can eliminate several decades later: acarids, those microscopic domestic arthropods, human parasites (notably), and airborne vectors of infectious disease (colds, coughs, respiratory distress). No, in the spring of 1975, innocently and self-satisfyingly, the urbane doctor flaunts the opulent carpet with curly pile in his luxury apartment with its state-of-the-art waiting room.In this grand interior of a medical office, a man in a white coat plies his important trade. For example, that day a little girl is re-learning how to breathe. One might think that exhaling and inhaling is learned for life—je t'aime comme je respire, elle parle comme elle respire, il ment comme il respire1—from the very first cry at birth. But in fact, sometimes in life breathing gets stuck between the nasal cavity and the bronchial tubes, between the respiratory tract and the lungs. Progressively, imperceptibly, the organism is short of air, a malicious infection spreads and impairs [End Page 92] alveolar diffusion to the point of respiratory exhaustion: Is it serious, doctor? We must act quickly, very quickly. How to liquify what stopped up the system one day to the point of blocking it—the doctors know what to do.This doctor undertook long, arduous and learned studies. He knows functionally how a living being breathes, how a child lives organically. He can also re-teach the little girl what she no longer knows how to do: inhale, exhale using the full volume of the thoracic cage, regulating the ventilatory flow, solidifying the invisible membranes. In the child's family, everyone knows (and knows how to do) important things, but no one undertook extensive studies, much less studies of the aerial exchanges in the human body. This special knowledge possessed by the doctor (unless special means something else unspoken that would explain why this specific doctor was chosen rather than any other) surrounds him with a padding of respect that creates (and the little girl feels this) a sort of protective continuum between him and the walls within which he sees her, where he practices his kind of calm and slow urbane medicine. It's far from the formidable hospital she has just left, with its spherical apparatus next to the bed aspirating the red and yellow pleural liquid, the "treatment room" where the surgeon, the "butcher" as the nurses call him among themselves, manipulated the drain without anesthesia, with no regard for the child's suffering. The doctor, and his place in the elevated tower, even though they are not to be confused, make for a cozy reception space in which one is comfortable, even in passing.This doctor—who is, in truth, a massage-physiotherapist—is located in a designer high-rise building with a façade decorated by white, pointed features that manifest a will toward an architectural act. On the ground floor, the entrance hall is finished in dark-veined, clear brown marble, and the entry threshold between the exterior and interior is marked by large transparent glass panes that must be manipulated with care. The entrance hall has an intimidating sonority and a useless cold nudity from which one escapes in an elevator where one is surrounded by mirrors and gold buttons and in which one speeds upward silently toward floors, clouds.The designer high-rise is located at the outskirts, the outskirts of a city of recent Olympic stature, where several years earlier Olympic athletes were welcomed and trained to increase their respiratory capacity and... (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous cherchons à penser les enjeux philosophiques et politiques de l’application des méthodes interprétatives en histoire de la philosophie politique. À partir d’une étude de l’interprétation de Machiavel développée par Quentin Skinner, nous interrogeons la relation entre l’exposition théorique de sa méthodologie et son application effective à la pensée machiavélienne. Dans un premier temps, nous exposons les fondements du contextualisme skinnérien, en insistant d’une part sur sa critique des méthodes orthodoxes en histoire des idées, et d’autre part, (...) sur sa conception de l’intentionnalité d’un auteur du passé et sur la relation étroite entre théorie politique et vie politique qu’elle présuppose. Dans un second temps, nous analysons la mise en œuvre de cette méthode à partir du cas Machiavel, en illustrant les résultats féconds ainsi que les limites d’une telle théorie interprétative. Nous terminons par une analyse critique du projet politique qui sous-tend l’application de cette herméneutique. La thèse défendue est que la relation entre la dimension méthodologique et la dimension proprement politique de l’entreprise skinnérienne est marquée par une certaine tension. D’un côté, Skinner affirme que l’historien ne peut, et ne doit, retirer de leçons intemporelles de l’étude des auteurs du passé; la notion même de continuité entre les époques – l’idée d’une « grande Tradition » – serait un leurre. De l’autre, il critique la conception négative de la liberté mise de l’avant par des auteurs tels que John Rawls ou Isaiah Berlin, et propose une vision renouvelée du républicanisme qui puiserait à la source machiavélienne et permettrait de réconcilier liberté individuelle et participation citoyenne. En explorant tour à tour ces deux volets et l’articulation parfois problématique entre les deux, nous interrogeons la nature de cette équivoque entre les visées méthodologiques de Skinner en tant qu’historien des idées et son propos en tant que théoricien politique. (shrink)

La vida de Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī es oscura. Datos aislados referentes a sus estudios, viajes y contactos se encuentran en breves noticias de los diccionarios biográficos de los siglos XII y XIII. Estas noticias permiten esbozar una biografía de al- Suhrawardī desde sus comienzos hasta la oposición de que fue objeto por parte de los ulemas de Alepo y su trágica muerte, interpretada en el marco y el contexto de la ciudad. Todo este material de los diccionarios biográficos es sólo (...) relativamente fidedigno e incluso los textos contemporáneos incluyen datos erróneos. (shrink)

Pour la théorie des média 1, les média techniques – par opposition au médium symbolique qu’est l’écriture, sont déjà porteurs d’une des caractéristiques fondamentales de l’époque informatique : la possibilité de manipulation de la dimension temporelle du réel. En tant que médium, l’ordinateur ne constitue pas la rupture qu’implique le concept de révolution. Au contraire, la théorie des média et l’archéologie des média invitent à reconsidérer la distinction entre « anciens » et « nouveaux » média et à interroger les (...) formes mêmes de la temporalité. (shrink)

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. (...) I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading. (shrink)

This article provides a summary of current knowledge about memory illusions. The memory illusions described here focus on the recall of imagined events that have never actually occurred. The purpose is to review theoretical ideas and empirical evidence about the reality-monitoring processes involved in memory illusions. Reality monitoring means deciding whether the memory has been perceptually derived or been self-generated (thought or imagined). A few key findings from the literature have been reported in this paper and these focus on internal (...) source-monitoring judgments which distinguish perceptual events from imagined events. Finally, the experimental paradigms used to shed light on processes occurring in the failure of reality monitoring in healthy subjects may be extended to an examination of the causes and the prevention of hallucinations in patients. (shrink)

What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.

In a recent contribution to this journal, Arjaliès (J Bus Ethics 92:57—78, 2010) suggests that the emergence of socially responsible investment (SRI) in France can be best described as a social movement with a collective identity that aimed to challenge the dominant logic of the financial market. Such an account is at odds with a body of empirical studies that approaches SRI in the French context as a process of market creation led by loosely coordinated actors with contradictory and conflicting (...) interests and values, who have mainly complied with—rather than opposed—the existing dominant financial logic of the asset-management field. In this comment, we build on this prior research to contest Arjaliès' perspective on both theoretical and empirical grounds, with the aim of highlighting the shortcomings of conflating social movements and other forms of collective actions in understanding the building of new markets in organization theory and SRI studies. We contend that in mistaking for social movement forms of collective actions that underpin the emergence of markets, scholars of organization theory may confuse distinct mechanisms in their explanation of SRI emergence across countries, overlook the complex dynamics and interactions of markets and social movements, and, most importantly, fail to evaluate the real political significance of SRI as an empirical phenomenon. We propose that future research on SRI distinguishes carefully "social-movement research as a theoretical framework" from "social movement as an empirical phenomenon" in order to avoid such drawbacks while benefiting from recent advances in social-movement research. (shrink)

One of the assets of the simulation theory, as defended by Alvin Goldman in many papers and in his book Simulating Minds, is its ability to explain egocentric bias, and more generally the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading (ascription of mental states to other people). This chapter argues, on the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that go both ways: taking one's beliefs for the other's beliefs (egocentric bias) and vice versa, taking the (...) other's beliefs for one's beliefs (altercentric bias). It sees how the risk of such confusion may be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, questioning thus the evolutionary plausibility of the simulation theory. Egocentric errors have been taken as evidence of the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading, which seems in line with the simulation theory. Recent findings on altercentric bias have opened a new promising way to investigate the cognitive basis of third‐person mindreading. (shrink)

Although developmental biology is an institutionalized discipline, no unambiguous account of what development is and when it stops has so far been provided. In this article, I focus on two sets of developmental molecular mechanisms, namely those underlying the heterochronic pathway in C. elegans and those involving Hox genes in vertebrates, to suggest a conceptual account of animal development. I point out that, in these animals, the early stages of life exhibit salient mechanistic features, in particular in the way mechanisms (...) of genetic regulation occur in the organism. Indeed, these stages are characterized by sequential and irreversible changes in gene expression taking place throughout the organism. A general definition of animal development based on these distinctive features implies that, at least for some animal species, development does not go on throughout the life of the animal, contrary to what has recently been claimed by some biologists and philosophers. Instead, in such species, development encompasses various events occurring sequentially at the beginning of life. (shrink)

This paper will explore the gender discourse of contemporary Egyptian Islamists and argue that their gender discourse is not merely a religious and traditional discourse, but that this politico-religious Islamic ideology articulates a quite modern construct of gender equality. The gender discourse of a number of important Egyptian Islamists, al-Banna’, Qutb, al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi and Ezzat will provide illustrations of these modern developments. Modern elements incorporated in today’s Islamist revivalist approaches create new understandings, neither purely traditional, nor purely modern, that are (...) ‘modern constructs’ that attempt to remain traditional, while integrating specifically modern components. The presence of these two seemingly opposing and contradictory elements may account for the present popularity that Islamist discourses enjoy in many Muslims countries. (shrink)

Dans les traités italiens du XVIe siècle consacrés au mérite, à la dignité et excellence des femmes, le mot « censure » ne figure pas nommément, mais si le terme est anachronique, la notion qu'il recouvre ne l'est peut-être pas, comme semblent le suggérer les comparaisons de la valeur féminine à un soleil obscurci ou masqué par des nuages, ou bien à de l'or enfoui dans la terre. Ces images d'occultation, d'ensevelissement, d'étouffement pourraient être des métaphores d'une censure que ..

En partie issu d’un colloque sur les « Effets de voix : la voix et les voix dans la pensée et la littérature romaines » qui s’est tenu en novembre 2014 à Lille, ce livre rassemble dix-huit contributions, classées selon quatre grandes catégories : I. Philosophie, II. Rhétorique et médecine, III. Acoustique, théâtre et littérature, IV. Linguistique, anthropologie, religion. Il comprend également une bibliographie (p. 385-423), un index des noms (p. 425-429), un index des passages cités (p. 431-...

In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.

In this paper, we show that there is a distinctive mode of spatial awareness in blind individuals, which we call sense of volume, that is not to be confused with echolocation based on self-generated sounds. It is based on the analysis of variations in the ambient sound field and it provides locational information about objects in one’s surroundings. We propose that the sense of volume offers a primitive contact with the outside world. It does not give access to perceptual objects (...) as such, but it should rather be understood as a rudimentary sense of presence that expresses that there is something out there at a certain distance and in a certain direction. We conclude by highlighting its tactile quality. More specifically, we argue that the sense of volume consists in a form of tactile anticipation: when one experiences something as being out there, one tactually expects that one could come in contact with it. (shrink)

Desde la Revolución de Independencia, el relato histórico ha ido acompañando el devenir político de Venezuela, por desempeñar un papel fundamental en la elaboración del mito unificador de la nación. Oficializado en las últimas décadas del siglo XIX, el culto a Bolívar ha sido el punto de partida de una historia oficial que, hoy en día, se asienta en una instrumentalización propia del pasado nacional. El presente ensayo intenta poner de relieve esta peculiar conformación de las memorias en su expression (...) más reciente así como los retos que conlleva, y analizar la acérrima lucha por la escritura de la historia que se está dando hoy día en la República Bolivariana. (shrink)

Le contenu et la portée de l'ouvrage se déploient sur trois plans. Alliant outils d'histoire intellectuelle et approche philosophique, cet ouvrage jette tout d'abord un éclairage nouveau sur le problème de l'historicisme du point de vue de sa dimension pratique et de son rapport avec la philosophie politique au cours des années 1930 de même que durant la période de l'après-guerre. L'approche novatrice du livre conjugue épistémologie de l'histoire et théorie politique et permet de mettre en contexte la mobilisation politique (...) et idéologique du concept d'historicisme et ses corollaires, le relativisme et le nihilisme. La seconde partie du manuscrit traite plus directement d'une question centrale en philosophie politique, celle des fondements de la rationalité politique. À partir d'une réflexion sur la réception de la philosophie des valeurs de Max Weber, l'ouvrage aborde la question des possibilités et limites du jugement politique en temps de crise. Ensuite, cet ouvrage examine une dimension peu étudiée des oeuvres respectives de Leo Strauss et Raymond Aron. D'un point de vue historiographique, le livre montre que la reconstruction du dialogue amorcé entre les deux penseurs (à partir de sources d'archives incluant correspondances, transcriptions de séminaires et textes inédits) permet de jeter une lumière nouvelle sur la façon dont on peut conceptualiser l'utilité de l'histoire pour la philosophie politique. Finalement, dans le champ disciplinaire de la philosophie politique contemporaine, la figure de Raymond Aron est souvent peu considérée. L'une des visées de ce manuscrit est de montrer la pertinence de la philosophie aronienne du jugement et de la responsabilité politique. (shrink)

Cette toute première édition critique de la version arabo-latine de la _Rhétorique_ d’Aristote réalisée par Hermann l’Allemand est accompagnée d’une étude complète de la tradition latine du texte, et présente les principes d’édition adoptés ici, qui prennent en compte la version arabe de la _Rhétorique_. This is the first critical edition of Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ in its Arabo-Latin translation made by Hermann the German. It contains a full study of the latin tradition of the text, as well as the principles used (...) in the edition, which takes account of the Arabic version of the _Rhetoric_. (shrink)

Susan Stebbing (1885–1943), the UK’s first female professor of philosophy, was a key figure in the development of analytic philosophy. Stebbing wrote the world’s first accessible book on the new polyadic logic and its philosophy. She made major contributions to the philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophical logic, critical thinking, and applied philosophy. Nonetheless she has remained largely neglected by historians of analytic philosophy. This Element provides a thorough yet accessible overview of Stebbing’s positive, original contributions, including her solution to the (...) paradox of analysis, her account of the relation of sense-data to physical objects, and her anti-idealist interpretation of the new Einsteinian physics. Stebbing’s innovative work in these and other areas helped move analytic philosophy from its early phase to its middle period. (shrink)

Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...) be extended. We show the limits of embodiment in social cognition. (shrink)

When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial (...) phenomenology of pain shares some key features with touch by contrast to sight, but these similarities should not make us neglect major differences between these two types of bodily sensations. I shall then draw the consequences of these differences for the awareness of one’s body as one’s own. In brief, to fix the boundaries of the body that one experiences as one’s own, one must answer two questions: where does the body stop, and the rest of world start? and what matters for self-preservation? I will suggest that touch primarily answers the first question, whereas pain primarily answers the second question. (shrink)

Recent imaging results suggest that individuals automatically share the emotions of others when exposed to their emotions. We question the assumption of the automaticity and propose a contextual approach, suggesting several modulatory factors that might influence empathic brain responses. Contextual appraisal could occur early in emotional cue evaluation, which then might or might not lead to an empathic brain response, or not until after an empathic brain response is automatically elicited. We propose two major roles for empathy; its epistemological role (...) is to provide information about the future actions of other people, and important environmental properties. Its social role is to serve as the origin of the motivation for cooperative and prosocial behavior, as well as help for effective social communication. (shrink)

Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different mirror matching mechanisms have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one''s own? I intend in this essay (...) to address the epistemic problem of other minds by developing Ayer''s notion of co-consciousness. (shrink)

In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe (...) the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival. (shrink)