In recent years, the practices of work organizations have raised increasing concerns regarding individual privacy at work. It is clear that people expect and value privacy in their personal lives. However, the extent to which privacy perceptions influence individuals’ work attitudes is less clear. Research has explored the extent to which employee perceptions of privacy derive from characteristics of the programs themselves. However, there is a paucity of research that examines how the characteristics of the individual employee may influence perceptions (...) of these programs. In this study we seek to shed light on this issue, as we examine how the individual ethical orientation of employees influences perceptions of a variety of human resource programs that have the potential to be perceived as invasive. Results indicate that ethical orientation exerts direct effects on perceived invasiveness of programs and exerts both direct and indirect effects on perceived appropriateness of programs. Implications for research and for managers adopting privacy-related programs are discussed. (shrink)

In his article, a unified brain-based determination of death is described by James Bernat (2024) as a permanent cessation of systemic circulation causing a permanent cessation of brain circulation...

This thoughtful, learned, well-written, extensively illustrated, and heavily documented study deserves to be regarded as a landmark in art history. Traditional art history has dealt for the most part with the “fine arts” (chiefly painting, drawing, sculpture, and architecture), whereas other human creations that take physical form (such as furniture, ceramics, textiles, and metal and glass items), whether utilitarian or decorative (or both at once), are considered “craft” or “applied art” and are studied by folklorists, anthropologists, and archaeologists and often (...) displayed in different museums. Cooke wishes to break down this “hierarchical taxonomy,” this “fragmented, hierarchical field,” that emerged from Western Europe's “misunderstanding of art,” which valued “the cerebral over the manual.” His goal, in other words, is to outline “a more inclusive human history of art”— “a connected art history.” This phrase from his subtitle refers not simply to connecting “fine art” with “applied art” but also to crossing temporal and regional boundaries. Still another act of connecting is to examine all parts of an object's life history, and thus the three main divisions of the book deal with the making of objects, their circulation from one person and place to another (and “their ability to transmit ideas” in the process), and their meaning for the persons who possessed or encountered them.Over the years I have repeatedly said that all objects made by human beings are worthy of preservation and study because they bring us into direct contact with the past and, as part of our surroundings, affect our thoughts in the present. Every object, I have argued, including copies of a single printed edition of a book (so-called duplicates), is an independent witness to the past. I am particularly pleased, therefore, to welcome a major book that explores in detail, with a wealth of examples from many centuries and cultures, the place of objects in human history. Cooke's pursuit is “object-driven,” beginning with the nature of the materials and finally coming to “the inherent power of the object itself to influence human thought and action.” (Compare the subtitle of Sherry Turkle's 2007 anthology Evocative Objects: Things We Think With.) Cooke's refusal to separate “materials” from “people,” or “technologies” from “values,” reminds me of John Szarkowski's approach to photographs. In Photography until Now (1989), Szarkowski points out that histories of photography generally treat technical matters separately from artistic ones—a split between the “empirical” and the “intuitive” that he finds indefensible, for “these two ways of knowing meet in the process of making things.” He adds, “The meeting can be cordially symbiotic or aggressively competitive, but its resolution defines the character and meaning of the thing that is made.” This statement has been a favorite of mine as an elegant characterization of the nature of art, and it is one that Cooke would clearly agree with.Cooke does not discuss photography, but he makes clear that he is not attempting a “comprehensive history that charts the complete ebb and flow of objects over time.” Rather, his book is meant to be a “suggestive guide” to the “principles of material literacy,” a “kit of tools for future complex constructions of history.” Even so, I find some of the omissions puzzling. Why, for example, are glass objects not taken up, when he so thoroughly deals with other common materials? More serious, in my opinion, is the exclusion of the fine arts. (Of the 215 illustrations, five are of oil paintings and one is of a Japanese print, but they are present only as the sources for information drawn from their pictorial content; one Hogarth engraving is shown because its image was often reproduced on punch bowls; and there is a very brief passage on the “uneasy relationship” between sculpture and material culture, but no sculptures are illustrated or used as examples for discussion.) Presumably Cooke felt it was unnecessary for his book to encompass the fine arts after demonstrating that functional objects are just as sophisticated artistically and culturally as products of the fine arts are. Yet those products also belong to the universe of “entangled objects” (How could they not?), and it would have been illuminating to see them adduced among the examples Cooke cites. One could argue that by excluding them—and by referring to the makers of the objects he does discuss as “artisans” and “craftspeople”—he comes close to reinforcing the division he wishes to eliminate.Less easy to explain is Cooke's omission of books, for they have been one of the largest and most widely circulated classes of utilitarian objects. Most people never think about books as objects, treating them only as disposable receptacles for transmitting verbal texts in tangible form (which is why so many books are destroyed when their texts supposedly become available in another form). Such people do not realize that texts have connections with their physical embodiments. (For example, books, whether manuscript or printed, often contain clues revealing how their texts were affected by the production process; and readers’ attitudes toward texts can be influenced by their presentation.) Cooke, however, with his deep understanding of the way objects function and his impressive knowledge of the scholarship, cannot be one of these uninformed people. He would obviously be aware of the vast literature devoted to leather and cloth bookbindings and their decoration, as well as to the myriad styles of letters and the varieties of paper and parchment; he would also know how letterforms and binding designs reflect a complex interplay of social, political, and artistic forces. Bibliographers have long studied books as Cooke advocates studying other objects: “working from the inside out,” beginning with the evidence in books themselves for reconstructing the routines that were followed in their creation. And book historians are recognizing the necessity for an international approach like Cooke's, since many of the books circulating in one country originated in other countries. Books would have been a prolific additional source for illustrating Cooke's analyses.My admiration for Cooke's book is not altered by these few disappointments. Even without discussions of paintings, sculptures, and books, it is still exhilarating in its scope and depth. One hopes that art and material-culture historians will pay attention to it. But it ought to have a wider audience, for the daily lives of all of us would be enriched by a greater appreciation of the objects that make up a significant part of our environment. (shrink)

I want to suggest that Plato arrived at a revised theory of forms in the later dialogues. Or perhaps I might rather say that he constructed a new underpinning for the theory. This can be discerned, I believe, in the Sophist, taken together with certain parts of the dialectic of the Parmenides which use the same language as the Sophist.

A sceptical response to the idea that wisdom may be turned into a new academic subject or science, and to the idea that to do so would be in any way be wise. .

This article is an attempt to clarify a confusion in the brain death literature between logical sufficiency/necessity and natural sufficiency/necessity. We focus on arguments that draw conclusions regarding empirical matters of fact from conceptual or ontological definitions. Specifically, we critically analyze arguments by Tom Tomlinson and Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler. which, respectively, confuse logical and natural sufficiency and logical and natural necessity. Our own conclusion is that it is especially important in discussing the brain death issue to observe (...) the distinction between logical and natural sufficiency/necessity in a strict fashion. (shrink)

_The Ethics of Homelessness_ is a compilation of essays analysing the philosophical, legal and social implications of the seemingly intractable condition that people endure without a home, where their fundamental human rights, autonomy and privacy are compromised. Authors use literature and arguments to demonstrate the failings of public policy.

The title of this article will perhaps seem excessively contentious to the reader. What solitude of Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii, he might ask, if he has even the slightest familiarity with the scientist's biography?

I do not mean to suggest that Kroner's book is not in many places interesting and learned, nor that, in its original form of lectures, it had no value. But, apart from the exaggeration and distortion of the central thesis, the detailed treatment of historical points leaves one with little confidence and robs the work of what usefulness it might have had. Thus an unquestioning application of Nietzche's division of Greek thinkers into 'Dionysiac' and 'Apollonian' leads to remarks like the (...) following: "Aristotle has little in common with the Dionysian romanticism and universal dynamism of Heraclitus, and yet there is a kinship between them based upon becoming instead of being". What evidence we have for the Presocratic period is harshly treated. On p. 85 this is the 'more literal' of two versions of Anaximander's fragment and its introduction: "All things are going back through destruction, whence they had come through generation, according to what is due; for they suffer just punishment by repayment to each other the wrong in the succession of time"--but Anaximander did not, in fact, write nonsense like this. Even a simple sentence like Heraclitus fr. 113 is mistranslated as "Thinking is the same for all," where the Greek is ξυνόν and not τὸ αὐτό. Nor is Kroner incapable of rebuking others for mistakes of his own; thus on p. 110 he writes: "J. Burnet, e.g., waters down the words of Parmenides which literally rendered are: 'The same is to know and that on behalf of which thought is,' by letting Parmenides say: 'You cannot find thought without something that is as to which it is uttered.'" But Burnet was translating not the line translated by Kroner, but the following one, a line ignored by Kroner and one which seriously damages his interpretation of Parmenides. Then the Greek word ἰδέαι, used of Plato's Forms, is implied to connote ideas existing in the mind; Socrates is the most worth-while of Greek thinkers because in some respects he resembled Jesus Christ; he was not really an ethical thinker, though, and in any case Plato's Forms owed nothing to him--and so on. The best treatment is of Aristotle; and there are many short sections of acute discussion, as, for example, on the meaning of the second part of the Parmenides. But the mind may be spinning so wildly by the time it reaches them that it is incapable of recognizing them. Cambridge University. (shrink)

Coercion and pressure in mental healthcare raise moral questions. This article focuses on moral questions raised by the everyday practice of pressure and coercion in the care for the mentally ill. In view of an example from literature—the story of Ulysses and the Sirens—several ethical issues surrounding this practice of care are discussed. Care giver and patient should be able to express feelings such as frustration, fear and powerlessness, and attention must be paid to those feelings. In order to be (...) able to evaluate the intervention, one has to be aware of the variety of goals the intervention can aim at. One also has to be aware of the variety of methods of intervention, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. Finally, an intervention requires a context of care and responsibility, along with good communication and fair treatment before, during and after the use of coercion and pressure. (shrink)

Obstetricians face difficult decisions when the interests of fetus and mother conflict. An example is the problem of choosing the delivery method when labour begins prematurely and the fetus is breech. Vaginal delivery involves risks for the breech fetus of brain damage or death caused by umbilical cord compression and head entrapment. Caesarean section might avoid these dangers but involves risks for the mother, including infection, haemorrhage and even death in a small percentage of cases. If a caesarean section is (...) performed the infant might die anyway, due to complications of prematurity. Thus, decisions about delivery method involve balancing the risks to mother and fetus. Uncertainty about the frequency of fetal injuries in vaginal breech deliveries adds to the difficulty of these decisions. (shrink)

The meaning of the once widely used term the Gibbs Free Energy in terms of available work energy is perfectly illustrated for chemical reactions by the Van’t Hoff Equilibrium Box. Combining this with DeDonder’s extent of reaction variable and using the reaction of $$\hbox {NH}_3$$ to $$\hbox {H}_2$$ and $$\hbox {N}_2$$ at $$200^{\circ }\hbox {C}$$ as an example shows the difference between total work energy and available work energy, and in addition allows calculation of the equilibrium composition, demonstration of the (...) minimum in the Gibbs energy curve, and the standard relationship between $$\Delta _\textrm{r}G^{\circ }$$ and $$\ln {K}$$. (shrink)

We use a result due to Rolin, Speissegger, and Wilkie to show that definable sets in certain o-minimal structures admit definable parameterizations by mild maps. We then use this parameterization to prove a result on the density of rational points on curves defined by restricted Pfaffian functions.

The ‘musca depicta’ trope is well known to art historians, with a history going back to Pliny. It flourished in the Renaissance, but in eighteenth-century England the meaning of the trope was altered greatly when employed in popular culture, both in live theatrical presentations (by George Alexander Stevens) and in published poetry (by James Robertson, comedian of York). Originally, the trope signalled the virtuosity of the painter, who was able to fool the eye by depicting flies so real that the (...) viewer attempted to shoo them off the picture. However, in the hands of Stevens and Robertson, that bit of theatre was turned on its head, as the supposed connoisseur engaged in a harsh criticism of a painting is startled when a fly that he thinks poorly depicted suddenly flies off the canvas, thereby rendering the connoisseur a satiric target. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant diagnoses an antinomy of taste: either determinate concepts exhaust judgments of taste or they do not. That is to say, judgments of taste are either objective and public or subjective and private. On the objectivity thesis, aesthetic value is predicable of objects. But determining the concepts that would make a judgment of taste objective is a vexing matter. Who can say which concepts these would be? To what authority does one appeal? (...) On the subjectivity thesis, aesthetic value is not predicable of objects. But this threatens judgments of taste with a sort of relativism. Can we not firmly assert the aesthetic value of any object? Have we no authority to make criticisms of taste? Following John McDowell’s “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World”, I will hold that aesthetic value is neither objective nor subjective, but rather intersubjective. But, contra McDowell, I will argue that the validity that intersubjective aesthetic value bestows on judgments of taste must assume an indeterminate absolute conception of reality, of the world as it is in itself. Only such a conceptual resource can in turn make intelligible the notion of a shared or common sense according to which a judgment of taste can be universally valid, that is, valid for all subjects. Finally, I will consider an objection to common sense in matters of taste. (shrink)