In introducing his argument - which resumes and develops the philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of globalisation advanced in his book Westward Passage (forthcoming from Verso, London-New York) - Giacomo Marramao takes the film Babel, by the Mexican director Alejandro Gonzáles Iñárritu, as the point of departure for his discussion: the film depicts the globalised world as a complex space at once interdependent and differentiated in character, constituted like a mosaic, composed of a multiplicity of "asynchronic" ways and forms (...) of life which are brought together by the manifold flux of events that traverse them. This cinematographic depiction perfectly captures the disconcerting bi-logic of globalisation: the logic through which the mix of the global market and of digital technologies operating in "real time" generates an increasing diaspora of identities. The Babel of our contemporary world thereby reveals itself as a kind of planetary extension of the world of Kakania described by Robert Musil: a cacophonous compendium of proliferating and mutually untranslatable languages. In order to conceptualise, and produce a suitably fluid and dynamic account, of this new "world picture," we must not only dissolve the spurious dilemma between universalism and relativism, but move beyond the current impasse encouraged by a normative political philosophy which tends to reify "cultural identities" and "struggles for recognition" by treating these as givens rather than as problems. The philosophical approach pursued in the following discussion attempts to liberate the concept of "the universal" - despite the etymology of the word - from the logic of the reductio ad unum, and apply it instead to the realm of multiplicity and difference. Developing a double phenomenology of the increasingly homogenising phenomenon of the market on the one hand and of the internally conflicted pandemic of identitarian and communitarian approaches on the other, the author indicates a variety of universalising tendencies whose potential can only fully be evaluated in the context of a new theory and practice of translation. Marramao's proposal for a universalism of difference is predicated on the failure of the two principal models of "democratic" inclusion that have previously been attempted in the West: the republican or assimilationist model (that of a Republique founded upon what could be called a universalism of indifference) and the "strong" multiculturalism model (the so-called Londonistan model that derives from a mosaic of differences that also provides fertile ground for the growth of fundamentalist ideas). But to advance beyond the antagonistic complicity generated by this dilemma calls for a re-enchantment of the political: the only way in which we may be able to read the prognostic signs of our present. (shrink)

A comparison between the standard adiabatic piston dynamics and that of a perfectly conducting (diathermal) piston helps to clarify their different behaviors and, in particular, the anomalously large random displacement of the adiabatic piston as compared to the diathermal one. It is shown to be associated with a situation where the presence of a single massive “particle” (the piston), acting as an internal constraint in a many-particle system, plays a somewhat unexpected relevant role. A significant physical insight accounting for the (...) above difference is gained by means of a simple analysis of the phase space available to our system. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that even the most radical metaphysics of powers (such as that adopted by Mumford & Anjum, Cartwright, or Groff) are compatible with eternalism. I first offer a taxonomy of powers ontologies, and attempt to characterise the difference between moderate and radical powers ontologies – the latter are characterised by an emphasis on production and dynamicity. I consider an argument by C. Friebe to the effect that the productive character of powers is inconsistent with Eternalism and (...) find it wanting. I then elucidate the notion of dynamicity that radical powers theorists employ by making apparent their link with an ontology of irreducible processes. Finally, I respond to an argument by Donatella Donati to the effect that eternalism entails a reductive account of change which is inconsistent with process ontologies, and show that the the two are compatible. I conclude that we have no reason to think that radical powers metaphysics (and, a fortiori, every powers ontology) are not compatible with eternalism. (shrink)

For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status‐conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of (...) moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude‐based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status‐holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la noción de fenómeno saturado en el pensamiento de Marion, pero, ante todo, y relacionado con dicho fenómeno, el tipo de sujeto que corresponde a la afectación saturante. La discusión se centra en la superación de la figura del Yo trascendental, y de la Modernidad en general, para dar lugar a un sujeto disminuido, a una diminutio ipseitatis, debida fundamentalmente a una iniciativa que, alega Marion, no proviene tanto del sujeto afectado, cuanto del fenómeno que (...) lo afecta. Desalojado de su formidable centro, el sujeto kenotizado emprende una clase de recreación bastante peculiar, la cual consiste en el conjunto de respuestas que habrá de ofrecer a la densidad del fenómeno mencionado. El sujeto se recibe de lo que recibe. En una hermenéutica sucesiva que retoma la afectación, tendrá que hacerse cargo del golpe de lo dado, es decir, de aquello que lo afecta, pero no exactamente de la manera como afectan los objetos a un sujeto cognoscente. A la pregunta de Nancy “¿qué viene después del sujeto?”, hay que responder sin ninguna hesitación: el sujeto, empero ahora disminuido en su capacidad creadora de mundo a través de la síntesis trascendental: l’adonné, el adonado. (shrink)

In his recent book, Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights, Andrea Sangiovanni argues that the principle of moral equality should be grounded in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors insofar as this constitutes an act of social cruelty. In this short piece, I will raise two concerns about the rejection of social cruelty as the basis of moral equality: first, Sangiovanni’s account seems to give rise to disturbing implications as to how those beings that have basic (...) moral status relate to each other. Second, grounding moral equality in the rejection of social cruelty may fail to capture some wrongs qua violation of moral equality. (shrink)

Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatic characterization of the (...) full set of AGM postulates. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The Timaeus is the dialogue that was for many centuries the most influential of Plato’s works. Among its readers we find Descartes, Boyle, Kepler and Heisenberg. In the first division of Timaeus Plato deals with the theory of celestial motion, in the second he presents us with the first mathematical theory of the structure of matter. Here, in a gigantic step forward with respect to the preceding Democritean atomistic theory with its unalterable micro-entities, he introduces the intertransformability of elementary corpuscles (...) and with that the first “chemical” reactions in history. Plato’s geometrical interpretation of Empedocles’ elements and his geometrical atomism is described at the molecular, atomic and sub-atomic level. The “chemical” reactions reported in Timaeus are written in the enlightening chemical symbolism, analogies with modern chemistry are noticed throughout. (shrink)

The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...) up the particular questions raised, but also extend and modify the framework of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. Part III deals with preference aggregation and consists of one contribution (by F. Herzberg and D. Eckert). (shrink)

If today a decidedly analytical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought seems to be dominant in many ways, there are, in my opinion, countless reasons that lead instead to reintroduce the possibility, and even the opportunity, of a different reading: a proper philosophical-aesthetic reading – where “philosophical” is equivalent to “transcendental” in the Kantian sense – which certainly seems to me more productive in theoretical terms.

Accuracy-first epistemologists argue that rational agents have probabilistically coherent credences. But why should we care, given that we can’t help being incoherent? A common answer: probabilistic coherence is an ideal to be approximated as best one can. De Bona (in: Philos Sci 84(2), 189–213, 2017) and Staffel (in: Unsettled thoughts: a theory of degrees of rationality, Oxford University Press, 2019) show how accuracy-firsters can spell out this answer by adopting an appropriate notion of approximate coherence. In this essay, I argue (...) that De Bona and Staffel’s proposal is not entirely satisfactory, because it does not show whether, or why, it’s generally better to be more rather than less approximately coherent from an accuracy-first perspective. To address this point, I give a characterisation of their notion of approximate coherence in terms of accuracy. This shows that accuracy-firsters should maintain that more approximately coherent credences are better than less approximately coherent ones _if and only if_ they accept that it’s better to miss out on less rather than more guaranteed accuracy. (shrink)

The symplectic quantization scheme proposed for matter scalar fields in the companion paper (Gradenigo and Livi, arXiv:2101.02125, 2021) is generalized here to the case of space–time quantum fluctuations. That is, we present a new formalism to frame the quantum gravity problem. Inspired by the stochastic quantization approach to gravity, symplectic quantization considers an explicit dependence of the metric tensor gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} on an additional time variable, named intrinsic time at variance (...) with the coordinate time of relativity, from which it is different. The physical meaning of intrinsic time, which is truly a parameter and not a coordinate, is to label the sequence of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} quantum fluctuations at a given point of the four-dimensional space–time continuum. For this reason symplectic quantization necessarily incorporates a new degree of freedom, the derivative g˙μν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\dot{g}}_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} of the metric field with respect to intrinsic time, corresponding to the conjugated momentum πμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi _{\mu \nu }$$\end{document}. Our proposal is to describe the quantum fluctuations of gravity by means of a symplectic dynamics generated by a generalized action functional A[gμν,πμν]=K[gμν,πμν]-S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {A}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }] = {\mathcal {K}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }] - S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document}, playing formally the role of a Hamilton function, where S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} is the standard Einstein–Hilbert action while K[gμν,πμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {K}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} is a new term including the kinetic degrees of freedom of the field. Such an action allows us to define an ensemble for the quantum fluctuations of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} analogous to the microcanonical one in statistical mechanics, with the only difference that in the present case one has conservation of the generalized action A[gμν,πμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {A}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} and not of energy. Since the Einstein–Hilbert action S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} plays the role of a potential term in the new pseudo-Hamiltonian formalism, it can fluctuate along the symplectic action-preserving dynamics. These fluctuations are the quantum fluctuations of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document}. Finally, we show how the standard path-integral approach to gravity can be obtained as an approximation of the symplectic quantization approach. By doing so we explain how the integration over the conjugated momentum field πμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi _{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} gives rise to a cosmological constant term in the path-integral approach. (shrink)

When we witness a great actor, musician, or sportsperson performing, we share something of their experience. Only recently has it become clear just how this sharing of experience is realised within the human brain. 'Mirrors in the brain' provides an accessible overview of mirror neurons, written by the man who first discovered them.

We investigate agents that have incomplete information and make decisions based on their beliefs expressed as situation calculus bounded action theories. Such theories have an infinite object domain, but the number of objects that belong to fluents at each time point is bounded by a given constant. Recently, it has been shown that verifying temporal properties over such theories is decidable. We take a first-person view and use the theory to capture what the agent believes about the domain of interest (...) and the actions affecting it. In this paper, we study verification of temporal properties over online executions. These are executions resulting from agents performing only actions that are feasible according to their beliefs. To do so, we first examine progression, which captures belief state update resulting from actions in the situation calculus. We show that, for bounded action theories, progression, and hence belief states, can always be represented as a bounded first-order logic theory. Then, based on this result, we prove decidability of temporal verification over online executions for bounded action theories. (shrink)

This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cubitt and Sugden’s reconstruction) stresses the importance of including it in the definition of convention. I discuss arguments pro et contra to (...) argue that, although the assumption might be relevant to a descriptively adequate account of social convention, it is not required for its rational reconstruction. I then point out that Lewis’ account, properly speaking, is of common reason to believe, rather than of common knowledge, and argue that, in order to formalize aptly the distinction between reason to believe and belief, standard formal epistemic models need to be supplemented with so-called awareness structures. Finally, I stress that the notion of knowledge implicit in Lewis’ text involves interesting elements that cannot be captured in the standard propositional formalizations, but need the full expressive force of quantified epistemic logic. (shrink)

This article contributes to the growing scholarship on the topic of assurance services for sustainability reports. We first synthetically illustrate the main international standards for the implementation of assurance services regarding the subject documents. The second part of our article is an empirical analysis of reports drawn up on the basis of the current Global Reporting Initiative 2006 guidelines, and looks at how effectively these standards have been implemented, analyzing the different typologies of assurance statement.

Nowadays, physicalism is arguably the received view on the nature of mental states. Among the arguments that have been provided in its favour, the inductive one seems to play a pivotal role in the debate. Leveraging the past success of materialistic science, the physicalist argues that a materialistic account of consciousness will eventually be provided, hence that physicalism is true. This article aims at evaluating whether this strategy can provide support for physicalism. According to the standard objection raised against the (...) inductive line of reasoning, the argument would beg the question by assuming some sort of metaphysical uniformity between consciousness and the rest of the natural domain. Here, I concede that there is a way to avoid this criticism. However, I argue that the argument still fails to support physicalism due to a structural problem of justification transmission. (shrink)

We propose here a new symplectic quantization scheme, where quantum fluctuations of a scalar field theory stem from two main assumptions: relativistic invariance and equiprobability of the field configurations with identical value of the action. In this approach the fictitious time of stochastic quantization becomes a genuine additional time variable, with respect to the coordinate time of relativity. Thisintrinsic timeis associated to a symplectic evolution in the action space, which allows one to investigate not only asymptotic, i.e. equilibrium, properties of (...) the theory, but also its non-equilibrium transient evolution. In this paper, which is the first one in a series of two, we introduce a formalism which will be applied to general relativity in its companion work (Gradenigo, Symplectic quantization II: dynamics of space-time quantum fluctuations and the cosmological constant, 2021). (shrink)

The logic of common belief does not always reflect that of individual beliefs. In particular, even when the individual belief operators satisfy the KD45 logic, the common belief operator may fail to satisfy axiom 5. That is, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. We identify the intersubjective restrictions on individual beliefs that are incorporated in axiom 5 for common belief.

_Selections from Leopardi’s prose masterwork, _Zibaldone_, one of the great intellectual diaries in European literature, expertly translated by Tim Parks__ _Revenge__—Revenge is so sweet one often wishes to be insulted so as to be able to take revenge, and I don’t mean just by an old enemy, but anyone, or even by a friend_._—from _Passions_ The extraordinary quality of Giacomo Leopardi’s writing and the innovative nature of his thought were never fully recognized in his lifetime. _Zibaldone_, his 4,500-page intellectual (...) diary—a vast collection of thoughts on philosophy, civilization, literary criticism, linguistics, humankind and its vanities, and other varied topics—remained unpublished until more than a half-century after his death. But shortly before he died, Leopardi began to organize a small, thematic collection of his writings in an attempt to give structure and system to his philosophical musings. Now freshly translated into English by master translator, novelist, and critic Tim Parks, Leopardi’s _Passions _presents 164 entries reflecting the full breadth of human passion. The volume offers a fascinating introduction to Leopardi’s arguments and insights, as well as a glimpse of the concerns of thinkers to come, among them Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Wittgenstein, Gadda, and Beckett. (shrink)

This article reassesses the notion of personal identity over time from a Heideggerian perspective, aiming to bridge the conceptual gap between concerns for personhood and continuity. Traditional approaches, including the psychological and moral approaches to the self, often inadequately address the relationship between personhood and temporal continuity. This article establishes an understanding of personhood as social agency, contending that this perspective encompasses both conceptual dimensions central to the question of personal identity over time. Following an initial exploration of the problem (...) (§ 2), a concept of social agency rooted in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein is developed in comparison with alternative conceptions of personhood (§ 3). Subsequently, drawing on Arthur Danto’s philosophy of history, Heidegger’s perspective on personal identity over time is examined with a focus on historicity (§ 4). Lastly, this account is compared with contemporary views on personhood and identity over time (§ 5). (shrink)

The philosophy of language of Robert Brandom is based on a theoretical structure composed of three main elements: the normative analysis of linguistic practices, the inferential characterization of conceptual contents and the expressive articulation of the relations between the former two. Normative pragmatics aims to explain how linguistic practices are sufficient to confer contentful states in those who engage in them. Inferential semantics provides a theory of such pragmatic significances in terms of the inferential relations that articulate conceptual contents. Rational (...) expressivism is the thesis that concept application is essentially a process of turning something that can only be done into something that can also be said. Such a threefold structure is the core of normative inferentialism. This book is a concise, selfcontained and comprehensive presentation of this philosophical enterprise. It guides the reader through the analysis of Brandom’s imposing theoretical apparatus, the discovery of the roots of his approach in American pragmatism and German idealism, till the exploration of some of its most interesting and recent outcomes in pragmatics and semantics. It is a valuable resource for both those who approach Brandom’s work for the first time and those who are interested in the potential of normative inferentialism. (shrink)

La aparición en nuestro siglo de una concepción postmoderna del poder responde a un proceso gradual cuyos hitos más importantes son las teorías políticas y sociales de Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Hans Kelsen y Niklas Luhmann. Con la profundización en sus postulados básicos, el autor pretende darles sentido como fases de un devenir ontológico en el que desde una concepción sustancialista y antropomórfica del orden político hobbesiano se acaba en una compleja interpretación funcionalista y sistémica del poder.

Nostalgia for the present -- Identity and contingency: zones of conflict -- Dämmerung: the twilight of sovereignty: state, subjects, and fundamental rights -- The exile of the Nomos: Carl Schmitt and the Globale Zeit -- Gift, exchange, obligation: Karl Polanyi and social philosophy -- Universalism and politics of difference: democracy as a paradoxical community -- The oriental mirror: Voltaire and the roots of intolerance -- Ciphers of difference -- Europe after the Leviathan: technology, politics, constitution -- After Babel: towards a (...) cosmopolitanism of difference. (shrink)

The evolutionary continuity between the prespeech functions of premotor cortex and its new linguistic functions, the main thesis of MacNeilage's target article, is confirmed by the recent discovery of “mirror” neurons in monkeys and a corresponding action-observation/action-execution matching system in humans. Physiological data (and other considerations) appear to indicate, however, that brachiomanual gestures played a greater role in language evolution than MacNeilage would like to admit.

In the following article I present a basic proposal that is intended to provide the ground for a broader program in which I attempt to explain and characterize the foundations of the normativity generally regarded as implicit in the notion of a "person." I intend to argue that these foundations are natural in the sense that they are derived from basic behavioral and cognitive patterns which are particularly characteristic of human beings especially during their infancy. Among these basic patterns I (...) take that known as dyadic engagement to be merely the foundational stage at which embryonic personhood emerges. Dyadic engagement is a very primitive and special form of social competence which has been identified by some cognitive developmentalists and comparative psychologists as a particular kind of sensitivity for contingencies which are experienced from the very beginning in the various processes of communicative interaction. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to characterize the semantic notion of trust, as it has been introduced by Robert Brandom. Traditionally, the concept of trust does not play any central role in semantics. This, I suggest, depends on the fact that the very social dimension plays a rather marginal role in the traditional representationalist theory of meaning. In Brandom’s normative inferentialism, instead, trust is essential to the constitution of the discursive communities, whose rules are taken to define contents.