Theories in the behavioral sciences are constrained so that stated relationships are empirically testable and explanations have predictive power. These constraints constitute the classical paradigm, and are trivial just when ?causal relationships? do not hold. It appears that such relationships do not hold for linguistic, and presumably other, behaviors, thus precluding study within the classical paradigm. This compels study of those behaviors in terms of the non?traditional approach to testability and explanation developed in Chomskyan linguistics. These constitute the grammatical (...) paradigm. The existence of two paradigms requires that any inquiry begin by determining which paradigm is appropriate. (shrink)

본 연구는 대표적인 빠알리어 전통문법서인 『깟짜야나 문법(KV)』과 『목갈라나 문법(MV)』이 동사의 시제를 어떻게 다루는지 알아보기 위해 관련된 문법규칙을 분석한 것이다. 분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, KV와 MV 모두 빠알리어 시제를 3종의 과거, 현재, 미래 이렇게 총 다섯 가지로 동일하게 구분하지만, 전개방식에 있어서 KV는 각 시제의 정의와 해당 시제 어미를 다른 규칙으로 분리해서 다루고, MV는 한 규칙으로 묶어 제시한다. 둘째, 두 문법서가 제시하는 시제의 용어가 그 시제를 정의하는 핵심단어라는 점은 동일하지만, 서로 다른 용어를 사용한다. 과거시제의 일반적인 용어로 KV는 atīta를, MV는 bhūta를 사용하고, (...) 세 가지 유형으로서의 과거시제 용어도 같지 않다. 현재시제의 용어로 KV는 paccuppanna를, MV는 vattamāna를 사용한다. 미래시제의 용어로 KV는 anāgata를, MV는 bhavissati를 사용한다. 셋째, 두 문법서는 규칙의 간결성을 위해 시제 어미군의 용어를 사용하는데, KV가 ajjatanī, hiyyattanī, parokkhā, vattamānā, bhavissantī와 같이 그 시제를 의미하는 단어를 사용한다면, MV는 ī-ādayo, ā-ādayo, a-ādayo, tyādayo, ssatyādayo와 같이 시제 어미군의 첫 어미에 ‘ādi’를 결합한 실용적인 단어를 사용한다. 넷째, 시제 어미군의 활용범위에 대해 KV는 해당 시제만 제시하는 반면, MV는 화자의 의지에 따라 시제 간에 시제 어미들을 바꾸어 사용하는 ‘시제불일치(kālabyattayo)’의 경우와 시제와 관계없는 문장 내 활용의 경우도 제시한다. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to analyse the concept of semi-sentence from a linguistic, formal and computational point of view. A semi-sentence can be characterised as a sentence which, from a grammatical perspective, is neither absolutely correct nor incorrect . This study focuses on: - a characterisation of the semi-sentences in the setting of the grammar of a language. This study will help to analyse in depth the concept of grammaticality [3]; - the correlate of semi-sentences in formal (...) languages, i.e., semi-strings, which arise from applying productions that deviate from that which is strictly permitted by the rules of grammar [6]; - a Prolog program for handling semi-grammaticality in a computational manner [2]. (shrink)

The traditional Buddhist Sanskrit term _vijñāna_ cannot be given the meaning “consciousness” in accordance with the grammatical rules of Pāṇini’s _Aṣṭādhyāyī_. In Vedic texts the traditional Sanskrit terms _citta_ and _manas_ refer to the eternal cognitive entities, which were also popular in some Indian Prakrit languages at the time of Buddha. It seems possible that Buddha himself created the new Prakrit term to denote the impermanent cognitive apparatus, which is produced by object and sensory organ. The sound of (...) the Prakrit term is recorded and written as _vijñāna_ with Sanskrit letters. In the case of a hypothetical debate between a Buddhist and a Brahmanist, the Brahmanist would insist on strictly following Sanskrit Grammar in order to interpret the Sanskrit word _vijñāna_. Discrepancies arising from the non-native usage of this term would lead to a great many mistakes and cause debates to become impossible. Vasubandhu, therefore, introduced a new Sanskrit term _vijñapti_ to refer to consciousness and remedy this confusion. Through the analysis presented in Pāṇini’s _Aṣṭādhyāyī_, we find that the root of _vijñapti_ is not _jñā_ as some scholars have said, but _jñap._ Although _vijñapti_ looks like a substantive thing, it is just a momentary aggregation of cognitive efficacies (_vyāpṛti_) without any ontic base. Therefore, the new term _vijñapti_ can not only be translated as consciousness, but it is also in conformity with the Mahāyāna doctrines of _anityatā_, _niḥsvabhāvatā_ and _śūnyatā_ well. (shrink)

In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments (...) of topics immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following.. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the grammatical nature of Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA). On my interpretation, the definition of private language implies that the private speaker has no natural expressions for his sensations. This in turn implies that he has no criterion of correctness for using his sensation‐words. This then implies, together with the grammatical rule that a word is senseless without a criterion of correctness for its use, that private sensation‐words are senseless, and hence also that (...) private language is senseless. So in my analysis, Wittgenstein succeeds in dissolving the problem of private language through a grammatical investigation, and therefore, his treatment of private language is consistent with his metaphilosophy. I further explain that Wittgenstein provides a diagnosis of the error of the philosopher who thinks that private language is possible and that he also offers a therapy consisting of analogies or objects of comparison. I also make a comparison with previous studies on the PLA and discuss a number of novelties in my interpretation. (shrink)

This study examines how second-language English learners' grammar issues differ in rural and urban Pakistani schools. This study is quasi-experimental. The study uses a quantitative approach and SPSS-analyzed writing test samples. The key findings reveal that pupils struggle to understand complicated syntactic structures like qualifiers, adjectives, adverbs, and adjunct and complement categories, even though they understand subject-verb agreement. Lack of resources and poor language education exacerbate these issues in rural areas. Teachers emphasize the need for the government to improve English (...) grammar education and the necessity for custom learning aids to help rural students with their particular issues in grammar and syntax. Teachers also want enhanced professional development to master advanced grammar teaching methods. Students expressed mixed confidence in their grammatical skills since they were unsure how well they comprehended complex grammar principles. To assist students in comprehending and using grammar rules, the study recommends adding more interactive and relevant grammar assignments to courses and using the process-genre technique. The results also demonstrate the need for teachers to continue to study and have support networks to ensure good language sessions. Policy suggestions include equipping schools, especially rural ones, modifying the curriculum, and funding teacher training. This study enhances Pakistani second language learners' academic and employment prospects by identifying grammar issues and providing writing tips. Thus, it expands ESL instruction. (shrink)

Are rules processes or similarity processes the default for acquisition of grammatical knowledge during natural second language acquisition? Whereas Pothos argues similarity processes are the default in the many areas he reviews, including artificial grammar learning and first language development, I suggest, citing evidence, that in second language acquisition of grammatical morphology “rules processes” may be the default.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Tractatus and rules of logical syntax From logical syntax to philosophical grammar Rules and rule‐formulations Philosophy and grammar The scope of grammar Some morals.

First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for both fulfil three (...) important features of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life. (shrink)

Inflectional morphology has been taken as a paradigmatic example of rule-governed grammatical knowledge (Pinker, 1999). The plausibility of this claim may be related to the fact that it is mainly based on studies of English, which has a very simple inflectional system. We examined the representation of inflectional morphology in Serbian, which encodes number, gender, and case for nouns. Linguists standardly characterize this system as a complex set of rules, with disagreements about their exact form. We present analyses (...) of a large corpus of nouns which showed that, as in English, Serbian inflectional morphology is quasiregular: It exhibits numerous partial regularities creating neighborhoods that vary in size and consistency. We then asked whether a simple connectionist network could encode this statistical information in a manner that also supported generalization. A network trained on 3,244 Serbian nouns learned to produce correctly inflected phonological forms from a specification of a word's lemma, gender, number, and case, and generalized to untrained cases. The model's performance was sensitive to variables that also influence human performance, including surface and lemma frequency. It was also influenced by inflectional neighborhood size, a novel measure of the consistency of meaning to form mapping. A word-naming experiment with native Serbian speakers showed that this measure also affects human performance. The results suggest that, as in English, generating correctly inflected forms involves satisfying a small number of simultaneous probabilistic constraints relating form and meaning. Thus, common computational mechanisms may govern the representation and use of inflectional information across typologically diverse languages. (shrink)

I argue that grammatical thomism helps to clarify certain problems in philosophical theology by focusing attention on the parameters of coherent God-talk. By drawing on figures like David Burrell, Brian Davies, Kathryn Tanner, and Denys Turner, I show that the first rule of theological grammar is to avoid talking about God as if God were some sort of thing existing alongside the world. In fact, Aquinas concedes that we cannot really know what God is at all. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s later (...) emphasis on meaning as use helps us to see why we can still talk intelligibly about God by focusing on the use of the word more than its referent. I connect this with the work of Stephen Mulhall and Cora Diamond on the nature of riddles, and suggest that this genre is one way of illuminating the peculiar grammar of certain Christian doctrines: in particular, the doctrine of the incarnation and of creation out of nothing. Finally, I look outside Christian contexts to the Hindu tradition of Advaita Vedānta, and argue that the language and imageries of non-dualism can provoke us into reconsidering the essence of Christian grammar and alert us to some of the therapeutic possibilities of grammatical thomism. (shrink)

Mastery of English grammatical accuracy is paramount for developing proficiency as a foreign language. However, research examining tendencies among Saudi undergraduate writers remains limited. This study aimed to address such gaps through a comprehensive identification and categorization of errors present in student essays. A rigorous mixed-methods approach analyzed over 350 grammatical mistakes across 50 female students' writing samples. Errors were systematically coded and categorized to reveal frequency data through quantitative analysis. Findings demonstrated spelling, subject-verb agreement, and capitalization as (...) the most prevalent issue areas, collectively accounting for over 75% of errors. Examples uncovered specific challenges involving verb tense, sentence fragments, and article usage. While outcomes aligned with previous literature, linguistic influences on persistent spelling difficulties were explored to broaden understandings. Recommendations for targeted exercises strengthening weaker domains like phonics rules and irregular verbs were provided. Continuing periodic error analyses can optimally inform evolving pedagogy tailored to emerging needs over time. Significantly, this novel diagnostic approach begins addressing critical literature gaps through data-driven insights that meaningfully inform curriculum development to better support the still under-researched Saudi EFL student population. (shrink)

“Grammar” is Ludwig Wittgenstein's preferred term for the workings of a language: the system of rules that determine linguistic meaning. A philosophical study of language is a study of “grammar”, in this sense, and insofar as any philosophical investigation is concerned with conceptual details, which manifest themselves in language, it is a grammatical investigation. In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus Wittgenstein offered a mathematical picture of language: presenting language as a calculus. Like a calculus, language was claimed to be governed (...) by syntactic rules: formation rules about the licit combination of names to form elementary propositions; formation rules about the licit combination of elementary propositions to make complex propositions; and finally, truth‐table rules, which enable us to identify logical truths and entailments. Logical grammar, for the young Wittgenstein, is only logical syntax and logical syntax can be determined without paying any attention to the meaning of the signs. (shrink)

A significant part of everyday learning occurs incidentally — a process typically described as implicit learning. A central issue in this domain and others, such as language acquisition, is the extent to which performance depends on the acquisition and deployment of abstract rules. Shanks and colleagues [22], [11] have suggested (1) that discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical instances of a biconditional grammar requires the acquisition and use of abstract rules, and (2) that training conditions — in particular (...) whether instructions orient participants to identify the relevant rules or not — strongly influence the extent to which such rules will be learned. In this paper, we show (1) that a Simple Recurrent Network can in fact, under some conditions, learn a biconditional grammar, (2) that training conditions indeed influence learning in simple auto-associators networks and (3) that such networks can likewise learn about biconditional grammars, albeit to a lesser extent than human participants. These findings suggest that mastering biconditional grammars does not require the acquisition of abstract rules to the extent implied by Shanks and colleagues, and that performance on such material may in fact be based, at least in part, on simple associative learning mechanisms. (shrink)

Abstract: The argument for interpreting Wittgenstein's project as primarily therapeutic can be extended from the domain of intellectual pathologies that form the core of the Philosophical Investigations to the topics in On Certainty , carrying further Hutchinson's recent argument for the priority of therapy in Wittgenstein's project. In this article I discuss whether the line Hutchinson takes is extendable to the work of the Third Wittgenstein. For example, how does Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's "refutation of idealism" in On Certainty work (...) as therapy when we think of it in "practice" terms? What practice? I suggest a further, but more tentative, step applying the therapeutic idea to seemingly insurmountable practical problems, where method is also at issue. (shrink)

This article proposes a new model of human concept learning that provides a rational analysis of learning feature‐based concepts. This model is built upon Bayesian inference for a grammatically structured hypothesis space—a concept language of logical rules. This article compares the model predictions to human generalization judgments in several well‐known category learning experiments, and finds good agreement for both average and individual participant generalizations. This article further investigates judgments for a broad set of 7‐feature concepts—a more natural setting in (...) several ways—and again finds that the model explains human performance. (shrink)

Recent grammatical theory begins with the notion that the sentences of any natural language are generated by phrase structure rules whose base structural outputs are filled in by lexical insertion rules, the result brought to surface structure through transformational rules. Phrase structure rules rewrite particular items; transformational rules have the greater power of rearranging items. The claim that there are deep structures may be thought equivalent to the claim that the system of rules (...) which will most economically and accurately structurally-describe a language's sentences will also define a base, post-lexical and pre-transformational level. In addition Katz-Postal claimed that the deep structure level as defined above would also provide all the information needed for semantic interpretation. Obviously much will depend in all this on how one defines transformational rule. Bowers argues here that Chomsky's notion of transformational rule is an artifact of his commitment to syntactic deep structure, that it leads to inadequate, needlessly complicated and undecideable grammatical analyses; we cannot segregate phrase structural and lexical processes from purely syntactic transformational rules, and hence transformational rules state "cooccurrence relationships between sentences" rather than relating deep and surface structures. Bowers considers passivization and "causitivization," complement structure, topicalization, and some related matters. The sledding is heavy for those not familiar with these matters. There may have been a delay in publication of this book for the arguments, theories, and papers referred to belong to the late sixties-early seventies or earlier, though Bowers mentions more recent work in a prefatory paragraph: the trouble is that much of what Bowers criticizes has long since been criticized and repaired though not in Bowers's way by those in the Chomskian aegus. When he writes at a general level Bowers seems to conflate the claim that there is a syntactic deep structure with the Katz-Postal claim that this level also provides all that is needed for semantic interpretation: rationalism, nativism, deep structure, intensionality, and autonomous syntax are boated together and sink similarly. But syntax may be autonomous and largely unlearned, growing through exposure in a way sizably independent of the rest of cognition, without otherwise loading down the boat.--J.L. (shrink)

Grammar as a discipline devoted to the study of language was greatly advanced by the Alexandrian philologists, and especially by Aristarchus, as demonstrated by Stephanos Matthaios. In order to edit Homer and other literary authors, whose texts were often written in archaic Greek and presented many linguistic problems, the Alexandrians had to recognize linguistic grammatical categories and declensional patterns. In particular, to determine the correct orthography or accentuation of debated morphological forms they often employed analogy, which is generally defined (...) as the doctrine that grammatical forms must follow strict rules of declension. Modern scholars have often opposed the Alexandrian doctrine of analogy to the Pergamene doctrine of ‘anomaly’, which favoured spoken usage to determine debated forms. Detlev Fehling and David Blank, however, have shown that this strong opposition never really existed and it is mostly due to Varro. More correctly, ancient grammarians identified inflectional rules as well as forms derived from spoken usage or otherwise aberrant forms—however, respect for spoken usage in the latter case was not labelled ‘anomaly’, which was never a technical term of ancient grammar. Rather, and especially in the Roman period, grammarians used the term ‘pathology’ to account for and explain irregular forms. (shrink)

'Knowledge' doesn't correctly describe our relation to linguistic rules. It is too thick a notion. On the other hand, 'cognize', without further elaboration, is too thin a notion, which is to say that it is too thin to play a role in a competence theory. One advantage of the term 'knowledge'-and presumably Chomsky's original motivation for using it-is that knowledge would play the right kind of role in a competence theory: Our competence would consist in a body of knowledge (...) which we have and which we may or may not act upon-our performance need not conform to the linguistic rules that we know. Is there a way out of the dilemma? I'm going to make the case that the best way to talk about grammatical rules is simply to say that we have them. That doesn't sound very deep, I know, but saying that we have individual rules leaves room for individual norm guidance in a way that 'cognize' does not. Saying we have a rule like subjacency is also thicker than merely saying we cognize it. Saying I have such a rule invites the interpretation that it is a rule for me-that I am normatively guided by it. The competence theory thus becomes a theory of the rules that we have. Whether we follow those rules is another matter entirely. (shrink)

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in (...) judgments and in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter .’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

이 글의 주된 목표는 종교적 행위로서의 기독교 방언을 비트겐슈타인의 시각으로 문법적 탐구를 해 보는데 있다.BR 방언은 사적언어는 아니지만, 그것은 겉보기에 사적언어와 매우 유사한 측면들을 보여준다는 점에서 언어의 본성에 관한 중요한 통찰력을 보여 준다. 그래서 방언을 사적언어로 간주하여 그와 관련된 여러 논의들을 결부시켜 살펴본다.BR 기독교의 방언에 관한 논의는 철학적 논의와 신학적 논의로 나누어 살펴볼 수 있다. 전자는 방언이 하나의 언어로서 성립 가능하냐는 문제, 즉 만일 방언이 다른 사람들이 알아들을 수 있는 공적역할을 하지 못한다면 그것은 사적언어에 해당되는 것이 아니냐 하는 문제가 논의의 (...) 초점이 되고, 후자는 오늘날 많은 기독교인들이 행하고 있는 방언이 성경에 나타난 그 방언인지 아닌지의 문제, 다시 말해 방언의 “지속과 단절”의 문제로 요약된다. 그러나 이 두 논의는 비트겐슈타인의 시각에서 보자면, 문법적 차이의 문제를 간과한 것으로 그 물음자체가 의미가 없다. 궁극적으로 ‘방언’이라는 종교언어놀이는 일상 언어놀이와는 구별되는 것이고, 삶의 형태가 각각 그 나름의 논리를 지니고 있다는 점에서 분명한 차이가 있다. 비트겐슈타인이 말하는 종교문법은 이성적 추론이나 근거에 호소하는 것이 아니라, 종교적 표현들과 행위들에 근거한다. 그래서 방언은 본능적인 종교행위로, 즉 복잡다양한 우리의 언어놀이 이전의 원형적인 것으로, 전언어적인 것으로, 그리고 무엇보다도 ‘종교적 언어화 된 것’이다. 이것은 특별한 종류의 견해 혹은 믿음을 나타내는 행위로 중요한 것이며, 신을 향한 믿음의 표현임과 동시에 신자의 삶의 의미를 드러내 보인다는 점에서 가치 있는 것이다. (shrink)

This work investigates the possibility of iʿrâb (parsing) simple texts by utilizing simple grammar rules in the case of I’râb al-Awâmil al-mi’a. I'râb, which is the 'application of grammar on texts', is an operation of reinforcing the knowledge of grammar from one perspective, and an attempt to under-stand the text from another. Since I’râb al-Awâmil al-mi’a is the iʿrâb of al-Awâmil al-mi’a, which is a brief grammar treatise, it is clear that this iʿrâb is intended to reinforce grammar knowledge. (...) Moreover, it indicates the level of knowledge to be reinforced, as is evident from the text. We think that examining such iʿrâb works in terms of the applicability of iʿrâb, will provide data to the field of grammar teaching. The work is currently available in manuscript and consists of the object text and the author's iʿrâb. The object text of the work, al-Awâmil al-mi'a, is a textbook and the target reader of the book is beginners. It is naturally assumed that both al-Awâmil al-mi'a and its parsing were written for the same level. This work examines the validity of this assumption. In order to determine whether the rules used in the parsing are simple or complex, it was necessary to create a measure of simplicity. Three measures of simplicity have been created. If the grammatical rules used in parsing are: limited to the rules in al-Avâmil, or if they are within the frame of the main topics of grammar or if the author does not address controversial issues during the application of the iʿrâb, then they are simple rules. Moreover, in order to facilitate the achievement of our goal, we divided the sentences into simple and complex sentences, and selected our data mostly from complex sentences. We simplified complex sentences by dividing them into two types: sentences with missing elements and sentences that are semantically connected. We created a second dataset by adding some examples other than the complex sentence types. We selected the other sentence types that make up the second dataset from sentences that contain elements that al-Awāmil al-mi'a does not include. The mentioned datasets examined by utilizing the measure of simplicity that we created and the degree of complexity of the grammatical rules used in I'râb al-Awâmil al-mi'a, was revealed. (shrink)

This book offers a detailed account and discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. In Part I, the stage is set with a brief presentation of Frege's logicist attempt to provide arithmetic with a foundation and Wittgenstein's criticisms of it, followed by sketches of Wittgenstein's early views of mathematics, in the Tractatus and in the early 1930s. Then (in Part II), Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of mathematics (1937-44) is carefully presented and examined. Schroeder explains that it is based on two key (...) ideas: the calculus view and the grammar view. On the one hand, mathematics is seen as a human activity - calculation - rather than a theory. On the other hand, the results of mathematical calculations serve as grammatical norms. The following chapters (on mathematics as grammar; rule-following; conventionalism; the empirical basis of mathematics; the role of proof) explore the tension between those two key ideas and suggest a way in which it can be resolved. Finally, there are chapters analysing and defending Wittgenstein's provocative views on Hilbert's Formalism and the quest for consistency proofs and on Gödel's incompleteness theorems. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant conceives of general logic as a set of universal and necessary rules for the possibility of thought, or as a set of minimal necessary conditions for ascribing rationality to an agent . Such a conception, of course, contrasts with contemporary notions of formal, mathematical or symbolic logic. Yet, in so far as Kant seeks to identify those conditions that must hold for the possibility of thought in general, such conditions must hold a (...) fortiori for any specific model of thought, including axiomatic treatments of logic and standard natural deduction models of first-order predicate logic. Kant's general logic seeks to isolate those conditions by thinking through – or better, reflecting on – those conditions that themselves make thought possible. (shrink)

The paper explores Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar in the sense of a discipline or an activity, as opposed to the object sense of the term (grammar as a body of rules for the use of a language). I argue that the Wittgensteinian activity of grammar consists in giving expression to rules of our language use. It differs from the traditional grammarian’s activity not only in focusing on a different type of rules, but also in that it does (...) not aim at an explicit and exhaustive treatment of a specific domain of language. Instead, Wittgenstein conceives its goal as therapeutic: the dissolution of particular philosophical problems. Further, I attempt to reconcile his seemingly contradictory remarks on the character of grammatical statements, defining the senses in which they respectively can, and cannot, be considered descriptive assertions. I confront G. P. Baker’s and P. M. S. Hacker’s conceptions of the Wittgensteinian grammatical activity and I argue in favour of the former. Finally, I critically examine N. Garver’s claim that Wittgenstein, in his later conception of philosophy as grammar, succeeded in formulating a successfully self-referential criterion of philosophical critique. I also argue that grammatical activity, despite Wittgenstein’s overt commitment, is in fact not the only method of his later philosophy. (shrink)

According to a persistent assumption in legal philosophy, the social rule at the foundation of a legal system (the Rule of Recognition) serves both an epistemic and a duty-imposing function. Thus, some authors have claimed that it would be a formidable problem for legal philosophy to explain how such social rules can impose duties, and some have taken it upon themselves to show how social practices might just do that. However, I argue that this orthodox assumption about the dual (...) function of rule of recognition is ill-founded. Contrary to the orthodox view, we have no good reasons to ascribe more than an epistemic function to the rule of recognition. Accordingly, the norms deriving immediately from the rule of recognition are no different than those entailed by other epistemic, grammatical or syntactic norms. Consequently, accounts of the normativity of law need not explain how social practices like conventions or plans might impose duties on the officials of a legal system. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Initial compass bearings Accord and the harmony between language and reality Rules of inference and logical machinery Formulations and explanations of rules by examples Interpretations, fitting and grammar Further misunderstandings.

Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious challenge: in many languages names normally occur as, what appear to be, grammatical arguments. The standard version of predicativism answers this challenge by positing an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences. I argue that this is a mistake. Predicativists should draw a distinction between two kinds of semantic type—underived semantic type and derived semantic type. The predicativist thesis concerns the underived semantic type of proper names and underdetermines (...) a view about the semantic type of bare occurrences. I’ll argue that predicativists should hold that bare names are derived individual-denoting expressions. I end by considering what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names. (shrink)

A significant part of everyday learning occurs incidentally — a process typically described as implicit learning. A central issue in this domain and others, such as language acquisition, is the extent to which performance depends on the acquisition and deployment of abstract rules. Shanks and colleagues [22], [11] have suggested (1) that discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical instances of a biconditional grammar requires the acquisition and use of abstract rules, and (2) that training conditions — in particular (...) whether instructions orient participants to identify the relevant rules or not — strongly influence the extent to which such rules will be learned. In this paper, we show (1) that a Simple Recurrent Network can in fact, under some conditions, learn a biconditional grammar, (2) that training conditions indeed influence learning in simple auto-associators networks and (3) that such networks can likewise learn about biconditional grammars, albeit to a lesser extent than human participants. These findings suggest that mastering biconditional grammars does not require the acquisition of abstract rules to the extent implied by Shanks and colleagues, and that performance on such material may in fact be based, at least in part, on simple associative learning mechanisms. (shrink)

When the Qur’ān was revealed, it primarily used the language of the first addressees, Arabic, in the most impressive and understandable way to convey its message. In doing so, it used all the possibilities allowed by the range of meanings and rules of the language. While the Qur’ān conveys its message to its addressees, it sometimes uses long expressions, sometimes quite concise ones, and even a word or preposition in some places. Due to the structure of the language, the (...) words, the smallest component of the language, and, peculiar to it, even the prepositions and letters, due to the morphological structure of Arabic, are the elements that completely affect the meaning. Like many other letters and prepositions in Arabic, the preposition “إنْ” handled in this study undoubtedly has an important effect on the meaning. We generally encounter, in many verses of the Qur’ān, the use of this preposition in the sense of condition, which is the most basic meaning in the language. In addition to this meaning, the negative, emphasis, and causal meanings are also the other uses of this preposition according to the integrity of Qur’ān and the context of the verses. Apart from the meaning of condition as the basic meaning of the preposition “إنْ” in the Qur’ān, whether the meaning of cause/ta‘līl exists in the language and this meaning is used in the Qur’ān is basically an issue discussed by the Basra and Kūfa language schools, the issue has still been discussed by the exegetes as well due to its effects on the meaning. It is quite important for correctly understanding the Qur’ān to determine the effect of the preposition “إنْ” on the meaning when it is mentioned in the Qur’ān and to give the appropriate meaning to the context. This paper is also important in that it aims to deal with the effect of the preposition in question on the meaning in the verses where there are controversial approaches and in the example of the use of the verb form “إِنْ كُنْتُمْ". In the study, the approaches of the exegetes to the verses on which there are problematic approaches are transferred from the major interpretations written from the early period to the modern period and some evaluations are included with an analytical view. Although the Basra language school and some exegetes following them say that “إنْ”does not mean causation, the linguists of Kūfa and the exegetes following the same line have stated that it also means that, and they showed examples from the āyāt (verses) and hadiths that it is not correct to use this preposition in the meaning of condition in some contexts in the Qur’ān. For example, they argued that the use of the expression “إِنْ كُنْتُمْ”used about angels in a verse in Sūrat al-Baqara 2/31, as “if you are of the truthful” would raise doubts as to whether they were truthful or not and this would contradict their qualifications as angels. On the other hand, they argued that giving a conditional meaning to “إِنْ كُنْتُمْ”at the end of the verses starting as “if you are believers” or the ones in which the believers is directly addressed as in al-Baqara, 2/278 and Āl ‘Imrān 3/139, would cause a contradiction between the beginning and the end of the verse, and that this style would cause a problem on the ground of belief about Allah. In the same way, some linguists argue that giving the meaning of conditions to some verses poses a problem in terms of the context and the style of the Qur’ān, and they explain this situation through al-Baqara 2/23 and similar verses. For, although it is certain that the polytheists doubted about the Qur’ān in the verse in question according to them, the statement “If you are in doubt about the Qur’ān, bring a sūra (chapter) like it” fits neither context nor fact. The Basra language school who constitutes the majority and think that the expression “إِنْ كُنْتُمْ”mostly found at the end of the verses in the Qur’ān includes the meaning of condition, and the other exegetes following them have systematically added the meaning of condition to all of the verses in which the aforementioned preposition is used, and in cases where the meaning of condition is problematic or subject to some objections in terms of context, they have resorted to various linguistic explanations such as omission (hazf), precedence-postponement (taqdīm-ta’khīr) and metaphor. As far as it can be determined in this study, except for some scholars of wujūh and naẓā’ir, there was no one who constantly gave the meaning of cause in the verses where the meaning of condition is open to discussion, whereas some exegetes gave the meaning of condition or cause/ta‘līl depending on the context and used all the possibilities of the language by acting more freely. However, it has not gone unnoticed that they present a problematic interpretation style by displaying different approaches in similar āyāt (verses) that come in the same context. (shrink)

'An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria' is not a thesis from which philosophical propositions are proved. It is a synopsis of grammatical rules that determine what we call 'the inner'. Although it is not a theoretical term in Wittgenstein's philosophy, the word 'criterion' was the heir to an expression which could, with some justice, be called 'theoretical', one which was embedded in a philosophical account which might be viewed as a theory. Wittgenstein used various metaphors (...) and similes to illuminate the relationship between genuine propositions and hypotheses. One can conceive of genuine propositions as sectional cross‐cuts through the connected structure of a hypothesis. The survey of the similarities and differences between the symptoms/hypothesis relation and criterial relations and of the distinction between criteria and symptoms (in the new sense of the term) has established the rough outlines of Wittgenstein's use of the term 'criterion'. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation (...) also helps us to see that Wittgenstein’s other remark, that to follow a rule is a custom, is also a grammatical one. (shrink)

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) is used to study how human adults, infants, animals or machines learn various sorts of rules defined over sounds or visual items. Ten Cate et al. introduce the topic and provide a critical synthesis of this important interdisciplinary area of research. They identify the questions that remain open and the challenges that lie ahead, and argue that the limits of human, animal and machine learning abilities have yet to be found.

Some empirical evidence in the artificial language acquisition literature has been taken to suggest that statistical learning mechanisms are insufficient for extracting structural information from an artificial language. According to the more than one mechanism (MOM) hypothesis, at least two mechanisms are required in order to acquire language from speech: (a) a statistical mechanism for speech segmentation; and (b) an additional rule-following mechanism in order to induce grammatical regularities. In this article, we present a set of neural network studies (...) demonstrating that a single statistical mechanism can mimic the apparent discovery of structural regularities, beyond the segmentation of speech. We argue that our results undermine one argument for the MOM hypothesis. (shrink)

The essay first makes some observations on the general interrelationship between the logical writings of Albert and Buridan. Second, it gives an account of a ‘semantic logical model’ for analyzing complex subject terms in some basic categorical propositions which is defended by Albert of Saxony, and briefly recounts Buridan's criticisms of that model. Finally, the essay maintains that the Albertian model is typically compatible with, and a further development of, what is called by a late-fourteenth century anonymous scholar ‘the English-Rule’ (...) but the ‘determinable/determinate’ grammatical model defended by Buridan is not. (shrink)

Language sciences have long maintained a close and supposedly necessary coupling between the infinite productivity of the human language faculty and recursive grammars. Because of the formal equivalence between recursion and non-recursive iteration; recursion, in the technical sense, is never a necessary component of a generative grammar. Contrary to some assertions this equivalence extends to both center-embedded relative clauses and hierarchical parse trees. Inspection of language usage suggests that recursive rule components in fact contribute very little, and likely nothing significant, (...) to linguistic creativity. Further than this, if the productivity of human language is considered as not rigidly bound, but not infinite, then the need for any sort of iteration in generative grammars vanishes and can be replaced with a Non-iterative Explicit Alternatives Rule grammar. The knock-on effects of dispensing with recursive grammar components are: that language diversity can simply be based on rule and lexicon combinatorics with no potentially infinite dimensions derived from recursive or iterative components of rules; the oddity of a vast, multiply-infinite competence set of ‘grammatical but unacceptable’ productions is gone; and the development of a language faculty based on rules that eschew iterative rule components avoids any need for explaining ‘special’ mechanisms. On the broader front of searching for the mechanisms of mind, our analysis can be similarly applied to the proposals for a recursive basis for mind as an explanation for humanity’s great leap forward. (shrink)

The idea that correspondences relating grammatical relations and semantics (argument structure constructions) are needed to account for simple sentence types is reviewed, clarified, updated and compared with two lexicalist alternatives. Traditional lexical rules take one verb as ‘input’ and create (or relate) a different verb as ‘output’. More recently, invisible derivational verb templates have been proposed, which treat argument structure patterns as zero derivational affixes that combine with a root verb to yield a new verb. While the derivational (...) template perspective can address several problems that arise for traditional lexical rules, it still faces problems in accounting for idioms, which often contain specifications that are not appropriately assigned to individual verbs or derivational affixes (regarding adjuncts, modification, and inflection). At the same time, it is clear that verbs play a central role in determining their distribution. The balance between verbs and phrasal argument structure constructions is addressed via the Principles of Semantic Coherence and Correspondence together with a usage-based hierarchy of constructions that contains entries which can include particular verbs and other lexical material. (shrink)

The ethics of technology deals with the moral grounds of creating and using devices and technological systems. This paper deals with the ethics of technology from the point of view of postphenomenology – by analysing multistability, mediation and technological intentionality – and of Wittgenstein’s fundamental grammar – by analysing technology as a rule-governed practice. Using these theoretical frameworks, this paper is able to offer a description of the way ethical values are embedded in technology and to present the foundation for (...) a normative ethics of technology. (shrink)

There is ample evidence that speakers’ linguistic knowledge extends well beyond what can be described in terms of rules of compositional interpretation stated over combinations of single words. We explore a range of multiword constructions to get a handle both on the extent of the phenomenon and on the grammatical constraints that may govern it. We consider idioms of various sorts, collocations, compounds, light verbs, syntactic nuts, and assorted other constructions, as well as morphology. Our conclusion is that (...) MWCs highlight the central role that grammar plays in licensing MWCs in the lexicon and the creation of novel MWCs, and they help to clarify how the lexicon articulates with the rest of the grammar. (shrink)

As children gradually master grammatical rules, they often go through a period of producing form‐meaning associations that were not observed in the input. For example, 2‐ to 3‐year‐old English‐learning children use the bare form of verbs in settings that require obligatory past tense meaning while already starting to produce the grammatical –ed inflection. While many studies have focused on overgeneralization errors, fewer studies have attempted to explain the root of this earlier stage of rule acquisition. In this (...) work, we use computational modeling to replicate children's production behavior prior to the generalization of past tense production in English. We illustrate how seemingly erroneous productions emerge in a model, without being licensed in the grammar and despite the model aiming at conforming to grammatical forms. Our results show that bare form productions stem from a tension between two factors: (1) trying to produce a less frequent meaning (the past tense) and (2) being unable to restrict the production of frequent forms (the bare form) as learning progresses. Like children, our model goes through a stage of bare form production and then converges on adult‐like production of the regular past tense, showing that these different stages can be accounted for through a single learning mechanism. (shrink)

Since several years ago, there is a debate about morphological processing. We have two different perspectives, one simple and another dual. The key difference is that latter accepts the existence of specific rules to morphological processing, while that simple one postulates that there is not rules because all complex morphologically words are stored in mental lexicon. In this paper, our goal is to analyze the neologisms created by four sensorial aphasic speakers to determine if constructions follow specific morphological (...) rules or not. First, we collected data through interviews; second, we identified neologisms using syntactic criteria and, then, we analyze its composition according to grammatical rules of Spanish. Our results suggest that sensorial aphasic speakers do respect the morphological rules when they create this sort of neologisms. Finally, evidence show that exist a dual-route to morphological processing to verbs in Spanish. (shrink)

Against the background of the fact that speakers not seldom intend to convey imports which deviate from the linguistically expressed meanings of linguistic items, the present article addresses some consequences of this phenomenon which appear to still be neglected in textual studies. It is suggested that understanding behaviour is in some respect a primary objective of exegesis and that due attention must be attributed to the high diversity of behaviour-related criteria by which interpretations of linguistic items are to be evaluated. (...) Although we intimate in addition that individual (meaningful) sentences occurring either in oral conversations or in written documents generally exhibit a multiplicity of contents of diverse types and that the circumstance that sometimes only a content equalling the linguistic significance of a pertinent unit matters for purposes of interpretation is caused by a material coincidence of different varieties of content, the tenets advocated in the paper do not essentially depend on that view. On the other hand, the following assumptions are relevant in the present connection: (a) A number of deviances between imports conveyed by linguistic utterances and literal meanings of expressions occur due to maxims of linguistic behaviour that are quite independent of lexical and syntactic features of individual natural languages. (b) It is by no means an exceptional phenomenon that imports not derivable by grammatical rules of a particular language alone possess primary importance for interpretation and textual exegesis. In view of significant affinities between understanding of sentences and of texts it is argued that the consideration of diverse aspects of behaviour possesses relevance for textual exegesis at least in the following respects: (1) By delivering a heuristic device for discerning problems affecting adopted interpretations it encourages searches for alternatives. (2) It provides means for evaluating the degree of acceptability of particular textual exegeses and possibly rejecting them on a more rational basis than mere intuition. (3) It offers possibilities for critically assessing the validity of explicit arguments advanced in favour of or in opposition to some interpretation. (4) It furnishes a background for assessing certain disputes about translation. The dimension of linguistic behaviour also attains importance in connection with questions of exegesis which are not concerned with assessments of (propositional) contents intended to be communicated, such as the ascertainment of the function which some argument possesses in a context. For substantiating the thesis that omission of raising relevant questions concerning behaviour is not an isolated phenomenon two examples will be employed: (1) A discussion concerning the exegesis of a crucial passage of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, (2) a critical appraisal of a recent publication dealing with the interpretation of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-s. (shrink)

In the article, the phenomenon of deviation, which is one of the important subjects of stylistics and rhetoric is discussed. The deviation is divided into three categories in terms of phonetic, word and grammar. The study was limited to morphological deviation defined as a transition from form to another. The morphological deviations and their relation with meaning reveal the importance of changes in word level. The linguistic and contextual elements are considered as two complementary parties in contextual linguistics. From phonetic (...) level to text consitency many linguistic elements play an important role in expression. Apart from the linguistic phenomenons that affect the meaning, non-linguistic elements should also be considered. In the research also word selection, meaning transfer and context are indicated. The deviation has expanded the use of Arabic words as well as the rich word derivation potential. In terms of Qur'ānic verses, it is an important criterion relationship of the word formula in the meaning for the Arabic language. The subtleties of this language phenomenon which is detected in Qur'ānic verses and fascinates the reader are explained by examples. Summary: Semantics, that is one of the most important areas of linguistics, initially focused on identifying the meanings of words; however, today it goes beyond that and tries to clarify the other elements of the language field. Linguists emphasize that the main goal of language studies is theme and the efforts made in this context are aimed at capturing the meaning. Metaphor and the ways of other extension of meaning should be considered in this context. As Ibn Jinnī (d. 392/1002) stated, language is generally composed of metaphor. This situation points to the necessity of examining the language with a wider perspective than the formal understanding in the field of linguistics research.In the writings of linguists such as Sībawayhi (d.180/796), Ibn Jinnī and al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) and the works that focus on the superiority of wording of Qur'ān, it is seen that there is no distinction between the structure and function of language. Each sentence style is shaped for a purpose. What directs them to such a method is the thinking of first person, interlocutor and context together. It is possible to find this understanding in linguistic and religious sources such as qirā’āt, rhetoric and exegesis. Today, this relationship between grammar and meaning is one of the basic subjects of linguistics.Besides the grammatical structure, word selection is also significant. It is easy to determine a sentence with a grammatical error. While the use of a word is correct in a sentence, it may not be appropriate elsewhere. The degree of accuracy of the sentence is affected by the word selection, which is also a matter of grammatical tasks. This is the expression of the meaning in the appropriate language structure. Depending on the context of the statement, the appropriate word and phrase style should be chosen. The word choice has a great influence on the superiority of the style of the Qur'ān. When the Qur'ānicverses are examined, it is seen how well the chosen words are used.One of the main factors determining the accuracy of the word is context. The same word can be assumed to be true or false due to the context. In addition to linguistic elements, non-linguistic factors such as psychological status, socio-cultural factors and educational background are a measure of value in language.The factor that determines the function of word is the position of word in the phrase. Missing sentence structures gain new meanings as a result of a number of transformations. In Arabic sentence structures it is possible to see how the language structures affect the meaning. The expression tools should be enriched through sorting, increasing, decreasing and changing which are the factors contributing to the understanding of the superficial and deep structure of the language. In this context, the flexibility in the grammatical rules and the issue of deviation, which provides richness to phrases, are important in terms of revealing the place and value of meaning in the language.The deviation phenomenon is called as language deviation in Turkish sources. Due to a semantic and communicative concern deviation is a new way of expressing by leaving the built-in style in the language in order to strengthen the language, draw attention to the text, give a holistic effect, remove the word out of the ordinary and make the indicators more effective in terms of sound and meaning. The deviation is an important part of the stylistics, which goes beyond the path expressions and increases effect of the word. The development of the stylistics, which was accepted as an extension of the rhetoric in the modern period, raised interest rates for deviation. The deviation is divided into three categories in terms of voice, word and grammar.Morphological deviation, which is defined as the transition from one mold to another, is a phenomenon that gives the power of persuasion, influence and subtlety to the word that is appears in the mold and context of phrase. The context is the most important determinant of the deviationthrough which the literary meanings are gained that is the aim of the rhetoric. The effect of morphological deviationon meaning changes is an important subject of language researches. From this point the meanings which were added to the Qur'ānicwords by morphological deviationwas analyzed in detail in this article. Besides this, numerous verses have been handled with the idea that such a method will contribute to understanding of the subtlety meanings of the verses and transferring of their meanings to non-Arabic languages in the best way.Linguists have pointed to the meaning differences between Arabic patterns by taking into consideration the meaning potential of word molds. The language researches, which reveal the role of the word molds in determining the meanings, reflect that there are no two patterns of which meanings are exactly overlapping in Arabic language that is the views of the linguists. It is seen that the patterns such as active and passive participle, resembling participle, hyperbolic participle and gerund are used interchangeably because of their meaning relationship between each other. Similar uses of the verb should be added to this since time change in verbs is one of the linguistic phenomena in which deviationhas occurred. Types of deviationare the significant stylistic features of theQur'ānand have effects on meaning and expression. The fact that the Qur'ānpossesses an unusual style, but such a quality prevents its addressing from becoming ordinary. It is important to determine these kinds of uses, which are called as morphological deviation, to grasp the meaning of the word. When the language structures related to deviationare examined, it is understood that there is a deeply relationship between deviationand meaning. It is important to solve deviationthat enriches the meaning in the word, as well as other linguistic structures to comprehend the gnomic structure of the style of the Qur'ān. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the rules of language, as distinct from its semantic features, are the characteristics which most clearly distinguish language from the communication systems of other species. A number of linguists (e.g., Chomsky 1972, 1980; Pinker 1994) have suggested that the universal features of grammar (UG) are unique human adaptations showing no evolutionary continuities with any other species. However, recent summaries of the substantive features of UG are quite remarkable in the very general nature of the (...) features proposed. While the syntax of any given language can be quite complex, the specific rules vary so much between languages that the truly universal (i.e. innate) aspects of grammar are not complex at all. In fact, these features most closely resemble a set of general descriptions of our richly complex semantic cognition, and not a list of specific rules. General principles of the evolutionary process suggest that syntax is more properly understood as an emergent characteristic of the explosion of semantic complexity that occurred during hominid evolution. It is argued that grammatical rules used in given languages are likely to be simply conventionalized, invented features of language, and not the result of an innate, grammar-specific module. The grammatical and syntactic regularities that are found across languages occur simply because all languages attempt to communicate the same sorts of semantic information. (shrink)

This book argues that a basic grasp of philosophy and logic can produce written and spoken material that is both grammatically correct and powerful. The author analyses errors in grammar, word choice, phrasing and sentences that even the finest writers can fail to notice; concentrating on subtle missteps and errors that can make the difference between good and excellent prose. Each chapter addresses how common words and long-established grammatical rules are often misused or ignored altogether – including such (...) common words as ‘interesting’, ‘possible’, and ‘apparent’. By tackling language in this way, the author provides an illuminating and practical stylistic guide that will interest students and scholars of grammar and philosophy, as well as readers looking to improve their technical writing skills. (shrink)

Cartesian scepticism poses the question of how we can justify our belief that other humans experience consciousness in the same way that we do. Wittgenstein’s response to this scepticism is one that does not seek to resolve the problem by providing a sound argument against the Cartesian sceptic. Rather, he provides a method of philosophical inquiry which enables us to move past this and continue our inquiry without the possibility of solipsism arising as a philosophical problem in the first place. (...) In this paper, I propose that Wittgenstein’s method of dismissing the Cartesian sceptic can also be applied to the problems posed by the ‘moral sceptic’, who denies the truth of all ethical or moral claims. I will argue that in the same way Wittgenstein’s focus on public language enables us to dismiss the traditional problem of other minds, a focus on public moral practices or language-games also enables us to dismiss the idea that moral claims are always ‘meaningless’, ‘false’ or ‘nonsensical’. On this account, the moral sceptic is misguided in much the same way as the solipsist who implicitly admits the existence of other minds in her practices. The moral sceptic who still engages in moral activities also implicitly admits the existence of meaningful moral positions. Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the Cartesian sceptic, as I understand it, can be broadly divided into two parts. The first part is an account of language acquisition. This part outlines how we might come to see other humans as conscious, thinking, feeling beings from a causal perspective. This suggests that we can arrive at an understanding of other minds as a primary perception itself - without needing to posit this perception as a kind of deductive or inductive hypothesis. Secondly, we can see how this relates to an epistemic model of language. This focuses on the role of language as something which consists of rule-governed activities, where the existence of other minds is embedded in our understanding of the world as a kind of grammatical rule, rather than an observational hypothesis. From both these arguments the Cartesian sceptic is,, irrelevant to some forms of philosophical inquiry. This is because the sceptic takes the existence of other minds to be a rational hypothesis/inference when it is not. I suggest that this approach can be applied to moral scepticism if we take certain normative claims as grammatical dispositions, rather than rational or metaphysical propositions. Hence, the moral sceptic who offers a rational or logical critique of these moral foundations is not necessarily saying anything relevant to our practices – the moral stances which they refute as rationally meaningless were never based on purely rational or logical hypotheses in the first place. (shrink)

This essay addresses Jacques Derrida’s theory of metaphor, as it has been handed to literary theory and continental philosophy. Our aim is to reassess the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics, using two distinct critical lenses. We will contrast Derrida’s influential position to an anachronistic author – Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). Vico initiated what is now (retrospectively) called the romantic theory of metaphor, but the details of his theory are missing from current discussions. For this reason, Vico’s view is given closer attention. (...) Two new concepts are introduced: mute metaphor and heroic metaphor. These terms help specify precisely how metaphor can be conceived as a process of consciousness rather than a grammatical rule or grammatical exception. Finally, it is suggested that Vico’s theory is preferable to Derrida’s. Vico’s vision of metaphorical language is more fruitful and less problematic than Derrida’s, both methodologically and terminologically. The romanticism espoused by Vico also suggests itself to new modes of contemporary research concerning the purpose and function of metaphor within language. (shrink)