The definition of precision medicine has continued to evolve, partly in response to criticism of the original concept. However, whatever the definition or current state of the brand, it fundamentally relies on a putatively tight linkage between genotype and complex human traits. If such a linkage is truly robust, then it should be possible to predict the occurrence of complex traits, both good and bad. If such prediction is possible, it should also be feasible to intervene to prevent or preempt (...) disease-related traits. There are of course many potential barriers to this sort of genomic medicine two-step. For example, a number of statistical considerations make generating biomarker (including gene... (shrink)

Le but de cette étude est de relire la Sixième méditation cartésienne de Fink comme une double tentative de radicalisation de la scission entre le transcendantal phénoménologique et ses différentes figures d'extériorité (le mondain, le spectateur phénoménologisant, l'ordre de la "non-donnée" réductive), et de réintégration de ces figures dans une transcendantalité élargie jusqu'à devenir absolue. Après avoir détaillé les modalités et les enjeux critiques (notamment à l'égard de Heidegger) de ce double mouvement, l'auteur tente d'évaluer la pertinence d'une telle (...) "clôture" du transcendantal, et interroge notamment sa capacité à réintégrer la "mondanéité" qui, tout en devenant chez Fink le "lieu" même où elle s'opère, n'en constitue pas moins, dans une certaine mesure, un "reste" inassimilable par l'absolu phénoménologique. (shrink)

The paper examines the relationships between the contents of imaginative episodes and the mental images that often play a central role within them. It considers, for example, whether the presence of mental imagery is required for a mental episode to count as an imagining.

In 1894, William Bateson objected to the terms “heredity” and “inheritance” in biology, on grounds of contamination with misleading notions from the everyday world. Yet after the rediscovery of Mendel's work in the spring of 1900, Bateson promoted that work as disclosing the “principles of heredity.” For historians of science, Bateson's change of mind provides a new angle on these terms at a crucial moment in their history. For philosophers of science, the case can serve as a reminder of the (...) potential of Putnam's hypothesis of a division of linguistic labor for analyzing the semantic lives of scientific kind terms. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs—beliefs whose propositional contents will be true just in case—and because—an agent believes them. Following Grice, many philosophers hold that believing such propositions would involve an impermissible form of bootstrapping. This paper argues that such objections get their force from a popular but problematic function-model of theoretical deliberation, and that attending to the case of self-fulfilling belief can help us see why such a model is mistaken. The paper shows that on (...) a revised model of theoretical deliberation our evidence will problematically underdetermine any appropriate doxastic attitude: when belief in a proposition is self-fulfilling, our evidence is insufficient to support belief, disbelief, or even suspended judgment toward that proposition. (shrink)

Much liberal-democratic thought has concerned itself primarily – even exclusively – with coercive interference in citizens’ lives. But political actors do things – they engage in influential speech, they offer incentives, they mislead other actors, they disrupt the expected functioning of decision-making mechanisms etc. – that fall short of coercion, yet may nonetheless call for normative evaluation and public justification, precisely because they serve to purposively alter citizens’ beliefs, intentions and behaviour. With this article, I explicate a conception of political (...) manipulation to capture this sort of interference, and to distinguish individual manipulation from the manipulation of nonindividual agents like committees, institutions and states. The account, beyond being necessary for further work on the ethics of political manipulation, should prove useful to both normative thinkers interested in power, justice and the ethics of democratic decision-making, and empirical scholars in search of a conceptual apparatus to sharpen their investigations into the exercise of subtle forms of political power. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 1-5.

Elizabeth Anderson claims that the prevailing culture of business is one of domination. “Most workplace governments in the United States are dictatorships, in which bosses.. don’t merely govern workers; they dominate them” (2017, p. xxii; italics in the original). If this diagnosis is correct, then the culture of business poses a significant threat to human liberty, as each year millions of people in the employ of businesses spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the job. This essay provides a further (...) argument supporting Anderson’s analysis, by extending her treatment of Adam Smith and drawing on his claim about the potentially mind-numbing effects on workers of extreme division of labor. Smith’s analysis, though consistent with Anderson’s, implies that the problem is more worrisome than she allows, and accordingly that Anderson’s own remedy might be insufficient. Our Anderson/Smith argument suggests that worker unfreedom might warrant more aggressive institutional remedy. (shrink)

_Objective:_ Recent research has indicated that sub-clinical narcissism may be related to positive outcomes in respect of mental and physical health, and is positively related to an extended lifespan. Research has also indicated narcissism levels may decline over the lifespan of an individual. The aims of the present study were to investigate these issues, exploring age-related differences in levels and outcomes of narcissism. Specifically, narcissism’s relationship with loneliness, a deleterious but pervasive state among older-age individuals, was assessed. _Methods:_ A total (...) of 100 middle-aged ( M AGE = 48.07; SD = 5.27; 53% female) and 100 older-aged participants ( M AGE = 70.89; SD = 5.97; 51% female) completed the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory and the UCLA Loneliness Scale, Version 3. _Results:_ Older-age participants had significantly lower levels of narcissism, and significantly higher levels of loneliness than middle-aged participants. Age and narcissism significantly predicted self-reported loneliness levels, with narcissism moderating the relationship between age and loneliness. _Conclusion:_ This study supports existing work, indicating that a degree of narcissism is of benefit to psychological functioning in respect of age-related loneliness, and is found to be a protective factor in mental health. (shrink)

Les textes rassemblés ici constituent les « Actes » du cinquième séminaire annuel de l?Unité de recherches Phénoménologie s , qui s?est tenu à l?Université de Liège du 2 au 6 mai 2011 et avait pour intitulé Entre phéno­ménologie et psychologie. Le problème de la passivité . Sans doute le thème de la passivité n?est-il pas neuf en phénoméno­logie. Très souvent, notamment dans le monde francophone, il a été brandi pour nuancer, voire contrecarrer, une certaine conception de la phénoméno­logie qui (...) se revendique de l?idéalisme transcendantal et insiste fortement sur l?activité rationnelle du sujet connaissant. On le sait ; les « actes » psychiques qui faisaient l?intentionalité de la conscience dans la tradition brentanienne (dont héritent encore les Recherches logiques ) ont, après le tournant transcendantal, été réinterprétés par Husserl dans le cadre de l? activité noétique de l? ego , laquelle « informe » la matière sensorielle du vécu et la constitue en véritable connaissance d?objets. Or, à l?encontre de ce modèle résolument inspiré de Kant et des néo-kantiens, on a souvent fait valoir que ce qui faisait la spécificité de la phénoménologie, c?était au contraire d?avoir pu penser, dans les textes postérieurs aux Idées directrices et sous la problématique générale de la passivité, une subjectivité incarnée, ancrée dans son Lebenswelt , influencée par ses habitus. (shrink)

Musical listening, looking at paintings and literary creation are activities that involve perceptual and cognitive activity and so are of interest to psychologists and other scientists of the mind. What sorts of interest should philosophers of the arts take in scientific approaches to such issues? Opinion currently ranges across a spectrum, with 'take no notice' at one end and 'abandon traditional philosophical methods' at the other. This collection of essays, originating in a Royal Institute of Philosophy conference at the Leeds (...) Art Gallery in 2012, represents many of the most interesting positions along that spectrum. Contributions address issues concerning aesthetic testimony, the processing and appreciation of poetry, the aesthetics of disgust, imagination, genre, evolutionary constraints on art appreciation, creativity, musical cognition and the limitations or productiveness of empirical enquiry for philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

There is a curious letter of 24 April 1928, reproduced in Russell’s Autobiography. It is from Russell to Max Newman. It is my thesis that there is a crucial “not” missing from the text and interpretations of the letter. This small point, if it is correct, has a very large impact for clarifying how Russell saw Newman’s challenge to his structural realism according to which all of our empirical knowledge in physics concerns structure alone.

We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.

Theory has a central place in the traditional accounts of scientific practice. It’s less clear, however, what role theory has, and should have, in contemporary neuroscience. John Bickle argues that we should appreciate the central role that the development and use of experiment tools have in neuroscientific practice and the notable lack of an apparent need for theory. Call this the tools first method. I use two cases to assess Bickle’s assertion that the tools first method is always used in (...) neuroscience. In the first—the use of gene targeting to investigate the relationship between memory and long-term potentiation—a well-defined theory did have a prominent role. In contrast, the second case, an optogenetic investigation of neurons in the extended amygdala, illustrates the application of Bickle’s tools first method. -/- The takeaway, then, is twofold. Although sometimes theory has a role, there are productive investigations in neurobiology that proceed without a theory as the starting point. This is, in part, a consequence of experiment tools that allow for ever more precise investigations of cellular and molecular processes. It is also a consequence of the explanatory goals in neurobiology, namely, the description of mechanisms. When these two consequences come together, there is no longer an apparent need for theories of the sort traditionally taken to be central to scientific practice. (shrink)

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor's conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor's intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman's planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical (...) account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a promisor's intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor's nonacceptance of a condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness to seek agreement with the promisee on how to fill contractual gaps. (shrink)

A bounded formula is a pair consisting of a propositional formula φ in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate, interpreted to express the lower-bound probability of φ. Converting conjunctive/disjunctive combinations of bounded formulas to a single bounded formula consisting of the conjunction/disjunction of the propositions occurring in the collection along with a newly calculated lower probability is called absorption. This paper introduces two inference rules for effecting conjunctive and disjunctive absorption and (...) compares the resulting logical system, called System Y, to axiom System P. Finally, we demonstrate how absorption resolves the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preference. (shrink)

Huston Smith's Why Religion Matters is the culminating reflections of one of the most respected religion scholars of our day. In this work, Smith sees modern society to be in the midst of a spiritual crisis. According to Smith, this crisis has been brought about by the advance of science and the inroads into what Smith calls the traditional worldview. While Smith's work is of some importance, I believe that several of its fundamental claims are mistaken. Smith often does not (...) accurately portray the content of science and frequently conflates the actual practice of science with philosophical scientism. Smith wrongly blames science alone for the decline of religion among Western elites. His claim that all religions can be equivocally described in terms of the traditional worldview is also problematic. Despite this, Smith does have a clear conception of what the issues are in the relation between science and religion. It is my hope that these issues will continue to be taken seriously. (shrink)

Death is the destiny we all share, and this will not change. Yet the way we die, which had remained the same for many generations, has changed drastically in a relatively short time for those in developed countries with access to healthcare. For generations, if people were lucky enough to reach old age, not having died in infancy or childhood, in childbirth, in war, or by accident, they would take to bed, surrounded by loved ones who cared for them, and (...) fade into death. Most likely, they would have seen their parents and grandparents die the same way, and so this manner of dying would be familiar: it was part of the natural cycle of life. Now less than 25 per cent of Americans die at home, having reached much older ages than people would have dreamed of in past generations, often after surviving many illnesses and even diseases that would have been terminal for their grandparents. We are fortunate to live (and die) today, supported by myriad scientific, medical, and technological advancements, however we also face new problems as a result of the new way in which we die. We can no longer anticipate a peaceful waning at home with family. We know our lives will likely end in hospitals likely after we have endured grueling treatments to prolong life. We have to decide what decisions we want our loved ones, or care-givers, to make when we cannot choose for ourselves. We have to think about whether in any circumstances we would seek physician-assisted death. We know we face other questions as well, but we may not even know where to start. In the face of these decisions, we can feel daunted and afraid. The best remedy is information and planning. In this book, Gregory Eastwood - a physician who has cared for dying patients, served as an ethics consultant, and taught end of life issues to medical and other health profession students - draws from his substantial experience with patients and families to provide the information that will help us think clearly about the choices and issues we will face at the end of our own lives, and when faced with the deaths of our loved ones. With sensitivity and profound insight, Eastwood guides us through all the important questions about death and dying in straightforward, clear language, enhanced by real-life stories. Throughout, he shows us how we can take ownership of the way we want to die, when we must die, and feel more in control as death approaches. (shrink)

Perhaps it is not overly pedantic to say that one will find Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus very difficult even if one first understands Russell’s philosophical logic. But the question remains as to whether the work is intended in alliance with Russell’s research program for a scientific method in philosophy or splits from that program. This paper endeavors to answer the question by revealing new evidence that Wittgenstein held his Doctrine of Showing in 1913 and that it was a demand he imposed (...) in criticizing Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment. (shrink)

This issue of the Hastings Center Report features three articles exploring aspects of decision-making for others. In the first two, the focus is on the limits of surrogate decision-makers’ authority when the surrogates’ judgments about a patient's treatment conflict with the physicians’. If a physician decides that a patient will not benefit from CPR, for example, but the patient's surrogate insists on it, is the physician obliged to proceed with the procedure? Or can the physician, pointing to a duty to (...) provide good care to the patient and not to cause the patient to suffer, get a do-not-resuscitate order for the patient—even in the face of the surrogate's objections? These are the questions that animate the first article, in which a group of authors report on a policy implemented at Massachusetts General Hospital to help doctors who face this dilemma. The second article, by physician Jeffrey Berger, flips the questions. If a physician decides that a patient's intractable suffering requires palliative sedation, may the surrogate prevent it anyway? Or can the physician, pointing to a duty to alleviate the suffering, administer palliative sedation even in the face of the surrogate's objections? Such circumstances, says Berger, show the need for conceptual work delineating the limits of surrogates’ authority and practical work on mechanisms for doing so—protecting patients and giving physicians a clear route to follow. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Neurology of Culture, or How We Move From Rage to Ritual in the Process of HominizationGregory J. Lobo (bio)The most (or rather the only) effective form of reconciliation—that would stop this crisis, and save the community from total self-destruction—is the convergence of all collective anger and rage towards a random victim, a scapegoat, designated by mimetism itself, and unanimously adopted as such.—René Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 64.INTRODUCTIONHow do (...) we move from rage to ritual? How do we become human? The work of René Girard would seem to offer an answer to this question. In this brief essay I want to simply add some evolutionary and neuroscientific details to Girard's theory, which flesh out while also corroborating the basic components of it. [End Page 255]To do this I need to draw a distinction between religion and culture. I mention this from the outset because the main source upon which I draw to represent Girard's thinking is the book Evolution and Conversion. Dialogues on the Origins of Culture, with Pierpaolo Antonello and João Cezar de Castro Rocha, published in 2008. I use this particular source because, as Girard's interlocutors say in their foreword to it, this book "is intended as a reassessment of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, 30 years on,"1 and it evidences the "ways in which, over 30 years, mimetic theory has matured, and its fruitfulness become more apparent, even since the initial excitement of Girard's groundbreaking works in the 1970s."2 I highlight my need to distinguish between culture and religion due to the fact that in Evolution and Conversion Antonello and Castro Rocha state forthrightly that for Girard (and, one might presume, for Girardians), culture and religion "amount to the same thing."3 But it is not totally clear that this holds. For as Girard, in the same book, says, "religion, as an institution, comes into being through the scapegoat mechanism."4 Thus, the question arises as to what it is that allows humans to have institutions in the first place. Surely the answer is the capacity for culture as such, understood as the very capacity for symbolic thought, for the manipulation of mental images and their combination into new ones. Hopefully, in the discussion that follows, my insistence on the need to analytically distinguish between culture and religion will be born out. For now, I simply ask the reader to play along. If the reader is game, I can restate my purpose: What is the neurology of culture, such that we can become human, or move from blind rage to deliberate ritual?THE MIMETIC MECHANISMGirard, we should recall, insists that we start "from a purely naturalistic standpoint."5 With this injunction in mind, I will give an account of the "mimetic mechanism," an expression that "describes the whole process, beginning with mimetic desire, which then becomes mimetic rivalry, eventually escalating to the stage of a mimetic crisis and finally ending with the scapegoat resolution"6 that strives for naturalistic representation. Therefore, I will avoid terms like "community" or even "group," which already suggest the existence of something like cultural realities. A naturalistic standpoint, which I take to be a scientific standpoint, must strive to circumvent begging the question by using terms like these, for they refer exactly to the phenomena we are trying to explain: a self-conscious sense of belonging and community. [End Page 256]For those familiar enough with its presuppositions about the human nature that underlies, or is the foundation of, human culture, the mimetic mechanism can be presented in a somewhat straightforward fashion. This presentation relies on Chapter 2 of Evolution and Conversion.The desire of Homo sapiens is in essence mimetic. That is, an individual member of the species desires what its proximal conspecifics—its models—desire. That two conspecifics should desire the same thing leads, inevitably, to two intermediate outcomes. First, the desire for what the other desires intensifies, due to the effects of mimesis; second, this drives the two now mutual models almost inevitably into conflict, as they become doubles. This is conflictual mimesis. The conflict can turn violent and... (shrink)

This book investigates the anti-Semitic foundations of Nazi curricula for elementary schools, with a focus on the subjects of biology, history, and literature. Gregory Paul Wegner argues that any study of Nazi society and its values must probe the education provided by the regime. Schools, according to Wegner, play a major role in advancing ideological justifications for mass murder, and in legitimizing a culture of ethnic and racial hatred. Using a variety of primary sources, Wegner provides a vivid account (...) of the development of Nazi education. (shrink)

Anaximander, the sixth-century BCE philosopher of Miletus, is often credited as being the instigator of both science and philosophy. The first recorded philosopher to posit the idea of the boundless cosmos, he was also the first to attempt to explain the origins of the world and humankind in rational terms. Anaximander's philosophy encompasses theories of justice, cosmogony, geometry, cosmology, zoology and meteorology. Anaximander: A Re-assessment draws together these wide-ranging threads into a single, coherent picture of the man, his worldview and (...) his legacy to the history of thought. Arguing that Anaximander's statements are both apodeictic and based on observation of the world around him, Andrew Gregory examines how Anaximander's theories can all be construed in such a way that they are consistent with and supportive of each other. This includes the tenet that the philosophical elements of Anaximander's thought (his account of the apeiron, the extant fragment) can be harmonised to support his views on the natural world. The work further explores how these theories relate to early Greek thought and in particular conceptions of theogony and meterology in Hesiod and Homer. (shrink)

Comparatively recent advances in quantum measurement theory suggest that the decades-old flirtation between quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind is about to end. Various approaches to what I have elsewhere dubbed 'interactive decoherence' promise to remove the conscious observer from the phenomenon of state vector reduction. The mechanisms whereby decoherence occurs suggest, on the one hand, that consciousness per se has no role in explaining the outcomes of quantum events and, on the other, that perhaps apart from questions about (...) the very lowest level properties of minds' instantiating hardware or wetware, the unique features of quantum mechanics are utterly irrelevant to the philosophy of mind. Here we explore a better account of interactive decoherence than I have offered elsewhere, make explicit the argument for irrelevance, and address some unanswered questions and an interesting objection against the formulation of decoherence on which our discussion is based. (shrink)

To mark the 200th anniversary of the birth of Søren Kierkegaard, I review in this essay the relationship between Kierkegaard and the Catholic tradition. First, I look back to consider both Kierkegaard’s encounter with Catholicism and the influence of his work upon Catholics. Second, I look around to consider some of the recent work on Kierkegaard and Catholicism, especially Jack Mulder’s recent book, Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition, and the many articles that examine Kierkegaard’s relation to Catholicism in the multi-volume (...) Kierkegaard Research series edited by Jon Stewart. Finally, I look ahead to consider possible directions in which the conversation between Catholics and Kierkegaardians might continue. (shrink)

Adam Slavny's Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation: Paying for Our Mistakes (OUP, 2023) is predicated on a break with a foundational assumption of most contemporary tort theory. It renounces all aspirat...

What are the boundaries of bioethics? Where does bioethics give way to other kinds of ethics—organizational ethics, environmental ethics, social ethics, or just ethics? According to one commonly cited account of the origin of bioethics, the field always had a relatively broad remit; it was supposed to be about the ethics of the life sciences in general. In the early days of bioethics, however, the topic that seemed most in need of critical attention was the encounter between experts in medicine (...) and the laity—doctors or medical researchers on the one hand and patients or medical research subjects on the other. Even given the narrow focal point, however, bioethics very naturally expanded.Much of the September‐October 2018 issue of the Hastings Center Report either argues or assumes that bioethics extends well beyond into social ethics. A special report published as a supplement to this issue pushes the point explicitly. (shrink)