A possible solution is offered to help resolve the “two times problem” regarding the veridical and illusory nature of time. First it is recognized that the flow (passage) of time is part of a wider array of temporal experiences referred to as manifest time, all of which need to be reconciled. Then, an information gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) model is used as a basis for a view of manifest time. The model IGUS robot of Hartle that solves the “unique (...) present” debate is enhanced with veridical and (corresponding) illusory components of not only the flow of time but also the larger entity of manifest time, providing a dualistic IGUS robot that represents all of the important temporal experiences. Based upon a variety of prior experiments, that view suggests that the veridical system is a reflection of accepted spacetime cosmologies and through natural selection begets the illusory system for functional purposes. Thus, there are not two opposing times, one outside and one inside the cranium. There is just one fundamental physical time which the brain developed, now possesses and is itself sufficient for adaption but then enhances. The illusory system is intended to provide a more satisfying experience of physical time, and better adaptive behavior. Future experiments to verify that view are provided. With a complete veridical system of temporal experiences there may be less need to reify certain temporal experiences so that the two times problem is less of a problem and more of a phenomenon. (shrink)

English summary: As a functioning part of the human body and mind, our internal information technology systems belong to our physical makeup just as much as body parts and substances do to the realm of reproductive medicine, genetic information does to gene technology and brain scans do to neurological technology. Bio-information law concerns itself with the rights of these roving human components. German description: Bio- und Informationstechnologien generieren standig neue, bislang kaum fur moglich gehaltene Verhaltnisse, Verknupfungen und Anschlusse zwischen Technischem (...) und Lebendigem. Im Recht werfen diese technisch-lebendigen Assoziationen grundsatzliche Fragen auf, wenn es beispielsweise darum geht, welche Personlichkeits- oder Eigentumsrechte an extrakorporal gelagerten Korpersubstanzen oder auch an genetischer Information bestehen. Ebenso hat das Recht eine Antwort darauf zu finden, welche Bedeutung neuronalen Daten und Abbildungen von Hirnaktivitaten, etwa fur den Beweis psychischer Schadigungen im Schmerzensgeldprozess, zukommt. Und nicht zuletzt erhebt sich die keineswegs mehr abwegige Rechtsfrage, ob der Eingriff in ein informationstechnisches System als personlichkeitsverletzend gelten darf, weil dieses womoglich wie ein ausgelagerter Teil des Korpers zu behandeln ist. Malte Gruber untersucht, wie sich diese Problemstellungen auf die privatrechtlichen Deutungen von Person, Sache und Rechtsverhaltnis auswirken und dabei ein technologieubergreifendes Recht formieren: Bioinformationsrecht handelt von der engen, untrennbaren Verbindung informationstechnisch-artifizieller und korperlich-lebendiger, gewissermassen kunstlicher und naturlicher Prozesse, von Expansionstechnologien und bioartifiziellen Rechtsverhaltnissen, in denen sich die Personlichkeit des Menschen in technisierter Verfassung entfaltet. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed commentary on the classic monograph by Alfred Tarski, and offers a reinterpretation and retranslation of the work using the original Polish text and the English and German translations. In the original work, Tarski presents a method for constructing definitions of truth for classical, quantificational formal languages. Furthermore, using the defined notion of truth, he demonstrates that it is possible to provide intuitively adequate definitions of the semantic notions of definability and denotation and that the notion (...) in a structure can be defined in a way that is analogous to that used to define truth. Tarski’s piece is considered to be one of the major contributions to logic, semantics, and epistemology in the 20th century. However, the author points out that some mistakes were introduced into the text when it was translated into German in 1935. As the 1956 English version of the work was translated from the German text, those discrepancies were carried over in addition to new mistakes. The author has painstakingly compared the three texts, sentence-by-sentence, highlighting the inaccurate translations, offering explanations as to how they came about, and commenting on how they have influenced the content and suggesting a correct interpretation of certain passages. Furthermore, the author thoroughly examines Tarski’s article, offering interpretations and comments on the work. (shrink)

In accordance with societal norms and values, consumers readily indicate their positive attitudes toward sustainability. However, they hardly take sustainability into account when engaging in exchange relationships with companies. To shed light on this paradox, this paper investigates whether defense mechanisms and the more specific concept of neutralization techniques can explain the discrepancy between societal norms and actual behavior. A multi-method qualitative research design provides rich insights into consumers’ underlying cognitive processes and how they make sense of their attitude–behavior divergences. (...) Drawing on the Ways Model of account-taking, which is advanced to a Cycle Model, the findings illustrate how neutralization strategies are used to legitimize inconsistencies between norm-conforming attitudes and actual behavior. Furthermore, the paper discusses how the repetitive reinforcement of neutralizing patterns and feedback loops between individuals and society are linked to the rise of anomic consumer behavior. (shrink)

There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic (...) model we are able to provide experimental tests for all of the human time assertions of 10 chosen spacetime cosmologies. The illusory aspect of the ‘present,’ i.e. a ‘unique present’ was confirmed. An information gathering and utilizing system was constructed using a virtual reality apparatus allowing the observer to experientially roam back and forth along the worldline ad lib. The phenomenon of ‘change’ was experimentally found to be illusory at high frequency observation and non-illusory at low frequency observation, the latter phenomenon coinciding with ‘change’ referred to in the ‘Order of Time’ and ‘Relativity Refounded’ views. Additional experiments are presented indicating that both motion and temporality are dualistic. In sum, the dualistic model of human time allows for the existence of both illusory and non-illusory aspects of human time that are not in conflict with one another. It also provides experimental evidence for various spacetime cosmological assertions regarding human time. (shrink)

The debate on cumulative technological culture is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.

Many physicists regard the flow of time as an illusion. There is an upper level flow of time, the phenomenon of past/present/future; and there is a lower level flow of time which is really a flow of events. Perceptual completion accounts for the lower level flow of time in a few ways: apparent movement; amodal completion; and dynamic change as exemplified by a newly described modal completion that we called happening. It acts like an illusory percept connecting discrete stimuli in (...) all sensory modalities. The past/present/future distinction cannot exist unless an object is perceived to be the same now as it is then. This cognition requires object persistence. Experiments with object persistence suggest the circumstances when that, too, is an illusory percept. The illusory percepts of object persistence and perceptual completion can account for the entire flow of time. Our findings and conclusions are congruent with a few time theories and cosmologies that suggest that the flow of time is an illusion. (shrink)

The operator form of the generalized canonical momenta in quantum mechanics is derived by a new, instructive method and the uniqueness of the operator form is proven. If one wishes to find the correct representation of the generalized momentum operator, he finds the Hermitian part of the operator —iħ ∂/∂q, whereq q is the generalized coordinate. There are interesting philosophical implications involved in this: It is like saying that a physical structure is composed of two parts, one which is real (...) (the measurable quantity) and one which is pure imaginary. However, in order to understand the theoretical generation of the physical structure, one must look at the imaginary part as well as the real part since the sum of these two parts gives the simplified physical theory. That is why we can choose the total generalized momentum operator as simply —iħ ∂/∂q, but in order to arrive at the “measurable” momentum operator, we must choose the real (Hermitian) part, the other part being anti-Hermitian (corresponding to pure imaginary eigenvalues). We also discuss the operator form of the generalized Hamiltonian and show that the primary focus in developing fundamental concepts and prescriptions in quantum mechanics should be on the generalized momenta rather than on the Hamiltonian. (shrink)

Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time. However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been (...) irreconcilable with the dynamic FOT. Dismissing the FOT as an illusion is unsatisfactory. Therefore, we provide four hypotheses for the TTP.1) Since cosmological static time demands that all events are discrete, DPC elements for dynamism should likewise be expected to be discrete and accounted for by a snapshot phenomenology such as the DSV. 2) If temporality can be demonstrated to be similar to apparent motion by being a snapshot phenomenon and not demanding temporal extension it would confirm the DSV and permit reconciliation with static time. 3) If the ‘present moment’ is subjective as static time theories suggest, it should be possible experimentally for an observer to choose his own ‘present’ by moving to various points in the past with the aid of virtual reality. 4) If dynamism e.g. motion can be precluded without significant information loss or violating physics principles it is a cognitive add-on, thereby contradicting non-static time theories which suggest that time is ‘real.’ We confirm those hypotheses. (shrink)

Building from recent attempts in the humanities and social sciences to conceive of creative, entangled ways of doing interdisciplinary work, I turn to Braidotti’s ‘nomadic ontology’ to (re)vision the human body without a brain. Her exploration of the body as a ‘threshold of transformations’ is put into conversation with Deleuze’s comments on neurobiology to consider what a brainless body might do, or undo, in neuroscientific practice. I ground discussion in a case study, detailing the practices of brain decoding or ‘mind (...) reading,’ re-interpreting Rose’s account. Therein, I argue that the technical-social configurations of brain decoding are unlikely to usher in a radically new ontology, as Rose suggests. To better match Rose’s vision and align with new ontologies in cultural theory, I argue that neuroscience must become nomadic and embrace a body without a brain. I then conclude with six recommendations towards a nomadic neuroscience. (shrink)

In seinem grossen Spätwerk »Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie« rekonstruiert Jürgen Habermas den Diskurs über Glauben und Wissen, aus dem nicht zuletzt die säkulare Welt resultiert. Ob und wie dieser Diskurs weitergehen kann, um die Moderne vor Entgleisungen zu bewahren, ist allerdings fraglich. Der Band setzt sich aus theologischer Perspektive kritisch und nach vorne gerichtet mit dem Werk auseinander. In einem eigenen Text antwortet Jürgen Habermas auf die Beiträge.

Women's experiences with sexual harassment were analyzed with three types of variables: occupational and workplace sex ratios, organizational policies and procedures for dealing with sexual harassment problems, and women's cultural status. Regression analyses revealed that extent of contact with men was a key predictor of incidence of harassment, number of different types of harrassment, sexual comments, sexual categorical remarks, and sexual materials. Gender predominance was a significant predictor of physical threats and sexual materials. Informational methods were less successful than proactive (...) methods in reducing incidents of sexual harassment. The analyses support two generalizations. The “contact hypothesis” tested and verified by Gutek and her colleagues provides a substantive understanding of our findings on workplace and occupational numerical predominance. Second, organizations that take a variety of steps to address sexual harassment are more apt to be successful in curtailing the problem than those relying mainly on “get out the word” techniques. (shrink)

Converging findings suggest that depressed individuals exhibit disturbances in positive emotion. No study, however, has ascertained which specific positive emotions are implicated in depression. We report two studies that compare how depressive symptoms relate to distinct positive emotions at both trait and state levels of assessment. In Study 1 (N=185), we examined associations between depressive symptoms and three trait positive emotions (pride, happy, amusement). Study 2 compared experiential and autonomic reactivity to pride, happy, and amusement film stimuli between depressive (n=24; (...) DS) and non-depressive (n=31; NDS) symptom groups. Results indicate that symptoms of depression were most strongly associated with decreased trait pride and decreased positive emotion experience to pride-eliciting films. Discussion focuses on the implications these findings have for understanding emotion deficits in depression as well as for the general study of positive emotion. (shrink)

Die postmoderne Philosophie ist nichts anderes als »das Nachleben des Nationalsozialismus in der Demokratie«. Weil der radikale Bruch mit dem Denken, das zu Auschwitz führte, ausblieb, weil vielmehr bereits in den sechziger Jahren gerade von links in vermeintlich tabubrecherischer Weise versucht wurde, die nationalsozialistische Philosophie für scheinbar »emanzipatorische« Projekte nutzbar zu machen, erscheint die deutsche Ideologie heute als links und progressiv. Diese neueste deutsche Ideologie ist nicht nur eine philosophische Strömung, sondern Ausdruck einer gesellschaftlichen Tendenz. Die postmoderne Übung, jede allgemeine (...) Begriffsbestimmung als »logozentrisch« und jede Betrachtung der Gesellschaft unter Vernunftkriterien als totalitär zu denunzieren, ist sowohl Reflex der objektiven Unbrauchbarkeit der Welt unter den Verhältnissen spätkapitalistischer Vergesellschaftung als auch der Versuch einer Sinnstiftung ebendieser Verhältnisse. In seinem Kult der Unmittelbarkeit schließlich sucht der Poststrukturalismus den Schulterschluß mit dem radikalen Islam und verrät jede Idee von Versöhnung. Mit Beiträgen von Manfred Dahlmann, Martin Dornis, Alex Gruber, Birte Hewera, Tjark Kunstreich, Philipp Lenhard, Niklaas Machunsky, Florian Ruttner und Gerhard Scheit. (shrink)

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung (...) von Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. ". (shrink)

Three physical theories explaining the flow of time are examined. One theory suggests that “flow” is associated with the manner of information transfer between registers within the brain. Different robotic systems are predicted to experience different types of flow. Here, human examples are found to support the theory and the model is modified suggesting that flow is a cognitive illusion. A second theory suggests that time is non-existent, that the universe is a complex quantum state which, upon observation, the brain (...) acquires “stills” and converts them to an illusion of motion and flow. Accordingly the brain should be able to generate a physiological illusion of temporality from stills. Experimental evidence is given that the temporality illusion so generated is not physiological; it is cognitive, lending no support to that theory. A third theory suggesting that the flow of time is really a myth is briefly reviewed. (shrink)

Currently, new business models created in the sharing economy differ considerably and they differ in the formation of trust as well. If and how trust can be created is shown by a comparison of two examples which diverge in their founding philosophy. The chosen example of community-based economy, Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), no longer trusts the capitalist system and therefore distances itself and creates its own environment including a new business model. It is implemented within rather small groups where trust (...) is created by personal relations and face-to-face communication. On the contrary, the example of a platform economy, the accommodation-provider company Airbnb, shows trust in the system and pushes technological innovations through the use of platform applications. It promotes trust and confidence in the progress of technology. For the conceptual analysis, the distinction between personal trust and system trust defined by Niklas Luhmann is adopted. The analysis describes two different modes of trust formation and how they push distrust or improve trust. Grounded on these analyses, assumptions on the process of trust formation within varying models of the sharing economy are formulated as well as a hypothesis about possible developments is introduced for further research. (shrink)

During a series of protests in Hong Kong about a leadership transition widely perceived to give Mainland China greater political influence, the Hong Kong Museum of History held a Special Exhibition of the Terracotta Warriors of Xian, China. Sponsored by "The Leisure and Cultural Service Department, " the exhibit featured the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty who ushered in "an epoch-making era in Chinese history that witnessed the unification of China" (Museum Exhibition). This essay explores the multi-media aspects of (...) the exhibit, arguing that encounters with dramatic music and fully immersive digital experiences are examples of an embodied, affective form of constitutive rhetoric. Put differently, the museum's multi-media elements demonstrate how Maurice Charland's theory of a constitutive rhetoric can be informed by recent work on affect and can provide one point from which to engage affect theory and the "affective dimension of politics.". (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics has come under criticism for his treatment of the other. Generally these critiques charge that Gadamer fails to give the other due consideration and instead collapses her into a non-challenging conversational partner of the interpreter or listener. Robert Bernasconi, in his “‘You Don’t Know What I’m Talking About’: Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal” and “‘Y’All Don’t Hear Me Now’: On Lorenzo Simpson’s The Unfinished Project,” charges that the hermeneutic model of conversation is unable to respect the (...) alterity of an other that wishes to issue a truly radical critique of the conversation. Against this characterization I contend that Gadamer’s account of the other does indeed provide for an other that is neither assimilated nor prevented from announcing a thorough challenge, so long as the comparison that Gadamer draws between the hermeneutic task of reading a text and the relationship between the listener and the other is taken to its full extent. (shrink)

This article presents a critical qualitative study of two opinion articles, written by two eminent scholars (Jürgen Habermas and Timothy Snyder), on the German government’s hesitant arms supply for Ukraine during the first phase of the Russian war of aggression in 2022. The main aim of the article is the uncovering of the discursive practices of critique performed by two major public intellectuals. This case study thus allows insights into the simplistic representation of the Russo-Ukrainian war in German elite media (...) discourse. The analysis focuses on actor representations and topic limitations and manipulations in the two op-eds. It is shown that both Habermas and Snyder use characteristic ways of social actor representations in their texts which exhibit their allegiances. Furthermore, both of them limit and change topics at the meso- and macro-levels of their texts in order to make their arguments sound. In closing, the critical potential of linguistic discourse analysis is shortly addressed by arguing that the context sensitive application of the categories for analyzing discourse can uncover the internal norms to which authors orient which makes them open for a critical analysis. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo explorar y dilucidar las distinciones fundamentales entre la inteligencia artificial (IA) y la inteligencia sentiente, tal como se propone en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri. El estudio busca comprender hasta qué punto la IA puede replicar aspectos de la inteligencia humana y cómo la comprensión de la inteligencia sentiente puede informar e influenciar el desarrollo futuro de la IA. La investigación adoptó un enfoque cualitativo, utilizando una investigación bibliográfica para construir un marco teórico sólido sobre (...) la IA y la inteligencia sentiente. Además, se realizó un análisis de contenido para comparar la inteligencia artificial con la inteligencia sentiente, con un enfoque en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri, que permitió identificar dos categorías principales relacionadas con la IA desde la perspectiva de la inteligencia sentiente: características ausentes y presentes de la IA según la comprensión de la inteligencia sentiente. Dentro de las características ausentes, se encontraron 14 unidades de registros; para las características presentes, 7 unidades de registro, con un total de 21 códigos. El estudio concluye que, aunque la inteligencia artificial puede imitar ciertos aspectos de la inteligencia humana, no puede replicar la totalidad de la experiencia sentiente. (shrink)

In his seminal work “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, Alfred Tarski showed how to construct a formally correct and materially adequate definition of true sentence for certain formalized languages. These results have, eventually, been accepted and applauded by philosophers and logicians nearly in unison. Its Postscript, written two years later, however, has given rise to a considerable amount of controversy. There is an ongoing debate on what Tarski really said in the postscript. These discussions often regard Tarski as (...) putatively changing his logical framework from type theory to set theory. In what follows, we will compare the original results with those presented two years later. After a brief outline of Carnap’s program in The Logical Syntax of Language we will determine its significance for Tarski’s final results. (shrink)

There is great injustice in the distribution of wellbeing among humans. But the situation may appear even worse once we expand our outlook to include other animals. Even a human who has a decent but not very good life plausibly has a much better life than the life of a mouse or an ant. And yet, if nonhuman animals are typically worse off than humans, does that mean that we should favor distributions that prioritize their wellbeing over the wellbeing of (...) humans? Many of the popular principles of distributive justice imply that we should, and some philosophers view this as a problem. I carefully specify this alleged problem, reject two popular approaches that have been taken to resolve it, and I then explore how a desertist approach to distributive justice handles the problem. I suggest that desertism about distributive justice sometimes favors human over nonhuman wellbeing in distributions. However, I then show that the desertist principle that I advance offers only a very limited justification for favoring human wellbeing over the wellbeing of other animals. (shrink)

The most ambitious effort in many years to reform the U.S. health insurance system was signed into law earlier this year in Massachusetts. In the essay below, a health economist who advised the state on the reform describes the plan and how it unfolded. Five commentaries weigh its odds of success and ask whether it can provide a model for the nation.

Recent discoveries stress the importance of studying positive emotion disturbances (PED) yet there remains little empirical work or integrative conceptual framework in this domain. We suggest that an ideally suited opportunity to advance the study of PED is to consider a cross-species evolutionary framework. We apply this framework—drawing from principles of stabilizing selection—to recent empirical findings in humans and nonhumans suggesting how positive emotion and associated play behaviors may lead to detrimental outcomes. This cross-species approach suggests a potential paradigm shift (...) in the way psychologists and evolutionary biologists approach positive emotion functioning, opening the possibility for new conceptual opportunities and interdisciplinary dialogues and research. (shrink)

The following interview explores neuroscientist Christof Koch's participation in the adversarial collaboration, testing the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness against the global neuronal workspace theory (GNW). The interview offers a current update on the adversarial project and then pivots to Koch's responses to three standing critiques of IIT, which include the inexactness of IIT's measures of the neural correlates of consciousness, the charge that IIT implies an unwieldy panpsychism, and the claim that IIT conflates its measures with consciousness.

ABSTRACT The problem of quantum nonlocality references instantaneous entanglements happening between particles at great distances, putting under question physical assumptions about time and local effects. Despite a wide range of proposed solutions in physics, the problem persists; however, due to the recent interest in panconsciousness and panpsychism in philosophy as well as numerous suggestions that consciousness and quantum physics are intimately related, I argue in favor of thinking strange quantum effects—and nonlocality as case in point—in lieu of conscious activity happening (...) at a universal scale. Drawing on the mind-brain problem or “the hard problem” as an intellectual resource and particularly pertinent metaphor in the case helps to illuminate the argument; briefly stated, I argue that a conscious universe eliminates the necessity of thinking distance as a problem needing to be resolved to comprehend disparate physical observations. In other words, I offer a speculative vision for quantum nonlocality and ultimately aim to encourage scholars to more carefully consider what it is like to be In, Of, and About a brain when thinking about the universe. (shrink)

One of Frank Ramsey’s crucial contributions to philosophy is his theory of belief. Ramsey deals with the notion of full belief in “Facts and Propositions,” as well as that of degrees of belief in “Truth and Probability.” In his posthumously published manuscript OnTruth, Ramsey analyses beliefs and emphasizes the essential role of agent’s actions in his theory. In this paper, I follow Ramsey’s thoughts as they developed in consecutive essays all evolving around the concept of belief. I show how Ramsey (...) considers partial and full beliefs, distinguishing between full, certain, and true ones. His final project was to be titled Truth and Probability, which means Ramsey was considering these issues simultaneously. I examine the strong influence pragmatism has on Ramsey’s thoughts to finally show that even though Ramsey is working with both these doxastic states his rejection of true beliefs for his final theory of belief becomes clearer with every essay. I will argue that Ramsey’s final theory of belief is a theory of partial belief. Moreover, I will provide arguments supporting a normative reading of Ramsey’s theory. (shrink)

This article explores the different uses of forms of direct verbal quotes in follow-up utterances delivered during the parliamentary debates after the inaugural speech of a new chancellor in the Austrian parliament and investigates their positioning effects for members of parliament who have the first opportunity of publicly ‘doing being a government or opposition MP’ in the new legislative term. Representing the first public confrontation between government and opposition MPs, the debates foreshadow topical and interpersonal aspects of the political frontstage (...) communication in the beginning legislative term. The main purpose of this article is to investigate the relations between formal properties of direct verbal quotes, recontextualization practices, their pragmatic function, and the specific aspect of the public personae speakers foreground by their use in the inaugural debates. Although direct quotations in follow-up utterances of MPs do not occur very often, the analyses demonstrate that this specific form of discourse representation deserves attention not only because it is mainly opposition MPs who use direct quotations in uptaking discourse units, but also because of the different semiotic aspects of direct quotes which are foregrounded in the investigated recontextualization practices. These practices result in MPs’ different public self-positionings toward their role of ‘being an opposition MP’, namely, either as policy-oriented arguers or as ironic evaluators. (shrink)

In connection with another article by the author, we show how it might be possible to travel faster than the speed of light. We show that for clocks and rods moving faster than the speed of light, we get instead of “time dilation” and “Lorentz contraction,” respectively, “time contraction” and “Lorentz expansion,” respectively. It is shown that this paper is in confirmation with earlier articles dealing with this subject.

The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.

The law of the future faces fundamental challenges that it cannot overcome by means of ‘tried and trusted’ dogmatics alone. Nor can it, from a methodological standpoint, take refuge in a purportedly apolitical hermeneutics or a one-sided application of empirical methods. Its responsibilities are not exhausted in mere steering, innovation or stimulating operations, but also encompass critical-emancipatory functions. Methodological reflection and legal critique - understood as social theory in the ‘interior’ of law - enable legal doctrine to meet the particular (...) demands that arise from the simultaneous affiliation of jurisprudence to the systems of law and science. The future development of legal studies thus requires a foundational research approach that preserves the interdisciplinary connection to neighbouring disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and provides impetus for enlightened self-critique and self-reflection. Only in this way - through the emergence of jurisprudence from its self-incurred ignorance regarding its social function - might legal practice assert itself in everyday legal life and confront the injustices of the legal world with its own thinking. Such critical legal thinking demands more than just the perpetuation of traditions based on the history of ideas. Nor can it be satisfied through the mere cultivation of empirical approaches to reality. It must aim to develop and unfold a normative concept of law, and write this forward into the future. It derives its essential reflective potential from social-theoretical modelling and methodological development. In the process, the reciprocal confrontation and translation of rival theoretical models opens new learning possibilities not to solve legal conflicts, but to treat them more judiciously. Here, it is above all the foundational legal subjects that, through their discrete approaches and perspectives, open diverse and flexible entryways to the potentialities and actualities of law and, particularly in light of new cases, ensure the necessary variance of options for perception and action. The future of law resides in experimental testing and innovative discovery, in the creative quest for alternative possibilities and possible realities, in the critical and constructive struggle for the law of the future - as the ecological law of future life in the next bio-digital society. (shrink)

In a recent “Rejoinder” by Landau,(8) he indicates that there is an error in a previous article of mine. In fact, this was corrected in an immediately subsequent article(2) of mine, and the “intriguing problem” to which Landau refers is solved in this subsequent article. In the present paper, I consolidate these and other ideas on the subject. In particular, I show that by discussing generalized coordinates in quantum mechanics one achieves much new insight, both philosophical and physical, in understanding (...) the transition of classical to quantum mechanics. (shrink)