ZusammenfassungDie rechtliche Regelung der Fortpflanzungsmedizin ist dringend reformbedürftig. Das Embryonenschutzgesetz von 1990 erfasst die neuesten technischen Entwicklungen nicht, ist in manchen Bereichen unstimmig und lückenhaft, setzt die betroffenen Frauen, Paare und Kinder unnötigen gesundheitlichen Risiken aus, erschwert paradoxerweise die Durchsetzung von Kinderrechten und erzeugt Gerechtigkeitsprobleme und Rechtsunsicherheit für die betroffenen Paare und die behandelnden Ärztinnen und Ärzte.Das Embryonenschutzgesetz enthält zudem nur strafrechtliche Verbote. Diese erlauben keine angemessene Reaktion auf die medizinische Entwicklung und den gesellschaftlichen Wandel und werden der Komplexität der (...) Materie nicht gerecht.Diese Probleme müssen gelöst werden. Der Bundesgesetzgeber verfügt seit mehr als 20 Jahren über die Kompetenz zur Regelung der Fortpflanzungsmedizin. Er sollte in der kommenden Legislaturperiode ein umfassendes Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz schaffen. (shrink)

This study extends experimental tests of (cumulative) prospect theory (PT) over prospects with more than three outcomes and tests second-order stochastic dominance principles (Levy and Levy, Management Science 48:1334–1349, 2002; Baucells and Heukamp, Management Science 52:1409–1423, 2006). It considers choice behavior of people facing prospects of three different types: gain prospects (losing is not possible), loss prospects (gaining is not possible), and mixed prospects (both gaining and losing are possible). The data supports the distinction of risk behavior into these three (...) categories of prospects, Further, probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity of utility as predicted by PT are observed. Loss aversion is, however, less pronounced, except for choices where one prospect is degenerate. The data suggests that the probability of losing may be relevant for loss aversion. (shrink)

(I) V orbestimmung des Themas Der Titel der folgenden Untersuchungen nennt 'Grund' und 'Gegen­ wart' als die maBgeblichen Blickpunkte, auf die hin die friihgriechische Philosophie - ob ausgesprochen oder nicht - sich bei der Entfaltung ihres Gegenstandes und ihrer selbst sammelt. Dadurch wird das Eigen­ tiimliche dieser Philosophie allerdings nicht hinsichtlich ihres Unter­ schieds zu, sondern nur hinsichtlich ihrer Zusammengehorigkeit mit der spateren Philo sophie bezeichnet. Erst aufgrund dieser Zusammen­ gehOrigkeit sowohl der Sache als auch dem Vorgehen nach kann die (...) friihgriechische Philosophie zugleich als die anfangliche begriffen werden. Eben darin aber hat sie im Verhaltnis zu der spateren ihre Auszeichnung; denn sie vollbringt die weitreichendste Bestimmung dessen, was als philosophische Erfahrung und Erkenntnis gelten kann. (2) Die fruhgriechische Philosophie als anfiingliche Aber ist denn die friihgriechische Philosophie so gemeinhin auch die anfangliche? 1m Falle des indischen und chinesischen Denkens gilt dies offenbar nicht. Hier konnte man einwenden, daB dieses Denken zu 1 Unrecht 'Philosophie' genannt wird. Auch abgesehen von grundsatz­ 2 lichen Erwagungen zum 'richtigen' Gebrauch von Namen, notigt jedoch weder die Sagekraft dieses Namens noch sein Gebrauch in der griechischen Sprache zur Einschrankung seiner Anwendung auf abend­ landisch-europaisches Denken. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

Horst Bredekamp’s subject is the astute deployment and perennial resonance of the startling image of the body politic that dominates the frontispiece to Leviathan: a treatise on the psychology of the individual and the dynamic of the multitude, published in 1651 by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Affirming the centrality of such a figural device for this pioneering theorist of the state, Bredekamp goes on to address the art-historical dimension of the mesmerising etched title-page. In his central chapters he (...) explores the extraordinary range of sources – from socio-cultural tradition to scientific advances – on which the author and his artist-collaborator may have drawn. In conclusion, he reveals Hobbes to be no less passionate than shrewd in his belief that the constraints and amenities of a tolerable life in common attest to the potency of the visual. As appendices, two essays and catalogues explore the portraits made of Hobbes as well as illustrations that appeared in his other works, thus systematically completing the exploration of the images connected with this exceptional philosopher. (shrink)

Let us begin—as is fitting—with what is familiar. Now, familiar is by no means what ‘totalizing thinking’ is, but rather what ‘totalitarian’ means. Today this word rings in everyone’s ears, is common in public life—not so much as a descriptive, but more as a defamatory epithet. It brands political systems of our time which not only gave rise to horrifying consequences, but what is more spread terror through their form of domination. Now, rule by means of terror is in fact (...) no recent discovery; new here is rather the technique of the complete penetration of every expression of social life. Were the latter perhaps susceptible in a special way to such penetration? (shrink)

Self-management interventions are a heterogeneous group of interventions that are regarded as important tools for the management of chronic diseases. They consist of a broad range of techniques and are available for a large variety of chronic organic as well as mental conditions or illnesses, which are by definition generally chronic. These interventions aim that the individual concerned takes substantial responsibility for managing the symptoms, treatment, and physical and psychosocial consequences associated with having a chronic medical condition, disability or disease. (...) Alternate terms used in this context, among others, are self-care... (shrink)

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...) archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. (shrink)

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

This book challenges the standard view that modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleiermacher, arguing instead that it is the dialectic of reflective and teleological reason in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that provides the actual proto-hermeneutic foundation. It is revolutionary in doing so by replacing interpretive truth claims by the more appropriate claim of rendering opaque contexts intelligible. Taking Gadamer’s comprehensive analysis of hermeneutics in Truth and Method (1960) as its point of departure, the book turns to Kant’s (...) Critiques, reviewing his major concepts as a coherent system in relation to his sensus communis. At the heart of the book is the interaction between reflective, bottom-up search and teleological, top-down interpretative projection as provided in Part II of the third Critique. This text contends that Kant’s broad definition of nature invites the liberation of the reflective-teleological judgment from its biological exemplifications and so permits us to establish its generalised status as a path-breaking, methodological tool. Kant’s dialectic of reflective search and meaning bestowing, stipulated teleology is asserted to anticipate a series of motifs commonly associated with hermeneutics. Figures covered include Dilthey, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo, Nancy and Caputo. Their collective contributions to interpretation allow for a review of the evolution of hermeneutics from the perspective of the Kantian critique of the limitations of human cognition. The book is written for the informed, general reader, but will likewise appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well as researchers in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

The three ways to start thinking of modern ideology of the integrity of the scientific thinking of the life of the world's thinking, the nature of human thought. Theory for its own requirements, think of the first two forms of the rejection of metaphysics in the door to understanding other than for the occasional appearance of metaphysics. Productive nature of human depth of metaphysical thinking, recognized its relative historical inevitability. Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger reveals more of their origin relationships: man and (...) his living strength, will, thought relations. Authors think is an absolute metaphysical necessity. Modern thinking themselves to be reading for the historical marker. Should be based on the contemporary metaphysics itself as an intermediary to the reality of our own. There shall be: first, to break the so-called "historical continuity", that metaphysics is the history of the formation of technical thinking; two, revealing the "nothingness of the cry," the hidden "presence of the final there," which is preserved in the history of metaphysics "sacred." Modern thought has developed into what it is today from three sides, a consideration of science, of the living world and of man's essence. The first two systems of thought demand that the theory of a body be considered outside a metaphysical realm. The essence of man can be considered from a relative necessity of history. Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have proceeded form an even more basic stance, considering the relationship between man and his will to power, volition and thought. I consider in this paper the absolute necessity of a metaphysics. Modern thought must resolve this historical representation. It must go the way of metaphysics in realizing this task. Here we must: 1) Breakthrough the notion of the so-called 'linear history'. Metaphysics must complete a history of technological thought . 2) Reveal existence's ultimate being hidden in the 'cry of nothingness'. This is a metaphysical 'holiness' hidden in history. (shrink)

Cycle of lectures held at Heinrich-Heine-Universitèat Dèusseldorf.

English summary: The relationship between science and politics can hardly be reduced to a simple formula. On one hand they appear to be completely separate systems that follow only their own internal logic. On the other hand, mutual references can be identified. It is quite possible to consistently align political decisions to scientific evidence, whereby the autonomy and the legitimacy of democratic policy would however inevitably be affected. In four sections the relationship between science and politics are analyzed under the (...) viewpoint of a specific key question: Does true policy require powerful decision and therefor specifically the absence of science? And is science not conversely determined by it being free of value and policy? What about concepts that tend to want to replace policy with science? Finally, there is the question of what legitimate role science can play in today's politics, and whether this can be in the form of policy advice. This book, with contributions from renowned authors from different disciplines, is systematically devoted to answering these questions. German text. German description: Das Verhaltnis zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik ist kaum auf eine einfache Formel zu bringen. Einerseits erscheinen sie als vollig getrennte Systeme, die nur ihrer eigenen inneren Logik folgen. Andererseits lassen sich wechselseitige Bezugnahmen ausmachen. So ist durchaus denkbar, politische Entscheidungen konsequent an wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen auszurichten, wodurch aber unweigerlich die Autonomie auch und gerade demokratisch legitimierter Politik betroffen wuerde.In vier Sektionen wird das Verhaltnis von Wissenschaft und Politik unter einer bestimmten Leitfrage analysiert: Setzt wahre Politik kraftvolle Dezision und somit gerade die Abwesenheit von Wissenschaft voraus? Und ist Wissenschaft nicht umgekehrt durch ihre Wert- und damit Politikfreiheit bestimmt? Wie steht es um Konzepte, die Politik tendenziell durch Wissenschaft ersetzen wollen? Schliesslich fragt sich, welche legitime Rolle Wissenschaft heutzutage in der Politik spielen kann, etwa in Form der Politikberatung.Der Band mit Beitragen renommierter Autoren unterschiedlicher Disziplinen geht diesen Problemkonstellationen in systematischer Weise nach. (shrink)

Although the individuality of whole-body movements has been suspected for years, the scientific proof and systematic investigation that individuals possess unique movement patterns did not manifest until the introduction of the criteria of uniqueness and persistence from the field of forensic science. Applying the criteria of uniqueness and persistence to the individuality of motor learning processes requires complex strategies due to the problem of persistence in the learning processes. One approach is to examine the learning process of different movements. For (...) this purpose, it is necessary to differentiate between two components of movement patterns: the individual-specific component and the discipline-specific component. To this end, a kinematic analysis of the shot put, discus, and javelin throwing movements of seven high-performance decathletes during a qualification competition was conducted. In total, joint angle waveforms of 57 throws formed the basis for the recognition task of individual- and discipline-specific throwing patterns using a support vector machine. The results reveal that the kinematic throwing patterns of the three disciplines could be distinguished across athletes with a prediction accuracy of up to 100% (57 of 57 throws). However, athlete-specific throwing characteristics could also be identified across the three disciplines. Prediction accuracies of up to 52.6% indicated that up to 10 out of 19 throws of a discipline could be assigned to the correct athletes, based on only knowing these athletes from the kinematic throwing patterns in the other two disciplines. The results further suggest that individual throwing characteristics across disciplines are more pronounced in shot put and discus throwing than in javelin throwing. Applications for training and learning practice in sports and therapy are discussed. In summary, the chosen approach offers a broad field of application related to the search of individually optimal movement solutions in sports. (shrink)