Originally published in 1830, this book can be called the first modern work in the philosophy of science, covering an extraordinary range of philosophical, methodological, and scientific subjects. "Herschel's book . . . brilliantly analyzes both the history and nature of science."—Keith Stewart Thomson, American Scientist.

"The Religious Thought of the Greeks" by Clifford Herschel Moore. Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to (...) everyone in a high-quality digital format. (shrink)

_The Herschel Telescope of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences: An Instrument Biography_ The so called Herschel telescope is one of the key items in the artefact collection of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science. The optics was commissioned from William Herschel in England in the mid-1780s and arrived a couple of years later, but the telescope as such was not finished until 1812. Even if it amounted to a considerable investment for the Academy, scientific speaking it (...) turned out to be a total failure. A biographical approach is used to study the instruments shifting roles in the formation of knowledge, from its completion in the early 19th century, until the present era. Since the telescope in its original configuration was unusable, it was firstly rebuild 1842, still without coming to any scientific use, and then reinterpreted as a cultural heritage object. As such, it has since served different roles in several exhibitions contexts. (shrink)

In what follows, I consider the role of analogy in the first edition of Darwin’s Origin. I argue that Darwin follows Herschel’s methodology and hence exploits an analogy between artificial and natural selection that allows him generalize selection as a cause of evolutionary change. This argument strategy is not equivalent to an argument from analogy. Reading Darwin’s argument as conforming to Herschel’s two-step methodology of causal analysis followed by generalization allows us to understand the role and placement of (...) Darwin’s discussion of artificial selection in the Origin, without making the mistake of portraying Darwin’s argument for the existence and character of natural selection as an analogical argument. (shrink)

Herschel's experiments on radiant heat are analysed to see how he understood the role of experiment and how he handled potential difficulties in measurement. He believed that experiments could answer essential questions about nature and was willing to change his mind in light of evidence. Potential problems with data did not shake his confidence in the results of his experiments. Herschel's critic, Leslie, had even less patience with experimental results that did not fit his theory. His harsh condemnations (...) of Herschel's work could not be empirically substantiated, but they pointed to problems of which Herschel was aware. Although the theories of both men about radiant heat have subsequently been abandoned, attempts to address their concerns and differences contributed to the development of the electromagnetic spectrum. The unification of radiant heat and light through the spectrum came about after better instruments made it possible to account for the rival claims of earlier experimenters. (shrink)

In what follows, I consider the role of analogy in the first edition of Darwin’s Origin. I argue that Darwin follows Herschel’s methodology and hence exploits an analogy between artificial and natural selection that allows him generalize selection as a cause of evolutionary change. This argument strategy is not equivalent to an argument from analogy. Reading Darwin’s argument as conforming to Herschel’s two-step methodology of causal analysis followed by generalization allows us to understand the role and placement of (...) Darwin’s discussion of artificial selection in the Origin, without making the mistake of portraying Darwin’s argument for the existence and character of natural selection as an analogical argument. (shrink)

In his comprehensive survey of the work of William Herschel, published in the Annuaire du Bureau des Longitudes for 1842, Dominique Arago argued that the life of the great astronomer ‘had the rare privilege of forming an epoch in an extended branch of astronomy’. Arago also noted, however, that Herschel's ideas were often taken as ‘the conceptions of a madman’, even if they were subsequently accepted. This fact, commented Arago, ‘seems to me one that deserves to appear in (...) the history of science’. From the time Herschel published his first paper in the Philosophical transactions in 1781, he was subjected to the suggestion of lunacy. His patron and friend William Watson, told him that after his claims for the extraordinary power of his telescopes, ‘your prognosis that some would think you fit for Bedlam has been verified’. On learning of Herschel's supremely accurate new micrometer, the astronomer Alexander Aubert exclaimed to Herschel that ‘we would go to Bedlam together’: Aubert wrote to Herschel in January 1782 that he should ‘mind not a few jealous barking puppies: a little time will clear up the matter, and if it lays in my power you would not be sent to Bedlam alone, for I incline much to be of the party’. (shrink)

It is traditionally held that Mayer denied the existence of a solar motion while Herschel and Prévost, using much the same data, demonstrated its presence. The existence of such diverse conclusions has not, however, been satisfactorily explained. It is shown here that the supposed disagreement as to the existence of a solar motion is illusory. Mayer did not make the denial attributed to him; and the estimates of Herschel and Prévost do not represent responses to the factual question (...) as to whether or not the Sun moved, but rather those to the heuristic question as to what value of the probable solar motion one should assume. The analyses behind these estimates are reported and shown to be well matched to the combination of question and available data. The conceptual context of Herschel's and Prévost's work is discussed. And a brief comparison is made with the later investigations into the systematic motions of the stars. (shrink)

The nature of the contributions to astronomy of Caroline Lucretia Herschel are explored in this article. Her accomplishments included new observational discoveries and the skilled and accurate transcription and reduction of astronomical data. Although she made important additions to the sum total of astronomical facts available to the scientist, she herself showed little interest or ability in applying these data to explain phenomena. Love of her brother, Sir William Herschel, motivated her achievements in astronomy. Barred from the ranks (...) of creative astronomers by both her inability and her disinterest in abstract concepts, she substituted other qualities such as accuracy and perseverance which assured her a place in the history of astronomy. (shrink)

In this article I would like to show that Charles Darwin conscientiously developed his theory of natural selection conforming to criteria of John Herschel, one of the leading philosophers of science at his time. Therefor I will present Herschel's methodology and search for the criteria in Darwin's _Origin of Species_. I conclude with Herschel's negative reaction to Darwin's theory, showing that Herschel himself probably could not comply with his own criteria. _German_ In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich (...) zeigen, dass sich Charles Darwin bei der Entwicklung seiner Theorie gewissenhaft an den wissenschaftstheoretischen Kriterien seiner Zeit orientierte, die maßgeblich von John Herschel geprägt wurden. Dazu werde ich zuerst die Methodologie Herschels vorstellen, um anschließend Darwins _Entstehung der Arten_ auf diese wissenschaftstheoretischen Kriterien hin zu untersuchen. Abschließend soll an der Reaktion Herschels auf Darwins Theorie gezeigt werden, dass Herschel seine eigenen Kriterien nicht erfüllt hat, weil er sich nicht von seinem,,Vorurteil der Meinung“ befreien konnte. (shrink)

There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the (...) manner that one would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)

Between the first and second editions of A System of Logic, John Stuart Mill underwent a startling conversion from an uncompromising frequentist philosophy of probability to a thoroughly Bayesian degree-of-belief view. The conversion was effected by correspondence with the eminent scientist Sir John Herschel, to whom Mill already owed what have become known as Mill's Methods of Experimental Inference. We present the relevant correspondence, and discuss the extent of Mill's conversion.

This paper offers a solution to a problem in Herschel studies by drawing on the dynamic frame model for concept representation offered by cognitive psychology. Applying the frame model to represent the conceptual frameworks of the particle and wave theories, this paper shows that discontinuity between the particle and wave frameworks consists mainly in the transition from a particle notion ‘side’ to a wave notion ‘phase difference’. By illustrating intraconceptual relations within concepts, the frame representations reveal the ontological differences (...) between these two concepts. ‘Side’ is an object concept built on spatial relations, but ‘phase difference’ is an event concept built on temporal relations. The conceptual analyses display a possible cognitive source of Herschel’s misconception of polarization. Limited by his experimental works and his philosophical beliefs, Herschel comprehended polarization solely in terms of spatial relations, which prevented him from replacing the object concept ‘side’ with the event concept ‘phase difference’, and eventually resulted in his failure to understand the wave account of polarization.Author Keywords: Herschel; Polarization; Object concept; Event concept; Frame; Cognitive psychology. (shrink)

John Herschel's discussion of hypotheses in the Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy has generated questions concerning his commitment to the principle that hypothetical speculation is legitimate only if warranted by inductive evidence. While Herschel explicitly articulates an inductivist philosophy of science, he also asserts that “it matters little how {a hypothesis or theory} has been originally framed” when it can withstand extensive testing and empirical scrutiny. This evidence has convinced some that Herschel endorses an early form of (...) hypothetico-deductivism. I aim to clarify this interpretive puzzle and adduce evidence in support of the inductivist interpretation of Herschel's philosophy of science by examining his published account of a series of experiments in the domain of electromagnetism. (shrink)

Stargazing Knight Errant, beware of the day When the Hottentots catch thee observing away! Be sure they will pluck thy eyes out of their sockets To prevent thee from stuffing the stars in thy pocketsIf Herschel should find a new star at the Cape, His perils no longer would pain us He will salt the star's tail to prevent its escape And call it ‘The Hottentot Venus’.Astronomy has long been recognized as a tool of empire. Its service to navigation (...) and geography have made it indispensable to European expansion. Britain in particular excelled at this brand of control; each day when the sun set on the British empire, its telescopes continued to enhance imperial power.While the above claims are no longer controversial, we have hardly begun to understand the extent to which imperialism subsequently changed the nature of the physical sciences. (shrink)

While historians of scientific method have recently called attention to the views of many of John Stuart Mill's contemporaries on the relation between probability and inductive inference, little if any note has been taken of Mill's own vigorous attack on the received "Laplacean" interpretation of probability in the first edition of the System of Logic. This paper examines the place of Mill's critique, both in the overall framework of his philosophy, and in the tradition of assessing the so-called "probability of (...) causes". It also offers an account of why, in later editions of the work, Mill appears to adopt a much more sympathetic stance toward the received view. (shrink)