Far-reaching promises made by nanotechnology have raised the question of whether we are on the way to understanding human beings more and more as belonging to the realm of technology. In this paper, an increasing need to understand the technological re-conceptualization of human beings is diagnosed whenever increasingly “technical” interpretations of humans as mechanical entities are disseminated. And this can be observed at present in the framework of nanobiotechnology, a foremost “technical” self-description where a technical (...) language is adopted. The arena in which the decision is made on increasing the use of technological understanding to define mankind will not be found in the surgery room in which one works with implants, nor the NBIC-laboratory, in which “nerve plugs” are supposed to be developed. The thesis of this paper is that such arena is rather related to the manner in which concepts of humanity are associated with it, how we think and talk about ourselves, and which consequences we draw out of it. (shrink)

The problematics of civilization development and the place of human being in it is a significant area of research, which is additionally actualized nowadays in the conditions of the outlined transition to a new stage - the civilization of cognitive technologies. According to the assessment proposed in the article, three stages of civilization development should be distinguished: agrarian, machine, and the civilization of cognitive technologies, which is currently being formed. It is characterized by the main need in the form (...) of artificial cognitive systems for intellectual control of machines for the production of material goods, and the result of satisfying this need is the replacement of human beings by artificial cognitive systems in the intellectual control of machines. The following several questions are key in the context of the mentioned problems: "What are the functions of human beings in the existence and development of civilization?", "Do these functions change?", "Are there inalienable ones among them?", "What can become the basis for the further development of civilization?". The functions of human beings within civilization are the generation of needs and work to satisfy them. Generation of needs is an inalienable function of human being in civilization, which determines the determining role of the evolution of needs in the development of civilization. The main role in the evolution of needs belongs to social mechanisms of compulsion (motivation) to consumption, which influence not only the satisfaction of social needs, but also stimulate excessive consumption of material goods and intellectual activity. Further development of civilization will preserve the position of human being as an initiator of this development only in case of successful implementation of social coercion mechanisms. The condition for this is social integration: preservation and expansion of ties between human beings, counteraction to the fragmentation of society. (shrink)

Since ancient times philosophy has dealt with the relation between technology and man. Nowadays this is especially true in the context of the philosophy of technology. Technology is interpreted as an anthropological constant to construct an environment in which man can survive. Acting in the field of technology is to act rationally with a purpose, i.e., in the framework of a means-end relation, and it is employed for coping with experiences (Widerfahrnisse) by means of using tools. Like technology, language can (...) be reconstructed as a symbolic form and thus as a technological means, as a tool so that the employment of metaphors can also be described as an employment of tools. Using technology has effects on man as well as on his self-image. Thus, philosophy of technology creates different ideas of man, which have to become subject to ethical discourses. (shrink)

Technological advancements raise anthropological questions: How do humans differ from technology? Which human capabilities are unique? Is it possible for robots to exhibit consciousness or intelligence, capacities once taken to be exclusively human? Despite the evident need for an anthropological lens in both societal and research contexts, the philosophical anthropology of technology has not been established as a set discipline with a defined set of theories, especially concerning emerging technologies. In this paper, I will utilize a New (...) Materialist approach, focusing particularly on the theories of Donna Haraway and Karen Barad, to explore their potential for an anthropology of technology. I aim to develop a techno-anthropological approach that is informed and enriched by New Materialism. This approach is characterized by its relational perspective, a dynamic and open conception of the human being, attention to diversity and the dynamics of power in knowledge production and ontology, and an emphasis on the non-human. I aim to outline an anthropology of technology centered on New Materialism, wherein the focus, paradoxically, is not exclusively on humans but equally on non-human entities and the entanglement with the non-human. As will become clear, the way we understand humans and their relationship with technology is fundamental for our concepts and theories in ethics of technology. (shrink)

The cultural activities of human being are to be mediated by physical elements. These are, as a matter of fact, the natural things. There is allowed no other way for human being to realize his mental work but than in and through the nature. So, generally speaking, culture in ordinary sense consists in the human mind "objectified" in the natural reality. It remains within the boundary of human activities, which themselves cannot transcend the nature.

The revolution in science and technology is significantly changing the character of production and work. One of the important aspects of this change is that labor becomes a scientifically organized process that makes increased demands on development of the human factor in production. The most productive scientific ideas, the most perfect technologies, when combined with production, may fail to produce the desired "yield" unless a sufficient number of well-trained personnel, or of the required organizational structures corresponding to the level (...) of societal relationships, the habits of collective work, and human psychology, are available. Implementation of a truly scientific organization of work presumes as a condition that a considerable level of development will already have been achieved in socialist labor discipline, as well as habits of collectivism and ethical motivations for work, and not merely occupational skills and qualities. More precisely, the list of qualities that, while they may not be occupational in the strict sense are nonetheless necessary features of the person employed in socialist society, includes general cultural and moral development, social activity, and political consciousness. The transformation of work into a scientifically organized process presumes an increasing demand for a highly skilled labor force with comprehensive development. Moreover, the development of the labor force and the rise in its skills should run ahead of the development of the means of production. It is precisely this that determines the need for conscious management of the development of the human being. For comprehensive development of the labor force to run ahead of the means of production requires considerable outlays for occupational and general cultural training of the direct participants in production. A worker of a new type, with a higher level of general and occupational education, will emerge in the course of implementation of a complex of economic, social, and scientific-technological measures. (shrink)

The revolution in science and technology exercises an enormous influence on the processes of socialization of the human being under the conditions of an advanced socialist society, thereby becoming one of its significant objective factors. Significant changes in the conditions of the functioning both of the individual and of socialist society as a whole are occurring under the influence of the revolution in science and technology.

As human beings age, they become weak, fragile, and feeble. It is a slowly progressing yet complex syndrome in which old age or some disabilities are not prerequisites; neither does loss of human parts lead to frailty among the physically fit older persons. This paper aims to describe the influences of transhumanist perspectives on human‐technology enhancements and replacements in the transcendence of human frailties, including those of older persons, in which technology is projected to deliver (...) solutions toward transcending these frailties. Through technologies including genetic screening and other technological manipulations, intelligent machines and augmented humans improve, maintain, and remedy human‐linked susceptibilities. Furthermore, other technologies replace parts fabricated through inorganic‐mechanical processes such as 3D‐printing. Advancing technologies are reaching the summit of technological sophistication contributing to the transhumanist views of being human in a technological world. Technologies enhance the transcendence of human frailties as essential expressions of the symbiosis between human beings and technology in a transcendental world. (shrink)

To be alive is to be vulnerable. That is probably the most basic truth all living creatures confront, from the smallest to the greatest and from the most primitive to the most complex. As Hans Jonas states in the introduction to his wonderful treatise, The Phenomenon of Life, the paradoxical, still enigmatic fact that vital substance by some original act of segregation has isolated itself from the general fabric of things and set itself over against the world introduced the tension (...) of ‘to be or not to be’ in the indifferent continuum of material existence. With life, Jonas observes with Friedrich Nietzsche, being appears as being in an emphatic sense for the first time. Life means mortality, it is existence affirmed but as such, given the inherent and continuous threat of relapsing back into non-being (all living creatures’ ultimate fate anyway), it is existence as concern. Being alive as being free from the identity with matter implies having its own being as a burden and this means—h. (shrink)

Transhumanism introduces from its very beginning a paradigm shift about concepts like human nature, progress and human future. An overview of its ideology reveals a strong belief in the idea of human enhancement through technologically means. The theory of technological singularity, which is more or less a radicalisation of the transhumanist discourse, foresees a radical evolutionary change through artificial intelligence. The boundaries between intelligent machines and human beings will be blurred. The consequence is the (...) upcoming of a post-biological and posthuman future when intelligent technology becomes autonomous and constantly self-improving. Considering these predictions, I will investigate here the way in which the idea of human enhancement modifies our understanding of technological innovation. I will argue that such change goes in at least two directions. On the one hand, innovation is seen as something that will inevitably lead towards intelligent machines and human enhancement. On the other hand, there is a direction such as “Singularity University,” where innovation is called to pragmatically solving human challenges. Yet there is a unifying spirit which holds together the two directions and I think it is the same transhumanist idea. (shrink)

The issue of human nature is a perennial question – as obstinate as it is old. Human reflection on the human condition is a defining feature of the experience of being human. In our time, the idea of post-biological evolution, the design paradigm of NBIC-convergence and transhumanism – as a philosophy and a cultural movement – all confront and confound our traditional notions of human nature. Unlike previous challenges to established images of the human (...) being, this re-assessment of human nature has a practical aspect – for technology now seems poised to finally achieve the age-old aspiration of human control over human nature. At its core, the idea of post-biological evolution assumes the human condition as the object of engineering. The problem of the human being thus becomes an engineering problem, approached from an engineering perspective, which – in an essential way – is design orientated. Hence, the idea of the human being that underlies the apprehension of ourselves as such an object of engineering, is of vital significance. As such, this paper argues for the relevance of philosophical anthropology within the post-biological discourse. (shrink)

Amid the growing interest in the relationship between technology and human flourishing, philosophical perfectionism can serve as a fruitful lens through which to normatively evaluate technology. This paper offers an analytic framework that explains the relationship between technology and flourishing by way of innate human capacities. According to perfectionism, our human flourishing is determined by how well we exercise our human capacities to know, create, be sociable, use our bodies and exercise the will, by engaging in (...) activities that ultimately produce valuable output. The paper introduces technology affordances to this framework, to show how affordances enable or restrict the exercise of human capacities, thereby impacting levels of human flourishing. One implication of this analysis is that it highlights how technology affordances can cause the privation (absence) of flourishing, by impoverishing capacities. The upshot is that privation may bring about robustly bad unflourishing, especially given that technology and its affordances have the power to degrade the human capacities in the long run. By linking how human capacities are shaped by affordances, we can achieve a better understanding of the ethical implications of technology on human flourishing. (shrink)

While not aiming to exhaust the project of postphenomenology in the philosophy of technology, a field characterized by its empirical nature when contemplating the relationship with technology, the focus is on articulating some general assumptions for a distinct perspective on the human-world relationship, one that can clearer delineate the contemporary hyper-technological context. This context allows for the consideration of post-Heideggerian or post-phenomenological aspects, wherein the world can be contemplated without the presumption of a “being given” state through systemic (...) and practical constructivism. By doing so, it moves beyond the confines of mere “lifeworld” and “being-in-the-world”, shedding their sheer clearing and daunting openness, thereby complementing the understanding of the technological and the artificial. This does not imply considering the technological and artificial as mere supplements to the human-world constellation; on the contrary, it is through contemplation of the technological and artificial that one can truly grasp both the human and the world simultaneously. If postphenomenology is viewed as a “critical dialogue” with the phenomenological tradition, it becomes evident that the philosophies of Don Ihde and Peter Sloterdijk have had a significant impact in paving the way for a different understanding of the relationship between humans and the world, overturning any notions of self-referentiality inherent in classical phenomenology. (shrink)

What is “human being”? In this book, Thomas Langan draws on a lifetime of study to offer a new understanding of this central question of our existence, turning to phenomenology and philosophical anthropology to help us better understand who we are as individuals and communities and what makes us act the way we do. While recognizing the human being as an individual with a particular genetic makeup and history, Langan also probes the real essence of human being (...) that philosophers have tended to ignore. He argues that human being is the result of the experiences of humans throughout time—an ontological reality that not only incorporates our collective memories, institutions, habits, ethical practices, and religious faiths but also unfolds in time with its own history to inform individuals in the present. He provides tools and descriptions for accessing this broader historical and present-day reality, investigating deeper structures of human being to show how those historical roots can be appropriated and made meaningful. Building on Langan’s earlier works, _Human Being_ is also readily accessible on its own. Langan shows how the larger issues discussed in those books, ranging from the Catholic tradition to high technology, relate to being human while he brings to light new philosophical insights and ideas. Because human beings continue to evolve, informing our everyday understanding of the world, Langan shows how vital it is for us to think through the sense of human being and how great a challenge that is in today’s society. His work offers insight into human being that invites readers to think and live more deeply in their humanity—and to face the challenges of a rapidly changing world by reawakening perennial quests for love and the divine, and the very search for meaning itself. (shrink)

Technology is developing fast - so fast that it threatens to overwhelm the very species whose genius lies in its technological cunning: us. From the metaverse to genetic engineering and mood-altering pharmaceuticals, to cybersex and cyberwar and the widespread automation of work, new technologies are rewriting the terms of our existence, not in a neutral spirit of 'progress' but in line with the priorities of power and profit, and in ways that often work against the grain of our fundamental (...) being.In this timely, provocative book, Richard King argues that we need to evolve a more critical attitude to new technologies if we are to avoid a world in which humans are no different in kind from algorithmic machines. The stakes could not be higher. As science, technology and capitalism fuse into a single system, and activists and entrepreneurs talk of a 'post-human' future in which individuals will transform themselves using powerful computers and biotechnologies, we are entering unchartered territory - a territory marked with the mapmaker's warning, Here Be Dragons... Here Be Monsters. (shrink)

Any complete understanding of human psychology must take into account that a brain’s actions in the world are mediated by the body it belongs to. In the process of such interaction the human being creates artificial things, structures and mechanisms, such as technology, relationships, and culture. The subjective world is not simply the interactions between neurons at different systemic levels, but the existence of mental contents, which are determined by specific features of a certain domain of reality with (...) which a cognitive agent interacts by means of her actions. It is possible to understand specific features of the subjective world with the conception of the “embodied” and “inactive” cognition. In this framework, the problems of consciousness of consciousness, free will, the possibility of “reading” another mind and constructing mental phenomena are analyzed. If cognitive studies are not used for manipulating humans, and are not means of human degradation they must take into consideration specific features of the human phenomenon: the belonging of the human being to the social world and the world of culture. The development of cognitive studies can lead humans to new levels and contribute to new interpretations of humanism. However, under certain conditions, this development can lead to the death of the human being. This paper shows that some Soviet philosophers and psychologists, during the second half of the twentieth century, anticipated the formulations and solutions of several contemporary key problems in cognitive science before these problems emerged. (shrink)

This philosophical enquiry considers the impact of a global world view and technology on the meaning of being human. The global vision increases our awareness of the common bond between all humans, while technology tends to separate us from an understanding of ourselves as human persons. We review some advances in connecting as community within our world, and many examples of technological changes. This review is not exhaustive. The focus is to understand enough changes to think through (...) the possibility of healthcare professionals becoming cyborgs, human–machine units that are subsequently neither human and nor machine. It is seen that human technology interfaces are a different way of interacting but do not change what it is to be human in our rational capacities of providing meaningful speech and freely chosen actions. In the highly technical environment of the ICU, expert nurses work in harmony with both the technical equipment and the patient. We used Heidegger to consider the nature of equipment, and Descartes to explore unique human capacities. Aristotle, Wallace, Sokolowski, and Clarke provide a summary of humanity as substantial and relational. (shrink)

Technology and animals often serve as the boundaries by which we define the human. In this issue contributors explore these categories as necessary supplements or as porous membranes which disturb the scaffolding of how the human is constructed. A lingering question throughout is whether we have ever been human or if such a category is a non-localizable ideal or perhaps a misnomer. In this collection of essays, internationally known theorists muddle the categorical boundaries such that animals and (...) technologies become necessary components rather than limits for what it means to be human. They examine a range of subjects, including apophatic animality, critical media objects-to-think-with, biosemiotic insect resonances, the monstrous and horrific which dislodges our cultural animals, and the problem of thinking of animality as stupidity. Novels, films, digital objects, scientific laboratories, philosophical texts, animals on the road and in the fields serve as sites for inquiry. The result of these investigations is the spectral possibility that we are not the humans we make ourselves out to be. This book was originally published as a special issue of Angelaki. (shrink)

According to a chorus of authors, the human life-world is currently invaded by an avalanche of high-tech devices referred to as “emerging,” ”intimate,” or ”NBIC” technologies: a new type of contrivances or gadgets designed to optimize cognitive or sensory performance and / or to enable mood management. Rather than manipulating objects in the outside world, they are designed to influence human bodies and brains more directly, and on a molecular scale. In this paper, these devices will be framed (...) as ‘extimate’ technologies (both intimate and external; both embedded and foreign; both life-enhancing and intrusive), a concept borrowed from Jacques Lacan. Although Lacan is not commonly regarded as a philosopher of technology, the dialectical relationship between human desire and technological artefacts runs as an important thread through his work. Moreover, he was remarkably prescient concerning the blending of life science and computer science, which is such a distinctive feature of the current techno-scientific turn. Building on a series of Lacanian concepts, my aim is to develop a psychoanalytical diagnostic of the technological present. Finally, I will indicate how such an analysis may inform our understanding of human life and embodiment as such. (shrink)

The exponential digitization of medical data has led to a transformation of the practice of medicine. This change notably raises a new complexity of issues surrounding health IT. The proper use of these communication tools, such as telemedicine, e-health, m-health the big medical data, should improve the quality of monitoring and care of patients for an information system to "human face". Faced with these challenges, the author analyses in an ethical angle the patient-physician relationship, sharing, transmission and storage of (...) medical information, setting pins to an ethic for the digitization of medical information. Drawing on good practice recommendations closely associated with values, this model is developing tools for reflection and present the keys to understanding the decision-making issues that reflect both the technological constraints and the complex nature of human reality in medicine. (shrink)

Spengler’s work is typically represented as speculative philosophy of history. However, I argue that there is good reason to consider much of his thought as preoccupied with existential and phenomenological questions about the nature and ends of human existence, rather than with history per se. In this paper I consider Spengler’s work in comparison with Heidegger’s history of Being and analysis of technological modernity. I argue that Spengler’s considerable proximity to much of Heidegger’s thought compels us to reconsider (...) the nature and scope of Spengler’s philosophical project. (shrink)

Abstract in English, German, French and Croatian -/- In the paper “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, which was published in 2013 in the Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow attempted to reveal the specific qualities of the uprisings which emerged after the year 2010 in some European countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy, England etc. According to the authors, the mode of organization which forms the main body of these emancipatory movements obtains its basic (...) logic from the world of the Internet. The use of the Internet requires a re-evaluation of negative philosophical commentary regarding technology. In the context of twentieth-century philosophy, Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse are the most influential philosophers who studied the negative aspects of technology. Heidegger portrayed the destructive effects of scientific reasoning and technology on the Western culture through the criticism of the traditional Western metaphysics on a phenomenological-ontological level. Marcuse, belonging to the tradition of Western Marxism, formed his critique of technology in the context of the concept of instrumental rationality and the critique of advanced industrial society and capitalism. Although the starting points of their perspectives on technology and the underlying purposes of their critiques of technology were different, it may be asserted that both have a rather negative and almost entirely pessimistic disposition towards technology. Heidegger’s and Marcuse’s criticisms of technology will be discussed in this context and the differences and similarities between these criticisms will be shown. Finally, the paper will emphasise the question of the possibility of a positive role of technology. Technology can serve as an alternative to negative uses by shedding light on the relation between the current uprisings and the Internet. Keywords technology, rationality, freedom, enframing, criticism, revolt movements, Internet, politics //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Ist die Emanzipation des Menschen durch Technologie möglich? Zusammenfassung In dem Artikel „The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, veröffentlicht im Jahre 2013 im Journal of Civil Society, versuchten Mary Kaldor und Sabine Selchow die spezifischen Qualitäten der Aufstände zum Ausdruck zu bringen, die nach 2010 in den europäischen Ländern ausbrachen – Deutschland, Spanien, Italien, England usw. Nach Ansicht der Autoren erhält der Modus der Organisation, der den Hauptkörper dieser emanzipatorischen Bewegungen bildet, seine grundlegende Logik aus der Welt des Internets. Die Analogie mit dem Internet erfor- dert eine Neubewertung der negativen Kommentare über die Technologie aus philosophischer Perspektive. Martin Heidegger und Herbert Marcuse sind die einflussreichsten Philosophen, die sich mit den negativen Aspekten der Technologie in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts befasst haben. Heidegger schilderte die zerstörerischen Auswirkungen der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft und Technologie auf die westliche Kultur durch die Kritik an der traditionellen abend- ländischen Metaphysik auf der phänomenologisch-ontologischen Ebene, während Marcuse, ein Mitglied des westlichen Marxismus, seine Kritik an der Technologie im Rahmen des Konzepts der instrumentellen Rationalität und der Kritik der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft und Kapitalismus geformt hat. Obgleich die Ansatzpunkte ihrer Perspektiven über die Technologie und die zugrunde liegenden Zwecke ihrer Kritik an der Technologie unterschiedlich waren, kann behauptet werden, dass beide eine eher negative und fast völlig pessimistische Einstellung zur Technologie hatten. In diesem Zusammenhang werden Heideggers und Marcuses Kritiken an der Technologie diskutiert sowie Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Kri- tiken aufgezeigt. Abschließend unterstreicht das Paper die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer positiven Rolle für die Technologie, die als Alternative zur negativen Perspektive dienen kann, indem sie Licht in das Verhältnis zwischen aktuellen Aufständen und Internet bringt. Schlüsselwörter Technologie, Rationalität, Freiheit, Gestell, Kritik, Revoltebewegungen, Internet, Politik //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// L’émancipation humaine est-elle possible à travers la technologie ? Résumé Dans l’article « The “Bubbling Up” of Suberranean Politics in Europe » publié en 2013 dans Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor et Sabine Selchow tentent de mettre en lumière les caractéristiques spécifiques des révoltes qui ont fait jour après 2010 dans certains pays européens – Allemagne, Espagne, Italie, Angleterre, etc. Selon nos auteures, le mode d’organisation qui a formé le corps essentiel de ces mouvements émancipatoires tire sa logique de base du monde de l’internet. Cette analogie avec l’internet requiert une réévaluation, à partir d’un point de vue philosophique, des commentaires négatifs sur la technologie. Martin Heidegger et Herbert Marcuse sont les philosophes les plus influents ayant travaillé sur les aspects négatifs de la technologie au sein de la philosophie du XXe siècle. Heidegger a dépeint les effets destructeurs de la raison scientifique et de la technologie de notre culture occidentale à travers son criticisme de la métaphysique traditionnelle occidentale à un niveau phénoménologico-ontologique, tandis que Marcuse, membre du « communisme occidentale », a formé une critique de la technologie au sein du concept de rationalité instrumentale et une critique de la société industrielle avancée et du capitalisme. Bien que le point de départ de leur perspective sur la technologie et que le but sous-jacent de leur critique diffèrent, il est possible d’affirmer que leur point commun est d’avoir posé un regard négatif et presque entièrement pessimiste sur la technologie. À cet égard, le criticisme d’Heidegger et de Marcuse vont être abordés afin d’en soulever les différences et les similarités. Enfin, cet article mettra l’accent sur la possibilité d’un rôle positif de la technologie qui pourrait servir d’alternative aux perspectives négatives en faisant la lumière sur le lien entre les révoltes actuelles et l’internet. Mots-clés technologie, rationalité, liberté, mettre en forme, criticisme, mouvements de révolte, internet, politique //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Je li moguća ljudska emancipacija kroz tehniku? Sažetak U članku »The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe«, objavljenom 2013. u časopisu Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor i Sabine Selchow pokušale su otkriti specifične značajke pobuna koje su se javila nakon 2010. godine u europskim zemljama poput Njemačke, Španjolske, Italije, Engleske itd. Prema autoricama, način organiziranja koji čini glavno tijelo ovih emancipatornih pokreta preuzima svoju osnovnu logiku iz svijeta Interneta. Analogija s Internetom zahtijeva ponovnu evaluaciju negativnih komentara o tehnici iz filozofske perspektive. Martin Heidegger i Herbert Marcuse najutjecajniji su filozofi 20. stoljeća koji su se bavili negativnim aspektima tehnike. Heidegger je prikazao destruktivne učinke znanstvene racionalnosti i tehnike na zapadnu kulturu kroz kritiku tradicionalne zapadne metafizike na fenomenološko-ontološkoj razini, dok je Marcuse, kao predstavnik zapadnoga marksizma, oblikovao svoju kritiku tehnike u kontekstu pojma instrumentalne racionalnosti te kritike razvijenog industrijskog društva i kapitalizma. Iako su polazišne točke njihovih pogleda na tehniku, kao i osnovne svrhe kritike tehnike, različite, može se reći da obojica imaju poprilično negativno i gotovo u potpunosti pesimističko shvaćanje tehnologije. U tom će se kontekstu razmotriti Heideggerova i Marcuseova kritika tehnike kao i razlike i sličnosti između tih dvaju pristupa. Zaključno će rad naglasiti mogućnost pozitivne uloge tehnike, koja može služiti kao alternativa negativnoj perspektivi osvjetljavajući odnos između nedavnih pobuna i interneta. Ključne riječi tehnologija, racionalnost, sloboda, postav, kritika, pobunjenički pokreti, Internet, politika. (shrink)

This article calls into question the simplistic identification of modern technology with quantitative efficiency in order to develop three main themes. First, I establish that technology, broadly construed, is the use of knowledge and resources to meet specific human needs. Accordingly, dominant technical practice that favors efficiency and numerical criteria and discriminates against other technologies should more appropriately be called “technology of technology.” Second, I delineate how dominant practice in engineering is an exemplar of technology of technology, when it (...) becomes socially ambitious while remaining technically provincial and bears upon our personal and institutional life. Third, I illustrate what I call the “subjugated technical practice,” which exists under the rule of the dominant technical practice. Recognizing the importance of subjugated technical practices to engineering, I propose the concept of “critical technology of technology,” which is intended to advance technological alternatives and make critique an essential part of our technological world. (shrink)

I present Gilbert Simondon’s thinking of technics, that I take to be so compelling today because it articulates technological reality in ecological terms as a technogeography and life as being-with-the-machines. I will flesh out Simondon’s program for a being-with-the-machines, show how it corresponds to the essence of the technical objects described in terms of milieu and relation indicate how this is based on Simondon’s ontology of individuation suggest a criticism of Simondon, insofar as he would underestimate the technicality of (...) the human being him/herself and of his/her world. (shrink)

The use of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in health care opens up new opportunities for the measurement of the human. Their application aims not only at gathering more and better data points but also at doing it less invasive. With this change in health care towards its extension to almost all areas of life and its increasing invisibility and opacity, new questions of transparency arise. While the complex human-machine interactions involved in deploying and using AI tend to (...) become non-transparent, the use of these technologies makes the patient seemingly transparent. Papers on the ethical implementation of AI plead for transparency but neglect the factor of the “transparent patient” as intertwined with AI. Transparency in this regard appears to be Janus-faced: The precondition for receiving help - e.g., treatment advice regarding the own health - is to become transparent for the digitized health care system. That is, for instance, to donate data and become visible to the AI and its operators. The paper reflects on this entanglement of transparent patients and (non-) transparent technology. It argues that transparency regarding both AI and humans is not an ethical principle per se but an infraethical concept. Further, it is no sufficient basis for avoiding harm and human dignity violations. Rather, transparency must be enriched by intelligibility following Judith Butler’s use of the term. Intelligibility is understood as an epistemological presupposition for recognition and the ensuing humane treatment. Finally, the paper highlights ways to testify intelligibility in dealing with AI in health care ex ante, ex post, and continuously. (shrink)

During the last decades several tools have been developed to anticipate the future impact of new and emerging technologies. Many of these focus on ‘hard,’ quantifiable impacts, investigating how novel technologies may affect health, environment and safety. Much less attention is paid to what might be called ‘soft’ impacts: the way technology influences, for example, the distribution of social roles and responsibilities, moral norms and values, or identities. Several types of technology assessment and of scenario studies can be used to (...) anticipate such soft impacts. We argue, however, that these methods do not recognize the dynamic character of morality and its interaction with technology. As a result, they miss an important opportunity to broaden the scope of social and political deliberation on new and emerging technologies.In this paper we outline a framework for building scenarios that enhance the techno-moral imagination by anticipating how technology, morality and their interaction might evolve. To show what kind of product might result from this framework, a scenario is presented as an exemplar. This scenario focuses on developments in biomedical nanotechnology and the moral regime of experimenting with human beings. Finally, the merits and limitations of our framework and the resulting type of scenarios are discussed. (shrink)

Governance theory in political science and international relations has to adapt to the onset of an increasingly digital society. However, until now, technological advancements and the increasing convergence of technologies outpace regulatory efforts and frustrate any efforts to apply ethical and legal frameworks to these domains. This is due to the convergence of multiple, sometimes incompatible governance frameworks that accompany the integration of technologies on different platforms. This theoretical claim will be illustrated by examples such as the integration of (...) technologies on the “human platform” as it is referred to in the case of enhanced soldiers. Hence, successful governance might require new approaches borrowed from a distant relative, namely cybernetics. Insights gained from cybernetics for governance theories might be able to give guidance for a more efficient and adaptive governance approach that is able to deal with increasing complexity caused by technology and governance convergence. While cybernetics itself might be considered a governance approach, it has had surprisingly little reception in the wider field of governance within the area of social and political sciences. This article will develop cybernetic governance as a set of expandable governance principles that are applicable to an increasingly complex digital and smart society. It thereby tries to further galvanise what could be termed cybernetic governance theory as a subject of worthwhile insights from the combination of otherwise largely the disjoined fields of cybernetics and governance. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at (...) most bearers of instrumental value. (shrink)

Essay I explores brain machine interface technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers an inquiry into the ethical problems that are likely to emerge. Essay II, co-written with professor Sven-Ove Hansson, presents a novel procedure to engage the public in deliberations on the potential impacts of technology. This procedure, convergence seminar, is a form of scenario-based discussion that (...) is founded on the idea of hypothetical retrospection. The theoretical background and the results of the five seminars are presented. Essay III discusses moral bioenhancement, an instance of human enhancement that alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behavior. Moral bioenhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy is behavioral enhancement. The second strategy, favored by prominent defenders of moral enhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. Essay IV considers the possibility and potential desirability of sensory enhancement. It is proposed that existing sensory modalities in vertebrate animals are proof of concept of what is biologically possible to create in humans. Three considerations on the normative aspects of sensory enhancement are also presented in this essay. Essay V rejects disease prioritarianism, the idea that the healthcare system ought to prioritize the treatment of diseases. Instead, an approach that focuses on what medicine can accomplish is proposed. Essay VI argues that from the idea that species have an intrinsic value and that humanity has a collective responsibility to protect animal species from extinction, the conclusion that we ought to recreate species follows. Essay VII argues that unknown existential risks have not been properly addressed. It proposes a heuristic for doing so, and a concrete strategy. This strategy consists in building refuges that could withstand a large number of catastrophic events. (shrink)

All the medical and bioethical questions, ranging from stem cell research to converging technologies and synthetic biology, touch on the question regarding the image of human beings and their position in the cosmos, by which we are able to orient ourselves. This article argues that the biblical belief in creation and the discourse about humans as created beings by and in the image of God can still be proclaimed as a viable form of human self-interpretation in (...) the present. The distinction between practical knowledge and knowledge of orientation may be of help here. Guidance for how to live and act is not best found in abstract principles, but rather in meaningful stories, in metaphors and symbols. On this level, too, is also where faith in creation and the certainty of our own creatureliness is located. Contribution: This article interprets the doctrine of creation by a hermeneutical theology. It analyses the interdependence between hermeneutics and criticism in the process of reinterpreting the classical propositions about the human being and the world as God’s creation and the relation of anthropology and ethics. The aim is to show what might be the contribution of Christian faith in creation to the approach of an ethics of responsibility in the field of bioethics and ecology. The specific contribution of this article to current debates on an ethics of creation is the thesis that the key to a well-balanced theological approach to all this is the Pauline doctrine of justification as interpreted by the protestant reformers. (shrink)

Presently we are experiencing a world where distributed information reshapes human modes of expression and being. The avalanche of images presented to us daily shifts our attention between numerous contexts and systems of meaning. Faced with the intensity of this broadcast, one tends to turn to abbreviations and flattening of the message. Jacques Rancier talks about aesthetics as a form of disconnected experience, which operates as a disinterested gaze. The disconnection serves as a coping mechanism allowing one to function (...) within the informational deluge. On the other hand, this flattening of an image does not represent the whole truth. Behind every image one senses a depth of meanings, which gives rise to a particular manifestation. In this article, I propose that image hides a being, which through that image individuates itself. While the acquisition of specific qualities constitutes this process of individuation, the being is the motion and agency enabling the process. Culture can be seen as technology and prosthesis, which facilitates memory of our mortality and forces us to individuate. Following this logic, image as part of culture is a technology of being. (shrink)

Introduction. A human and the world are an organically connected part and whole, they are always a single World, and therefore they can only evolve together, in one direction. The human world consists of many interconnected and interdepend- ent parts. If any one of the parts (for example, technology) begins to dominate and claim the sta- tus of the whole, then the problem of violating the optimal ratio in the coexistence and co-evolutionary development of each of the parts, (...) and hence the whole itself, becomes aggravated. Hence, the eco-humanistic problem arises. The purpose of the work is to present the content and substantiate the theoretical and practical significance of eco-humanism as a new humanitar- ian knowledge and methodology for understanding the specifics of the relationship “man — technical and-technological world”. Methods. The author uses the methods of dia- lectics, systemic and synergetic approaches, the project (projective) method, which is implemented in the design and development of a new philo- sophical and scientific discipline of eco-humanism, and ideas of co-evolution. Scientific novelty of the research. The author determines basic foundations of eco-humanism as a new type of humanitarian knowledge; formulates and meaningfully substan- tiates the main principles of eco-humanism as a methodological setting for the ecologization of a person and the world: optimality, coordination and dominance of the whole (integrity) in relation to its parts. Results. Eco-humanistics is defined as a new type of knowledge about a person and a specific setting of his thinking and practical activities, focused on finding ways and means to achieve op- timality in relation to various aspects (for example, technical and anthropological) in a person’s being to ensure the possibility of their fruitful existence, to preserve and reproduce a person (as a unique integrity) and his world (as a universal integrity), in their interconnected and interdependent unity. Conclusions. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that the theoretical development of eco-humanistics will make it possible to study and analyze the phenomena of modern culture in a more multifaceted way, to get a more accurate interpretation of the ways of human existence and eco-cultural practices that provide the effect of the state of the “ecosystem” in situations of any intense socio-cultural transformations. (shrink)

This book brings phenomenology, the main player in the continental tradition of philosophy, to bioethics. Medical science and emerging technologies are examined as endeavours that bring enormous possibilities in relieving human suffering but also great risks in transforming our fundamental life views.

In popular lay discourse, objections to human biological enhancement technologies are sometimes expressed in terms of the charge that they are unnatural. This paper critiques the literal claim that seems to be presented here, namely that such technologies are in some ordinary sense ’unnatural' and that it follows from this they are immoral. Such a conceptual ’nature argument' is unsound. However, the paper contends that this does not mean that the charge of unnaturalness should be dismissed out of hand. (...) Rather, the charge of unnaturalness made by a non-philosophically trained public can be construed as expressive of a general attitude of conservative concern about enhancement technologies. Viewed in this way, the charge invites philosophers to take seriously the underlying empirical concerns that underpin these widespread lay reactions. (shrink)

The theory of technological mediation aims to take technological artifacts seriously, recognizing the constitutive role they play in how we experience the world, act in it, and how we are constituted as (moral) subjects. Its quest for a compatible ethics has led it to Foucault’s “care of the self,” i.e., a transformation of the self by oneself through self-discipline. In this regard, technologies have been interpreted as power structures to which one can relate through Foucaultian “technologies of the (...) self” or ascetic practices. However, this leaves unexplored how concrete technologies can actuallysupportthe process of self-care. This paper explores this possibility by examining one such technology: a gamified To-Do list app. Doing so, it first shows that despite the apparent straightforwardness of gamification, confrontation and shame play an important role in how the app motivates me to do better. Second, inspired by Ihde’s schema of human-technology relations, it presents different ways in which the app may confront me with myself. Subsequently, it accounts for the motivation and shame that this technologically mediated confrontation with myself invokes through a Levinasian account of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, it also shows how Levinas’ phenomenology implies a responsibility for self-care and how nonhuman, technological others may still call me to responsibility. It concludes with a reflection on the role of gamification in technologically mediated subjectivation and some implications for design. (shrink)

A passionate defence of humanity and a work of radical optimism from the international bestselling author of Postcapitalism How do we preserve what makes us human in an age of uncertainty? Are we now just consumers shaped by market forces? A sequence of DNA? A collection of base instincts? Or will we soon be supplanted by algorithms and A.I. anyway? In Clear Bright Future, Paul Mason calls for a radical, impassioned defence of the human being, our universal rights (...) and freedoms and our power to change the world around us. Ranging from economics to Big Data, from neuroscience to the culture wars, he draws from his on-the-ground reporting from mass protests in Istanbul to riots in Washington, as well as his own childhood in an English mining community, to show how the notion of humanity has become eroded as never before. In this book Paul Mason argues that we are still capable - through language, innovation and co-operation - of shaping our future. He offers a vision of humans as more than puppets, customers or cogs in a machine. This work of radical optimism asks: Do you want to be controlled? Or do you want something better? (shrink)

Despite the many turns that philosophy of technology has undergone in recent decades, the question of the nature and limits of technological determinism (TD) has been neglected, because it was considered as solved and overcome, and therefore not worth further discussion. This paper once again raises the problem of TD, by trying to save the opposing, but complementary elements of truth of the two main forms of TD that I shall call “nomological” and “normative”: (a) technology is all-pervasive and (...) has an inexorable capacity for extending itself into every field of human life, and (b) we have a capacity to counteract and orient technology, at least in some measure. In order to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent claims, the key move for my argument is a brief analysis of the notion of scientific experiment from the perspective of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. As a result, two senses of technology are distinguished, which I shall call respectively “reflective” and “methodological.” From the point of view of this distinction, the all-pervasiveness and inexorability of technology and the in principle irreducibility of human persons to technology—which nomological and normative TD assert dialectically one against the other—can be reconciled. Among other things, this requires the rejection (in one fundamental sense) of the widely held assumption, made both by nomological and normative TD, that technology is a cultural field whose contents can be neatly separated from the rest of human culture. This thesis should be replaced by the more qualified claim of the reflective unity and the methodological multiplicity of technology. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1 The Problem of Subjectivism -- 2 The Self: Dispersion and Constancy -- 3 Decentering the Subject: Works of Art as Heroes -- 4 Practice, Language, and Poetry -- 5 Language: The Transcendental Path -- 6 Language as a Web -- 7 The Human Being as Speaker and Mortal -- 8 Being Human in the Age of Technology.

In 1968, Jürgen Habermas claimed that, in an advanced technological society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the ‘forgotten experience of reflection’. In this article, we argue that, in the contemporary situation, critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a process of mutual learning, a consciously organised process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards optimising (...) class='Hi'>human cognition. In order to create a deliberative ambiance, fostering critical upstream reflection on emerging technologies, we developed the concept of a mutual learning exercise. Building on a number of case studies, we analyse what an MLE involves, both practically and conceptually, focussing on key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of ‘genres of the imagination’ and the profiles of various ‘subcultures of debate’. Ideally, an MLE becomes a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple and sometimes unexpected voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other, in order to strength-en the societal robustness and responsiveness of emerg-ing technologies. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent debate on the ethics of human enhancement. A number of prominent authors have been concerned about or critical of the use of technology to alter or enhance human beings, citing threats to human nature and dignity as one basis for these concerns. Frances Kamm has given a detailed rebuttal of Sandel's arguments, arguing that human enhancement is permissible. Nicholas Agar, in his book Liberal Eugenics, argues that enhancement should be permissible (...) but not obligatory. He argues that what distinguishes liberal eugenics from the objectionable eugenic practices of the Nazis is that it is not based on a single conception of a desirable genome and that it is voluntary and not obligatory. This article takes a more provocative position. It aims to argue that, far from its being merely permissible, we have a moral obligation or moral reason to enhance ourselves and our children. Indeed, we have the same kind of obligation as we have to treat and prevent disease. It begins by considering the current interests in and possibilities of enhancement. It then offers three arguments that we have very strong reasons to seek to enhance. (shrink)

Trust is a central dimension in the relation between human beings and technologies. In many discourses about technology, the relation between human beings and technologies is conceptualized as an external relation: a relation between pre-given entities that can have an impact on each other but that do not mutually constitute each other. From this perspective, relations of trust can vary between _reliance_, as is present for instance in technological extensionism, and _suspicion_, as in various precautionary (...) approaches in ethics that focus on technological risks. Against these two interpretations of trust, this article develops a third one. Based on a more internal account of the relations between human beings and technologies, it becomes possible to see that every technological development puts at stake what it means to be a human being. Using technologies, then, implies trusting ourselves _to_ technologies. We argue that this does not imply an uncritical subjection to technology. Rather, recognizing that technologies help to constitute human subjectivity implies that human beings can get actively involved in processes of technological mediation. Trust then has the character of _confidence_: deliberately trusting oneself _to_ technology. (shrink)

Over the years, many movies have presented on-screen a struggle between machines and human beings. Typically, the machines have come to rule and threaten the existence of humanity. They must be conquered to ensure the survival of and to secure the freedom of the human race. Although these movies appear to expose the dangers of an autonomous and hegemonic technology and to champion the human being, they do not. Humans do not in the end triumph over (...) technology but merge with the machine. Instead of liberation from technological domination, the movies in question depict as inevitable the total surrender and absorption of humanity to and into technology. These movies lead to a denial of the true conditions of our existence in technology. Many films could serve to illustrate the problem, but this study focuses on two representative film trilogies: The Terminator and The Matrix. (shrink)

I focus on Miki’s concept of the imagination as developed in his Logic of Imagination together with his understanding of technology that he also develops in his contemporaneous work Philosophy of Technology. Taking off from Kant’s productive imagination (Einbildung), Miki’s philosophy exposes the ontological function of the imagination in its construction, or formation (Bildung), of the world as well as our own being, in Heideggerian terms, our being-in-the-world. This formation of the world and self that is an embodied praxis is (...) technological, radically altering the environment along with ourselves, thus mediating between human beings and their surroundings and extending our somatic nature into the environing world. Moreover this ontological formation is social or collective, rather than simply being a matter of the individual subject. Through this dynamic process, the world unfolds as historical, and the imagination and technology are thus constitutive of what Miki calls, in Nishidian terms, the historical world. I will conclude with some critical assessments of Miki’s philosophy in regard to the Anthropocene and Miki’s claim that the imagination is operative within nature itself and the need to update Miki’s dialectic of continuity and discontinuity between nature and culture in light of more recent scientific discoveries and technological advances. (shrink)

We continuously talk about autonomous technologies. But how can words qualifying technologies be the very same words chosen by Kant to define what is essentially human, i.e. being autonomous? The article focuses on a possible answer by reflecting upon both etymological and philosophical issues, as well as upon the case of autonomous vehicles. Most interestingly, on the one hand, we have the notion of “autonomy”, meaning that there is a “law” that is “self-given”, and, on the other hand, we (...) have the notion of “automation”, meaning that there is something “offhand” that is “self-given”. Yet, we are experiencing a kind of twofold shift: on the one hand, the shift from defining technologies in terms of automation to defining technologies in terms of autonomy and, on the other hand, the shift from defining humans in terms of autonomy to defining humans in terms of automation. From a philosophical perspective, the shift may mean that we are trying to escape precisely from what autonomy founds, i.e. individual responsibility of humans that, in the Western culture, have been defined for millennia as rational and moral decision-makers, even when their decisions have been the toughest. More precisely, the shift may mean that we are using technologies, and in particular emerging algorithmic technologies, as scapegoats that bear responsibility for us by making decisions for us. Moreover, if we consider the kind of emerging algorithmic technologies that increasingly surround us, starting from autonomous vehicles, then we may argue that we also seem to create a kind of technological divine that, by being always with us through its immanent omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and inscrutability, can always be our technological scapegoat freeing us from the most unbearable burden of individual responsibility resulting from individual autonomy. (shrink)

Robots are becoming an increasingly pervasive feature of our personal lives. As a result, there is growing importance placed on examining what constitutes appropriate behavior when they interact with human beings. In this paper, we discuss whether companion robots should be permitted to “nudge” their human users in the direction of being “more ethical”. More specifically, we use Rawlsian principles of justice to illustrate how robots might nurture “socially just” tendencies in their human counterparts. Designing (...) class='Hi'>technological artifacts in such a way to influence human behavior is already well-established but merely because the practice is commonplace does not necessarily resolve the ethical issues associated with its implementation. (shrink)

Human enhancement technologies raise serious ethical questions about health practices no longer content simply to treat disease, but which now also propose to “optimize” human beings’ physical, cognitive and psychological abilities. These technologies call for a reassessment of our relationship to health, the human body and the body's organic, identity and social functions. In nursing, such considerations are in their infancy. In this paper, we argue for the relevance of critical phenomenology as a way to better (...) understand the ethical issues related to human enhancement technologies (HET). In so doing, we seek to problematize HET and assess their influence on the future development of nursing science and practice. It is difficult to anticipate the concrete effects of HET, we suggest, because these practices reconfigure the meaning of normativity and disorient our conventional ethical landscape. In this context, we argue that the later work of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault invites a critical perspective into how techno‐scientific discourses modify our relationship to care, to health and to our own social and corporeal identities. Despite the traditional philosophical opposition between phenomenology and critical theory, we maintain that a hybrid critical phenomenological approach opens new ways to assess the integration of technology and practice. Our analysis understands HET as a process of “hybridization” between technological objects and human subjects. Critical phenomenology thus effectively questions anthropocentric definitions of technology, challenges the dichotomy between curative treatment and enhancement and, finally, prompts valuable reflection on the implications of HET for nursing theory and practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:- Our universe is home to millions of galaxies, thousands of different species of flora and fauna, inhabited on different ecosystems, like under the ocean surface, in the air, on the surface of land, and inside the earth. Every single organism, whether biotic or abiotic, has a role to play in the universe. Above all these things, there is a crown of all the creation, and that we call as ‘man.’ Man has a significant place in the universe; therefore he (...) has a significant role to play here. What distinguishes a man from all the other creations is the possession of conscious, which according to the philosophers makes him the ‘desired creation.’ Every other thing, ranging from an atom to the mighty oceans and mountains are for the use of man, but the human is created for doing justice in the world with the creations of God. Keywords:- Existence, Human, Justice, Universe, Wonder. (shrink)

Immersive virtual reality (VR) emerges as a promising research and clinical tool. However, several studies suggest that VR induced adverse symptoms and effects (VRISE) may undermine the health and safety standards, and the reliability of the scientific results. In the current literature review, the technical reasons for the adverse symptomatology are investigated to provide suggestions and technological knowledge for the implementation of VR head-mounted display (HMD) systems in cognitive neuroscience. The technological systematic literature indicated features pertinent to display, (...) sound, motion tracking, navigation, ergonomic interactions, user experience, and computer’s hardware that should be considered by the researchers. Subsequently, a meta-analysis of 44 neuroscientific or neuropsychological studies involving VR HMD systems was performed. The meta-analysis of the VR studies demonstrated that the new generation HMDs induced significantly fewer dropouts and VRISE. Importantly, the commercial versions of the new generation HMDs with ergonomic interactions had zero incidents of adverse symptomatology and dropouts. Solely, HMDs equivalent to or greater than the commercial versions of contemporary HMDs accompanied with ergonomic interactions are suitable for implementation in cognitive neuroscience. In conclusion, researchers’ technological competency, along with meticulous methods and reports pertinent to software, hardware, and VRISE, are paramount to ensure the health and safety standards and the reliability of neuroscientific results. (shrink)