My subject on this occasion goes uneasily with my piety. Lordship did not as such much interest my teachers William E. Lunt and Joseph R. Strayer, who were leaders in their turn of the Medieval Academy of America. In their presidential addresses of 1954 and 1968 both scholars dealt magisterially with subjects each had studied for forty years. Lunt spoke on financial relations of the papacy with England, Strayer on the place of Normandy and Languedoc in the building (...) of an administrative monarchy in France. It is easy to see that in a considerable sense both historians were working on medieval government, and it is some measure of their achievement that even today no one wishing to be informed in this grand subject can do much better than read Lunt and Strayer. I wish I could discourse on my own years of research as did those admirable scholars. If I cannot, it is not simply because I lack the accumulated erudition to reflect summarily on my work; it is also because I lack the conceptual serenity of my teachers in our common subject matter. Like Lunt and Strayer I have worked on justice, finance, and the beginnings of parliamentary life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; unlike those mentors I became uneasy about the paradigm in which these studies were framed. I came to wonder how Strayer could have held students, myself included, spellbound with details about the deportment of judges or sergeants while saying nothing about the adequacy of concepts like “government” or “administration” to describe such behavior. Believing there was something timeless about the action of people in power, he was gifted at evoking the ways of modern bureaucrats in those “corridors of power” he knew from his own experience in Washington. He assumed with other historians of his day and ours that all societies have governments, so that he could speak of feudalism as essentially a “method of government,” of “political organization … reduced to the simplest possible terms.”. (shrink)

This paper examines two realisations of the television talk show in North America: The Oprah Winfrey Show and Dr. Phil, looking specifically at how they function within the sub-genre of ‘therapeutic talk show’ in keeping with Livingstone and Lunt’s (1994) classification of talk shows. Talk shows are defined by Ilie (2001) as “semi-institutional discourse” having features of a given setting (TV studio), topic- and goal-oriented talk, high degree of topic control, as well as restrictions on time and turn-taking. Theorists (...) examining this sub-genre of therapeutic talk show have argued that it provides a valuable means by which stories otherwise unrecognized have a forum, or that values of truth and honesty can be conveyed (Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Masciarotte 1991; Carbaugh 1988). However, theorists such as Abt and Seesholtz (1994) view therapeutic talk shows as potentially demeaning to guests who appear on them as well as a means by which suffering can be trivialized. Through an examination and analysis of requests for information, both direct and indirect, which are the principal features of all interviews, I look at how Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil problematize the narratives told by their guests. Both hosts rely heavily on one type of request, B-Event assertions functioning as indirect requests for information, to provoke specific response. My findings indicate that these talk shows do not in fact provide a forum for talk that would otherwise not be considered as suggested by Livingstone and Lunt (1994). Both Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil appropriate the stories provided by their guests; they also participate in their own overarching meta-narrative whereby as ‘heroes’ they solve their guests’ problems within a given time frame. Guests’ narrative responses share more with the speech act of confession than with free self-expression. The speech act of confession encouraged by these therapeutic talk shows serves in turn to reinforce conservatively-held values on the part of the at-home audience for whom such confession is also entertainment. (shrink)

Opening the round table, I. T. Frolov, editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii, stated that discussing problems of this type today, the task lies not so much in emphasizing their general and traditional aspects but in finding a scientific and practical solution to new problems of interaction of man and nature that can now be solved only on a global scale. Furthermore, he observed that discussion of these problems as questions of morality, in terms of pessimistic or optimistic evaluation, is very important (...) but certainly entirely inadequate. Not only social and philosophical but many political conclusions follow from a discussion of problems of interaction between man and nature. Investigation and solution of these problems, which require concrete scientific and practical approaches, may facilitate the development of such policies as peaceful coexistence, strengthening of neighborly treaty relations, and so forth. Solving these problems will help peoples come closer together and contribute to the firmer establishment of peace throughout the world. (shrink)

-- v. 4. Tshad ma rig pa -- v. 5. Dbu ma -- v. 6. Mdzod ʼdul.

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)

We do not usually draw conclusions and summarize the results of our round table meetings. The speakers share their ideas, divergent viewpoints are discussed, and a certain level of approach to the problems under discussion is formulated. Therefore, today I will also not attempt to draw a conclusion.

t. 1. Igry rynka -- t. 2. Torgovet︠s︡ v Khrame.

Sanskrit treatise on Jaina ethics and doctrines.

-- ch. 2. Tekhnosfera i osnovy sovremennykh tekhnologiĭ.

Après avoir situé la signification politique de la Convention et du projet de Constitution, l’article analyse la place reconnue aux valeurs dans le projet européen, d’abord dans l’histoire de l’institution européenne depuis 1950, ensuite dans son développement. Il met ensuite en avant la nécessité d’un débat politique interconvictionnel sur les questions fondamentales du sens dans la société européenne. Il situe dans ce cadre les débats difficiles qui ont eu lieu autour des préambules de la Charte des droits fondamentaux et de (...) la Constitution , et autour de l’article 51 . Enfin, il explicite quelques conditions d’une participation féconde des Églises au débat européen. (shrink)

The systems approach and systems research as a whole are currently experiencing a period of intensive development, which is due both to widening of their areas of application and incorporation into this area of various kinds of practical activity connected with science and technology and to a more intensive treatment of certain aspects of this approach. All of this inevitably demands further development of the philosophical range of inquiry into the systems approach.