Corporate Social Responsibility amongst Small and Medium Enterprises is often characterised in the literature as unstructured, informal and ad hoc discretionary philanthropic activities. Drawing insights from recent theoretical/analytical frameworks :52–78, 2010), and on empirical data collected from both Nigeria and Tanzania, we found that CSR practices in SMEs are much more nuanced than previously presented. In addition, SMEs undertake their CSR practices to varying degrees in multiple spaces—i.e. the workplace, marketplace, community and the ecological environment. These CSR practices go beyond (...) philanthropy and in some instances involve institutional works aimed at addressing some of the institutional gaps in the environments where these SMEs operate. The paper makes a contribution by drawing attention to the multiple spaces of CSR practices amongst SMEs, and the institutional works they do, which are often taken for granted in the extant literature. We provide a unique perspective—by arguing that what is frequently conceptualised as philanthropic CSR in Africa is ‘institutional works’. (shrink)

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)

t. 1. Igry rynka -- t. 2. Torgovet︠s︡ v Khrame.

Sanskrit treatise on Jaina ethics and doctrines.

-- ch. 2. Tekhnosfera i osnovy sovremennykh tekhnologiĭ.

Literature; hermeneutics; theory, etc.; history and criticism.

Данная работа является попыткой рассмотреть проблему рациональности, главным образом, как проблему познания, не исключая при этом ее мировоззренческого и аксиологического аспектов.

Cultural education for the soldiers of People army of Vietnam.