Ethical dilemmas require evaluation of alternatives in light of conflicting principles. Because of the difficulty of making and defending such complex decisions, we may compromise the quality of our ethical decisions and debates. We need a methodology that combines the weighted effects of multiple ethical guidelines on the issue at hand. This paper describes how the Analytic Hierarchy Process can help us improve ethical decision making.

The article defends three claims regarding the relation between the different formulas of the categorical imperative. On its prevailing reading, FUL gives different moral guidance than FH; left answered, this problem is an argument for adopting a competing perspective on FUL. The prohibitions and commands of the formulas should be taken to be extensionally the same; but FKE adds a dimension missing from the others, gained by uniting their perspectives, namely, bringing the variety of moral laws into systematic unity. The (...) grammatically ambiguous phrase inGMS, 4: 436.9–10 claims that FA alone unites the other formulas in itself. (shrink)

Previous studies suggested that emotions can be correctly interpreted from facial expressions in the absence of conscious awareness of the face. Our goal was to explore whether subordinate information about a face’s gender and race could also become available without awareness of the face. Participants classified the race or the gender of unfamiliar faces that were ambiguous with regard to these dimensions. The ambiguous faces were preceded by face-images that unequivocally represented gender and race, rendered consciously invisible by simultaneous continuous-flash-suppression. (...) The classification of ambiguous faces was biased away from the category of the adaptor only when it was consciously visible. The duration of subjective visibility correlated with the aftereffect strength. Moreover, face identity was consequential only if consciously perceived. These results suggest that while conscious awareness is not needed for basic level categorization, it is needed for subordinate categorization. Emotional information might be unique in this respect. (shrink)

The notion of aesthetic ideas is of great importance to Kant's thinking about art. Despite its importance, he says little about it. He characterizes aesthetic ideas as representations of the imagination and says that the gift of artistic genius is the inscrutable capacity to envision them. Furthermore, they are counterparts of rational ideas. Works of art thus sensibly present rational ideas; the pleasure they occasion is a consequence of the enriching process of reflection upon the wealth of content they sensibly (...) present. The purpose of this article is to ask whether all rational ideas have aesthetic ideas as counterparts, and so can be presented in art, or whether only some do and which. The answer should reveal what, for Kant, is the subject-matter of art. I argue that for Kant art is concerned with the range and variety of human freedom as well as with its highest fulfillment in morality. (shrink)

The claim that art has no role to play in what is of highest significance for modernity is often attributed to Hegel. Against this interpretation, the paper makes the following claims: First, Hegel does not claim that art is simply superseded in modernity by rational reflection. Artistic expression remains an essential human need in modernity. Second, Hegel’s ideal of modern ethical life in which values shape human nature has an essentially aesthetic shape. Third, Hegel describes the foundation of a new (...) shared form of life—in particular, the ideal ethical life of the future—not as a rational act of legislation, but as the politically creative work of art. This idea appears in Hegel’s early thinking and shapes his mature thought of the figure of the world-historical individual. Finally, Hegel turns to art to give life to the tragedy of the foundation of the state in his discussions of Sophocles’ Antigone and Schiller’s Wallenstein. (shrink)

Many of its students are first drawn to Kant's practical philosophy because it seems to promise a theory of morality both objective and practicable. Moral theory, as Kant conceives of it, must abst...

The article investigates the function and signification of doors in two silent films, Ernst Lubitsch's 1916 When I Was Dead and Charlie Chaplin's 1917 The Adventurer. Taking a theoretical perspective provided by the field of intellectual inquiry known as cultural techniques (Kulturtechniken), the door in these films is studied with respect to its procedural and functional operations. Specifically, the article focuses on the ways in which the employment of doors in each of the films relates to these films' configurations of (...) inside and outside as conceptual realms. The analysis presented shows that Lubitsch and Chaplin engage doors in uniquely different ways. It further reveals that, while the operation of the door in When I Was Dead reinforces an exclusive binary of inside and outside, which itself can be traced back to the film's concern with sexual difference, the operation of the door in The Adventurer essentially deconstructs the inside/outside binary, an act that can be linked to a critique of contemporary notions of industrial management and the treatment of humans as machines. (shrink)

Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex . To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: the welfare of (...) others ; and our own moral being . Feelings shape our particular moral acts . I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties. (shrink)

Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active agents (...) acquire moral knowledge. I argue that Sticker appears to construe universalization as a formal test that presupposes no moral knowledge and that so construed the test cannot serve for acquiring moral knowledge. (shrink)

Kant announces that the Critique of the Power of Judgment will bring his entire critical enterprise to an end. But it is by no means agreed upon that it in fact does so and, if it does, how. In this book, Ido Geiger argues that a principal concern of the third Critique is completing the account of the transcendental conditions of empirical experience and knowledge. This includes both Kant's analysis of natural beauty and his discussion of teleological judgments of organisms (...) and of nature generally. Geiger's original reading of the third Critique shows that it forms a unified whole - and that it does in fact deliver the final part of Kant's transcendental undertaking. His book will be valuable to all who are interested in Kant's theory of the aesthetic and conceptual purposiveness of nature. (shrink)

During the 2020 COVID-19 epidemic a variety of social activities migrated online, including religious ceremonies and rituals. One such instance is the case of Santo Daime, a Brazilian rainforest religion that utilizes the hallucinogenic brew ayahuasca in its rituals. During the pandemic, multiple Santo Daime rituals involving the consumption of ayahuasca took place online, mediated through Zoom and other online platforms. The phenomenon is notable since the effects of hallucinogens are defined by context (set and setting) and Santo Daime rituals (...) are habitually governed by punctilious regulations aimed at directing the experience of participants. The abrupt move to online space thus augurs significant implications in the context of hallucinogenic rituals. This paper looks at this development and its repercussions for entheogenic rituals, as it asks how do psychedelic rituals change when they move online? Building on the author’s previous work on set and setting in the Santo Daime religion, the paper introduces accounts from 12 semi-structured interviews with daimistas participating in online daime rituals, approached through the prism of set and setting, and the study of online religiosity. The analysis points at several key dynamics emerging in the context of virtual rituals. The migration online allowed for the continuation of Santo Daime entheogenic rituals at a time of social distancing, fostered a sense of global brotherhood and opened new possibility for religious participation and learning. Concurrently, online ritual produced an impoverished ritual experience and novel types of challenges including a higher potential for distractions, technical difficulties, and low sensory fidelity. Other novel challenges included social anxiety and an in-built tension between the social and spiritual dimensions of ritual. Finally, some participants were concerned by the cultural context of online rituals: technological mediation, consumerism, commodification, and digital divide. The limitations of digital technology appear amplified by the highly immersive, body oriented, experientially intensified context of the psychedelic experience. This paper contributes to the literature on the extra-pharmacological factors shaping experiences with psychedelics, as well as to the literature on the consequences of the adoption of digital media technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This Article examines the implicit assumptions about the state and state-society relations that pervade the literature on legal pluralism. I argue that much of this literature rests on an underlying conception of the state as a monolithic entity which is clearly and objectively differentiated from society. Most notably, John Griffiths’ influential distinction between "weak" legal pluralism, which exists within the boundaries of the state, and "strong" legal pluralism, which involves both state and non-state legal orders, reflects such assumptions. I contend (...) that an alternative conceptualization of the state, which acknowledges the internal diversity and contradictions within the state and the blurred boundaries between state and society, can serve as a more productive basis for the study of legal pluralism. Such an approach draws attention to the socially constructed character of the boundaries between state and non-state legal orders, to the social significance of intra-state legal pluralism, to the points of view of individual litigants who maneuver between different courts of law, and to the institutional level of analysis, namely, the complex interrelations between different courts under conditions of legal pluralism. (shrink)

Paul Claudel a eu à plusieurs reprises l’occasion de méditer sur le mystère de la sainte Trinité, même s’il ne lui a consacré aucune œuvre particulière. Sa perspective est toujours poétique : il s’agit de savoir comment exprimer par les mots l’inexprimable. Après avoir examiné ses sources théologiques, nous nous arrêtons sur le rapprochement des deux termes machina et Trinitas, caractéristique de l’usage claudélien de l’oxymore, ainsi que sur d’autres métaphores du registre mécanique, pour dégager finalement une poétique plus générale (...) de l’acte créateur. (shrink)

According to Korsgaard’s very influential interpretation, moral normativity follows from a commonly accepted conception of rational agency, namely, the capacity to set ends and pursue them or humanity. The paper argues that humanity is not the source of moral normativity. Taking the exercise of your freedom in pursuit of your ends to be justified commits you to acknowledging the equal claim of others to see themselves as justified in the pursuit of their ends. This entails the equal restriction of the (...) freedom of each to ensure maximal freedom for all. But this is precisely what Kant thinks of as the state of right. In contrast, the paper claims that the second formula of the categorical imperative commands making the humanity of rational beings who are assumed to possess the capacity to act morally or personality, into our end, precisely because they are assumed to possess this distinct rational capacity. (shrink)

There is increasing evidence for epigenetically mediated transgenerational inheritance across taxa. However, the evolutionary implications of such alternative mechanisms of inheritance remain unclear. Herein, we show that epigenetic mechanisms can serve two fundamentally different functions in transgenerational inheritance: (i) selection-based effects, which carry adaptive information in virtue of selection over many generations of reliable transmission; and (ii) detection-based effects, which are a transgenerational form of adaptive phenotypic plasticity. The two functions interact differently with a third form of epigenetic information transmission, (...) namely information about cell state transmitted for somatic cell heredity in multicellular organisms. Selection-based epigenetic information is more likely to conflict with somatic cell inheritance than is detection-based epigenetic information. Consequently, the evolutionary implications of epigenetic mechanisms are different for unicellular and multicellular organisms, which underscores the conceptual and empirical importance of distinguishing between these two different forms of transgenerational epigenetic effect. (shrink)

Kant claims that empirical laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity” (Kant, 1998 ; A159/B198). What precisely is this “expression of necessity” and what grounds it? The metaphysical necessitation approach asks “What are laws of nature for Kant?” It answers that, for Kant, empirical laws possess necessity and are grounded in the properties and causal powers essential to natural kinds. The epistemological systematization approach claims that empirical natures, kinds and causal laws are rightly viewed as necessitating in (...) virtue of the place they ideally take within an ultimate systematic conception of nature. The paper defends a hybrid transcendental-idealist approach to empirical necessity. It argues that Kant offers a transcendental deduction of the a priori principle of the systematic conceptual purposiveness of nature. In contrast to the systematization approach, this builds necessity into our most fundamental, conceptually articulated experience of nature. The approach can furthermore complement metaphysical necessitation accounts by showing that the commitment to necessitation follows from the metaphysical doctrine of transcendental idealism and the critical project of articulating the a priori transcendental conditions of experience. Recognizing the transcendental status of the principle of the systematic conceptual purposiveness of nature thus allows us to merge valuable insights of both the epistemological systematization and the metaphysical necessitation views. (shrink)