In a review of our work, Kincaid suggests that we are 'productivist', reducing interpretation of Marx and capitalism to production at the expense of the relatively independent role that can be played by the value-form in general and by the money-form in particular. In response, we argue that he distorts interpretation of our work through this prism of production versus exchange, unduly emphasises the independence of exchange to the point of underconsumptionism, and simplistically collapses the mediation between production and exchange (...) in the restructuring that accompanies the accumulation of capital. (shrink)

Every year, unfavorable environmental factors significantly affect crop productivity and threaten food security. Plants are sessile; they cannot move to escape unfavorable environmental conditions, and therefore, they activate a variety of defense pathways. Among them are processes regulated by stress‐associated proteins (SAPs). SAPs have a specific zinc finger domain (A20) at the N‐terminus and either AN1 or C2H2 at the C‐terminus. SAP proteins are involved in many biological processes and in response to various abiotic or biotic constraints. Most SAPs play (...) a role in conferring transgenic stress resistance and are stress‐inducible. The emerging field of SAPs in abiotic or biotic stress response regulation has attracted the attention of researchers. Although SAPs interact with various proteins to perform their functions, the exact mechanisms of these interactions remain incompletely understood. This review aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of SAPs, covering their diversity, structure, expression, and subcellular localization. SAPs play a pivotal role in enabling crosstalk between abiotic and biotic stress signaling pathways, making them essential for developing stress‐tolerant crops without yield penalties. Collectively, understanding the complex regulation of SAPs in stress responses can contribute to enhancing tolerance against various environmental stresses through several techniques such as transgenesis, classical breeding, or gene editing. (shrink)

Our final instalment in the debate with Jim Kincaid argues that his value-analysis suffers from weaknesses associated with both Ricardian and Rubinesque interpretations of Marx. These approaches are methodologically flawed, because value-theory does not draw upon externally imposed theories or standards of logic or evidence to check the conceptual or empirical validity of its approach to the understanding of capitalism. Rather, Marxian value-theory involves reconstructing in thought the class-based production-processes underpinning capitalism through to their more complex and concrete consequences in (...) the broader economic and social structures, agencies and processes, through which they are formed, albeit with definite effects of their own. Examination of the methodological shortcomings in Kincaid's analysis is followed by specific rebuttals of his claims about the determination of value and price, the circulation of capital, the role of competition, fixed capital, productive labour and the leverage of value-theory in informing empirical studies. (shrink)

The current study aimed at identifying the awareness level of artificial intelligence applications' risks among faculty members and its relation to the attitude towards digital culture at Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University. The descriptive survey method was used. A questionnaire was designed to measure the awareness of the artificial intelligence applications' risks, and a scale for measuring the attitude towards digital culture. They were administered to a sample of [463] faculty members at Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University. The study concluded (...) that there is an average awareness of the artificial intelligence applications' risks and the attitude towards digital culture among faculty members. A significant relationship was found out between awareness of the artificial intelligence applications' risks as a whole and the attitude towards digital culture. The results indicated that there are no differences in the awareness level of the artificial intelligence risks due to the variables of: gender, use duration of digital applications, and colleges. There are no differences in the variable of the attitude towards digital culture with its various dimensions: cognitive, psychomotor, and affective and its total score. The current study recommended designing a professional development plan for faculty members on the negative effects and risks of artificial intelligence, and launching an Arab platform based on artificial intelligence applications. (shrink)

Hoping to bring some objectivity to the debate, Ben-Moshe has argued that conscientious objection in medicine should be accommodated based on its concordance with the ‘impartial spectator’, a metaphor for conscience drawn from the writings of Adam Smith. This response finds fault with this account on two fronts: first, that its claim to objectivity is unsubstantiated; second, that it implicitly relies on moral absolutes, despite claiming that conscience is a social construct, thereby calling its coherence and claims into question. Briefly, (...) a traditional account of conscience is then described, before ending with a related thesis for future discussion. (shrink)

Steve Clarke, Nathan Emmerich, Francesca Minerva and Toni Saad have offered nuanced and insightful commentaries on my paper ‘The truth behind conscientious objection in medicine’.1 I cannot, in this brief response, do justice to all of the objections and suggestions that they have raised. I have tried to focus my response on what I take to be my interlocutors’ main concerns with my Smithian account, with the hope that we can continue the conversation elsewhere. Clarke argues that both Smith (...) and I ‘underestimate the difficulties involved in overcoming the distorting influence of “self-love” on moral judgement’ and ‘fail to recognise how easy it is for us to mistake a self-interested view for an impartial one’.2 His thought is that cognitive bias and ideological commitments will prevent many of us from identifying the standpoint of the impartial spectator and from realising that we are not impartial.1 I agree that successfully adopting the standpoint of the impartial spectator is not an easy task. However, moral reasoning more generally is difficult and susceptible to bias. This does not mean that we should cease such reasoning; rather, we ought to do our best, and we are, at times, successful. Clarke discusses the entrenched attitudes of Antebellum white racists. However, attitudes about slavery have changed, and cognitive biases can change too. In other words, moral progress is possible. Moreover, as I argue in the paper, one of the advantages of the impartial-spectator approach is that it ‘provides a standpoint from which shared deliberation is possible and public reasons are available’.1 Thus, we can appreciate, with relative ease, whether an objector is reasoning from this standpoint. Clarke further argues that we should entertain the idea of employing ‘experts who are trained to overcome cognitive bias and to set aside ideological commitments’ and …. (shrink)

A further critique of Fine and Saad-Filho's reading of Marxist political economy: it neglects the monetary dimension of Marx's analysis; it focuses too much on production, and on the organic composition of capital, treated in isolation from the overall circuit of capital. An alternative theorisation is proposed, stressing what will now be called emergence patterns in Marx's value theory, and giving due weight to circulation, realisation, competition and capital allocation.

This article assess two important recent books on Marx's political economy and argues that, despite many virtues, there are some crucial limitations in their approach to Marx's political economy. Ben Fine's and Alfredo Saad-Filho's Marx's 'Capital' and The Value of Marx by Saad-Filho place too much explanatory weight on the composition of capital, giving too little attention to Marx's analysis of money, and to the processes of circulation and realisation.

Answers to the questions of what justifies conscientious objection in medicine in general and which specific objections should be respected have proven to be elusive. In this paper, I develop a new framework for conscientious objection in medicine that is based on the idea that conscience can express true moral claims. I draw on one of the historical roots, found in Adam Smith’s impartial spectator account, of the idea that an agent’s conscience can determine the correct moral norms, even if (...) the agent’s society has endorsed different norms. In particular, I argue that when a medical professional is reasoning from the standpoint of an impartial spectator, his or her claims of conscience are true, or at least approximate moral truth to the greatest degree possible for creatures like us, and should thus be respected. In addition to providing a justification for conscientious objection in medicine by appealing to the potential truth of the objection, the account advances the debate regarding the integrity and toleration justifications for conscientious objection, since the standard of the impartial spectator specifies the boundaries of legitimate appeals to moral integrity and toleration. The impartial spectator also provides a standpoint of shared deliberation and public reasons, from which a conscientious objector can make their case in terms that other people who adopt this standpoint can and should accept, thus offering a standard fitting to liberal democracies. (shrink)

Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate (...) the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realist's explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Hud Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, which is based on Davidson's anomalous monism. I sketch an alternative interpretation of my own, an incompatibilistic interpretation according to which agents qua noumena are responsible for the particular causal laws which determine the actions of agents qua phenomena. Hudson's interpretation should be attractive to philosophers who value Kant's epistemology and ethics, but insist on a deflationary reading of things in themselves. It is in an (...) incompatibilist interpretation of Kant's theory of free will that a "positive" conception of noumena is at its most important. If a compatibilistic interpretation is acceptable, one might suppose that we can do without a "positive" conception of noumena throughout Kant's philosophy. I demonstrate, however, that there are central elements of Kant's theory of free will that cannot be accommodated within Hudson's interpretation. (shrink)

I argue against several extant views (Rolston, etc) about the value of endangered species. I argue that the best way to defend a non-anthropocentric view about the value of endangered species is to appeal to the intrinsic value of biological diversity.

A growing number of contributors to environmental philosophy are beginning to rethink the field’s mission and practice. Noting that the emphasis of protracted conceptual battles over axiology may not get us very far in solving environmental problems, many environmental ethicists have begun to advocate a more pragmatic, pluralistic, and policy-based approach in philosophical discussions abouthuman-nature relationships. In this paper, we argue for the legitimacy of this approach, stressing that public deliberation and debate over alternative environmental ethics is necessary for a (...) culture of democracy to be upheld in decision making and policy formulation. Then we argue for a democratically tempered environmental ethics that is grounded in a practical understanding of the character of moral claims regarding the natural world. We offer the results of an empirical study of environmental ethics held by the public to illustrate the diversity in their moral commitments to nature. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of this ethical pluralism for policy discussions about the management of American public lands. (shrink)

By defining both depictive and linguistic representation as kinds of symbol system, Nelson Goodman attempts to undermine the platitude that, whereas linguistic representation is mediated by convention, depiction is mediated by resemblance. I argue that Goodman is right to draw a strong analogy between the two kinds of representation, but wrong to draw the counterintuitive conclusion that depiction is not mediated by resemblance.

In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257–277, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces (...) a further Benacerraf problem, one that threatens to undercut his explanation of why propositions have truth-conditions. If correct, our arguments undercut King’s main motivation for accepting his view over its rivals. (shrink)

British Journal of Aesthetics (forthcoming Jan. 2008).

This paper criticizes Kripke’s and Putnam’s theory of the semantics of natural kind terms (KPT) and develops an alternative theory. It first examines description theories of natural kind terms, to see what their flaws are and what can be preserved of them. It then presents the KPT and makes three main criticisms. These rely on the meaning of elementary particles’ names, on reactions to the absence of a common essential nature, and on applications of old terms to new cases. Lastly, (...) it develops a theory that takes noun phrases to be plural referring expressions, and shows how that theory meets the objections to the KPT. (shrink)

Millianism and Fregeanism agree that a sentence that contains a name expresses a structured proposition but disagree about whether that proposition contains the object that the name refers to (Millianism) or rather a mode of presentation of that object (Fregeanism). Various problems – about simple sentences, propositional‐attitude ascriptions, and sentences that contain empty names – beset each view. To solve these problems, Millianism can appeal to modes of presentation, and Fregeanism can appeal to objects. But this raises a further problem: (...) namely, to explain why the proposition expressed by a sentence that contains a name matters in some cases but not in others. (shrink)

Educators continue to struggle with how masculinities are performed and regulated in spaces of learning. In a time of rapid social change, there is a renewed impetus for gender justice reform in schooling, though these approaches themselves remain a shifting picture. Adding a new layer of complexity, we are now witness to educational policy recommendations around surveillance which are designed to counteract boys’ and young men’s vulnerabilities to be radicalised into the misogynies of the ‘manosphere’. These recommendations exist despite limited (...) research and significant gaps in our understanding regarding both the manosphere as well as the emotional lives of young men. The article intentionally shifts the conversation from reactive surveillance in schools to educative gender justice approaches. We focus, in particular, on the significance of ‘pedagogic discomfort’ in terms of fostering gender transformative dialogue which is critical of ideas associated with the manosphere. We consider how a constructive dialogue might be fostered with a particular focus on pedagogies that recognise the emotional intensities of gender justice work. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones.

Purpose Online violence has been rampant in the past decade, intensifying the victims’ suffering owing to its rapid dissemination to vast audiences. This study aims to focus on online gender-based violence directed against young Bedouin women who have left their male-dominated home territory for academic studies. This study examined how the backlash against these students, intended to stop changes in traditional gender roles, is reflected in offensive TikTok videos. Design/methodology/approach This research is based on a qualitative-thematic analysis of 77 questionnaires (...) and 30 semistructured in-depth interviews with first-year female Bedouin students aged 18–21 years. Findings The backlash was widespread, with young Bedouin men using offensive videos as “proof” that women have violated codes of honor and morality. The videos exhibited four types of gender-based violence: claims of immoral behavior, aggressive captions that take the footage out of context, allegations of immodest clothing and digital photo editing that produced fabricated results. Examining participants' reactions to the videos, this study revealed two patterns of response: passive acceptance of the situation and an active approach that included reaching out to powerful Bedouin men for solutions. Originality/value This research enriches the literature on online gender-based violence, particularly against women in traditional societies, and suggests practical steps: developing online media literacy in traditional societies, adopting a proactive approach and nurturing social self-competence in women who have been victims of online gender-based violence. (shrink)

Suppose that at the moment of death, a person goes out of existence.1 This has been thought to pose a problem for the idea that death is bad for its victim. But what exactly is the problem? Harry Silverstein says the problem stems from the truth of the “Values Connect with Feelings” thesis (VCF), according to which it must be possible for someone to have feelings about a thing in order for that thing to be bad for that person (2000, (...) 122). But in order for a person to have feelings about a thing, the person and the thing must coexist in some way. Thus Silverstein feels compelled to endorse a metaphysical view he calls “four-dimensionalism,” but which I prefer to call “eternalism”: the view that purely past and purely future objects and events exist.2 I agree with Silverstein that the badness of death entails eternalism. But the reason is different. Eternalism must be true in order for there to be a time at which death is bad for its victim. Death is bad for its victim at all those times when the victim is worse off for having died: namely, the times when he would have been living a good life had that death not occurred.3 Silverstein rejects this view; he thinks there is something wrong with the very question of when death is bad for its victim. In what follows I argue that Silverstein has not shown the relevance of eternalism to VCF or the badness of death, and I defend my view about the time of death’s badness against Silverstein’s arguments. (shrink)

According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with (...) some very simple practical guidance. (shrink)

This article contends that close attention to music/language analogies allows us to perceive how language attempts to gain an understanding of its own cognitive nature. The article does so by closely reading Paul de Man's ‘The Rhetoric of Blindness’, an essay in which de Man suggests that a detailed look at the analogies between musical and linguistic structures made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Essay On the Origin of Languages helps reveal how literary criticism becomes ‘blind’ to its own metaphysical (...) presuppositions. Scrutinizing the terms on which de Man engages Rousseau, the article argues that surface inconsistencies in de Man's use of musical concepts reveal a deeper pattern of ‘deafness’ which turns his notion of ‘empty’ subjectivity against itself. It concludes with some suggestions for how we might further develop the study of music/language analogies, a subject that has the potential to invigorate our understanding of the non-conceptual aspects of linguistic meaning. (shrink)

In "Demonstratives or Demonstrations", Marga Reimer argues that quotation marks are demonstrations and that expressions enclosed with them are demonstratives. In this paper, I argue against her view. There are two objections. The first objection is that Reimer''s view has unattractive consequences: there is more ambiguity, there are more demonstratives, and there are more English expressions than we thought. The second objection is that, unlike other ambiguous expressions, some expressions that are ambiguous on Reimer''s view can''t be disambiguated by using (...) subscripts. This suggests that, contrary to her view, those expressions aren't really ambiguous. (shrink)

Bruno Latour is not the only scholar to reflect on his earlier contributions to science studies with some regret and resolve over climate skepticism and science denialism. Given the ascendency of merchants of doubt, should those who share Latour's concerns join the scientists they study in circling the wagons, or is there a productive role still for science studies to question and critique scientists and scientific institutions? I argue for the latter, looking to postpositivist feminist philosophy as exemplified by Alison (...) Wylie and Lynn Nelson, among others, as a guide. Feminist philosophers of science who ground their analysis in a detailed understanding of scientific practice are not science's champions nor its antagonists, but they do stand in a distinct relationship to science. If not merchants of doubt, are they scientific gadflies or perhaps in scientific loyal opposition? Though these notions can underwrite useful approaches to science studies, neither captures the distinctive interdependency and interestedness of feminist philosophers and science. I suggest that we would be better served by the notion of trustworthy science criticism, building on the analyses of trust and trustworthiness by Annette Baier, among others, attendant to the dynamics of interdependency in trust relationships. (shrink)

Those who care about and engage in politics frequently fall victim to cognitive bias. Concerns that such bias impacts scholarship recently have prompted debates—notably, in philosophy and psychology—on the proper relationship between research and politics. One proposal emerging from these debates is that researchers studying politics have a professional duty to avoid political activism because it risks biasing their work. While sympathetic to the motivations behind this proposal, I suggest several reasons to reject a blanket duty to avoid activism: (1) (...) even if it reduced bias, this duty would make unreasonable demands on researchers; (2) this duty could hinder research by limiting viewpoint diversity; (3) this duty wrongly implies that academia offers a relative haven from bias compared to politics; and (4) not all forms of political activism pose an equal risk of bias. None of these points suggest that researchers should ignore the risk of bias. Rather, researchers should focus on stronger evidence-based strategies for reducing bias than a blanket recommendation to avoid politics. (shrink)

This issue of The Monist was edited in the middle of a worldwide pandemic. As the submissions came in, millions of people across the globe were infecting each other with the coronavirus ‘Covid-19’ in buses and on trains; in bars and in hotels; in airports and hospitals; in homes and universities. During parts of 2020, the presence of this deadly virus made national governments ‘lock down’ their economies and ‘lock up’ their citizens in a manner that has not previously been (...) seen in modern peacetime. Long after this extraordinary event, people will still be asking themselves what really happened. (shrink)

In this article is presented a reading of Heidegger in relation to the conception of desire, and its relation to various terms he uses frequently. I argue that the genesis of desire lies in the gap between the fullness of possibility and the poverty of actualization; that inauthentic desire aims at presence, possession, actualization (always insufficient); and that authentic desire aims at the conservation of the possibility-character of being. I also pay attention to the temporality of desire; to the analogy (...) between Kant's emphasis on respect for the law one has freely postulated and Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's subjection to the possibilities it projects; to possibility as original abundance; and, in principle, to the turning in which desire is evoked in the event of granting, rather than simply produced in the act of projection. Special attention is paid on the German word 'Verlangen', which is related etymologically to the English 'long for', which stands for wanting something very much. But the word is also connected to the word 'long' which is important to get a grip on the notion of desire in Heidegger. (shrink)

Background: Context: Digital health interventions have become essential instruments in contemporary medicine, providing viable means of improving patient outcomes and healthcare provision. The goal of this study is to examine the impact, difficulties, and potential future directions of digital health interventions across a range of healthcare situations by synthesizing results from 12 carefully chosen studies. Aim: This study's objective is to thoroughly examine and summarize the body of research on digital health interventions, with an emphasis on acceptance and utilization as (...) well as implementation and efficacy. Method: Twelve pertinent papers published between 2016 and 2024 were found after a thorough search of electronic databases. Numerous digital health interventions were covered by these research, such as remote monitoring systems, telemedicine, and mobile applications. In order to find common themes, sub-themes, and patterns among the chosen research, thematic analysis was used in the data synthesis process. Results: A number of important themes emerged from the thematic analysis, including interoperability problems, patient engagement, healthcare provider acceptability, regulatory concerns, and usability issues. The sub-themes that fell under these categories emphasized the variables that affect the uptake and efficacy of digital health interventions. Conclusion: The synthesis of data emphasizes how digital health initiatives can increase clinical results, improve patient care, and streamline the delivery of healthcare. But in order to fully reap the benefits, major obstacles like interoperability problems, regulatory difficulties, and usability impediments need to be solved. The recommendations put forth aim to promote innovation and evidence-based practice in digital health by stressing user-centered design, improving digital literacy among medical practitioners, and encouraging interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

Cet article tente d’éclairer l’obscurité qui entoure la réalité dans laquelle vivent ou survivent les demandeurs d’asile pendant des mois, voire des années. Si, pour beaucoup d’entre eux, cette réalité reste « humainement supportable », pour d’autres, elle constitue un environnement pathogène propice à la production de la maladie mentale et physique. L’auteur souligne ici l’importance de ne pas réduire un sujet à ses appartenances culturelles ni de faire de lui uniquement un être exilé. Il est primordial de prendre en (...) considération l’ensemble du parcours subjectif et collectif qui se dessine avant, pendant et après le voyage vers la terre promise. Ce parcours s’éclaire autant des représentations du réel du sujet exilé que de la réalité du pays d’origine et du pays d’accueil. (shrink)