Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.

Draft for the Oxford Handbook of Margaret Cavendish (edited by Julie Crawford with Jacqueline Broad). -/- This chapter looks at Margaret Cavendish's treatment of the supernatural, beginning by asking how she distinguishes the natural from the supernatural, and then by examining her treatment of a series of alleged supernatural beings: fairies, ghosts, witches, the human supernatural soul, angels, and God. Throughout, it argues that Cavendish's approach to the supernatural is often similar to Thomas Hobbes's.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to CommentariesLauren Freeman (bio) and Heather Stewart (bio)We are grateful and humbled that this esteemed group of scholars and healthcare practitioners have dedicated the time to read and engage with our book. Their thoughtful, critical comments have given us new ways of reflecting on our own work, compelled us to develop and expand some of our claims, and have also nudged us to move in new directions (...) that we hope to explore in future research. In what follows, we reply to each of the commentaries, focusing on what we take to be the most central insights, critiques, and areas for further exploration from each contribution.Catherine Sherron (2024) offers an expansive commentary on chapter 4, "Epistemic Microaggressions," focusing on the nature of epistemic agency, situating epistemic agency within the bioethical context of the principle of autonomy, considering epistemic microaggressions and the phenomenon of silencing of patients, asking whose evidence counts when making claims within medical contexts, and questioning how we might develop a system of reward and admonishment to healthcare professionals who respectively mitigate and commit microaggressions. She presents far more content than we can adequately respond to here. We have chosen to focus on Sherron's specific point about why certain patients experience epistemic microaggressions and what they can do about it. Her line of reasoning echoes an argument found in popular articles about women's health and healthcare that, while seemingly reasonable at first glance, is fraught with problematic assumptions and implications that we would like to draw out and reflect on. Doing so helps pinpoint where the locus of our attention should be in our aim to diminish microaggressions in medical contexts, without placing that burden on the very people who experience and are harmed by them.Within the context of discussing possible contributing factors that perpetuate epistemic microaggressions for patients, Sherron mentions the reality that "patients often don't have good scientific or medical literacy, or education generally, so they might not be in a position to advocate for themselves as epistemic [End Page 169] agents" (150). We surmise that Sherron's more complete argument runs something like this. Many patients lack scientific or medical literacy, postsecondary and postgraduate education, and the language, concepts, and frameworks to be fully empowered epistemic agents and best communicate with healthcare professionals on their terms. As a consequence—and combined with other factors pertaining to their identities and the accompanying stereotypes and biases that healthcare professionals (and all of us) hold—patients who are members of marginalized groups are often not treated as epistemic equals or epistemic peers by healthcare professionals; they are also unable to best advocate for themselves or to speak up in the aftermath of experiencing microaggressions (or macroaggressions) in medical contexts. Thus, if patients were more literate, educated, and able to speak the language of healthcare professionals, they would be able to better advocate for themselves, and they would be better positioned to speak up and respond when epistemic microaggressions (and other injustices and harms) occur. As a result, their situation and relationships with healthcare professionals, their epistemic credibility, and consequently, their care (and maybe even their health outcomes) would improve. Thus, the line o argument implies that we ought to focus our attention on empowering patients: helping them learn how to better educate and advocate for themselves so that they can improve their epistemic situation and, consequently, receive better medical care.This line of argument is common in popular books and articles about women's health (see Dusenbery [2018], who criticizes the argument and Gainty [2023], Jacqueline [2024], Lichtman et al. [2015], Onque [2022], and Singh [2015] where the argument is promoted). The consensus seems to be that yes, there is a problem: women and members of marginalized groups are not getting adequate healthcare, and if only they took better control of and responsibility for their care, they could and would receive better care. We are highlighting this line of reasoning because it is commonplace, problematic, and dangerous.Such an argument is worrisome for at least two reasons. First, the suggested solution—that members of marginalized groups just need to become better advocates for themselves—is not only a form of (unintentional... (shrink)

There is a parallel between the debate between Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert at the turn of the twentieth century and at least some aspects of the current controversy over whether category theory provides the proper framework for structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics. The main issue, I think, concerns the place and interpretation of meta-mathematics in an algebraic or structuralist approach to mathematics. Can meta-mathematics itself be understood in algebraic or structural terms? Or is it an exception to the (...) slogan that mathematics is the science of structure? (shrink)

The hope is that this collection will encourage students and scholars to further explore the different dimensions of Heiberg's thought, both on its own terms ...

According to ante rem structuralism a branch of mathematics, such as arithmetic, is about a structure, or structures, that exist independent of the mathematician, and independent of any systems that exemplify the structure. A structure is a universal of sorts: structure is to exemplified system as property is to object. So ante rem structuralist is a form of ante rem realism concerning universals. Since the appearance of my Philosophy of mathematics: Structure and ontology, a number of criticisms of the idea (...) of ante rem structures have appeared. Some argue that it is impossible to give identity conditions for places in homogeneous ante rem structures, invoking a version of the identity of indiscernibles. Others raise issues concerning the identity and distinctness of places in different structures, such as the the natural number 2 and the real number 2. The purpose of this paper is to take the measure of these objections, and to further articulate ante rem structuralism to take them into account. (shrink)

The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and (...) the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we allow for basic knowledge, we can come to know our faculties are reliable in ways that intuitively are too easy. This raises a serious doubt about whether we had the basic knowledge in the first place. In “Easy Knowledge”, Peter Markie argues that BKS theories do not face any problem concerning easy knowledge.3 I argued that the problem arises in two forms, and Markie takes issue with both. I will argue that Markie's defense of BKS theories fails. (shrink)

As reproductive genetic technologies advance, families have more options to choose what sort of child they want to have. Using preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), for example, allows parents to evaluate several existing embryos before selecting which to implant via in vitro fertilization (IVF). One of the traits PGD can identify is genetic deafness, and hearing embryos are now preferentially selected around the globe using this method. Importantly, some Deaf families desire a deaf child, and PGD–IVF is also an option for (...) them. Selection for genetic deafness, however, encounters widespread disapproval in the hearing community, including mainstream philosophy and bioethics. In this paper I apply Elizabeth Barnes’ value-neutral model of disability as mere-difference to the case of selecting for deafness. I draw on evidence from Deaf Studies and Disability Studies to build an understanding of deafness, the Deaf community, and the circumstances relevant to reproductive choices that may obtain for some Deaf families. Selection for deafness, with deafness understood as mere-difference and valued for its cultural identity, need not necessitate impermissible moral harms. I thus advocate that it is sometimes morally permissible to select for deafness in one’s child. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to delimit what can and cannot be claimed on behalf of second-order logic. The starting point is some of the discussions surrounding my Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Secondorder Logic.

In this paper I argue against two prevailing views of Kant’s Religion. Against commentators such as Michalson and Quinn, who have argued that Kant’s project in Religion is riddled with inconsistencies and circularities, I show that a proper understanding of Kant’s views on grace reveals these do not exist. And contra commentators that attribute to Kant at best a minimalist conception of grace, I show that Kant’s view of it is remarkably robust. I argue that Kant works with three different (...) conceptions of grace. These are: a) grace and the God within, b) grace and the transformation of the fundamental orientation, and c) grace that can be laid hold of; the first and the last play a significant role in his philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This study involved using a mixed method research design to examine the moral philosophy difference between the ethical decision-making process of CEOs in U.S.-led and non-U.S.-led within the luxury goods industry. The study employed a MANOVA to compare the ethical profiles between the two leader types and a phenomenological qualitative process to locate themes that give indication as to the compatibility of the luxury strategy values and practices with the principles and concepts of responsible leadership and conscious capitalism. As the (...) luxury goods industry is facing the first slowdown since 2000, pressure to achieve sales targets in the U.S. to make up for losses in other markets will place these CEOs under extreme pressure from their headquarters. These leaders must possess the ethical decision-making capability to balance legal and moral dilemmas unique to multinational luxury goods organizations while delivering business results in a challenging environment. Results of the study show no evidence of difference in the ethical decision-making profiles between the two groups of leaders. The themes and emergent findings resulting from the qualitative analysis indicate a profound incompatibility between the values informing decision-makers using the luxury strategy and those employed by leaders operating within the principles and parameters of responsible leadership and conscious capitalism. Recommendations for future research include replicating the study with a larger sample, within a different geographic region or comparing leaders using the luxury strategy to those using conscious capitalism. (shrink)

The purpose of Key Approaches to Biblical Ethics is to address fundamental as well as practical questions of methodology in examining the ethical material of the Bible. Sixteen scholars of international reputation, most of them leaders in the field of biblical ethics, discuss questions of biblical interpretation from the perspectives of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament ethics in close dialogue with one another. In the present volume both established and new approaches to biblical ethics are presented and discussed. The (...) result is a volume of unprecedented scholarly interaction that provides key insights into issues of biblical ethics that play a significant role both for biblical interpretation as well as for methodological questions in Jewish and Christian ethics today. (shrink)

Just about every theorist holds that vague terms are context-sensitive to some extent. What counts as ?tall?, ?rich?, and ?bald? depends on the ambient comparison class, paradigm cases, and/or the like. To take a stock example, a given person might be tall with respect to European entrepreneurs and downright short with respect to professional basketball players. It is also generally agreed that vagueness remains even after comparison class, paradigm cases, etc. are fixed, and so this context sensitivity does not solve (...) the problems with vague terms. In this paper, I briefly sketch the main features of my broadly contextualist account of vagueness, that of the late Ruth Manor, and that of Agustín Rayo, showing how the three accounts relate to, and reinforce, each other, noting a seeming difference. A key item used to articulate my own view is David Lewis's notion of conversational score. This is used to track which borderline cases have been called in the course of a conversation. Manor alludes to Lewis's notion of accommodation, a key aspect of the kinematics of conversation, and Rayo invokes Stalnaker's notion of common ground. I'll show how the conversational score could be employed to develop and extend their views, showing how vague terms, as they construe them, are (or can be) deployed in conversation, consistent with both the underlying indeterminacy of the terms and normal communicative goals. To help develop all three views further, I invoke Craige Roberts's notion of Retrievability, a tool developed to show how definites, such as definite descriptions, singular pronouns, and proper names, are deployed in conversation, in a Lewis-style scorekeeping framework. This, I think, is exactly the right way to understand conversations in what Manor calls non-sorities situations and, to invoke my own view, in sorites situations as well. (shrink)

The interaction between philosophy and mathematics has a long and well articulated history. The purpose of this note is to sketch three historical case studies that highlight and further illustrate some details concerning the relationship between the two: the interplay between mathematical and philosophical methods in ancient Greek thought; vagueness and the relation between mathematical logic and ordinary language; and the study of the notion of continuity.

This paper examines Aristotle's attempt to describe space in terms of place in the Physics, and shows why Aristotle rejected both Platonic and Atomistic understandings of space.

Summary Based on Clausius’ phrasing of a “transformational content” and the resulting 2nd law of thermodynamics, I demonstrated that Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects is historically situated at the threshold of understanding open systems thermodynamics and the related concepts of balance. Furthermore, I showed that Gestalt theory, as represented by Wolfgang Köhler, at least reproduced, if not partially anticipated or even prepared this development of 20th century thinking. Finally, I gave some short examples of how (...) Simondon applied the figure/ground distinction to human perception, memory, and a general theory of becoming and I introduced his proposal to analyse “the grounds” just as thoroughly as the laws of figuration. (shrink)

Normal.dotm 0 0 1 444 2534 MM 21 5 3111 12.0 0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false Este artigo tem por objetivo abordar a teodiceia platônica, sintetizada pela célebre expressão theòs anaítios , à luz da gênese do mundo sensível descrito por Platão no Timeu . O significado desta expressão em Platão é claro: a responsabilidade pela escolha do gênero de vida e suas consequências é da alma ( psych é ), e não do deus. (...) Mas o que é a alma? Partiremos da definição clássica da alma em Platão como princípio de movimento e sede de conhecimento, mas não nos deteremos nela. Qual seria a origem da alma? Com base na cosmogênese relatada pelo Timeu , tentaremos evidenciar que a formação e a autonomia da alma humana são afetadas de forma determinante pelas condições demiúrgicas: pela existência de elementos alógicos pré-cósmicos, pela interferência na regularidade dos ciclos cósmicos da Alma do Mundo, pela atividade mimética dos deuses secundários e, principalmente, pela presença de um desígnio inteligente ( nous ) que atua teleologicamente. A leitura do Timeu, além de justificar cosmologicamente a questão da justiça divina em Platão, apresentará um admirável modelo ético baseado nas noções de ordem e proporção a orientar as escolhas humanas, reforçando o pressuposto platônico da inevitável responsabilidade que os seres humanos têm sobre seu destino. Palavras-chave: theòs anaítios , inteligência ( nous ), alma ( psych é ), causa/ responsabilidade (aítia/aition), proporção ( symmetría) ABSTRACT This article aims to approach platonic theodicy, synthesized by the renowed expression theòs anaítios , in light of the genesis of sensible world described by Plato in Timeu . The meaning of this expression in Plato is clear: it is soul's ( psych é ), not god's the responsibility to choose a kind of life and its consequences. But, what is this, the soul? We start with that classic definition of soul in Plato, as moving principle and site of knowledge, but will not stop in it. What would be soul's origins? Based upon cosmogony refered to in Timeu , we shall attempt to evidence that formation and autonomy of human soul are affected by, or determined by demiurgical conditions: by existence of alogic precosmic elements, by interference in the regularity of cosmic cycles of the World Soul, by mimetic activity of secondary gods; and, above all, by the presence of an intelligent design ( nous) which operates in a teleological manner. Timeu's reading, besides explaining by cosmology the question of divine justice in Plato, will present an admirable ethical prototype, based upon notions of order and proportion to guide human choices, reinvigorating the platonic presupposition of the unavoidable responsibility that human being has about his fate. Key-words: theòs anaítios , intelligence ( nous ), soul (psych é ), cause, responsibility (aitia, aition), proportion (symmetría). (shrink)

SummaryAccording to Dummett's understanding of Frege, the sense of a denoting expression is a procedure for determining its denotation. The purpose of this article is to pursue this suggestion and develop a semi‐formal interpretation of Fregean sense for the special case of a first‐order language of arithmetic. In particular, we define the sense of each arithmetic expression to be a hypothetical process to determine the denoted number or truth value. The sense‐process is “hypothetical” in that the senses of some expressions (...) cannot be completed in a finite number of steps. The motivation for this work is to explicate an intensional notion of effectiveness in terms of the senses of function names. It is proposed, in particular, that an expression is effective if and only if its sense can be completed in a finite number of steps. It is shown that a function is computable if and only if it has an effective name.RésuméSelon la lecture que Dummet donne de Frege, le sens ?on;une expression consiste en une procédure pour déterminer sa dénotation. Le but de cet article est de développer cette suggestion par une interprétation semi‐formelle du sens frégéen dans le cas particulier ?on;un langage de premier ordre en arithmétique. En particulier, nous définissons comme sens de toute expression mathématique un procédé hypothétique pour déterminer le nombre dénoté ou la valeur de vérité. Le procédé créateur de sens est hypothetique en ce sens que les sens de certaines expressions ne peuvent pas être donnés en un nombre fini de pas. Le but de cette étude est ?on;expliciter une notion intensionnelle ?on;effectuabilite en termes de sens des noms de fonction. II est en particulier propose qu'une expression soit dite effectuable si et seulement si son sens peut être épuisé en un nombre fini de pas. On montre qu'une fonction est calculable si et seulement si elle a un nom effectuable.ZusammenfassungDummets Auffassung von Frege gemäss besteht der Sinn eines denotierenden Ausdruckes in einem Verfahren, das dessen Denotation bestimmt. Es ist der Zweck der vorliegenden Arbeit, die‐sen Vorschlag weiterzufuUhren und eine halbformale Interpretation des Fregeschen Sinnes fiir den besonderen Fall der Sprache erster Stufe der Arithmetik zu entwickeln. Es wird im besonderen der Sinn eines jeden arithmetischen Ausdruckes als hypothetisches Verfahren zur Bestimmung der denotierten Zahl oder des Wahrheitswertes definiert. Die Sinngebung ist insofern hypothe‐tisch, als der Sinn gewisser Ausdrucke nicht in einer endlichen Zahl von Schritten gegeben wer‐den kann. Das Anliegen der Arbeit grundet in der Absicht, einen intensionalen Begriff der Effek‐tivitat aufgrund des Sinnes von Funktionsnamen zu erlautern. Es wird im besonderen festgelegt, dass ein Ausdruck dann und nur dann effektiv sei, wenn sein Sinn in einer endlichen Zahl von Schritten erreicht werden kann. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine Funktion genau dann berechenbar ist, wenn sie einen effektiven Namen hat. (shrink)

Some central philosophical issues concern the use of mathematics in putatively non-mathematical endeavors. One such endeavor, of course, is philosophy, and the philosophy of mathematics is a key instance of that. The present article provides an idiosyncratic survey of the use of mathematical results to provide support or counter-support to various philosophical programs concerning the foundations of mathematics.

Søren Kierkegaard is an author who, due to his creative use of genre, has been difficult to characterize straightforwardly. His unconventional form of writing has at times been understood as a part of his criticism of German speculative philosophy; however, little work has been done to actually understand the nature of his criticism and his precise objection to the form of presentation traditionally used by systematic philosophy. In this article it is argued that there is a close connection between the (...) form and the content of speculative philosophy, and that due to his disagreements with the content of the latter Kier- kegaard was obliged to make use of a different literary form in order to criticize it. (shrink)