Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal (or “libertarian”) one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as equal to oneself in point of (...) demands on our action. Why, then, would we ever aggregate? The reason is that we are affected by behavior that has general effects, especially unintended side effects, on all sorts of people among whom we ourselves are often to be found. When we are randomly situated among such groups—as we sometimes are and often are not—minimizing aggregate harm is the plausible strategy, and sometimes promoting aggregate benefit as well. (shrink)

Jan W. Wojcik - The Works of Robert Boyle - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 543-545 Book Review The Works of Robert Boyle Robert Boyle. The Works of Robert Boyle. 14 vols. Edited by Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis. London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999, 2000. Cloth, $1,950. This is the first edition of Boyle's oeuvre since that of Thomas Birch , and is the first scholarly edition ever. It is a (...) masterful achievement by Michael Hunter and Ted Davis, informed as it is by a total of approximately forty years of experience with the Boyle archive housed at the Royal Society of London. What began in 1980 as an attempt to catalogue the archive has led to this new, and most welcome, edition—one that includes not only Boyle's published work, but also two volumes of previously unpublished archival material. Despite its many defects, Birch's 1772 edition, in its reprint of edition of 1965 , has been popular with scholars living far from access to large collections of seventeenth-century works. The first thing to note about this new edition is that the editors have repaired the defects in Birch's edition. In selecting.. (shrink)

This book’s four main theses: -/- (1) Interpersonal liberty requires an explicit, pre-propertarian, purely factual, theory. -/- (2) Liberty is—and need only be—morally desirable in systematic practice, not in every logically possible case. In practice, there is no clash between the two main moral contenders: rights and consequences. -/- (3) Nothing can ever justify, support, or ground any theory of liberty or its applications, because it is logically impossible to transcend assumptions. Theories can only be explained, criticised, and defended within (...) conjectural frameworks. -/- (4) The state is inherently authoritarian and also negative-sum. It reduces welfare overall, with the losses compounding over time. Libertarian anarchic order is the positive-sum solution to illiberal political chaos. -/- J C Lester is a philosopher whose solution to the crucial philosophical problem of interpersonal liberty provides an explicit theory of liberty, explains how its application entails self-ownership and external property, and relates to all other interpersonal matters. (shrink)

Self-cultivation—taking pedagogical action to educate oneself—is an integral part of non-formal adult education. Ever since Greek antiquity, it has been a central ingredient in the western philosophical and educational tradition. However, we argue that the global challenges that have emerged in the present era of the ecological crisis call for a new kind of understanding of this basic educational phenomenon. Based in particular on recent work in dark ecology and its central concept of the ‘uncanny’, we outline a few key (...) features of our time in relation to the contemporary challenge of self-cultivation. We then review extant literature on self-cultivation to ascertain whether the theoretical resources that have been used to conceptualise it in the past are capable of addressing these new aspects of self-cultivation. We conclude that each of the theoretical resources analysed here offer valuable insights into the novel challenges facing self-cultivation, though not all important questions can be answered. By specifying the contributions and limitations of these theoretical resources, we pave the way for future work on conceptualising self-cultivation for our times. (shrink)

Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the (...) soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the "changing self''. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. (shrink)

The close ties between law and psychiatric illness challenge our effort to understand the complex semantics of Western culture and the foundations of law in the heart of that culture. It is, however, difficult to be immediately confronted with the limitations of these semantics. Can one ever achieve a refined precision of psychiatric issues? Lawyers and psychiatrists tend to disregard the fact that people live within different realms of expressiveness, even where the same phenomena seem apparent. They neutralize all relativity (...) and design a quasi-universal body of legal doctrines or construct an all-embracing medical nosology. The question remains what practices of judgment are justifiable when the history books demonstrate the ever-changing character of the idea of a common good and a well-ordered life. Notions of relativity accompany decisions to punish or to cure, to exclude or to include, to disregard or to consider. In these decisions, there are never supracultural notions at hand and only rarely ideas that reach beyond the boundaries of either profession's own discourse. (shrink)

Software systems play an ever more important role in our lives and software engineers and their companies find themselves in a position where they are held responsible for ethical issues that may arise. In this paper, we try to disentangle ethical considerations that can be performed at the level of the software engineer from those that belong in the wider domain of business ethics. The handling of ethical problems that fall into the responsibility of the engineer has traditionally been addressed (...) by the publication of Codes of Ethics and Conduct. We argue that these Codes are barely able to provide normative orientation in software development. The main contribution of this paper is, thus, to analyze the normative features of Codes of Ethics in software engineering and to explicate how their value-based approach might prevent their usefulness from a normative perspective. Codes of Conduct cannot replace ethical deliberation because they do not and cannot offer guidance because of their underdetermined nature. This lack of orientation, we argue, triggers reactive behavior such as “cherry-picking,” “risk of indifference,” “ex-post orientation,” and the “desire to rely on gut feeling.” In the light of this, we propose to implement ethical deliberation within software development teams as a way out. (shrink)

Several areas of expanding corporate responsibilities are evident from current practices. This article penetrates one such field, economic compensation through litigation, and discusses the possibility and desirability of reversing the trend. In court, companies are fined increasing amounts for an ever wider range of faults, or they settle out of court under this legal threat. This is not a local American problem, but European companies are increasingly involved because of globalization. The development in Europe is also driven by the same (...) factors as in America – the mechanics of litigation and conventional ethics. The greed of plaintiffs and lawyers can mobilize the perceived virtue of sympathizing with a victim. Therefore it seems likely that a precondition for tort reform is an ethical reevaluation. Is it desirable and politically possible to make the individual more responsible for his own fate? (shrink)

Changes occur all the time. They can be identifiable and dramatic, or they can emerge imperceptibly, creeping up on you until one day you realise your foundations are less solid than you imagined. At this point in your life you need to find a new path.' Changing Gear looks at why work is such an important part of a person's identity. The book is filled with case studies of people who have transitioned from one career to another, or stepped back (...) from work to embrace retirement, and shines a light on the underlying, and sometimes unconscious, psychological and social dynamics involved. The book offers insight, advice and a practical 7-Step Transition Plan to help the reader make decisions and take account of their domestic and professional situations, looking at what's important and how to cope with change, and providing a road map for the future and all the different opportunities it may bring. Now, more than ever, our working lives have changed and we are all getting used to a new way of doing business. Coping with transition is hard and this book will help the reader to navigate new ways of working, by tapping into the current issues being faced by all workers. (shrink)

Ever since the 19th century, political parties and free media were widely deemed indispensable for the proper functioning of representative democracy. They constituted what one might call the criti...

Though this moderately-priced anthology dates back to 1983, its lively articles are as relevant as ever. Topics covered include suicide, euthanasia, war, punishment,world hunger, abortion, sexual relations, equality, affirmative action, and future generations.

As the Byzantinist Ihor Ševčenko once observed, "Philology is constituting and interpreting the texts that have come down to us. It is a narrow thing, but without it nothing else is possible." This definition accords with Saussure's succinct description of the mission of philology: "especially to correct, interpret, and comment upon the texts." Philology is not just a grand etymological or lexicographical enterprise. It also involves restoring to works as much of their original life and nuances as we can manage. (...) To read the written records of bygone civilizations correctly requires knowledge of cultural history in a broad sense: of folklore, legends, laws, and customs. Philology also encompasses the forms in which texts express their messages, and thus it includes stylistics, metrics, and similar studies. _On Philology _brings together the papers delivered at a 1988 conference at Harvard University's Center for Literary and Cultural Studies. The topic "What is Philology?" drew an interdisciplinary audience whose main fields of research ran the gamut from ancient Indo-European languages to African-American literature, signaling a certain sense of urgency about a seemingly narrow subject. These papers reveal that the role of philology is more important than ever. At a time when literature in printed form has taken a back seat to television, film, and music, it is crucial that scholars be able to articulate why students and colleagues should care about the books with which they work. Just as knowledge will be lost if philological standards decline, so too will fields of study die if their representatives cannot find meaning for today's readers. _On Philology _will be of interest not only to students of philology but also to anyone working in the fields of hermeneutics, literature, and communication. (shrink)

Introduction -- Part I: The lie that we are not good enough as we are -- Where the lie came from and why we bought it -- Trying to meet the criteria for good enough -- Perpetuating the striving and the lack -- Part II: Dead ends and what they teach us -- Money/stuff -- Appearance -- Religion -- Food -- Drugs/alcohol -- Sex/romantic love -- Accomplishment/education/notoriety -- Busyness -- Part III: The truth : we are innately good -- Evil (...) is an alternative, not our nature -- Lighting our darkness to let go of fear, false beliefs, and all negative -- Emotion -- Looking at our essence, which is love, or everything good -- Being who we are ... it means overcoming our separateness -- Invoking love -- Aligning with love -- Being love innately more than we ever dreamed of being. (shrink)

Between Calculability and Non-Calculability. Issues of Calculability and Predictability in the Physics of Complex Systems. The ability to predict has been a very important qualifier of what constitutes scientific knowledge, ever since the successes of Babylonian and Greek astronomy. More recent is the general appreciation of the fact that in the presence of deterministic chaos, predictability is severely limited (the so-called ‘butterfly effect’): Nearby trajectories diverge during time evolution; small errors typically grow exponentially with time. The system obeys deterministic laws (...) and still is unpredictable, seemingly a paradox for the traditional viewpoint of Laplacian determinisms. With the concept of deterministic chaos the epistemological issue about an adequate understanding of predictability is no longer just a mere philosophical topic. Physicists on the one hand recognize the limits of (long term) predictability, computability and even of scientific knowledge, on the other hand they work on concepts for extending the horizon of predictability. It is shown in this paper that physics of complex systems is useful to clarify the jungle of different meanings of the terms ‘predictability’ and ‘computability’ — also with philosophical implications for understanding science and nature. Today, from the physical point of view, the relevance of the concepts of predictability seems to be underestimated by philosophers as a mere methodological topic. In the paper I analyse the importance of predictability and computability in physics of complex systems. I show a way how to cope with problems of unpredictability and noncomputability. Nine different concepts of predictability and computability (i.e. open solution, sensitivity/chaos, redundancy/chance) are presented, compared and evaluated. (shrink)

There is a widespread sense that intermediary institutions which made representative democracy function ever since the nineteenth century—political parties and free media—are presently undergoing profound structural transformations. We partly have trouble judging those transformations—will they destroy or strengthen democracy?—because we lack a set of clear normative standards for intermediary powers. The article suggests such standards: institutions should be accessible, accurate, autonomous, assessable, and accountable. A precondition for these attributes to be realized is financial transparency and the empowerment of citizens other (...) than the owners of concentrated wealth to influence intermediary powers. Accordingly, the article also endorses a scheme to put financing into the hands of citizens themselves via a voucher scheme for both political parties and media. (shrink)

History is hardly ever classified not as the science about the past of the human race. Meanwhile, fairly big part of it is due to nonhumanistic sciences like paleontology, geology or cosmogony. Thus, it would be reasonable to classify history by methodology rather, common to the mentioned sciences, that allows to reconstruct the past on the grounds of various kinds of traces.

G. A. Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality proposes that both concepts need rescuing from the work of John Rawls. Especially, it is concerned with Rawls’ famous second principle of justice according to which social primary goods should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to the benefit of the worst off. The question is why this would ever be necessary if all parties are just. Cohen and I agree that Rawls cannot really justify inequalities on the basis given. But (...) he also thinks equality is the correct analysis of justice, though he provides no actual direct arguments for this. He does, however, provide a striking analytical argument claiming that fundamental principles of justice must be fact insensitive, and that Rawls’s view of justice violates this requirement. I argue that the requirement is itself misconceived and that principles of justice cannot possibly be fact insensitive in the sense developed by Cohen. Few philosophers share this view of Cohen’s—which I argue is due to several conceptual mistakes. With these ironed out, the contractarian view, broadly speaking, is seen to be plausible and powerful. Meanwhile Cohen appears to embrace intuitionism, a stance that cannot possibly be acceptable in social philosophy. In the end, Cohen is successful in arguing that Rawls cannot have what he wants, but neither is Cohen successful in claiming that justice is equality. (shrink)

The general subject of Professor Bond's book, Reason and Value, is, as the title implies, the relation between reason and value, or more precisely the connections between concepts of motivation and value, with reasons as the contested notion in between. Bond offers a thesis that at least appears to go very much against the current trend on these matters. Whereas most recent theorists of note have tied justificatory reasons as well as explanatory reasons to desire, thus holding, in effect, that (...) values are somehow a function of desire, Bond wishes to cut the link between value and desire altogether. The first three chapters are devoted to developing this argument, mainly negatively. He distinguishes between “motivating” and “grounding” (or “justifying”) reasons in the customary way (e.g., Baier distinguishes “explanatory” from “justificatory” reasons to much the same effect'), and argues that “whereas desire or wanting and the reasons tied to it belong to the theory of motivation, where they are central, reason, in the sense of the reason(s) that a person has for or against doing a thing, is tied essentially to value, and the two are not to be confused” (9). “… The existence of grounding reasons (though not of motivating reasons) has no internal or necessary connection with desires of any kind” (37). “… All value is necessarily objective, in the sense that it is never a function of desire (or will); nothing is ever valuable or desirable in virtue of being desired” (84). “Value is not to any extent whatever a function or product of desire” (155). (shrink)

Mass assembly on squares tends to be associated both with democracy and authoritarian as well as populist regimes (where assembly is connected to acclamation). The article elucidates the specific democratic functions of mass assembly, and how they can be facilitated both legally and spatially. In case of the former, it provides a critical analysis of indispensable core components of the right to assemble (which has recently been hollowed out in many jurisdictions); in matters of space, the article proposes characteristics of (...) squares that might facilitate and represent different forms of democratic assembly (without claiming that such characteristics could ever guarantee democratic outcomes). Some recent empirical evidence for how squares have enabled the increasingly important phenomenon of “urban civic revolutions” is also discussed. (shrink)

I suppose I’m writing this because of my 1965 paper on Pacifism. In that essay I argued that pacifism is self-contradictory. That’s a strong charge, and also not entirely clear. Let’s start by trying to clarify the charge and related ones.Pacifism has traditionally been understood as total opposition to violence, even the use of it in defense of oneself when under attack. I earlier maintained (in my well-known “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis” (Narveson, Ethics, 75:4, 259–271, 1965)) that this position is (...) contradictory, if it is intended to mean that one has no right to use violence. While that is perhaps going too far, pacifism as so characterized is surely, as I have later argued, self-defeating in an obvious sense of that expression. But in any case, contemporary theorists who describe their views as pacifist profess to hold no such doctrine—they regard that familiar characterization of pacifism as a caricature. They do express strong opposition to war, but even that is not unlimited. If the chips are genuinely down, they will approve going to war-level self-defense—but they deny that it ever is really necessary, or at least that it is necessary nearly as often as actual war-making behavior among nations would suggest.In this it is not clear that we have a purely philosophical disagreement. How much opposition to war qualifies a view as “pacifist”? That is now very hard to say. After all, all decently liberal thinkers are against violence as a standardly available way of pursuing one’s ends. We all agree that if violence is to be justified, it takes something special. It should be a “last resort,” Just War theorists have classically said, and while ‘last’ is very difficult to pin down, at least, violence should be very far from the first thing a responsible nation thinks of. What’s more, the “something special” is not just that one’s ends are so important. It has to be that the violence would be employed in defense, of self or of other innocent parties under threat. So if there is genuine disagreement, it must be along this line: that we are morally required to make very substantial sacrifices in the pursuits of our otherwise legitimate interests, including our interests in security, in order to avoid using the violence of war.Is this reasonable? I think not. We should, of course, be reasonable, and that includes refraining from violence—except when the violence is necessary to counter the aggressive violence of others. For we reason, on practical matters, in terms of benefits and costs. Agents, especially political agents, can, alas, benefit from violence where that violence is unilateral. Thus it is rational to see to it that it won’t be unilateral. And when it is not unilateral, then the balance is in favor—strongly in favor—of peace. It remains that we must, alas, be able to make war in the possible case that we can’t have peace. When everybody shares the preference for peace, then we can scale down and hopefully even eliminate war-making capability. (Contemporary nations have already scaled down considerably—there have been few wars in the classic sense of military exchanges between states as such in recent times.) But until the scaling down is universal and includes a genuine renunciation of the use of warlike methods to achieve ends other than genuine self-defense, what most of us think of as “pacifism” is a non-option in the near run. (shrink)

Energy consumption is central to both a number of pressing environmental issues and to people’s attempts to improve their well-being. Although typically understood as essential for people to thrive, this paper sketches a theoretical foundation for the possibility that the form and amount of energy consumption in modern society may inhibit rather than enable human flourishing. It achieves this goal by connecting and critically assessing the writings of Ivan Illich and Albert Borgmann, which offer a number of concepts that enable (...) a qualitative discussion on energy practices. For different reasons, both authors are highly critical of the societal tendency to command ever-increasing amounts of energy. Illich focuses on negative effects of high energy consumption at the societal level, whereas in my particular re-reading of Borgmann, one finds reasons why high energy consumption fails to realize intended positive effects. It is argued that therefore, energy transition should involve a re-appreciation of the function of energy consumption: to support, rather than to be central to life. (shrink)

Micheal Snow's talking picture »Rameau's Nephew […]« develops an ever unstable taxonomy of audio-visual relations in the talking movie. The contribution investigates this experimental film by following three motives – translation, surface, water – with which the talking movie reflects itself. Thus, moments of transition between mere technical lip-sync and »synchresis« – prove to be a critical point of the talking movie. In this perspective, synchronization is to be understood as a process which distributes and correlates potentials of homogenization and (...) heterogenization German Michael Snows » talking picture « »Rameau's Nephew […]« entwickelt eine – laufend aus den Fugen geratende – Taxonomie audiovisueller Verhältnisse des Tonfilms. Der Beitrag durchstreift diesen Experimentalfilm, indem er drei Motive – Übersetzung, Fläche, Wasser – nachverfolgt, an denen Tonfilm erprobt, reflektiert und erfahrbar wird. Dabei kristallisiert sich in Umschlagsmomenten zwischen technischer Bild-Ton-Synchronisation und »Synchresis« – irreduzibel audiovisuelle Synthese der Wahrnehmung – ein kritischer Punkt des Mediums Tonfilm heraus. Synchronisation ist von solchen Momenten aus als Prozess zu verstehen, in dem Potenziale von Homogenisierung und Heterogenisierung verteilt und aufeinander bezogen werden. (shrink)

This paper explores the role and resolution of disagreements between physicians and their diagnostic AI-based decision support systems. With an ever-growing number of applications for these independently operating diagnostic tools, it becomes less and less clear what a physician ought to do in case their diagnosis is in faultless conflict with the results of the DSS. The consequences of such uncertainty can ultimately lead to effects detrimental to the intended purpose of such machines, e.g. by shifting the burden of proof (...) towards a physician. Thus, we require normative clarity for integrating these machines without affecting established, trusted, and relied upon workflows. In reconstructing different causes of conflicts between physicians and their AI-based tools—inspired by the approach of “meaningful human control” over autonomous systems and the challenges to resolve them—we will delineate normative conditions for “meaningful disagreements”. These incorporate the potential of DSS to take on more tasks and outline how the moral responsibility of a physician can be preserved in an increasingly automated clinical work environment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Far-Future Paleontology: The Baffling Case of Brunaspis enigmaticaAnne-Sophie Milon (bio) and Jan Zalasiewicz (bio)Paleontologists, for more than two centuries, have studied and debated the petrified remains of plants and animals that have evolved over the past three billion years on Earth. They have argued over the grand concepts that they reveal, such as biological evolution and climate change, and also the many specific questions thrown up by these (...) relics: was such-and-such a shell, a mollusk, or an arthropod? Did this fossil fish live high up in the water, among the plankton, or grub in the mud on the sea floor?These studies have for many paleontologists been a blessedly human-free zone, detached from the busy realities of our everyday lives. The science of paleontology, though, is simply one obscure part of a burgeoning and rapidly evolving technosphere that underpins our lives, and that is now evolving millions of new kinds of fossils—technofossils—far more rapidly than ever happened in biological evolution. Many of these objects will, quite certainly, become part of Earth’s future fossil record.If such an endeavor as paleontology were ever to arise again, in a distant post-human future, how would its practitioners deal with these bizarre relics?We provide a preview, on the following pages, of just one such enigma, and how it may be resolved (or not) by our puzzled disciplinary descendants. [End Page 31] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 32] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 33] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 34] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 35] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 36] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 37] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 38] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 39] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 40] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 41] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 42] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 43] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 44]Anne-Sophie Milon Anne-Sophie Milon is an artist-researcher who applies her illustration skills (HEAR, Strasbourg, France, 2010) and 2D traditional animation (UWE, Bristol, UK, 2012) to political arts (SPEAP, Sciences Po, 2015) and science and technology studies (HSTS, EHESS, 2022). For the past ten years, she has translated geological narratives–and ordinary ones for Earth sciences–into extraordinary plots for the uninitiated, including the humanities. She is currently working with Jan Zalasiewicz on a play, The Petrified Museum (2024), based on the British Geological Survey (Keyworth, UK), and on a PhD project in science and technology studies looking at limestones’ agencies in extractive industry practices (2025). She regularly collaborates with researchers from the Anthropocene Working Group: The Cosmic Oasis (Oxford University Press, 2022), “The Victims of Carbon Dioxide are Starting to Appear” in Feral Atlas (2021), and The Epochs of Nature (University of Chicago Press, 2016).Jan Zalasiewicz Jan Zalasiewicz is Emeritus Professor of Paleobiology at the University of Leicester. He was formerly a field geologist and paleontologist with the British Geological Survey, involved in the geological mapping of eastern England and central Wales. His interests include Early Paleozoic fossils, notably the graptolites (a kind of extinct zooplankton), mud and mudrocks, the Quaternary Ice Ages, the nature of geological time, and the geology made by humans. In recent years, he has helped develop the concept of an Anthropocene epoch. He enjoys writing popular science articles and books, and being involved in art/science projects.Copyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press and SubStance, Inc... (shrink)

In the field of theology, the comparative study of religions has exhibited growing interest in recent years. For this reason, more than ever, the moment seems right for a critical reflection on the status of comparative religious science as an autonomous discipline and on its relation to theology. At present, a consensus is growing among many – although seldom formally confirmed this tacitly remains, nevertheless, the ruling fundamental orientation – that the comparative study of religions, along with the scientific study (...) of literature , psychology, anthropology, sociology and the other “classical” human sciences, is the only way to practice theology in a “scientifically justified way”. This makes comparative religious science - along with the other human sciences - the only valid authority to claim truth in Christian doctrine. I believe this is an incorrect opinion, which is based upon an underestimation of the distinction between Christian theology and the “classical” practice of science. In the present article, I will attempt to provide a new interpretation of the position of the phenomenology of religion in relation to Christian theology by determining what functions theology is at liberty to perform in view of comparative religious science and vice versa. In doing so, I will restrict myself to the phenomenological method within the context of comparative religious science, a method which has served for a long time as themodel for every comparative research. I intend to take the following twofold thesis as my point of departure: 1. In contrast to what its most fervent adherents claim, the understanding of the phenomenology of religion as a separate branch within human sciences is partly based upon prejudices regarding the scope of the latter disciplines. Theoretically and practically speaking, the research object of the phenomenology of religion can easily be arranged, broadly speaking, under the other disciplines of human sciences, which have religion as their object of research. 2. The relation of the phenomenology of religion to theology is that of an auxiliary science. While it is true that, under certain terms, there is a degree of cross-fertilisation between theology and the phenomenology of religion, theology and the phenomenology of religion must remain, nevertheless, theology and phenomenology of religion. (shrink)

The present book is the result of the conference 'Renovatio, inventio, absentia imperii. From the Roman Empire to Contemporary Imperialism', held in Brussels at the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Academia Belgica in Rome (September 11-13, 2014). At the heart of the conference was the 'reception', 'Nachleben' or 'permanence' of the Roman Empire, of an idea and a historical paradigm which since classical Antiquity has supported the most widespread claims to obtain and consolidate power. The volume's focus is (...) on culture in a broad sense, i.e. including besides the arts, philosophy, religion and, most importantly, discourse. As such, a wide array of themes are subjected to academic scrutiny. Whereas the main focus is on Europe and North America, some contributors also reach out towards non-Western contexts, whether or not directly related to the Roman example. A theoretical and sociological dimension is also added thanks to the discussion on methodological issues. More specifically, the following question(s) receive particular attention: what is our position as researchers, embedded in a contemporary, often Western, democratic and capitalist context; what about the notion of empire itself, its constituent elements and the kind of ideological prerogatives to which it is generally subjected; in other words, apart from the many historical variants and instances of reception of empire, through which filters can, and inevitably do, we approach this topic? A question that has become ever more pregnant since the beginning of the twenty-first century, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events of September 11, which have revivified what could be called American 'imperialism', and at a time when an essentially economic variant, driven by 'emerging' powers such as China, has increasingly contested existing power structures."--Page [4] of cover. (shrink)

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in (...) German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a tragedy for those who have been hard hit worldwide. At the same time, it is also a test of concepts and practices of what good care is and requires, and how quality of care can be accounted for. In this paper, we present our Care-Ethical Model of Quality Enquiry (CEMQUE) and apply it to the case of residential care for older people in the Netherlands during the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of thinking about care in healthcare (...) and social welfare as a set of separate care acts, we think about care as a complex practice of relational caring, crossed by other practices. Instead of thinking about professional caregivers as functionaries obeying external rules, we think about them as practically wise professionals. Instead of thinking about developing external quality criteria and systems, we think about cultivating (self-)reflective quality awareness. Instead of abstracting from societal forces that make care possible but also limit it, we acknowledge them and find ways to deal with them. Based on these critical insights, the CEMQUE model can be helpful to describe, interrogate, evaluate, and improve existing care practices. It has four entries: (i) the care receiver considered from their humanness, (ii) the caregiver considered from their solicitude, (iii) the care facility considered from its habitability and (iv) the societal, institutional and scholarly context considered from the perspective of the good life, justice and decency. The crux is enabling all these different entries with all their different aspects to be taken into account. In Corona times this turns out to be more crucial than ever. (shrink)

Investigations into inter-level relations in computer science, biology and psychology call for an *empirical* turn in the philosophy of mind. Rather than concentrate on *a priori* discussions of inter-level relations between 'completed' sciences, a case is made for the actual study of the way inter-level relations grow out of the developing sciences. Thus, philosophical inquiries will be made more relevant to the sciences, and, more importantly, philosophical accounts of inter-level relations will be testable by confronting them with what really happens (...) in science. Hence, close observation of the ever-changing reduction relations in the developing sciences, and revision of philosophical positions based on these empirical observations, may, in the long run, be more conducive to an adequate understanding of inter-level relations than a traditional *a priori* approach. (shrink)

Drawing from field theory, Gestalt therapy conceives psychological suffering and psychotherapy as two intentional field phenomena, where unprocessed and chaotic experiences seek the opportunity to emerge and be assimilated through the contact between the patient and the therapist (i.e., the intentionality of contacting). This therapeutic approach is based on the therapist’s aesthetic experience of his/her embodied presence in the flow of the healing process because (1) the perception of beauty can provide the therapist with feedback on the assimilation of unprocessed (...) experiences; (2) the therapist’s attentional focus on intrinsic aesthetic diagnostic criteria can facilitate the modification of rigid psychopathological fields by supporting the openness to novel experiences. The aim of the present manuscript is to review recent evidence from psychophysiology, neuroaesthetic research, and neurocomputational models of cognition, such as the free energy principle (FEP), which support the notion of the therapeutic potential of aesthetic sensibility in Gestalt psychotherapy. Drawing from neuroimaging data, psychophysiology and recent neurocognitive accounts of aesthetic perception, we propose a novel interpretation of the sense of beauty as a self-generated reward motivating us to assimilate an ever-greater spectrum of sensory and affective states in our predictive representation of ourselves and the world and supporting the intentionality of contact. Expecting beauty, in the psychotherapeutic encounter, can help therapists tolerate uncertainty avoiding impulsive behaviours and to stay tuned to the process of change. (shrink)

This book presents the first English translation of the original French treatise “La Physique d’Einstein” written by the young Georges Lemaître in 1922, only six years after the publication of Albert Einstein’s theory of General Relativity. It includes an historical introduction and a critical edition of the original treatise in French supplemented by the author’s own later additions and corrections. -/- Monsignor Georges Lemaître can be considered the founder of the “Big Bang Theory” and a visionary architect of modern Cosmology. (...) The scientific community is only beginning to grasp the full extent of the legacy of this towering figure of 20th century physics. Against the best advice of the greatest names of his time, the young Lemaître was convinced, solely through the study of Einstein’s theory of General Relativity, that space and time must have had a beginning with a tremendous “Big Bang” from a “quantum primeval atom” resulting in an ever-expanding Universe with a positive cosmological constant. -/- But how did the young Lemaître, essentially on his own, come to grips with the physics of Einstein? A year before his ordination as a diocesan priest, he submitted the audacious treatise, published in this book, that was to earn him Fellowships to study at Cambridge, MIT and Harvard, and launched him on a scientific path of ground-breaking discoveries. Almost a century after Lemaître’s seminal publications of 1927 and 1931, this highly pedagogical treatise is still of timely interest to young minds and remains of great value from a history of science perspective. (shrink)

Jan Assmann, one of the world’s most outstanding Egyptologists, has written a remarkable and fascinating book, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Assmann, however, is not primarily concerned with the historical question that has intrigued thinkers throughout the ages : Was Moses an Egyptian? Nor is the book primarily a contribution to Egyptology—although Assmann is a master of the discipline. What then is it really about? The question is simple and direct, but the answer—as we shall (...) see—is complex and subtle. Assmann’s primary aim is to contribute to a new field of study that he calls “mnemohistory.” Moses, Assmann tells us, is a “figure of memory, not of history.” There is no independent historical or archaeological evidence that the biblical Moses ever really existed. Our knowledge of Moses is based primarily on the biblical account, although there are also legends, stories, and anecdotes that can be found in apocryphal sources. Yet there is no other human figure of memory that has exerted such a powerful influence in shaping the tradition of Western monotheism. Assmann explores the image of Egypt in Western thinking; he probes the dynamics of religious intolerance and tolerance, and the origins of anti-Semitism. He also contributes to an enriched understanding of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Furthermore, Assmann’s study can be read as a lucid reflection on issues that have been at the center of recent controversies about multiculturalism and cultural identity. Moses The Egyptian is erudite, beautifully conceived, and passionately written. (shrink)

Doing Educational Administration is the final part in a three volume series by Evers and Lakomski presenting their perspective on educational administration. The first volume, Knowing Educational Administration , established the importance of epistemological issues in the international field of educational administration and suggested a new, post-positivist approach to research. The theoretical approach presented in the first volume was further examined in Exploring Educational Administration, where the authors' theories were considered in an applied context. In this, the third and (...) final volume, the authors conclude their presentation of their post-positivist theory by demonstrating how their account of knowledge and cognition shapes the content and structure of administrative practice. Built around a set of basic issues in the practice of educational administration where the role of condition is of primary importance, Evers and Lakomski produce a comprehensive and persuasive applied theory of administrative practice. (shrink)

Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.

A traditional belief is that there is but one self to a body, and that each of us has a single biography and personality. Varieties of this monistic view have dominated most of mankind’s intellectual history in philosophy, science, religion, and psychology, as well as legal and social theory. It has been challenged by appeal to those people whom psychiatry labels “multiple,” or “dissociated” personalities who, some claim, are “multiple selves.” This may be adequate if the self is explained by (...) reference to personality. But if the self is characterized in terms of self-awareness, its numerical identity will be independent of that of the individual’s personality. On this account, the self is a biological ability that forms the basis of subjective reality without determinately enumerating the subject living it. The concept “self” is ambiguous and contextually sensitive; its meaning can vary with circumstances. On conceptual, ethical and existential grounds, a minimal conception of the self should be adopted without thereby excluding complementary stronger notions of the self. In principle, one organism could thus simultaneously be one and many selves in different meanings of that term. In human societies, the importance of being a self can hardly be overestimated, and any denial of this status must therefore carefully be considered. (shrink)

Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...) believe this problem is a reason to prefer a realist or error theoretic semantics of morals. I argue two things: first, that plausible versions of all these theories are afflicted by the problem equally, and second, that any solution available to the realist and error theorist is also available to the contextualist. So the problem of triviality does not favour noncontextualist views of moral language. (shrink)

The human mind strives to maintain equilibrium between memory and oblivion and rejects irrelevant or disruptive memories. However, extensive amounts of stress hormones released at the time of a traumatic event can give rise to such powerful memory formation that traumatic memories cannot be rejected and do not vanish or diminish with time: Post-traumatic stress disorder may then develop. Recent scientific studies suggest that beta-blockers stopping the action of these stress hormones may reduce the emotional impact of disturbing memories or (...) prevent their consolidation. Using such an intervention could, in principle, help people who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, but the idea of doing so is controversial. I shall here discuss memory manipulation in this perspective. (shrink)

According to subjectivist views about a meaningful life, one's life is meaningful in virtue of desire satisfaction or feelings of fulfilment. Standard counterexamples consist of satisfaction found through trivial or immoral tasks. In response to such examples, many philosophers require that the tasks one is devoted to are objectively valuable, or have objectively valuable consequences. I argue that the counterexamples to subjectivism do not require objective value for meaning in life. I also consider other reasons for thinking that meaning in (...) life requires objective value and raise doubts about their strength. Finally, I argue that beauty is not plausibly objective, but that it seems important for meaning. This puts pressure on the objectivist to explain why objectivity matters in the case of other values. (shrink)

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.

Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.

Stephen Finlay analyses ‘ought’ in terms of probability. According to him, normative ‘ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between ‘ought’ and the balance of reasons. ‘A ought to Φ’ seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A Φ-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for ‘ought’, it also makes sense to think of reasons and their weight in (...) terms of probability. In this paper, I develop such a theory of weight. It turns out, however, that it cannot explain the entailments. This leaves Finlay with a challenge: to explain these entailments in some other way consistent with his theory, or to show why the appearances deceive and there are no such entailments. (shrink)

In this article, we present and analyse the concept of Digital Twin linked to distinct types of objects and examine the challenges involved in creating them from a fundamental neuroethics approach that emphasises conceptual analyses. We begin by providing a brief description of DTs and their initial development as models of artefacts and physical inanimate objects, identifying core challenges in building these tools and noting their intended benefits. Next, we describe attempts to build DTs of model living entities, such as (...) hearts, highlighting the novel challenges raised by this shift from DTs of inanimate to DTs of living objects. Against that background, we give an account of contemporary research aiming to develop DTs of the human brain by building "virtual brains", e.g. the simulation engine The Virtual Brain as it is carried out in the European Human Brain Project. Since the brain is structurally and functionally the most complex organ in the human body, and our integrated knowledge of its functional architecture remains limited in spite of recent neuroscientific advances, the attempts to create virtual copies of the human brain are correspondingly challenging. We suggest that a clear scientific theoretical structure, conceptual clarity and transparency regarding the methods and goals of this technological development are necessary prerequisites in order to make the project of constructing virtual brains a theoretically promising and socially beneficial scientific, technological and philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Belief in the benevolence of free markets has become a fundamental credo of professional experts, economists, business people and politicians. We regard this discourse as part of a new culture of markets, which has also taken root in Southeast Asia. Expanding markets and using high-tech devices of communication are interpreted as cultural systems that are used in the construction of modernity. An `unbridled romanticism of productivity' (Baudrillard) and a `romance of capitalism' are the meta-narratives underlying the culture of markets. This (...) theme is followed up on two empirical levels. The development policy of three Southeast Asian governments, namely Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, is briefly characterized as market corporatism, market socialism and high-tech developmentalism. We then focus on the emergence of the new middle classes, their actual and symbolic consumption and their lifestyles. Finally the decline of real markets, the creation of virtual markets and the state of postmodernity in Southeast Asia are discussed. We conclude that market fundamentalism and postmodern lifestyles characterize the beginning rather than the end of modernity in Southeast Asia. (shrink)