This study articulates the relationship between conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting. Neoliberal healthcare services, with their focus on efficiencies, predominantly calculate quality care based on time‐on‐the‐clock workforce management planning systems. However, the ways staff conceptualise and then relate to diverse meanings of time have implications for good care and for staff morale. This phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical–surgical wards, investigating the contextual, temporal nature of care embedded in human relations. The (...) study interviews involved 17 participants: 11 staff, 3 previous patients and 3 family members. Data were analysed iteratively to surface the phenomenality of temporality and good care. The following constituents of the data set are explored that together illustrate the relationship between the conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting: patient time as a relational journey; patient time, sovereign time and time ethics and time, teamwork and flow. The findings are clinically significant because they offer a contrasting narrative about the relationship between time and care quality. The experiences of giving and receiving good care are indivisible from how temporality is experienced and the social relations within which care is embedded. Healthcare staff experience temporality differently from patients and families, a point that healthcare participants in this study appeared to comprehend and accommodate. For all parties involved in providing care or being the recipient of care, however, the capacity to be present was valued as a humanising ethic of care. Our study reinforces the importance of not creating presumptive binaries about which temporal structures are more or less humanising—there is a place for a fast‐paced tempo, which can be experienced as being in the flow of human relations with one's team and on behalf of patients. (shrink)

This study articulates the relational constituents of good care beyond techno‐rational competence. Neoliberal healthcare means that notions of care are readily commodified and reduced to quantifiable assessments and checklists. This novel research investigated accounts of good care provided by nursing, medical, allied and auxiliary staff. The Heideggerian phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical‐surgical wards, investigating the contextual, communicative nature of care. The study involved interviews with 17 participants: 3 previous patients, 3 family members and 11 staff. Data were analysed (...) iteratively, dwelling with stories and writing and rewriting to surface the phenomenality of good care. The data set highlighted the following essential constituents: authentic care: caring encompassing solicitude (fürsorge); impromptu care: caring beyond role category; sustained care: caring beyond specialist parameters; attuned care: caring encompassing family and culture; and insightful care: caring beyond assessment and diagnosis. The findings are clinically significant because they indicate the importance of nurse leaders and educators harnessing the potential capacity of all healthcare workers to participate in good care. Healthcare workers reported that participating in or witnessing good care was uplifting and added meaning to their work, contributing to a sense of shared humanity. (shrink)

‘It comes together at the end’: the impact of a one‐year subject in Nursing Inquiry on philosophies of nursingThis paper reframes an interpretive study as critical inquiry as the researchers interrogate their roles and authority in the ‘reading’ of what is valued as reflective. Working from data collected in written philosophies and interviews within the context of a one‐year subject aimed at developing reflective practice and an appreciation of ways of knowing, this paper examines the change in philosophies of nursing (...) perceived by three university‐based educators and their students. The study reveals a growing appreciation of the complexity of nursing but a limited consideration of the dialectic of critical theorising and everyday engagement necessary to critical reflection and reconstruction of action. More importantly, the process of research collaboration raises questions of the soul‐searching necessary for university educators to act against the institutionalised political context that determines what is seen to be of value in student learning. (shrink)

Jan Kavan was one of the most active émigrés who fled Czechoslovakia after the 1968 Soviet-led invasion that crushed the Prague Spring. As his mother was British, Kavan settled in London. A devout socialist, he founded the Palach Press Agency and established a smuggling network for circulating banned literature to and from Czechoslovakia. Kavan was also active in the European Nuclear Disarmament movement. On his return to Czechoslovakia in 1990, Kavan held several important posts, including that of foreign minister of (...) the Czech Republic and president of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Based largely on archival documents, this essay sheds light on some of the more controversial aspects of Kavan’s personality, life, and work. (shrink)

The program of intervening, manipulating, constructing and creating is central to natural and engineering sciences. A renewed wave of interest in this program has emerged within the recent practices and discourse of nano-technoscience. However, it is striking that, framed from the perspective of well-established epistemologies, the constructed technoscientific objects and engineered things remain invisible. Their ontological and epistemological status is unclear. The purpose of the present paper is to support present-day approaches to techno-objects ( ontology ) insofar as they make (...) these hidden objects epistemologically perceivable. To accomplish this goal, it is inspiring to look back to the origin of the project of modernity and to its founding father: Francis Bacon. The thesis is that everything we need today for an adequate (dialectic-materialist), ontologically well-informed epistemology of technoscience can be found in the works of Bacon—this position will be called epistemological real-constructivism. Rather than describing it as realist or constructivist, empiricist or rationalist, Bacon’s position can best be understood as real-constructivist since it challenges modern dichotomies, including the dichotomy between epistemology and ontology. Such real-constructive turn might serve to promote the acknowledgement that natural and engineering sciences, in particular recent technosciences, are creating and producing the world we live in. Reflection upon the contemporary relevance of Bacon is intended as a contribution to the expanding and critical discussion on nano-technoscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:1. The present state of the questionEsser's turnaboutIn his collection of studies on the writings of Francis, published in 1973, Kajetan Esser, the acknowledged master of Franciscan textual criticism, wrote that in verse 13 of Francis's Letter to the Clergy there exists "a striking difference, that is difficult to explain," between the oldest manuscript which originally belonged to the Benedictine abbey of Subiaco and was written before 1238, and (...) the famous manuscript Assisi 338 which originated between 1250 and 1260. However, Esser considered this difference "a too weak basis to accept a double version of the Letter to the Clergy." It is therefore somewhat strange, to say the least, that in his textcritical edition of the writings of Francis, published only three years later in 1976, the same Esser concludes, without any further explanation, that the differences are "so serious that one has to accept two versions of one and the same letter."Esser's conclusion immediately raises the question about which one of the two versions would be the first. Esser opted for the Subiaco manuscript as the first version and the Assisi manuscript as the second. An important reason for Esser's option was the fact that the Assisi manuscript of the Letter to the Clergy added in verse 13 that the clerics have to observe all of these matters "according to the precepts of the Lord and the constitutions of holy mother Church ." With "the constitutions of holy mother Church" Francis referred, according to Esser, to the papal bull Sane cum olim, issued by pope Honorius III on November 22, 1219. And as this bull, in Esser's view, also "contained references to the will of God as laid down in Holy Scripture," Francis decided to insert both a reference to the papal bull and to "the precepts of the Lord" in a new, second version of the letter. This would imply that Francis, who in the summer of 1219 left for Egypt, wrote the second version only after his return from the Middle East in the spring of 1220. For it was only then that he came to know about the existence of the papal bull issued during his absence from Italy, and could refer to it in order to strengthen his appeal to the clergy to show greater reverence for the Eucharist. At the same time, however, the absence of these important additions in the first version implies that this version was written before the papal bull of Honorius was issued and thus also before Francis's departure for the Middle East in the summer of 1219.Present reception of Esser's theoryThe latest English translation, published in 1999, follows Esser and contains a separate translation of both versions, the first of which was written before 1219 and the second in 1220. In the most recent German translation Leonhard Lehmann acknowledges the existence of two versions but the differences between the two are so small that it suffices to print only the text of the oldest manuscript, that of Subiaco, written before 1238. He agrees, though, that the addition constitutiones sanctae matris Ecclesiae in the second version refers to the papal bull Sane cum olim and that the earlier version may have been written before 1219. The revised edition of the Fonti Francescane still follows Esser's theory as regards the existence of two versions, the early date of the first version and the reference of the second version to Sane cum olim. However, in a lengthy article on Francis's letters, C. Paolazzi, the author of the introduction to the Letters in FF, revised his previous opinion in 2008. He still accepts the existence of two versions but dates both after Sane cum olim and therewith also after Francis's return from the Middle East in 1220. His main argument is that theimplicit quotations.. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to appreciate more deeply the ecclesiological and missiological perspectives of synodality and thus to suggest that synodality is not something new or created as the whim of Pope Francis but that it is rooted in the Church's ecclesiology from its earliest times and as such finds an expression in the Church's life and mission. In this paper I will demonstrate that the Church has always been a synodal Church and what we are witnessing now (...) is a valid theological development which takes us into the third millennium. I wish to set my examination of synodality in its ecclesiological and missiological perspectives and thereby posit that these two branches or routes lead into the one synodal pathway. I will show that as we examine the ecclesiological perspective of synodality we shall see that it is set in a renewed sense of mission. For this, we will need to co-operate with God and each other, as Pope Francis hinted at in 2015. (shrink)

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the attempts to clarify and classify the vague notion of “technosciences” from a historical perspective. A key question that is raised is as follows: Does Francis Bacon, one of the founding fathers of the modern age, provide a hitherto largely undiscovered programmatic position, which might facilitate a more profound understanding of technosciences ? The paper argues that nearly everything we need today for an ontologically well-informed epistemology of technoscience can be found in the works (...) of Bacon—this position will be called epistemological real - constructivism. Rather than realist or constructivist, empiricist or rationalist, Bacon’s position can best be understood as real-constructivist since it challenges modern dichotomies. Reflection upon the contemporary relevance of Bacon could contribute to the expanding and critical discussion on technoscience. In the following I will reconstruct the term “technoscience”. My finding is that at least four different understandings or types of the term “technoscience” co-exist. In a second step, I will analyze and elaborate on Bacon’s epistemological position. I will identify central elements of the four different understandings in Bacon’s work. Finally, I will conclude that the epistemology of technoscience is, indeed, very old—it is the epistemological position put forward by Bacon. (shrink)

While Reinhart Koselleck articulated the limits of conceptual history in relation to social history, and the limits of historiographical understanding in his discussion of the event, his thinking about the limits of the conceptual as such is harder to trace. However, a close reading of key texts where he discusses situations or events marked as “meaningless” or absurd, allows us to uncover both his ethics and analytics of the limit of meaning, of what we call “the ungraspable.” It is further (...) argued that Koselleck's conceptual mapping of European modernity can be fruitfully extended by bringing it into contact with the ideas of thinkers such as Michel De Certeau, Edourd Glissant, and Francis Affergan who have contemplated how especially “the colonial” both represents the outside to and is the site from which the limit of European modernity and its conceptual universe might be (re)thought. (shrink)

Philosophers often rely on sciences of their own time. This is especially true for scientists writing philosophical works. In the case of Ernst Mach, the scientific references are mainly to physics, physiology, evolutionary biology and—in a somewhat different manner—the new discipline of psychology. Like so many authors in the late 19th century, Mach had extreme confidence in the methods of the natural sciences. However, this trait, often called scientism or positivism, can easily be used in polemical accounts that obscure other (...) aspects of Mach’s thought. Mach is well-known for both his analysis of sensations and his evolutionary conception of perception and knowledge. The tension between the ambition to clarify the empirical basis of perception on the one hand and the focus on the natural origins of human perception on the other hand is, however, considerable. A comparison of these two perspectives can contribute to an ontological understanding of experience that sheds new light on the much-discussed topic of sense data and at the same time clarifies the difference between experience and observation and the role of experimental science in this context. In some respects, Mach seems closer to William James than to his followers in the Vienna circle. The accusation of idealism made by Lenin in his influential critique of positivism overlooks the implications of this naturalist approach but offers the occasion to dwell on the ontological implications of something that can be called natural historicity. Comparisons with Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Kant situate the empiricist theory of perception. (shrink)

The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by (...) the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by defining a conception of intuition, answering some skeptical challenges, delimiting its target, and arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ch'an/Zen-Catholic Dialogue Spreads a "Welcome Table" at the 2009 Annual MeetingFrancis V. TisoA retreat program designed by the participants in the ongoing Ch'an/Zen-Catholic Dialogue explored the dialogue of religious experience and the dialogue of life, set amid the redwoods of Guerneville, California. The 28–31 January 2009 meeting was cochaired by the Rev. Heng Sure of the Berkeley Buddhist Monastery and the Institute for World Religions, Berkeley, California, and by (...) Most Rev. John C. Wester, Bishop of Salt Lake City, Utah.Sr. Mary Ann Donovan of the Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley, led an experience of lectio divina based on John 15:1–17, Jesus's simile of the vine and the branches. Rev. Victoria Austin of the San Francisco Zen Center gave an "encouragement talk," which would typically be delivered to Zen retreatants. She referred to the Gospel passage, noting: "We don't prune the vine because it is dead, but because it has the capacity to be fruitful. We don't purify the mind to get rid of dirt, but to return to the mind's original purity, which is the source of our conscience and is the true life within us." Rev. Jan Chosen Bays of Great Vow Zen Monastery in Oregon observed that "Vows make our life energy more focused, keeping us from losing purpose and meaning. Vows prune away unnecessary things. When we ask for help with the challenge of being faithful to our vows, we call up and encounter unexpected sources of support and 'grace.' "The Ch'an Buddhist presentation focused on meditation experience, which was described as "recovering the natural state of the mind." Prof. Martin Verhoeven of the Pacific School of Religion pointed out that in meditation "we are returning to the origin, not moving forward to 'gain something.'" Linking ethical engagement with contemplation, he said, "When the mind of a meditator is motivated to act out of genuine compassion, its action is accurate and correct. Action is neither driven nor obstructed by ego or sentiment." These comments resonated with Rev. Heng Sure's presentation on the statement on the environment from the recent Gethsemane III conference "Simple and Sufficient," in which Buddhist and Christian monastics embraced an ecologically valid way of life. Urging the group to notice the connections between contemplation and ethical action, Bishop John C. Wester commented: "This [End Page 145] work embodies mercy by lifting people up; it embodies justice as it arises out of our common humanity."Because of the financial challenges that all three sponsoring institutions are facing, it was decided to conclude formal sponsorship of the Ch'an/Zen-Catholic Dialogue with this meeting. However, participants agreed to work together to reconstitute the dialogue regionally. A steering committee was designated to undertake new logistical arrangements and to draft a narrative of the previous seven years of dialogue for posting on our respective websites. Bishop Wester summarized the convictions of participants, both Buddhist and Catholic, by observing: "It is impossible not to be affected by this experience. Dialogue in this atmosphere has had an impact on my own way of ministering to others. I feel that my faith, sensitivity, compassion, and reverence have been enhanced by participating in these meetings."Participants in the 2009 dialogue meeting included Rev. Heng Sure, Berkeley Buddhist Monastery; Bishop John C. Wester, Salt Lake City; Dr. Snjezana Akpinar, Dharma Realm Buddhist University; Rev. Gigen Victoria Austin, San Francisco Zen Center; Rev. Jan Chozen Bays, Great Vow Zen Monastery; Sr. Phyllis D'Anna, SND, Zen Center, Palo Alto; Sr. Mary Ann Donovan, SC, Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley; Dr. Ron Epstein, Dharma Realm Buddhist Association; Mrs. Lorraine Moriarty, Society of St. Vincent De Paul; Bhikshuni Heng Jiao, City of 10,000 Buddhas; Bhikshuni Heng Liang, City of 10,000 Buddhas; Rev. Canon Francis Tiso, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops; Rev. James Massa, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops; Rev. Thomas W. Devereaux, Diocese of Santa Rosa ecumenical and interreligious officer; Dr. Martin Verhoeven, Pacific School of Religion; and Ron Brown, observer (Cloverdale, California). [End Page 146]Francis V. TisoUnited States Conference of Catholic BishopsCopyright © 2009 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

SUMMARYThis article investigates the Anglo–Dutch scholar and diplomat Isaac Dorislaus's sole published work, Praelium Nuportanum, on the battle of Newport in 1600. After presenting some new or little known information about the work, it discusses PN's intellectual context and concludes that the work is a reminder of successful Anglo–Dutch cooperation in the past, of Dutch indebtedness to English assistance, and the Republic's importance as an ally for England, all relevant to the negotiations running in 1640 for an Orange–Stuart wedding, and (...) their backgrounds in the British Civil Wars and Anglo–Spanish–Dutch relations at the time. After the troubles ensuing from Dorislaus's Cambridge lectures on Tacitus in 1627, PN shows the author reconciled with the Court and the Laudian faction. With respect to style and content, PN appears clearly Tacitist in style, with many direct quotations from Tacitus, but this Tacitism operates more on a literary than a political level. Much of PN's historical content is a reworking of Francis Vere's Commentaries. From the perspective of the Protestant ‘Anglo–Scoto–Dutch public sphere’ recently discussed in the scholarship, PN might perhaps be read as a warning of the gradual emergence of an Anglo–Dutch Calvinist–parliamentarian ‘realm’ as a force opposing the Crown. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique DecaixBrian Francis ConollyVéronique Decaix. Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback, $48.00.Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect, as presented in his De origine rerum praedicamentalium, has proved unusually resistant to contextualization within the philosophical and theological discussions at the (...) University of Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century. There is little indication in the quodlibet literature that any of his contemporaries were aware of his unusual doctrine, let alone interested in responding to it, and Dietrich himself provides few hints as to which quaestiones of contemporary interest he is responding to. One therefore welcomes this study by Véronique Decaix in which it is argued that "il est irréfutable que les concepts centraux du De origine ont été forgés dans une discussion permanente avec Henri de Gand" (223). Drawing upon and developing the work of Pasquale Porro, Jan Aersten, and others, Decaix establishes Dietrich's indebtedness to Henry of Ghent, all while providing a comprehensive and remarkably clear, detailed, and precise presentation of Dietrich's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect. [End Page 706]Particularly noteworthy is the manner in which Decaix clarifies that there are several distinct ways in which the intellect, on Dietrich's theory, exercises its constitutive power. Thus, for instance, "categorial constitution," whereby certain relations and the six posterior relative categories are constituted, is distinguished from "quidditative constitution," wherein a real natural thing is constituted in its quidditative being, which is at the same time the mode or manner in which the intellect constitutes its own proper object. Decaix clarifies that such modes of constitution differ not only with respect to what is constituted, but by the kind of causality exercised by the intellect. Categorial constitution is a kind of formal causality—because it concerns only accidents, and because intellect grasps these accidents "sur une modalité déduite d'un élément extrinsèque" (284)—whereas quidditative constitution is efficient—it is "plus fondamentale, car elle est plus essentielle et plus intérieure" and "s'exerce sur la forme substantielle et cause l'étant en tant qu'étant" (286). In either case, whether the mode of constitution is categorial or quidditative, Decaix makes clear that constitution is not creation, and does not pertain to the reality or absolute entity of the thing affected by the intellect's constitutive power. Rather, constitution in the relevant sense here entails introducing and imposing upon the real natural thing a new mode of being: with respect to categorial constitution, that mode of being is ad aliud (to be in relation to another); with respect to quidditative constitution, the constituted mode of being is quidditative being.Decaix argues that Dietrich consciously develops his theory of categorial relation within the framework provided by Henry of Ghent. She cites as evidence, among other factors, that Dietrich concludes his analysis of categorial relation with what Decaix calls the "exacte contre-pied" (154) to question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX: "Utrum circumscripta re sui fundamenti relatio possit signari per nomen primae impositionis?" Dietrich in effect responds: "Si autem ab huiusmodi entibus removeamus actum rationis, tunc secundum nullum modum sunt entia quantum ad id, quod significatur per nomen, sed relinquitur sola realitas et entitas fundamenti" (160).Question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX is still more important for Decaix's argument. For she sees herein more than a germ of Dietrich's doctrine of the constitutive power of the intellect. As Decaix explains, in addition to the real foundation (quantity or quality) provided by nature, and the pure ratio of relation, provided by the intellect, Henry introduces the modus characterizatus a re, whereby the peculiar nature of the foundation (e.g. the length or the color) particularizes the general notion of the pure relation (157–58). Thus, the real, particular relation, for example, "is shorter than" or "is similar to," arises only from both nature and the intellect as joint contributing causes. In this... (shrink)

Since the very beginning of modern Comenius studies there have been attempts to examine the relationship of the Czech philosopher, theologian, and educational reformer Jan Amos Comenius to the English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon. A study dealing with the efforts of both philosophers to reform philosophy is, nevertheless, still lacking. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to introduce Comenius’s relationship to the work of Francis Bacon in this regard. In the first part, the author presents an overview of (...) Comenius’s references to Bacon. The following section focuses on a description and comparison of the structure and fundamental concepts held by both Comenius and Bacon in their works relevant for the topic. In the last part of the paper, the reader will find the characteristics of both philosophers’ projects of the restoration of knowledge. The author concludes that although both Comenius and Bacon directed their intellectual powers towards restoring the original immaculate knowledge of Adam, they approached its implementation in their own unique and original ways. © Filosofia, 2017. (shrink)

In 1683 Francis Daniel Pastorius became the founder of Germantown, Pennsylvania, the first German settlement in colonial North America. He and several prominent German Pietists in Frankfurt originally wanted to follow in William Penn’s wake by setting up a "godly community" in America. Although it is generally recognized that the works of Jan Amos Comenius, Jacob Böhme and Johann Valentin Andreae influenced the Frankfurt Pietists, very little has been done on addressing how much impact Rosicrucianism and Behmenism had on Pastorius’s (...) late Renaissance hopes of utopian renewal and eschatological fears. Through an examination of Pastorius’s commonplace book the Beehive, this paper contends that the Rosicrucian and Behmenist influences on Pastorius were critical in motivating his colonizing efforts and elucidate his perspectives dealing with alchemy, astrology, and his relationship with Swedish settlers that he encountered. © FILOSOFIA, 2014. (shrink)

Jan Patočka's “Galileo Galilei and the End of the Ancient Cosmos” was initially published in the popular science journal Vesmír, 33 (1954), no. 1, pp. 27–29. The year before, there had been published in the same journal, under the general heading “On the Development of the Ideas of Natural Science,” a series of Patočka’s articles, including “The First Critics of Aristotelianism” [Vesmír 32 (1953), no. 7, pp. 254–256]; “The Breakdown of Aristotle’s Dynamics and the Prelude to Modern Mechanicism” (ibid., no. (...) 8, pp. 285–287); “Intermezzo on the Threshold of Modern Science: Cusanus and Comenius” (ibid., no. 9, pp. 322–325). This series had been introduced by yet another text: “Aristotle’s Philosophical Natural Science” [Vesmír 32 (1953), no. 3, pp. 102–105]. A last short essay on the theme of the birth of modern natural science—“On the Significance of Francis Bacon of Verulam” [Vesmír 40 (1961), no. 5, pp. 152, 155, and no. 6, pp. 186–188]—followed several years later. These texts were all subsequently revised to a greater or lesser extent and included in the book Aristoteles, jeho předchůdci a dědicové (Aristotle, His Forerunners and Successors), Prague: NČSAV, 1964. (shrink)

In this study of Robert Boyle's epistemology, Jan W. Wojcik reveals the theological context within which Boyle developed his views on reason's limits. After arguing that a correct interpretation of his views on 'things above reason' depends upon reading his works in the context of theological controversies in seventeenth-century England, Professor Wojcik details exactly how Boyle's three specific categories of things which transcend reason - the incomprehensible, the inexplicable, and the unsociable - affected his conception of what a natural philosopher (...) could hope to know. Also covered in detail is Boyle's belief that God had deliberately limited the human intellect in order to reserve a full knowledge of both theology and natural philosophy for the afterlife. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a solution to the problem that the need to accommodate the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses for reliabilism. Defeaters are supposed to remove justification for previously justified beliefs. According to standard process reliabilism, the justification of a belief depends on the reliability of a process that is already completed when a defeater for that belief is obtained. It is hard to see, then, how a defeater can affect reliabilist justification, if that justification, from the perspective (...) of the defeater, lies wholly in the past. What is more, undercutting defeaters plausibly defeat by generating incompatibilities with higher-order propositions :105–118, 2014; Melis in Philos Stud 170:433–442, 2014). This is hard to integrate with reliabilism which explicitly denies higher-order conditions for justification. I argue that both of these phenomena can be accommodated by it via what I call the “Replacement Principle”: when a defeater is obtained, it generates either a logical incompatibility or a doxastic incompatibility. The resulting tension is registered and initiates a reasoning process that compares the epistemic support for the defeater with that for the defeated belief. This process may replace the original reliable formation process as a doxastic base for the defeated belief. If the defeater is not given its due weight in the reasoning process, that process was unreliable and if the defeated belief is retained as a result, it will be unjustified. This is intuitively the right result. Since reasoning is reliable, only if it is rational, the account manages to capture the intuition that disregarding a defeater would be irrational without having to make rationality a condition for justification. Replacement is not only plausible on causal pictures of doxastic basing, but also required in order to allow for the possibility of belief reevaluation in general and is therefore not an ad hoc addition to reliabilism, but rather part of its inherent explanatory resources. (shrink)

Against the position of professor rex martin ("the review of metaphysics," xxv, December 1971) it is argued that there is a conceptual link between disobedience and destruction of authority, As socrates argues; that socrates does not take obedience to law to be an absolute principle of action; that socrates in the two dialogues about his trial does not contradict himself on the question of obedience to the court; that socrates' argument from piety does not undermine his arguments from injury and (...) agreement. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBased on an overview of the ways in which politics and the political have been thought in critical discourse analysis, the author calls for a focus on the metapolitical dimension of discourse. The author develops his notion of metapolitics on the basis of post-foundational insights into politics, the political and processes of politicization. Metapolitics refers to projects and struggles where conflicting modes and models of politics clash. Metapolitical debates potentially reshape the structure of the public realm as well as the (...) entities, borders and processes that constitute it. The author differentiates his descriptive and analytic use of the term from the way this signifier has been used programmatically by the anti-democratic New Right and its heirs. He demonstrates that metapolitical projects can be democratic as well as anti-democratic. In order to facilitate discourse analyses of metapolitical projects, debates and struggles, the author suggests that the metapolitical dimension of contemporary debates can be explored further by integrating insights from governmentality studies, studies of political rationality and the discourse theoretical logics approach with CDA. Moreover, a further exploration of the linguistic and textual underpinnings of metapolitics constitutes a promising pathway for future investigation. The study of metapolitics should be part and parcel of the transdisciplinary domain of critical discourse studies so that our understanding of the linguistic and non-linguistic features of metapolitical projects can be developed in equal measure at multiple levels of abstraction. (shrink)

L’inquiétude de la totalité de la vie, qui s’éveille chez certains esprits, les amène à créer des représentations canoniques, types de vie stylisée et unifiée. Les philosophes sont des créateurs de « canons » de vie philosophique ; mais on peut se demander s’il est possible de dresser un tableau idéal du philosophe qui pourrait lui servir en même temps de norme et de critère. Non, car la vie philosophique est un mouvement, un « acte imparfait » dont la fin (...) nous échappe ; nous la poursuivons par des voies profondément personnelles ; c’est pourquoi on ne saurait « canoniser » un philosophe. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que le temps? Cette question nous plonge forcément dans l'embarras. La physique refuse de la poser: elle mesure le temps et en propose diverses théories au sein desquelles nous ne reconnaissons pas le temps de notre monde. Renonçant elle aussi à le définir, la philosophie s'est généralement réfugiée dans la conscience du temps, mais sans rien nous dire du temps lui-même. Il y a pourtant bien un concept de temps qui ne doit rien à la conscience ni à l'ordre (...) cosmique, c'est celui de ce monde où nous vivons et dont nous parlons; celui par lequel se distinguent l'avant et l'après, celui qui nous fait dire que les êtres changent et que Pierre est en retard. Tout cela dépend, à notre échelle, du mobilier du monde commun. La philosophie peut ainsi reprendre l'analyse du concept de temps soutenue par toute la tradition, d'Aristote à Bergson, de Kant à David Lewis. Elle offre alors de nouvelles réponses à nos interrogations les plus classiques: Le devenir n'est-il qu'une illusion? Le passé existe-t-il ou n'est-il qu'un fantôme de la mémoire? Pourquoi le temps est-il irréversible? Devons-nous l'imaginer comme une flèche dirigée vers l'avenir ou comme un fleuve précipitant notre présent en passé? Ces problèmes n'ont pas épuisé leurs mystères. Au bout de l'enquête, il y a l'espoir d'éclairer ce qu'Einstein lui-même estimait être l'énigme du 'maintenant'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper discusses the concept of nothing (nothingness) from the point of logic and ontology (metaphysics). It is argued that the category of nothing as a denial of being is subjected to various interpretations. In particular, this thesis concerns the concept of negation as used in metaphysics. Since the Leibniz question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and the principle of sufficient reason is frequently connected with the status of nothing, their analysis is important for the problem in question. (...) Appendix contains a short critical analysis of Heidegger’s famous statement Das Nichts nichtet. (shrink)

The Academy seems to operate with a swarm consciousness; suddenly we find ourselves on a new landscape laden with new percepts and affects to be deciphered as signs, as Deleuze and Guattari might a...

This essay is a review of Edward Feser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. In the first part, the author summarizes the book’s five chapters, drawing attention to Feser’s application of Aquinas’s thought to contemporary philosophical problems. Part 2 is dedicated to Feser’s Thomistic analysis of Intelligent Design. The author explains Feser’s case and why Aquinas’s “Fifth Way,” which is often labeled a “design argument,” depends on a philosophy of nature that ID’s methods implicitly reject.