Our approach to counseling and personal ministry is often lopsided—we treat people as minds to be taught or problems to be fixed, moving too quickly toward applying biblical solutions without taking the time to love people well and understand their experiences and hurts. The Dynamic Heart in Daily Life provides a comprehensive view of how the heart works and how Christ redeems it. Pierre’s faith-centered understanding of people combines with a Word-centered methodology to give readers a practical way to (...) help others better understand their tough experiences and who they are in light of who Jesus is. Pierre guides readers through four key activities—reading, reflecting, relating, and renewing—that will consistently position them to understand everyday human experiences in light of Scripture. Pierre exposes the false dichotomy between the spiritual and seemingly unspiritual parts of the human experience, showing how every thought, feeling, and choice actually expresses the spiritual activity of the heart. He shows how faith in Christ is the means by which the heart begins to respond differently. Faith is not only the entry point for heart change, but also an expression of our everyday, ongoing need for Christ. Pierre’s holistic view of counseling—forged by his experiences as a counselor, pastor, and seminary professor—equips readers to understand how everyday beliefs, desires, and commitments shape how we respond to life’s biggest struggles and how an active relationship of trust in God is the foundation for lifelong change. (shrink)

Children’s reasoning on food properties and health relationships can contribute to healthier food choices. Food properties can either be positive (“gives strength”) or negative (“gives nausea”). One of the main challenges in public health is to foster children’s dietary variety, which contributes to a normal and healthy development. To face this challenge, it is essential to investigate how children generalize these positive and negative properties to other foods, including familiar and unfamiliar ones. In the present experiment, we hypothesized that children (...) might rely on cues of food processing (e.g., signs of human intervention such as slicing) to convey information about item edibility. Furthermore, capitalizing on previous results showing that food rejections (i.e., food neophobia and picky eating) are a significant source of inter-individual variability to children’s inferences in the food domain, we followed an individual approach. We expected that children would generalize the positive properties to familiar foods and, in contrast, that they would generalize more often the negative properties to unfamiliar foods. However, we expected that children would generalize more positive and less negative properties to unfamiliar sliced foods than to whole unfamiliar foods. Finally, we expected that children displaying higher levels of food rejections would generalize more negative properties than children displaying lower levels of food rejections. One-hundred and twenty-six children, aged 3–6 years, performed an induction task in which they had to generalize positive or negative health-related properties to familiar or unfamiliar foods, whole or sliced. We measured children’s probability of generalization for positive and negative properties. The children’s food rejection score was assessed on a standardized scale. Results indicated that children evaluated positively familiar foods (regardless of processing), whereas they tend to view unfamiliar food negatively. In contrast, children were at chance for processed unfamiliar foods. Furthermore, children displaying higher levels of food rejections were more likely to generalize the negative properties to all kinds of foods than children displaying lower levels of food rejections. These findings entitle us to hypothesize that knowledge-based food education programs should take into account the valence of the properties taught to children, as well as the state of processing of the food presented. Furthermore, one should take children’s interindividual differences into account because they influence how the knowledge gained through these programs may be generalized. (shrink)

Establishing healthy dietary habits in childhood is crucial in preventing long-term repercussions, as a lack of dietary variety in childhood leads to enduring impacts on both physical and cognitive health. Poor conceptual knowledge about food has recently been shown to be a driving factor of food rejection. The majority of studies that have investigated the development of food knowledge along with food rejection have mainly focused on one subtype of conceptual knowledge about food, namely taxonomic categories (e.g., vegetables or meat). (...) However, taxonomic categorization is not the only way to understand the food domain. We also heavily rely on other conceptual structures, namely thematic associations, in which objects are grouped because they share spatial-temporal properties or exhibit a complementary relationship (e.g., soft-boiled egg and soldiers). We rely on such thematic associations between food items, which may not fall into the same taxon, to determine the acceptability of food combinations. However, the development of children's ability to master these relations has not been systematically investigated, nor alongside the phenomenon of food rejection. The present research aims to fill this gap by investigating (i) the development of conceptual food knowledge (both taxonomic and thematic) and (ii) the putative relationship between children's food rejection (as measured by the Child Food Rejection Scale) and both thematic and taxonomic food knowledge. A proportional (A:B::C:?) analogy task, with a choice between taxonomic (i.e., bread and pasta) and thematic (i.e., bread and butter) food associates, was conducted on children between 3 and 7-years-old (n= 85). The children were systematically presented with either a thematic or taxonomic food base pair (A:B) and then asked to extend the example type of relation to select the respective thematic or taxonomic match to the target (C:?). Our results revealed, for the first time, that increased levels of food rejection were significantly predictive of poorer food identification and decreased thematic understanding. These findings entitle us to hypothesize that knowledge-based food education programs to foster dietary variety in young children, should not only aim to improve taxonomic understanding of food, but also thematic relations. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu's work on literature has frequently been criticized for its perceived failure to attend to the specificities of literary form. This article argues that, in fact, literary form plays an important role in Bourdieu's theorizations of literature, or rather, that form is called upon to play a range of different, potentially conflicting roles. Through close readings of both The Rules of Art and the 1975 essay ‘L'Invention de la vie d'artiste’, the article seeks to clarify the different roles (...) Bourdieu attributes to literary form, as that which both conceals and reveals ‘repressed’, ‘incorporated’ or ‘unconscious’ social realities. It will examine Bourdieu's contention that the literary work functions analogously to the Freudian dreamwork in this respect, and will question how appropriate or convincing that analogy proves to be. (shrink)

Bourdieu's academic work and his political interventions have always proved controversial, with reactions varying from passionate advocacy to savage critique. In the last decade of his career, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu became involved in a series of high-profile political interventions, defending the cause of striking students and workers, speaking out in the name of illegal immigrants, the homeless, and the unemployed, challenging the incursion of the market into the field of artistic and intellectual production. This new study presents (...) the first sustained critical analysis of the political implications of Bourdieu's sociology. Through a close reading of the political speeches and pronouncements of his later years, Jeremy F. Lane provides a detailed exposition both of Bourdieu's critique of neo-liberalism and of his own political position. Bourdieu's theory of politics is also brought into critical dialogue with the work of a range of other commentators of a broadly Marxist or post-Marxist orientation who have also intervened in such debates - theorists such as Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Judith Butler, Slavoj Zizek and Jacques Rancière. The first sustained analysis of Bourdieu's politics - this study will seek to assess the validity of his claims as to the distinctiveness and superiority of his own field theory as a tool of political analysis. It will be of great use to students, and researchers in sociology, social theory; cultural studies, French studies and political science. (shrink)

Phenomenological, process-based and post-Marxist approaches have stressed the immanent nature of the ontogenesis of our world. The concept of performativity epitomizes these temporal, spatial and material views. Reality is always in movement itself: it is constantly materially and socially ‘performed’. Other views lead to a pre-defined world that would be mostly revealed through sensations (i.e. ‘representational perspectives’). These transcendental stances assume that a subject, although pre-existing experience, is the absolute condition of possibility of it. In this paper, we develop another (...) view of performativity (either complementary or interrelated to an immanent stance), one that re-introduces transcendence in the analysis but sees in it something dialogical to the process itself. We draw from the notions of visibility-invisibility and continuity-discontinuity (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2013, 1964) in order to show how everyday activity both performs and makes visible the world. From that perspective, modes of visibility appear as conditions of possibility of performativity itself. We draw some implications for the conceptualization of management practices. (shrink)

Since his death in 1986, Michel de Certeau's reputation as a thinker has steadily grown both in France and throughout the English-speaking world. His work is extraordinarily innovative and wide-ranging, cutting across issues in historiography, literary and cultural studies, anthropology, sociology, theology, philosophy and psychoanalysis. This book represents the first full-length study of Certeau's thought. It is organized around the central theme of interpretation and alterity, which Ahearne uses to illuminate Certeau's work as a whole. The author also examines Certeau's (...) theory and practice of historiography; his reflection on the relations between changing historical forms of writing, reading and orality; and his distinction between the "strategic" programmes of the politically powerful and the "tactics" of the relatively powerless. Ahearne places Certeau's work in its general intellectual context, relating it to the views of important contemporary thinkers, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, and demonstrating the decisive importance to Certeau's thought of the writings of the early modern mystics and travellers. This book constitutes an excellent critical introduction to Certeau's work, while also providing a comprehensive and nuanced reading for those already familiar with his thought. (shrink)

Comment Sortir de la Terreur. by Bronislaw Baczko The Kiss of Lamourette. by Robert Darnton Les Origines Culturelles de la Revolution Francaise. by Roger Chartier Naissance du Journal Revolutionnaire. by Claude Labrosse; Pierre Retat "Mere Words," The Journal of Modern History, June 1991. by Dorinda Outram Revolutionary News: The Press in France 1789-1799. by Jeremy D. Popkin.

Part of a collective project for promoting the study of the history of political ideas within the field of the social sciences in French academia, this interview focuses on method, and more specifically on Prof. Quentin Skinner's relationship to the social sciences (from Max Weber to Peter Winch and Pierre Bourdieu). Questions were sent in French, via email, to Quentin Skinner, who answered them in English. The answers were then translated into French and the interview was published in Vers (...) une histoire sociale des idées politiques, ed. Chloé Gaboriaux and Arnault Skornicki (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2017). For editorial reasons, one question and response, regarding method in the Italian tradition of the history of ideas, had to be omitted; it is reintroduced here. The questions have been translated for Theoria by Victor Lu. Quentin Skinner is Emeritus Professor in the Humanities at Queen Mary University of London and co-director of the Centre for the Study of the History of Political Thought (London); Arnault Skornicki is Senior Lecturer at Paris Nanterre University (Institut des Sciences Sociales du Politique); and Jérémie Barthas is Researcher at the CNRS (Institut d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine). (shrink)

Sous l'Ancien Regime, les champs semantiques de la preuve sont aussi complexes et plastiques que ses usages. La notion circule et innerve des pratiques tres diverses, parfois de maniere inattendue. La plaidoirie ou le requisitoire reorganisent les faits, creant des fables qui s'eloignent quelquefois de la realite et qui tendent a transformer la verite en mensonge et le mensonge en verite. Ces ressorts sont aussi ceux de la fiction qui exploite toutes les ressources de la probation ou preuve et signe (...) viennent a se confondre. Dans d'autres domaines, pour assurer le passage de liaisons necessaires entre des elements divers qui conduisent a la certitude, a l'analyse morale qui s'appuie sur des relations probables pour etablir l'innocence ou la culpabilite, il faut s'etre approprie un art de la demonstration qui, ayant traverse la metaphysique et les mathematiques, parvient au droit. Ce passage-la marque le role historiquement grandissant de la probabilite dans la prise de decision et dans la conception de la verite. Le present volume interroge les lineaments semantiques et les usages de la notion de preuve, du XVIe au XVIIIe siecle, essentiellement en France et en Grande-Bretagne. Les etudes qui le composent suggerent que ces divers usages constituent l'un des aspects du long processus de division des savoirs. Jean-Pierre Schandeler est charge de recherche CNRS a l'IRCL. Ses travaux portent sur les rapports entre l'histoire et les sciences morales et politiques au XVIIIe siecle. Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin est professeur a l'universite Paul-Valery Montpellier 3, specialiste de Shakespeare. Elle dirige l'Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance, l'age Classique et les Lumieres (UMR 5186 du CNRS). (shrink)

En 1814, Jeremy Bentham entreprend la rédaction de Chrestomathia, qui expose le savoir qu'il est utile d'apprendre. Mais ce texte est plus généralement une organisation entière du savoir de son temps à partir d'une «théorie des fictions », qui est à la fois une réflexion sur les concepts et une critique des nomenclatures. L'article qui suit s'intéresse particulièrement à la cinquantaine de pages consacrées aux mathématiques dans un ouvrage qui porte sur toutes les sciences du début du XIXe siècle (...) et critique l' Encyclopédie de Diderot et D'Alembert. L'une des idées les plus originales développées par l'auteur et dont on trouvera un écho lointain chez Gaston Bachelard est celle d'un conflit entre les concepts et la façon dont ils sont désignés par les mots. Signifiés, signifiants et concepts dérivent les uns par rapport aux autres en des sens que nul ne peut contrôler, pas même les savants; ce qui rend l'éducation durablement difficile. (shrink)

Se trata de averiguar la compatibilidad entre utilitarismo y religión. La incompatibilidad sería la de una teoría cientificista conspicua y la creencia en lo ultraterreno vinculado a la salvación. Bentham escribió, solo o en colaboración, unas pocas pero importantes obras sobre religión. Consideró dos versiones, el deísmo y el anglicanismo y, dentro de éste, consideró la posibilidad de centrarse en un presunto mensaje original de Cristo que habría sido desvirtuado por Pablo de Tarso. Bentham apuesta claramente por la reducción de (...) lo religioso al ámbito de lo privado. Pero esta propuesta no habría acabado con todos los problemas que plantean las relaciones entre religión y felicidad. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse de (...) Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1932, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. La réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.) a impliqué un effort collectif. Monique Canto-Sperber en a conçu l'idée et assumé la direction, et l'ouvrage a paru en 1995 dans la collection Philosophie morale dont elle avait alors la responsabilité aux P.U.F. Chacun des trois tomes s'accompagne d'une postface, confiée au philosophe Jean-Pierre Dupuy pour le premier, au politologue Pierre Bouretz pour le second, et à l'économiste Philippe Mongin pour le troisième. Un travail de grande ampleur a été requis, d'une part, pour localiser les références de Halévy dans des sources plus récentes que celles dont il disposait, en particulier, s'agissant de Bentham, dans l'édition toujours en cours de ses œuvres, et d'autre part, pour traduire les très nombreux passages que Halévy citait en langue anglaise. Sophie Jallais et Mary Sokol se sont chargées de la première tâche et Jean-Pierre Cléro de la seconde. Prise après quelques années de circulation de l'ouvrage, la décision des P.U.F. d'en pilonner les exemplaires que ses responsables ne rachèteraient pas a semblé compromettre ce vaste travail. Mais grâce aux efforts du site québécois Les classiques des sciences sociales, et de son directeur Jean-Marie Tremblay, il est devenu possible d'accéder aux trois tomes électroniquement. Les adresses en sont : http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t1/radicalisme_philo_t1.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t2/radicalisme_philo_t2.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t3/radicalisme_philo_t3.html Avant la réédition de 1995, l'ouvrage de Halévy n'était facilement accessible que grâce à la traduction anglaise plusieurs fois rééditée de Mary Morris, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, New York, Macmillan, 1928. (shrink)

Le nouvel et dernier ouvrage de Jean-Pierre Cléro consacre à la philosophie de Jeremy Bentham est intéressant à plus d’un titre. Tout d’abord, il unifie et bénéficie de l’ensemble des textes et réflexions que Jean-Pierre Cléro a pu élaborer depuis de nombreuses années sur les différents aspects de la philosophie benthamienne. Ensuite, il débute habilement par une relecture particulièrement vive et intéressante de la vie de Bentham. Loin de se contenter de la classique biographie, Jean-Pierre Cléro (...) propose une relecture des différents évènements qui, selon lui, ont structuré la vie de Bentham tout en délivrant des clés qui permettront de mieux comprendre l’évolution de sa pensée. Sans sombrer dans la facilité d’une « psychologisation biographique », il s’agit bien plutôt de comprendre l’auteur à travers des éléments marquants de sa vie. A ce titre, les phrases d’ouverture et de clôture de cette partie biographique sont particulièrement éclairantes et intéressantes quant aux possibili... (shrink)

Deux livres récents d’introduction à la pensée de Jeremy Bentham, ceux de Michael Quinn et de Jean-Pierre Cléro, font apparaître des pistes nouvelles (autour de la théorie du gouvernement pour le premier, du langage et des fictions pour le second) pour découvrir l’actualité de cette pensée.

I try in this essay to accomplish two things. First I offer some first thoughts toward a clarification of the ethical foundations of private property rights that avoids pitfalls common to more strictly Lockean theories, and is thus better prepared to address arguments posed by critics of standard private property arrangements. Second, I'll address one critical argument that has become pretty common over the years. While versions of the argument can be traced back at least to Pierre Joseph Proudhon, (...) I'll focus on a formulation given it by Jeremy Waldron. The basic idea is that the only sound arguments for private property rights lead to the conclusion that society has an obligation to insure that every citizen possess private property. In Waldron's formulation, what is justifiable is a general, rather than a special, right to private property. I shall try to suggest that this conclusion is unwarranted. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham came to know Jacques-Pierre Brissot when he was in London between midwinter 1782–3 and summer 1784. They shared some opinions: Brissot indeed saw Bentham to some extent as his mentor. There was never complete accord, however; and Brissot's increasingly radical political views were not at that stage shared by Bentham. In any case, their ways parted with Bentham's prolonged sojourn with his brother in Russia between 1785 and 1788. It was revolution in France that brought renewed (...) contact, though no further personal encounters. By the winter of 1788–9 Bentham was writing, with France in mind, an increasingly elaborate work on parliamentary procedure; and by the spring Brissot was (much more expeditiously) writing and publishing his account of the subject. One element in that work dealt with an issue on which Bentham vigorously opposed Brissot; for it included a strongly argued case for a declaration of rights – something Bentham had already attacked in 1776. He renewed that attack in a letter to Brissot in the late summer of 1789. By the autumn, however, writing to Brissot again, he raised a subject on which the two could sympathise – the importance of asserting popular sovereignty in the new French constitution. That sovereignty, Bentham insisted, must extend to the administration of justice – royal authority must be rigourously excluded from control of the judiciary. The judicial establishment in France was to be Bentham's predominant concern between the winter of 1789–90 and the following summer, and he now had assistance, especially from Etienne Dumont, in translating and publicizing his work. Brissot was probably – though there is no direct evidence – aware of these efforts. In the autumn Bentham's principal concern was the promotion in France of his scheme for a model prison – the Panopticon. That cause was helped by the cordial reception in the National Assembly of his judicial reform proposals. By then he was again in touch with Brissot, whose support he now sought for the Panopticon project – at first with some success. No progress was made in 1793, however, as Brissot's revolutionary career reached first its apogee and then its disastrous end. Many years later, as Bentham's life drew to a close, Brissot's Mémoires served to remind him of their uneasy partnership in the years of revolution. (shrink)

" Faire d'Aristote un Aufklârer serait méconnaître ce qu'il y a en lui de religiosité authentique, cette intuition de la transcendance et du chorismos, qui sont la raison profonde de sa prudence spéculative. Faire d'Aristote un tragique serait méconnaître cette confiance en l'homme, en sa recherche et en son action, qui tranche sur les lamentations du chœur de la tragédie et sur une certaine résignation socratique et, avant la lettre, stoïcienne. Mais Aristote exalte l'homme sans le diviniser ; il en (...) fait le centre de son éthique, mais il sait que l'éthique n'est pas ce qu'il y a de plus haut, que Dieu est au-delà des catégories éthiques, ou plutôt que l'éthique se constitue dans la distance qui sépare l'homme de Dieu. Livré à ses seules forces par un Dieu trop lointain, qui est suffisamment visible pour être désiré, mais se tient trop à distance pour être possédé, l'homme est en butte, dans la région du monde qu'il habite, à un hasard qu'il ne peut entièrement dominer. Ou plutôt la vie de l'homme se meut entre deux hasards : le Hasard fondamental de la naissance, qui fait que la bonne nature n'est pas également partagée ; le hasard résiduel de l'action, qui fait que les résultats ne sont jamais tout à fait prévisibles. Mais le hasard de la naissance est le hasard résiduel de l'action divine, et la grandeur de l'homme consiste, en prolongeant par la prudence l'action d'une Providence défaillante, à reculer le plus possible les limites de l'imprévisible et de l'inhumain. " Pierre Aubenque. (shrink)

We discuss from a philosophical perspective the way in which the normal concept of time might be said to `emerge' in a quantum theory of gravity. After an introduction, we briefly discuss the notion of emergence, without regard to time. We then introduce the search for a quantum theory of gravity ; and review some general interpretative issues about space, time and matter. We then discuss the emergence of time in simple quantum geometrodynamics, and in the Euclidean approach. Section 6 (...) concludes. (shrink)

“Now, in calm weather, to swim in the open ocean is as easy to the practised swimmer as to ride in a spring-carriage ashore. But the awful lonesomeness is intolerable. The intense concentration of self in the middle of such a heartless immensity, my God! who can tell it? Mark, how when sailors in a dead calm bathe in the open sea—mark how closely they hug their ship and only coast along her sides.” (Herman Melville, Moby Dick, Chapter 94).

We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...) principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver. (shrink)

A notion called Herbrand saturation is shown to provide the model-theoretic analogue of a proof-theoretic method, Herbrand analysis, yielding uniform model-theoretic proofs of a number of important conservation theorems. A constructive, algebraic variation of the method is described, providing yet a third approach, which is finitary but retains the semantic flavor of the model-theoretic version.

In 1837, Dirichlet proved that there are infinitely many primes in any arithmetic progression in which the terms do not all share a common factor. We survey implicit and explicit uses ofDirichlet characters in presentations of Dirichlet’s proof in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with an eye toward understanding some of the pragmatic pressures that shaped the evolution of modern mathematical method.

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein''s world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man (...) and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells. (shrink)

I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates underdetermination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I confine the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as elaborated since then. Or rather, the discussion is confined to a (very!) few aspects of that history. I emphasize that despite (...) the underdetermination, a scientific realist can, and should, endorse this description. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe essay argues that Jeremy Bentham played a major role in the transitional process between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries leading to the ‘discovery' or ‘invention of society' as an order, i.e., as an autonomous object of knowledge. By comparing Bentham's discourse with those developed by select protagonists of that transition, particularly Ferguson, Sieyès, and Mirabeau, it is shown how society emerges as the logical and historical space of a set of relationships that affects both the rationalisation and (...) the practice of government. In contrast with Michel Foucault's interpretation of Bentham's role in the genealogy of neoliberalism, recently developed by Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, this paper suggests that ‘the new governmental reason’ rose from within the discourse of law. Consequently, the problem of ‘constitution’ was not left behind by the epistemological change of the eighteenth century, as they argue. Rather, the scientific and political understanding of society as a code became the base for an innovative conception of both law and politics. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Il s’agit en somme, dans cet ouvrage, de montrer qu’un vieux problème continue de résister à ceux qui prétendent l’avoir résolu. Ce vieux problème, c’est celui qui est sous-jacent aux paradoxes zénoniens de la Dichotomie et de l’Achille, rassemblés par l’auteur en une même « aporie du passage ». Ceux qui prétendent l’avoir résolu, ce sont principalement des philosophes d’obédience analytique qui s’appuient sur certains développements contemporains des mathématiques infinitaires et sur une cri...

Abstract:Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of (...) Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent. (shrink)

We analyze the pointwise convergence of a sequence of computable elements of L1 in terms of algorithmic randomness. We consider two ways of expressing the dominated convergence theorem and show that, over the base theory RCA0, each is equivalent to the assertion that every Gδ subset of Cantor space with positive measure has an element. This last statement is, in turn, equivalent to weak weak Königʼs lemma relativized to the Turing jump of any set. It is also equivalent to the (...) conjunction of the statement asserting the existence of a 2-random relative to any given set and the principle of Σ2 collection. (shrink)

I reject Norton and Earman's hole argument that spacetime substantivalism is incompatible with determinism. I reconcile these both technically and philosophically. There is a technical definition of determinism that is not violated by pairs of models of the kind used in the hole argument. And technicalities aside, the basic idea of determinism is not violated if we claim that at most one of the two models represents a possible world. This claim can be justified either by metrical essentialism, or by (...) denying transworld identity for points: I prefer the latter. (shrink)

In Section 2, I survey some of the ways that computers are used in mathematics. These raise questions that seem to have a generally epistemological character, although they do not fall squarely under a traditional philosophical purview. The goal of this article is to try to articulate some of these questions more clearly, and assess the philosophical methods that may be brought to bear. In Section 3, I note that most of the issues can be classified under two headings: some (...) deal with the ability of computers to deliver appropriate “evidence” for mathematical assertions, a notion that is explored in Section 4, while others deal with the ability of computers to deliver appropriate mathematical “understanding,” a notion that is considered in Section 5. Final thoughts are provided in Section 6. (shrink)

This article argues that there is ultimately a very close convergence between prominent conceptions of being in mainstream Anglo‐American philosophy and mainstream postmodern Continental philosophy. One characteristic idea in Anglo‐American or analytic philosophy is that we establish what is meaningful and so what we can say about what is, by making evident the limits of sense or what simply cannot be meant. A characteristic idea in Continental philosophy of being is that being emerges through contrast and interplay with what it (...) is not, with what has no being at all and so is beyond sense. The two traditions consequently conceive being in significantly related ways. As a result, what the Continental tradition gets at with “the meaning of being as such and in general,” and how it gets at it, has much in common with what the Anglo‐American tradition gets at, and how it gets at it, by establishing “what can be meaningfully said.”. (shrink)