The article elucidates the concept of subjectivity in Karl Marx, while providing an analysis from a Heideggerian and a Foucaultian perspective. Furthermore, the aim of the article is to determine the relevance of the categories elaborated by Heidegger and Foucault in the analysis of the Marxist concept of subjectivity. In order to achieve this goal, the article is divided into three sections. First, the concept of subjectivity is studied as it appears in Marx’s works. Second, a Heideggerian reading of that (...) concept is reconstructed from elements of the “early” and “later” Heidegger. Third, a Foucaultian reading of subjectivity is proposed from the coordinates of the notions of governmentality, veridiction and subjectivation. It is concluded that the readings of Heidegger and Foucault are, respectively, insufficient and partially sufficient, which does not exclude, however, the possibility of adding nuances to them in order to develop, with contributions from all three philosophers, a kind of “post-Heideggerian and post-Foucaultian Marxism”. (shrink)

The ultimate source of explanation in biology is the principle of natural selection. Natural selection means differential reproduction of genes and gene combinations. It is a mechanistic process which accounts for the existence in living organisms of end-directed structures and processes. It is argued that teleological explanations in biology are not only acceptable but indeed indispensable. There are at least three categories of biological phenomena where teleological explanations are appropriate.

Individuals can do a broad variety of things with their words and enjoy different degrees of this capacity. What moderates this capacity? And in cases in which this capacity is unjustly disrupted, what is a good explanation for it? These are the questions I address here. I propose that speech capacity, understood as the capacity to do things with your words, is a structural property importantly dependent on individuals' position in a social structure. My account facilitates a non-individualistic explanation of (...) cases in which speech capacity is undermined due to speaker's perceived social identity, e.g. episodes of silencing. Instead of appealing to interlocutors' implicit bias against speaker's identity, a structural approach refers to the positions interlocutors occupy in the social structure and the discursive conventions operating upon those positions. I articulate my proposal drawing on the notion of affordances. Each position within a social structure is associated with its own range of speech affordances. Thus, speech capacity is a function of the probability distribution of speech affordances across positions in the structure. (shrink)

The comparative study of synchronic occurrences of a particular construction in interactional corpora from different languages can provide a complete understanding of the development of the construction as a response to some basic intimately associated set of interactional moves and cognitive demands. A comparative formal analysis of lists in Spanish and English conversations shows that in both languages the construction has developed a stylized intonation pattern based on the holding of tones by means of lengthening of nuclear syllables, a durable (...) syntactic organization based on parataxis and an almost identical inventory of lexicalized expressions to index the end of the list. A parallel analysis of lists in their interactional contexts shows that in both English and Spanish conversation the formal properties of lists emerge as adaptations to a recurrent set of communicative tasks. The first type of `framing' lists is used for its incremental structure in the negotiation of common background between interlocutors, whereas the second type of `demonstrative' lists is used for its rhetorical structure to provide evidence for a claim and is directed to obtaining agreement. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the concept of animality from the perspective of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. More precisely, the question arises as to whether the animal possesses the status of otherness or lacks it. Indeed, the animal, with respect to the human, turns out to be another entity, but, from the assumptions of phenomenology, is that enough for it to be apprehended as an intersubjectivity or a coexistence that is donated to the world of human beings? To answer (...) this question, we will review Husserl's argumentation, especially in Hua IV and Hua XXXIX, and Heidegger's in GA 2 and GA 29/30. Finally, we will add a critical consideration of the ideas of the authors studied in the face of developments in contemporary biology to ask ourselves to what extent their philosophical inquiry would be consistent with current zoological evidence. (shrink)

This collection of specially commissioned essays puts top scholars head to head to debate the central issues in the lively and fast growing field of philosophy ...

Histories of nursing that disregard their linkage to broader historical movements often lead to historically detached versions of nursing identity that omit the perspective of their sources and the ideas of their time. Drawing on materials retrieved through a multilayered research strategy comprising internal and external sources, this article examines the development of a nursing identity in Chile during the period starting in the 1950s through the early 2000s. We analysed the sociopolitical contexts in which the nursing profession grew, the (...) changing direction of its role and how the nursing identity transformed itself. Through the use of historical sources and oral testimonies, we aim to give a nuanced account of how the history of public health and that of the country more broadly changed the object of identification of nurses, creating only relatively recently a sense of nursing community. Processes of identification, fragmentation and integration are highlighted, which challenge usual notions of history as a linear process. (shrink)

. Introductory Remarks THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY The problems of reduction in biology are currently of considerable theoretical interest and practical ...

El presente artículo elucida la posición de Félix Guattari sobre la organización política. Por este término entendemos la manera cómo, teórica y prácticamente, se construye y se desarrolla una militancia en lo real social, lo cual implica sostener una postura respecto al rol de los partidos, las instituciones y el Estado. A fin de precisar la especificidad del abordaje guattariano, desarrollado entre Psychanalyse et transversalité y Mille Plateaux, comparamos su planteamiento con los desarrollos tradicionales del anarquismo y el socialismo. Con (...) ello se asegura una aprehensión de la posible singularidad de los conceptos guattarianos de transversalidad, polivocidad, diagramatismo, entre otros. Finalmente, se reflexiona sobre el lugar que ocupa la macropolítica en estos conceptos. (shrink)

Se ofrece una interpretación teórico-política de la fusión de horizontes de Gadamer. Se argumenta que el diálogo político, desde un punto de vista hermenéutico, debe entenderse como el proceso de cuestionamiento y disputa de los horizontes de sentido en donde descansan las prácticas sociales. Asimismo, se sostiene que el diálogo instituye una pregunta-escenario-común que abre el horizonte social de sentido hacia la contingencia e incertidumbre, así como que este nunca busca un consenso procedimental o sustancial que subsane los conflictos y (...) concilie las diferentes perspectivas en un punto de vista homogéneo. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyze the explanatory level of the variables advertising influence, verbal messages, social models and social situations as regards body dissatisfaction, weight worry, and bodily discomfort. The study was conducted in a convenience sample of 206 Mexican women with an average age of 22.12 years. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze the direct and indirect effects of the independent variables on the dependent ones in three hypothetical models proposed. In the case of the (...) model proposed for body dissatisfaction, it was found that the set of variables had 79% of variance explained and showed adequate goodness-of-fit indices. The model for weight worry had 62% of variance explained and an acceptable goodness of fit. Finally, the model for bodily discomfort had 72% of variance explained and showed adequate goodness of fit. It is concluded that social influences have a significant impact on body image. Verbal messages had the strongest impact on the variables studied. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: The Design Argument The Design Argument in Antiquity Christian Authors Hume's Onslaught William Paley's Natural Theology The Bridgewater Treatises Intelligent Design: A Political Movement Eyes to See No “There” There Blood and Tears Gambling to Non‐existence Natural Selection Natural Selection and Design Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...) determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morally evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Since Darwin’s time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence (...) of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould’s monumental The Structure of Evolutionary Theory ‘‘attempts to expand and alter the premises of Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive evolutionary theory . . . while remaining within the tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument.’’ The three branches or ‘‘fundamental principles of Darwinian logic’’ are, according to Gould: agency (natural selection acting on individual organisms), efficacy (producing new species adapted to their environments), and scope (accumulation of changes that through geological time yield (...) the living world’s panoply of diversity and morphological complexity). Gould’s efforts to contribute something important to each of these three fundamental components of Darwinian Theory are far from successful. (shrink)

Should the philosophy of biology deal with organismic, or with molecular aspects , or with both ? We are, of course, not the first to appreciate the ...

Reseña de 'Piensa y Repite', realizada por Felipe Berríos Ayala, Dr. en Filosofía Política y Moral, por la Universidad de Chile. Camilo Brodsky Piensa y Repite 2023 Editorial Aparte Arica 118 páginas ISBN: 9789566054689.

La humanidad no solo ha evolucionado, sino que continúa evolucionando. ¿Hacia dónde va la evolución humana? La evolución biológica está dirigida por la selección natural, que no es un proceso benevolente que guíe a las especies hacia un éxito seguro. El resultado final puede ser la extinción. Los avances en genética, biología molecular y biomedicina han hecho posible manipular, rápida y efectivamente, la constitución genética de la humanidad. La terapia genética puede ser somática, o germinal. No hay intervenciones de terapia (...) germinal que estén siendo consideradas actualmente por científicos, médicos o compañías farmacéuticas. La clonación de humanos puede también referirse a clonación terapéutica o de individuos. Se han avanzado propuestas sugiriendo clonar individuos de gran capacidad intelectual o artística, o de virtud eminente. Tales propuestas utópicas son sumamente desafortunadas. No es posible clonar un individuo humano, aun si se clona su genoma. De genomas idénticos, desarrollados en contextos diferentes, familiares, sociales y culturales, pueden resultar individuos totalmente diferentes. Además, entran en juego consideraciones éticas, sociales y religiosas cuando se examina si una persona puede o debe ser clonada. (shrink)

Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and other physical scientists ushered in a conception of the universe as matter in motion governed by natural laws. Their discoveries brought about a fundamental revolution, namely a commitment to the postulate that the universe obeys immanent laws that can account for natural phenomena. The workings of the universe were brought into the realm of science: explanation through natural laws. Darwin completed the Copernican revolution by extending it to the living world. Darwin demonstrated the evolution of organisms. (...) More important yet is that he discovered natural selection, the process that explains the ‘design’ of organisms. The adaptations and diversity of organisms, the origin of novel and complex species, even the origin of mankind, could now be explained by an orderly process of change governed by natural laws. The origin of species and the exquisite features of organisms had previously been explained as special creations of an omniscient God. Darwin brought them into the domain of science. (shrink)

The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in Aquinas’ text (...) many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). (shrink)

I will, first, outline what we currently know about the last 4 million years of human evolutionary history, from bipedal but small‐brained Australopithecus to modern Homo sapiens, our species, through the prolific toolmaker Homo habilis and the continent wanderer Homo erectus. I shall then identify anatomical traits that distinguish us from other animals and point out our two kinds of heredity, the biological and the cultural.Biological inheritance is based on the transmission of genetic information, in humans very much the same (...) as in other sexually reproducing organisms. But cultural inheritance is distinctively human, based on transmission of information by a teaching and learning process that is in principle independent of biological parentage. Cultural inheritance makes possible the cumulative transmission of experience from generation to generation. Cultural heredity is a swifter and more effective (because it can be designed) mode of adaptation to the environment than the biological mode. The advent of cultural heredity ushered in cultural evolution, which transcends biological evolution.I will, finally, explore ethical behavior as a model case of a distinctive human trait, and seek to ascertain the causal connections between human ethics and human biology. My conclusions are that (1) moral reasoning—that is, the proclivity to make ethical judgments by evaluating actions as either good or evil—is rooted in our biological nature; it is a necessary outcome of our exalted intelligence, but (2) the moral codes that guide our decisions as to which actions are good and which ones are evil are products of culture, including social and religious traditions. This second conclusion contradicts those evolutionists and sociobiologists who claim that the morally good is simply that which is promoted by the process of biological evolution. (shrink)

This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...) conjectures. Inductive generalizations may also inspire hypotheses, but cannot validate them. A hypothesis is empirically tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions about the world of experience deduced from the hypothesis agree with what is actually observed. This has been appropriately considered the 'criterion of demarcation' that distinguishes science from other knowledge. But scientific hypotheses must satisfy other tests as well, e.g., whether they have explanatory value and further understanding. I briefly explore such issues as verifiability and falsifiability, empirical content and truthfulness, contingency and certainty, fact and theory, error and fraud. Science like any human activity is subject to error and to the foibles and other failings of human beings. But severe attempts of empirical falsification and other trials yield knowledge that stands the test of time and provides a foothold for further knowledge. Moreover, scientists have developed social mechanisms, such as peer review and publication, to evaluate their work. Because the research of scientists depends on the validity of previous knowledge, it is of great consequence that they discern valid from invalid knowledge and thus scientists are inclined to transcend ideology, nationality, friendship, monetary interest and other prejudices when the mettle of scientific knowledge is at stake. I use historical examples to illustrate some relevant aspects of scientific practice: its success (Mendel), misrepresentation (Darwin), ideological abuse (Lysenko), arrogant violation of the requirement of testing (Koch), theory replacement (Priestly and Lavoisier, Newton and Einstein), and the indispensability of context (Oswald Avery and Alfred Wegener). (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

El presente artículo elucida la posición de Félix Guattari, y secundariamente la de Gilles Deleuze, respecto al concepto de ideología. Para ello se efectúa un análisis del recorrido intelectual de Guattari desde sus primeros artículos reunidos en Psychanalyse et transversalité (1974) hasta Mille Plateaux (1980). Se procede en dos instancias. Primero, se precisa cuál es el concepto específico de ideología con el cual Guattari discute. Este no es otro que la noción desarrollada por Louis Althusser como se puede detectar en (...) referencias explícitas tanto cuanto en alusiones implícitas. Segundo, a partir de la discusión de los elementos centrales de la posición guattariana, se argumenta la afinidad que existe entre el célebre concepto de agenciamiento de Guattari y Deleuze y la recusación crítica de los aparatos ideológicos de Althusser. (shrink)