Much of our thinking focuses on deciding what to do in situations where the space of possible options is too large to evaluate exhaustively. Previous work has found that people do this by learning the general value of different behaviors, and prioritizing thinking about high-value options in new situations. Is this good-action bias always the best strategy, or can thinking about low-value options sometimes become more beneficial? Can people adapt their thinking accordingly based on the situation? And how do we (...) know what to think about in novel events? Here, we developed a block-puzzle paradigm that enabled us to measure people's thinking plans and compare them to a computational model of rational thought. We used two distinct response methods to explore what people think about—a self-report method, in which we asked people explicitly to report what they thought about, and an implicit response time method, in which we used people's decision-making times to reveal what they thought about. Our results suggest that people can quickly estimate the apparent value of different options and use this to decide what to think about. Critically, we find that people can flexibly prioritize whether to think about high-value options (Experiments 1 and 2) or low-value options (Experiments 3, 4, and 5), depending on the problem. Through computational modeling, we show that these thinking strategies are broadly rational, enabling people to maximize the value of long-term decisions. Our results suggest that thinking plans are flexible: What we think about depends on the structure of the problems we are trying to solve. (shrink)

In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...) like these have provoked passionate arguments and counterarguments, but few clear answers. Here, we offer a psychological account of why philosophical dilemmas arise, why they resist resolution, and why scientists should pay attention to them. Building on a family of recent proposals (Cushman & Young, 2009; Greene, 2008; Sinnott- Armstrong, 2008), we argue that dilemmas result from conflict between dissociable psychological processes. When two such processes yield different answers to the same question, that question becomes a “dilemma”. No matter which answer you choose, part of you walks away dissatisfied. This explanation of philosophical dilemmas has an important payoff for psychological research, and we discuss two specific cases in which it has yielded promising results. In each case, social neuroscience has played an important role in distinguishing the psychological processes responsible for producing a dilemma. This, we suggest, is no accident; cognitive neuroscientific methods are particularly well-suited to dissociating independent psychological processes (Henson, 2006). Consequently, philosophers’ dilemmas provide a reliable guide toward productive cognitive neuroscience by identifying the contours of distinct psychological process. The research we review below focuses particularly on moral dilemmas, which is our own area of expertise. The psychological processes that contribute to moral judgment are of interest in their own right, and play a central role in social cognition.. (shrink)

Why do sociological theorists remain uninterested in and resistant to feminist theory? Notwithstanding indications of increasing openness to feminist theory, journals and texts on sociological theory reflect a continuing pattern of neglect. I identify reasons for this pattern, including tensions resulting from the introduction of gender as a central analytical category: Not only does gender challenge the dichotomous categories that define sociology's boundaries and identity, it also displaces the discipline's central problematic of modernity. The significance of this displacement is apparent (...) when the discipline's responses to feminist and postmodernist theory are compared. I discuss the relevance of feminist theoretical work to contemporary issues in sociological theory, with specific attention to the synthetic nature of feminist theorizing, to work on rethinking power, resistance, and oppression, and to efforts to effect a conceptual shift from "either/or" to "both/and" thinking and to establish new grounds for assessing knowledge claims. (shrink)

This paper examines the metaphor of harmony as a criterion of hermeneutic understanding. Taking harmony as a play of integrated parts within a dynamic whole, we can see the hermeneutic task of interpretation as a process of harmonizing parts meaningfully with each other and with the larger whole. Holding up a sufficiently rich notion of harmony as an ideal of interpretation can guide our hermeneutic practices. After distinguishing subtle differences in the Greek and Chinese conceptions of harmony, I argue that (...) the Chinese conception more closely aligns with the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutic understanding. In the end, I suggest that these insights can lead us to progress in social harmony. (shrink)

The HOD Dichotomy Theorem states that if there is an extendible cardinal, δ, then either HOD is “close” to V or HOD is “far” from V. The question is whether the future will lead to the first or the second side of the dichotomy. Is HOD “close” to V, or “far” from V? There is a program aimed at establishing the first alternative—the “close” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of inner model theory. In recent years the (...) third author has provided evidence that there is an ultimate inner model—Ultimate-L—and he has isolated a natural conjecture associated with the model—the Ultimate-L Conjecture. This conjecture implies that that the first alternative holds—HOD is “close” to V. This is the future in which pattern prevails. In this paper we introduce a very different program, one aimed at establishing the second alternative—the “far” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of large cardinals beyond choice. Kunen famously showed that if AC holds then there cannot be a Reinhardt cardinal. It has remained open whether Reinhardt cardinals are consistent in ZF alone. It turns out that there is an entire hierarchy of choiceless large cardinals of which Reinhardt cardinals are only the beginning, and, surprisingly, this hierarchy appears to be highly ordered and amenable to systematic investigation, as we shall show in this paper. The point is that if these choiceless large cardinals are consistent then the Ultimate-L Conjecture must fail. This is the future where chaos prevails. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions often involve appeals to verdicts about particular cases, sometimes actual, more often hypothetical, and usually with little or no substantive argument in their defense. Philosophers — on both sides of debates over the standing of this practice — have often called the basis for such appeals ‘intuitions’. But, what might such ‘intuitions’ be, such that they could legitimately serve these purposes? Answers vary, ranging from ‘thin’ conceptions that identify intuitions as merely instances of some fairly generic and epistemologically (...) uncontroversial category of mental states or episodes to ‘thick’ conceptions that add to this thin base certain semantic, phenomenological, etiological, or methodological conditions. As this chapter discusses, thick conceptions turn out to have their own methodological problems; some may even leave philosophers in the methodologically untenable position of being unable to determine when anyone is doing philosophy correctly. (shrink)

Three apparently unrelated developmental processes – mammalian myogenesis, the choice of neural fate and sex determination in Drosophila – are controlled by a common mechanism. Most of the genes governing these processes encode transcriptional factors that contain the helix‐loop‐helix (HLH) motif. This domain mediates the formation of homo‐ or heterodimers that specifically bind to DNA through a conserved basic region adjacent to the HLH motif. Dimers differ in their affinity for DNA and in their ability to activate transcription from HLH (...) binding‐site containing promoters. In addition, the activity of HLH proteins is inhibited by dimerization with another class of HLH proteins that lack a basic domain entirely or have an altered one. These structural properties provide a molecular mechanism to explain the synergistic and antagonistic functional relations among the HLH encoding genes that control several developmental pathways. (shrink)

Systematizing Aquinas? : a paradigm in crisis -- Reconstructing Cajetan's question : the semantic intent of De nominum analogia -- Analogy, semantics, and the "concept vs. judgment" critique -- Some insufficient semantic rules for analogy -- Cajetan's semantic principles -- The semantics of analogy : inequality and attribution -- The semantics of proportionality: the proportional unity of concepts -- The semantics of proportionality : concept formation and judgment -- The semantics of proportionality : syllogism and dialectic.

Abstract: While pragmatism and the so-called 4E program may form a united front against methodological individualism, classical cognitivism, traditional internalism, and the like, the 4E approach is not without its own internal tensions. One such tension, between Embodied and Extended, is brought to light by Clark (2008), who argues in favor of the latter. Dempsey and Shani (2013) reply that Clark’s functionalism undercuts what should be a more fundamental commitment to Embodied. With respect to this tension, Gallagher (2014) claims that (...) “there may be resources in pragmatism that can help to adjudicate some of the current debate and to develop a more integrated perspective” (Gallagher 2014, 110). In this paper, I assess Gallagher’s strategy and offer a critical perspective on the use of Deweyan pragmatism to resolve these tensions in the 4E program. (shrink)

In this article, I summarize recent work on the philosophy of liturgy. In part 2 of this article, I consider how liturgy can provide a way of knowing God personally. I outline accounts of acquiring phenomenal knowledge, practical knowledge, and propositional knowledge by participating in liturgy.

Definitions of death are often referred to as legal fictions since brain death was conceived in the mid-twentieth century. Reference to legal fiction is generally paired with bioethicists’ concern that it facilitates post-mortem tissue donation and the health system generally, by determining death earlier on the continuum of dying and availing more viable tissue and therapeutic resources for others. The author argues that spatio-legal theory, drawing from legal geography, can account for the heterogeneity of effects that the fiction has in (...) spatially managing bodies (e.g., physicians, patient, family) at the bedside. The legal fiction is produced in physicians’ socio-legal practices, coordinating decision-making according to geographies of scarcity and severable, self-contained live- and dead-bodies. The determination liminally exists between private and public, enacting a sterile, affectless ordering of bodies but administered in the spectacle of sovereign death-making, conveying authority whilst managing patient’s and family’s consents. Spatialising traces of anatamo-politics and biopolitics thereby congeal and are enacted heterogeneously in and through the legal form of the fiction, securing preferred constructions of the body in the management of mortality. These spatio-legal features of the legal fiction are described from their collision with case law and literature that document competing nomoi produced from or secreted by antinomian bodies. (shrink)

Does Frege have a metatheory for his logic? There is an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which he does. Frege introduces and discusses his new logic in natural language; he argues, in response to criticisms of Begriffsschrift, that his logic is superior to Boole's by discussing formal features of both systems. In so far as the enterprise of using natural language to introduce, discuss, and argue about features of a formal system is metatheoretic, there can be no doubt: Frege has (...) a metatheory. There is also an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which Frege does not have a metatheory for his logic. The model theoretic semantics with which we are familiar today are a post-Fregean development. The question I address in this paper is, does Frege have a metatheory in the following sense: do his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference employ, or even require, ineliminable use of a truth predicate and metalinguistic variables? My answer is ‘no’ on both counts. I argue that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth predicate or metalinguistic variables in his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference. Quine's famous explanation of the need for semantic ascent simply does not apply to Frege's logic. The purpose of the discussions that are typically understood as constituting Frege's metatheory is, rather, elucidatory. And once we see what the aim of these particular elucidations is, we can explain Frege's otherwise puzzling eschewal of the truth predicate in his discussions of the justification of the laws and rules of inference. (shrink)

A theological treatment of the role of affections such as joy, compassion, and shame in contemporary politics. Hordern discusses what affections are and how they play a role in parts of political life such as representation and law. He shows that affections have an intelligent role to play in fostering loyalty, trust and public moral reasoning.

BackgroundThe process of peer-review in academia has attracted criticism surrounding issues of bias, fairness, and professionalism; however, frequency of occurrence of such comments is unknown.MethodsWe evaluated 1491 sets of reviewer comments from the fields of “Ecology and Evolution” and “Behavioural Medicine,” of which 920 were retrieved from the online review repository Publons and 571 were obtained from six early career investigators. Comment sets were coded for the occurrence of “unprofessional comments” and “incomplete, inaccurate or unsubstantiated critiques” using an a-prior rubric (...) based on our published research. Results are presented as absolute numbers and percentages.ResultsOverall, 12% of comment sets included at least one unprofessional comment towards the author or their work, and 41% contained incomplete, inaccurate of unsubstantiated critiques.ConclusionsThe large number of unprofessional comments, and IIUCs observed could heighten psychological distress among investigators, particularly those at an early stage in their career. We suggest that development and adherence to a universally agreed upon reviewer code of conduct is necessary to improve the quality and professional experience of peer review. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that analytic philosophy can contribute to the theological discussion of ecclesiology. By considering recent analytic work on social ontology, I outline how we might think of the Church as one entity, constituted by many disparate parts. The paper begins with an overview of the theological constraints for the paper, and then proceeds to examine recent work on the philosophy of social ontology and group agency. Drawing on this literature, I outline three models of (...) social ontology from the history of philosophy and suggest reasons why all of them fail to provide an account of the Church’s agency. Finally, I develop an alternative model which, I suggest, better fits the conditions stipulated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Protecting Human Research SubjectsThe Office for Protection from Research RisksJoan Paine Porter (bio)The office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), located within the National Institutes of Health, has two divisions: Human Subject Protections and Animal Welfare. This article will address the overall responsibilities and current projects relating to human subject protections.OPRR implements the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) regulations for the protection of human subjects (45 CFR (...) 46 (1991)). These regulations fulfill the responsibilities set forth in the Public Health Service (PHS) Act with regard to institutional review boards (IRB) and other protections for human subjects involved in biomedical and behavioral research conducted or supported by HHS. The PHS Act also mandates a program to clarify ethical issues in biomedical research involving human subjects and to address violations of the rights of human subjects of research (P.L. 99-158 (1985)).OPRR staff negotiate assurances of compliance with institutions conducting Federally-supported research involving human subjects. The assurances describe the policies and procedures each institution will follow to fulfill the requirements of the regulations, including specific IRB composition and functions.In addition, OPRR cosponsors with the Food and Drug Administration and awardee institutions a series of regional workshops that address human subject protections issues. These are attended by IRB members, institutional officials, research investigators, and others involved with human subject protections.Current ActivitiesNumerous activities are underway in OPRR. The following describes only a few of the initiatives and studies aimed at helping develop policies and procedures to protect human subjects of research."Points to Consider" DocumentsOPRR is currently working with the National Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) to develop a "points to consider" document for IRBs and others involved in large genetic pedigree studies. Many questions have emerged [End Page 279] on topics such as how subjects should be recruited, with whom information should be shared about others in the family, social risks of disclosure in employment and insurance, the circumstances and timing of informing subjects about study results, and involvement of children. OPRR and NCHGR hope to assemble a group this fall to review and refine the points that are now being developed jointly. A conference in South Carolina organized by the American Association for Advancement in the Sciences entitled "Project on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Genetic Testing," helped generate advice, and identified some of the more controversial issues in design and conduct of genetic research that involves large groups of family members.Another "points to consider" effort concerns enrollment of women and minorities in research. The PHS has established a policy that members of these groups must be included in research projects unless there are valid scientific justifications for their exclusion which can be made on a project by project basis (ADAMHA/NIH Policy 1990; NIH/ADAMHA Policy 1990). OPRR has commissioned several scholarly papers to help in developing "points to consider" for IRBs as they balance issues of equitable selection of subjects and protection of these selected individuals. Concerns about enrolling women of childbearing age in research that may be harmful to a fetus, and liability issues frequently dominate discussion in this area. The papers will address ethical, legal, and statistical aspects of enrollment of minorities and women as well as provide a description of various practices and roles of IRBs in addressing goals of fair selection of participants and appropriate protections.OPRR is also working with the PHS Panel on Women, Adolescents and Children to produce a document, also in the form of "points to consider" guidance, concerning enrollment of children who are wards of the state in HIV-related research. Subpart D of the regulations for the protection of human subjects (45 CFR 46) specifically addresses research involving children who are wards of the state, including the special protections that must be provided. State and local officials who have authority to enroll foster care children in research have indicated a desire to obtain advice in this area.The IRB GuidebookA major project that is now being completed under contract to the Poynter Center at Indiana University is the IRB Guidebook. It will revise and expand the current IRB Guidebook produced in the 1980s... (shrink)

College students implicitly judge interracial sex and gay sex to be morally wrong Some moral intuitions arise from psychological processes that are not fully accessible to consciousness. For instance, most people disapprove of consensual adult incest between siblings, but are unable to articulate why—they just feel that it is wrong (Haidt, 2001). More generally, there is evidence for at least two sources of moral judgment: explicit conscious reasoning and tacit intuitions, which are motivated by emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001) (...) and learned associations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). (shrink)

I argued that Frege does not have a metatheory in the following sense: the justifications he offers for his basic laws and rules of inference neither employ nor require a truth-predicate or metalinguistic variables. In ‘Does Frege Use a Truth-predicate in his "Justification" of the Laws of Logic?’, Dirk Greimann disputes this. As Greimann interprets Frege, (i) Frege's remarks commit him to giving a metatheoretic justification of the basic laws and rules of his logic, and (ii) Frege actually gives such (...) a justification in the early sections of Grundgesetze—although the truth-predicate that Frege employs is a non-standard one: it is neither a predicate that holds of all and only true sentences nor a predicate that holds of all and only true thoughts. I argue that Greimann's interpretation is not, in the end, true to the text, and that his non-standard view of what is required of a Tarskian truth-predicate is ultimately not viable. (shrink)

Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and (...) a kind of interpretive failure in the case of irrationality) are produced by independent psychological mechanisms, they have distal causes that turn out to be related in ways that—once language enters the picture—yield epistemically accessible necessary connections between the referents of their corresponding terms. (shrink)