ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the following: Professor DW Harding for suggesting inquiry into Binet's work and for allowing use of his own ideas in ...

Moral distress has received much attention in the international nursing literature in recent years. In this article, we describe the evolution of the concept of moral distress among nursing theorists from its initial delineation by the philosopher Jameton to its subsequent deployment as an umbrella concept describing the impact of moral constraints on health professionals and the patients for whom they care. The article raises worries about the way in which the concept of moral distress has been portrayed in some (...) nursing research and expresses concern about the fact that research, so far, has been largely confined to determining the prevalence of experiences of moral distress among nurses. We conclude by proposing a reconsideration, possible reconstruction and multidisciplinary approach to understanding the experiences of all health professionals who have to make difficult moral judgements and decisions in complex situations. (shrink)

Holobionts, consisting of a host and diverse microbial symbionts, function as distinct biological entities anatomically, metabolically, immunologically, and developmentally. Symbionts can be transmitted from parent to offspring by a variety of vertical and horizontal methods. Holobionts can be considered levels of selection in evolution because they are well-defined interactors, replicators/reproducers, and manifestors of adaptation. An initial mathematical model is presented to help understand how holobionts evolve. The model offered combines the processes of horizontal symbiont transfer, within-host symbiont proliferation, vertical symbiont (...) transmission, and holobiont selection. The model offers equations for the population dynamics and evolution of holobionts whose hologenomes differ in gene copy number, not in allelic or loci identity. The model may readily be extended to include variation among holobionts in the gene identities of both symbionts and host. (shrink)

For each natural number n, let C(n) be the closed and unbounded proper class of ordinals α such that Vα is a Σn elementary substructure of V. We say that κ is a C(n)-cardinal if it is the critical point of an elementary embedding j : V → M, M transitive, with j(κ) in C(n). By analyzing the notion of C(n)-cardinal at various levels of the usual hierarchy of large cardinal principles we show that, starting at the level of superstrong (...) cardinals and up to the level of rank-into-rank embeddings, C(n)-cardinals form a much finer hierarchy. The naturalness of the notion of C(n)-cardinal is exemplified by showing that the existence of C(n)-extendible cardinals is equivalent to simple reflection principles for classes of structures, which generalize the notions of supercompact and extendible cardinals. Moreover, building on results of Bagaria et al. (2010), we give new characterizations of Vopeňka’s Principle in terms of C(n)-extendible cardinals. (shrink)

Scott shows that the gender equality invoked today as a fundamental principle was not originally associated with the term "secularism" when it first entered the nineteenth century. The inequality of the sexes was fundamental to the articulation of the separation of church and state that inaugurated Western modernity. Western nation-states imposed a new order of women's subordination, assigning them to a feminized familial sphere meant to complement the rational masculine realms of politics and economics. It was not until the question (...) of Islam arose in the late twentieth century that gender equality became a primary feature of the discourse of secularism. (shrink)

This study examines how our personal values influence our judgment of the morality of some workplace behaviours. Sixty-nine undergraduates were asked to rank order separately Rokeach''s instrumental and terminal values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in their life. Subjects then read four scenarios, each of which described ethically questionable behaviour of the sort that might be encountered in business. They were then asked to rate whether or not the behaviour of the person described in the scenario was (...) ethical, and whether or not they had any intentions to rectify the situation. People with different value hierarchies perceived the targeted behaviours differently. For example, subjects who valued honesty perceived the behaviour as more immoral than subjects who did not value honesty. While the ranking of the instrumental valuehonesty was the best predictor of people''s judgments about the morality of the behaviour, their ranking of the instrumental valueambition was the best predictor of their behavioural intentions. (shrink)

Geroscience and philosophy of aging have tended to focus their analyses on the biological and chronological dimensions of aging. Namely, one ages with the passage of time and by experiencing the cellular-molecular deterioration that accompanies this process. However, our concept of aging depends decisively on the social valuations held about it. In this article, we will argue that, if we study social aging in the contemporary world, a novel phenomenon can be identified: the paradox of aging in the digital era. (...) If the social understanding of aging today is linked to unproductivity and obsolescence; then there is a possibility that, given the pace of change of digital technologies, we become obsolete at an early chronological and biological age, and therefore, feel old at a younger age. First, we will present the social dimension of aging based on Rowe and Kahn's model of successful aging. We will also show that their notion of social aging hardly considers structural aspects and weakens their approach. Second, departing from social aging in its structural sense, we will develop the paradox of aging in the digital era. On the one hand, we will explain how the institutionalization of aging has occurred in modern societies and how it is anchored in the concepts of obsolescence and productivity. On the other hand, we will state the kind of obsolescence that digitalization produces and argue that it can make cohorts of biologically and chronologically young individuals obsolete, and thus they would be personally and socially perceived as old. (shrink)

Frege's life and character -- The project -- Frege's new logic -- Defining the numbers -- The reconception of the logic, I-"Function and concept" -- The reconception of the logic, II- "On sense and meaning" and "on concept and object" -- Basic laws, the great contradiction, and its aftermath -- On the foundations of geometry -- Logical investigations -- Frege's influence on recent philosophy.

Book reviewed in this article: Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology. By Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak.

Frege begins Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, the work that introduces the project which was to occupy him for most of his professional career, with the question, 'What is the number one?' It is a question to which even mathematicians, he says, have no satisfactory answer. And given this scandalous situation, he adds, there is small hope that we shall be able to say what number is. Frege intends to rectify the situation by providing definitions of the number one and the (...) concept of number. But what, exactly, is required of a definition? Surely it will not do to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar - that would change the subject. It seems reasonable to suppose that an acceptable definition must be a true statement containing a description that picks out the object to which the numeral '1' already refers. And, similarly, that an acceptable definition of the concept of number must contain a description that picks out precisely those objects that are numbers - those objects to which our numerals refer. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of '1' and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of ‘1’ and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. There is, as we shall see shortly, a great deal of evidence that Frege’s definitions are not intended to pick out objects to which our numerals already refer. But if this is so, how can these definitions teach us anything about our science of arithmetic? And what criteria must these definitions satisfy? To answer these questions, we need to understand what it is that Frege thinks we need to learn about the science of arithmetic. (shrink)

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σn-reflecting cardinals, Σn-correct cardinals and Σn-extendible cardinals are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if κ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target θ, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically <κ-closed forcing Q∈Vθ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} (...) \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Q} \in V_\theta}$$\end{document}, the cardinal κ will exhibit none of the large cardinal properties with target θ or larger. (shrink)

This paper examines how in the ‘Critique of teleological judgment’ Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of (...) natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole. (shrink)

To learn whether criticism and regulation of research practices have been followed by a reduction of deception or use of more acceptable approaches to deception, the contents of all 1969, 1978, 1986, and 1992 issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology were examined. Deception research was coded according to type of (non)informing (e.g., false informing, consent to deception, no informing), possible harmfulness of deception employed (e.g., powerfulness of induction, morality of the behavior induced, privacy of behavior), method of (...) deception (e.g., bogus device or role, false purpose of study, false feedback), and debriefing employed. Use of confederates has been partly replaced by uses of computers. "Consent" with false informing declined after 1969, then rose in 1992. Changes in the topics studied (e.g., attribution, socialization, personality) largely accounted for the decline in deception in 1978 and 1986. More attention needs to be given to ways of respecting subjects' autonomy, to appropriate debriefing and desensitizing, and to selecting the most valid and least objectionable deception methods. (shrink)

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...) — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts. (shrink)

Ethics is normative; ethics indicates, in broad terms, what researchers should do. For example, researchers should respect human participants. Empirical study tells us what actually happens. Empirical research is often needed to fine-tune the best ways to achieve normative objectives, for example, to discover how best to achieve the dual aims of gaining important knowledge and respecting participants. Ethical decision making by scientists and institutional review boards should not be based on hunches and anecdotes (e.g., about such matters as what (...) information potential research participants would want to know and what they understand, or what they consider to be acceptable risks). These questions should be answered through empirical research. Some of the preceding articles in this special issue illustrate uses of empirical research on research ethics. This article places empirical research on research ethics into broader perspective and challenges investigators to use the tools of their disciplines to proactively solve ethical problems for which there currently exist no empirically proven solutions. (shrink)

Artificial persons are those who speak and act for others. Nurses speak and act for patients as well as for physicians and institutions, or, more aptly, institutionalized medicine. Yet, acting for institutionalized medicine can be harmful to nurses, due to the psychological experience of moral distress and the loss of integrity of their practice. This paper illustrates the harm to nurses as expressed in narratives of their practice, and suggests some initial steps we might take in resisting the artificial personhood (...) imposed by institutionalized medicine. (shrink)

We address Steel’s Programme to identify a ‘preferred’ universe of set theory and the best axioms extending ZFC by using his multiverse axioms MV and the ‘core hypothesis’. In the first part, we examine the evidential framework for MV, in particular the use of large cardinals and of ‘worlds’ obtained through forcing to ‘represent’ alternative extensions of ZFC. In the second part, we address the existence and the possible features of the core of MV_T (where T is ZFC+Large Cardinals). In (...) the last part, we discuss the hypothesis that the core is Ultimate-L, and examine whether and how, based on this fact, the Core Universist can justify V=Ultimate-L as the best (and ultimate) extension of ZFC. To this end, we take into account several strategies, and assess their prospects in the light of MV’s evidential framework. (shrink)

RESUMEN:Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la articulación entre la afirmación del carácter racional de la fe, esto es, su dimensión latitudinaria, el escepticismo epistemológico, y su derivación práctica en un concepto de tolerancia restringido al interior del protestantismo. Se subrayará, en este sentido, el carácter estratégico de la articulación entre racionalidad de la fe y escepticismo, en cuanto permite apelar a la ignorancia con vistas a la tolerancia, sin por ello dejar de sostener la interpretación protestante del cristianismo, en (...) detrimento de la interpretación católica.PALABRAS CLAVE:LOCKE - LATITUDINARISMO - ESCEPTICISMO - TOLERANCIA - PROTESTANTISMOABSTRACT:This paper aims to analyze the articulation between faith rationality assertion, i.e. its latitudinarian aspect, its epistemological skepticism, and its practical implication in a restricted concept of tolerance within Protestantism. In this regard, we will emphasize the strategic feature of the link between faith rationality and skepticism, as it allows appealing to ignorance towards tolerance, without dropping the Protestant interpretation of Christianity, to the detriment of Catholic interpretation.KEYWORDS:LOCKE - LATITUDINARIANISM - SKEPTICISM - TOLERATION - PROTESTANTISM. (shrink)

Does Frege have a metatheory for his logic? There is an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which he does. Frege introduces and discusses his new logic in natural language; he argues, in response to criticisms of Begriffsschrift, that his logic is superior to Boole's by discussing formal features of both systems. In so far as the enterprise of using natural language to introduce, discuss, and argue about features of a formal system is metatheoretic, there can be no doubt: Frege has (...) a metatheory. There is also an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which Frege does not have a metatheory for his logic. The model theoretic semantics with which we are familiar today are a post-Fregean development. The question I address in this paper is, does Frege have a metatheory in the following sense: do his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference employ, or even require, ineliminable use of a truth predicate and metalinguistic variables? My answer is ‘no’ on both counts. I argue that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth predicate or metalinguistic variables in his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference. Quine's famous explanation of the need for semantic ascent simply does not apply to Frege's logic. The purpose of the discussions that are typically understood as constituting Frege's metatheory is, rather, elucidatory. And once we see what the aim of these particular elucidations is, we can explain Frege's otherwise puzzling eschewal of the truth predicate in his discussions of the justification of the laws and rules of inference. (shrink)

This article briefly outlines some of the key problems with the way in which the moral realm has traditionally been understood and analysed. I propose two alternative views of what is morally interesting and applicable to nursing practice and I indicate that instability has its upsides. I begin with a moral tale – a 'Good Samaritan' story – which raises fairly usual questions about the nature of morality but also the more philosophically fundamental question about the relationship between subjectivity and (...) moral agency. I then consider this relationship from the perspectives of two twentieth century philosophers: Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Foucault. Levinas' basic point is that the experience of ethical subjectivity is made possible through others: the demand to respond to the existence of others is the basic social structure that precedes individual freedom. If Levinas posits intersubjectivity as a fundamental or primitive feature of the moral realm, Foucault poses an even more basic question: how have moral subjects and relations of obligation been constituted? The aim of ethical inquiry, for Foucault, is to describe the network of discourses, institutions, relations, and practices through which certain kinds of subjects are constituted and constitute themselves, e.g. as a kind of person who can act morally. Finally, I consider some recent research in philosophy of nursing which illustrates how Levinasian and/or Foucauldian perspectives can deepen understanding of nurses' moral practices, specifically, the work of Norwegian public health nurses, Canadian pediatric nurses, and Irish midwives. I suggest that in spite of the instability of morality in general and the particular ethical challenges that face nurses, there are grounds for hope and possible strategies for living in unstable times. (shrink)

This study considers the potential for influencing business students to become ethical managers by directing their undergraduate learning environment. In particular, the relationship between business students’ academic cheating, as a predictor of workplace ethical behavior, and their approaches to learning is explored. The three approaches to learning identified from the students’ approaches to learning literature are deep approach, represented by an intrinsic interest in and a desire to understand the subject, surface approach, characterized by rote learning and memorization without understanding, (...) and strategic approach, associated with competitive students whose motivation is the achievement of good grades by adopting either a surface or deep approach. Consistent with the hypothesized theoretical model, structural equation modeling revealed that the surface approach is associated with higher levels of cheating, while the deep approach is related to lower levels. The strategic approach was also associated with less cheating and had a statistically stronger influence than the deep approach. Further, a significantly positive relationship reported between deep and strategic approaches suggests that cheating is reduced when deep and strategic approaches are paired. These findings suggest that future managers and business executives can be influenced to behave more ethically in the workplace by directing their learning approaches. It is hoped that the evidence presented may encourage those involved in the design of business programs to implement educational strategies which optimize students’ approaches to learning towards deep and strategic characteristics, thereby equipping tomorrow’s managers and business executives with skills to recognize and respond appropriately to workplace ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

We explore the consistency strength of Σ 3 1 and Σ 4 1 absoluteness, for a variety of forcing notions.

Why the narrative self? -- Contemporary interest in narrative theory -- Is the self real or illusory? -- Dennett's brand of naturalism -- The heterophenomenological method (HM) -- Consciousness and the self -- The naturalist narrative self -- Puzzle cases -- The HM and the narrative self -- The limitations of Dennett's account -- The limits of language -- Epistemological fragility -- Ontological fragility -- Naturalism and phenomenology -- Confronting naturalism -- Phenomenology and hermeneutics -- The detour of interpretation -- (...) Reflexivity -- The problem of personal identity -- The number of selves, identity relations and truth -- The capable self and its narrative identity -- Narrative identity and aristotelian muthos -- Narrative recounting of human lives -- LPSE-identity and literary puzzle cases -- Certainty, knowledge and attestation -- Narrative attestation -- Fact and fiction -- Narrative attestation -- The limitations of Ricoeur's account -- Selective appeals to literary and psychoanalytic discourses -- Focus on the self-examining self -- The ontological status of the narrative self -- The epistemological status of the narrative self -- The practical self -- Why the narrative self? (shrink)

We give a sharper version of a theorem of Rosický, Trnková and Adámek [13], and a new proof of a theorem of Rosický [12], both about colimits in categories of structures. Unlike the original proofs, which use category-theoretic methods, we use set-theoretic arguments involving elementary embeddings given by large cardinals such as $\alpha$-strongly compact and $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals.

In describing and explaining the sexes, medicine and science participated in the delineation of what was "feminine" and what was "masculine" in the Middle Ages. Hildegard of Bingen and Albertus Magnus, among others, writing about gynecology, the human constitution, fetal development, or the naturalistic dimensions of divine Creation, became increasingly interested in issues surrounding reproduction and sexuality. Did women as well as men produce procreative seed? How did the physiology of the sexes influence their healthy states and their susceptibility to (...) disease? Who derived more pleasure from sexual intercourse, men or women? The answers to such questions created a network of flexible concepts which did not endorse a single model of male-female relations, but did affect views on the health consequences of sexual abstinence for women and men and on the allocation of responsibility for infertility - problems with much social and religious significance in the Middle Ages. Sometimes at odds with, and sometimes in accord with other forces in medieval society, medicine and natural philosophy helped to construct a set of notions that divided significant portions of the world - from the behavior of animals to the operations of astrological signs - into "masculine" and "feminine." Even cases that seemed to exist outside the definitions of this duality, for example, hermaphrodite features or homosexual behavior, were brought under control by the application of gendered labels, such as "masculine women.". (shrink)

We study the preservation of the property of being a Solovay model under proper projective forcing extensions. We show that every strongly-proper forcing notion preserves this property. This yields that the consistency strength of the absoluteness of under strongly-proper forcing notions is that of the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. Further, the absoluteness of under projective strongly-proper forcing notions is consistent relative to the existence of a -Mahlo cardinal. We also show that the consistency strength of the absoluteness of under (...) forcing extensions with σ-linked forcing notions is exactly that of the existence of a Mahlo cardinal, in contrast with the general ccc case, which requires a weakly-compact cardinal. (shrink)

Aim: The aim of this review is to examine the ways in which the concept of moral distress has been delineated and deployed in the argument-based nursing ethics literature. It adds to what we already know about moral distress from reviews of the qualitative and quantitative research. Data sources: CINAHL, PubMed, Web of Knowledge, EMBASE, Academic Search Complete, PsycInfo, Philosophers’ Index and Socindex. Review methods: A total of 20 argument-based articles published between January 1984 and December 2013 were analysed. Results: (...) We found that like the empirical literature, most authors in this review draw on Jameton’s original definition and describe moral distress in psychological–emotional–physiological terms. They also agree that moral distress is linked to the presence of some kind of constraint on nurses’ moral agency, and that it is best understood as a two-staged process that can intensify over time. There is also consensus that moral distress has an important normative meaning, although different views concerning the normative meaning of moral distress are expressed. Finally, the authors generally agree that moral distress arises from a number of different sources and that it (mostly) affects negatively on nurses’ personal and professional lives and, ultimately, harms patients. However, despite this consensus, many authors take issue with the way in which moral distress is conceptualized and operationalized. Moreover, while some worry that identifying nurses as a group of health professionals whose voices are ignored or marginalized might disempower nurses and encourage them to avoid their moral responsibilities, others take situations involving moral distress as indicative of more fundamental, structural inequities at the heart of contemporary healthcare provision. Conclusion: We conclude that research on moral distress in nursing is timely and important because it highlights the specifically moral labour of nurses. However, we suggest that significant concerns about the conceptual fuzziness and operationalization of moral distress also flag the need to proceed with caution. (shrink)

At least since the seventeenth century, the strange combination of epistemological certainty and ontological power that characterizes mathematics has made it a major focus of philosophical, social, and cultural negotiation. In the eighteenth century, all of these factors were at play as mathematical thinkers struggled to assimilate and extend the analysis they had inherited from the seventeenth century. A combination of educational convictions and historical assumptions supported a humanistic mathematics essentially defined by its flexibility and breadth. This mathematics was an (...) expression of l’esprit humain, which was unfolding in a progressive historical narrative. The French Revolution dramatically altered the historical and educational landscapes that had supported this eighteenth‐century approach, and within thirty years Augustin Louis Cauchy had radically reconceptualized and restructured mathematics to be rigorous rather than narrative. (shrink)