Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Discusses the ethical implications of modern technology and examines the responsibility of humanity for the fate of the world.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the (...) explanation of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

Schlussfolgern setzt voraus, dass die schlussfolgernde Person sieht, dass ihre Konklusion aus den Prämissen folgt und sie sie deswegen aus den Prämissen herleitet. Dies hat Paul Boghossian jüngst als eine Bedingung für eine adäquate Erklärung des Schlussfolgerns formuliert. Jonas Held entwickelt eine Erklärung, die sich diese Bedingung zum Maßstab setzt. Zugleich greift er kritisch in die neuere Debatte zum Thema ein, in der der Vollzug einer Schlussfolgerung zumeist als kausale Abfolge mentaler Einstellungen verstanden wird. Indem er auf Immanuel Kants (...) Verständnis von Urteil und Schluss zurückgreift, weist Jonas Held diese Annahme zurück und entwickelt einen alternativen Erklärungsansatz. Der systematische Anspruch des Buches wird so zugleich historisch verortet und untermauert. (shrink)

In this chapter, Jonas Ahlskog examines R. G. Collingwood’s conception of the philosophy of history and its metaphilosophical import. Ahlskog shows that Collingwood’s philosophy of history is simultaneously both a descriptive metaphysics of history and an elucidation of the relation between historical and philosophical thought. As a descriptive metaphysics, Ahlskog argues that Collingwood’s account has an irreducible and underexplored role for contemporary issues in the philosophy of history. The metaphilosophical import of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is unpacked through an (...) elaboration of Collingwood’s ideas about the historicity of human experience and understanding. In conclusion, Ahlskog argues that the metaphilosophical dimension of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is integrally connected with the concept of history as self-knowledge. (shrink)

The purpose of the present contribution is to develop an understanding of experience that accounts for its need to be continuously uncovered and recovered in order to consolidate itself. Through critical dialogue with modern phenomenological and hermeneutical traditions I posit that this consolidation process proves porous and discontinuous as experience contains caesuras and limits, which break open and even fracture what is already known by individual consciousness so as to make room for something new to appear over the horizon. Thinking (...) about how to engage with the phenomena given in experience draws us into a dynamic movement at the limits of singular subjectivity and the world which transcends it to all sides. After following and exploring this movement, it remains a question, which will be discussed in the end, whether all experience can be retrieved. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe scarcity of research on associations between inflammatory markers and symptoms of depression and anxiety during adolescence has yielded inconsistent results. Further, not all studies have controlled for potential confounders. We explored the associations between baseline inflammatory markers and psychological distress including moderators at follow-up in a Norwegian adolescent population sample.MethodsData was derived from 373 girls and 294 boys aged 15–18 years at baseline, in the Fit Futures Study, a large-scale 2-year follow-up study on adolescent health. Baseline data was gathered (...) from 2010 to 2011 and follow-up data from 2012 to 2013. Psychological distress was measured with Hopkins Symptom Checklist. Serum levels of the following inflammatory markers were measured: C-reactive protein, Interleukin 6, Transforming growth factor alpha, Tumor necrosis factor alpha variant 1, and variant 2. Independent associations between baseline inflammatory markers and HSCL-10 at follow-up were explored by linear regressions, in sex-stratified analyses.ResultsIn girls, analyses showed positive associations between all inflammatory markers and HSCL-10, except for TRANCE. However, all associations were non-significant in crude as well as in adjusted analyses. In boys, CRP and TGF-α showed significant associations with HSCL-10, that remained significant after adjustment. Additionally, moderators were found. In boys, CRP was associated with HSCL-10 in those with high body fat and those being physical inactive, and the association between TWEAK and HSCL-10 was dependent upon sleep duration.ConclusionThere were significant prospective associations between CRP, TFG-α, and HSCL-10 in boys aged 15–18 years at baseline. (shrink)

A classic of phenomenology and existentialism and arguably Jonas's greatest work, The Phenomenon of Life sets forth a systematic and comprehensive philosophy -- an existential interpretation of biological facts laid out in support of Jonas ...

My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual (...) claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons – and consequently no moral facts – in reality. I accept this version of moral error theory and I try to unpack what it amounts to in Section 2.1 In the course of doing so I consider two preliminary objections: that moral error theory is (probably) false because its implications are intuitively unacceptable (what I call the Moorean objection) and that the general motivation for moral error theory is self-undermining in that it rests on a hidden appeal to norms. The above characterization seems to entail the standard formulation of moral error theory, according to which first-order moral claims are uniformly false. Critics have argued that the standard formulation is incoherent since – by the law of excluded middle – the negation of a false claim is true. Hence if ‘Torture is wrong’ is false, ‘Torture is not wrong’ is true. Contrary to what moral error theorists contend, then, moral error theory seems to carry first-order moral implications that by the theory’s own lights are uniformly false. In Section 3 I suggest a formulation that is consistent with the standard formulation of moral error theory, free of first-order moral implications, and subject to no logical difficulties. In Section 4 I consider and rebut Stephen Finlay’s recent attack on moral error theory. According to Finlay the conceptual claim is false because all moral claims – and indeed all normative claims – are, or should be understood as, relativized to some moral standard or system of ends. Moral error theorists thus attribute to ordinary speakers an error that simply isn’t there. I argue that Finlay’s view has some very implausible implications and that it does not avoid commitment to various forms of error theory. This becomes especially clear when we focus on fundamental moral claims. In Section 5 I consider the worry that error theorists’ rejection of categorical reasons proves too much; in particular, the worry that error theorists’ qualms about categorical reasons apply equally to claims about hypothetical reasons, that is, claims to the effect that there is reason to take the means to one’s ends. In my view error theorists such as Mackie and Joyce have failed to pay due consideration to this problem. What the challenge establishes, I submit, is that error theorists cannot just take for granted that hypothetical reasons are metaphysically unproblematic; they must offer an account of hypothetical reasons that shows that they are. I argue that the only plausible account available to error theorists is one according to which claims about hypothetical reasons reduce to non-normative claims about relations between means and ends. (shrink)

Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...) than etiology. Proponents of the challenge argue that cognitively penetrated visual experiences can fail to provide the usual justification because they have improper etiologies. However, extant arguments for the challenge’s key claims are subject to formidable objections. In this paper, I present the challenge’s key claims, raise objections to previous attempts to establish them, and then offer a novel argument in support of the challenge. My argument relies on an analogy between cognitively penetrated visual and emotional experiences. I argue that some emotional experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their improper etiologies and conclude that analogous cognitively penetrated visual experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their etiologies, as well. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss some of the challenges related to formulating and adopting a realist position regarding non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In a standard approach to ontology, the ontological commitments of scientific theories can be extracted from them. Scientific realism is the standpoint that our best scientific theories are approximately true, and thus, their ontological commitments, roughly speaking, correspond to reality. Quantum mechanics complicates this view by introducing an interpretational requirement that links a particular conception of how reality should be (...) to the theory. This generates comprehensive difficulties: when we separate theory and interpretation, we have a clear conception of theory but not of interpretation and how to extract its ontology. On the other hand, if we somehow identify theory and interpretation, we have a reasonably clear conception of the desired ontology but lose our best characterizations of theory, rendering our methods for extracting ontology ineffective. Our aim is to map out the challenges for future rigorous realist approaches to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Organizations that develop and deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems need to manage the associated risks—for economic, legal, and ethical reasons. However, it is not always clear who is responsible for AI risk management. The three lines of defense (3LoD) model, which is considered best practice in many industries, might offer a solution. It is a risk management framework that helps organizations to assign and coordinate risk management roles and responsibilities. In this article, I suggest ways in which AI companies could (...) implement the model. I also discuss how the model could help reduce risks from AI: it could identify and close gaps in risk coverage, increase the effectiveness of risk management practices, and enable the board of directors to oversee management more effectively. The article is intended to inform decision-makers at leading AI companies, regulators, and standard-setting bodies. (shrink)

Data-intensive science comes with increased risks concerning quality and reliability of data, and while trust in science has traditionally been framed as a matter of scientists being expected to adhere to certain technical and moral norms for behaviour, emerging discourses of open science present openness and transparency as substitutes for established trust mechanisms. By ensuring access to all available information, quality becomes a matter of informed judgement by the users, and trust no longer seems necessary. This strategy does not, however, (...) take into consideration the networks of professionals already enabling data-intensive science by providing high-quality data. In the life sciences, biological data- and knowledge bases managed by expert biocurators have become crucial for data-intensive research. In this paper, I will use the case of biocurators to argue that openness and transparency will not diminish the need for trust in data-intensive science. On the contrary, data-intensive science requires a reconfiguration of existing trust mechanisms in order to include those who take care of and manage scientific data after its production. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...) F to vary according to the context in which F appears. Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ‘location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ‘evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favour of conditionalism. Thereafter I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism. (shrink)

In his recent book The Value Gap (2021), Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen defends a pluralist view of final goodness and goodness-for, according to which neither concept is analysable in terms of the other. In this paper I defend a specific version of monism, namely so-called ‘Mooreanism’, according to which goodness-for is analysable partly in terms of final goodness. Rønnow-Rasmussen offers three purported counterexamples to Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism can accommodate two of them. The third is more problematic, but this is in (...) the end not a decisive objection. (shrink)

This book is obviously about much more than education Lyle H. Rossiter, Jr, MD, forensic psychiatrist and author of The Liberal Mind: The Psychological Causes..

The book develops the metaphysics of meaning along the lines set up by Paul Grice, defining the three central notions of what is meant, said and implicated. The Gricean notion of what is said is threatened by semantic underdetermination: If the sentence underdetermines the thought it is used to express, what is said cannot be the proposition expressed by the sentence and meant by the speaker. This leads to a number of questions: How far does semantic underdetermination reach? Do we (...) have to extend or restrict the Gricean notion? Is what is said semantic or pragmatic? Keeping these metaphysical questions separate from the epistemological question of how the hearer understands what is meant, which is best explained by generalizing the Gricean theory of implicature derivation and combining it with a game-theoretic model, the book provides an original defense of a Gricean view in the ongoing debate about semantics and pragmatics. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main (...) purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice. (shrink)

Prior to the narrativist turn in the 1970s, philosophy of history focused on action and agency. Seminal pre-narrativist philosophers of history – from Collingwood and Oakeshott to Dilthey and Gadamer – argued that agent-centred action explanation constitutes an irreducible element of historical research. This paper re-examines the agent-centred perspective as one of the key insights of pre-narrativist philosophy of history. This insight has not only been neglected in philosophy of history after the narrativist turn but also fundamentally misunderstood. The paper (...) advances two connected arguments: (i) that the agent-centred perspective is internal to the very idea of historical knowledge, and (ii) that the agent-centred perspective is epistemically prior to retrospective (re)description, which has been the focus of narrativist philosophy of history. In conclusion, the paper contends that the agent-centred and the retrospective perspective constitute two integral and irreducible modes of thought that belong to history. (shrink)

In 1956, the Swedish Parliament decided to invest in a national nuclear energy program. The decision rested on the conviction that it would be in the interest of the nation to use the assets of natural uranium, the advanced reactor technology, and the expertise on nuclear physics that the country had at its disposal. Since the decision concerned the largest investment ever in Swedish industrial politics, the scientists and engineers had to promise that it would lead to a prosperous future. (...) In this article, the utopian discourse and the rhetoric that were developed to support the Swedish nuclear energy program are analyzed. An important conclusion is that the scientific, technological, political, economic, and moral discourse was not sufficient to create political and civil support. Instead, the scientists and engineers had to turn to the world of myths. Thereby, the conflicts between nuclear physics and magic, scientific objectivity and demons, and rationalistic belief in progress and irrational ideas of faith were dissolved. In Sweden, as in many other Western countries during the 1950s, the world was not disenchanted, but re-enchanted. (shrink)

The concern of this work is how knowledge based on design experience can be developed, disseminated, articulated, and acquired. We propose the notion of inspirational patterns, or i-patterns, which refers to abstractions of core ideas and essential elements from a class of coherent examples, pointing to promising regions in the design space. Most current work on patterns concentrates on proven solutions to recurring problems; i-patterns, on the other hand, are oriented toward the innovative and inspirational. The design domain of interest (...) to us is interaction design, which can be roughly defined as design with digital materials. More specifically, we focus on the intersection of tangible interfaces and social computing that is called embodied interaction. The paper presents nine i-patterns for embodied interaction, including “Virtual information is tied to positions in the material world” and “Heterogeneous virtual information fuses into a few sensory parameters.”. (shrink)

Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...) must solve an under-determination problem: the sensory data they receive could be caused by indefinitely many arrangements of distal objects and properties. Using a Bayesian approach to perceptual processing, I argue that in order to solve the under-determination problem, perceptual capacities must rely on prior beliefs or expectations of some kind. I then argue that perceptual states or processes can help ground knowledge of the world whether the ‘beliefs’ necessary for perceptual processing are encoded as sub-personal states within a perceptual system or cognitive states, such as person-level beliefs. My argument has two main parts. First, I give a preliminary argument that cognitive influence on perception can be appropriate, and I respond to three lines of objection. Second, I argue that cognitively influenced perceptual states can be instances of seeing that p, which makes the relevant states well suited to help ground knowledge that p. I conclude that a cognitively penetrated perceptual state or process can help ground knowledge under some circumstances. (shrink)

The doctrine of pactum salutis has in the past sparked serious theological debate and has often been rejected because of its contradictions with Reformed orthodoxy. Among other early church fathers and theologians, the pactum salutis is found in the writings of Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther. This doctrine is closely related to, or possibly overlaps with, the doctrine of predestination, as both involve the belief that God has already determined the object of his salvation. It has been (...) criticised for, among other things, its denial or insufficiency of Trinitarian understanding and its pro-Subordinationist character. The refutation of this doctrine may be warranted, particularly when viewed in the light of contemporary missiology, particularly the Missio Dei perceptions that arose from the 1952 IMC conference in Willingen. As there is little or no research examining the rationality of the pactum salutis on the basis of or in the light of the Missio Dei, this article draws on the available missiological literature to refute its coherence, relevance and authenticity. Contribution: This article made a significant missiological contribution to the field of Christian theology, analysing the validity of pactum salutis against Reformed orthodoxy and consequently rejecting it as incompatible with the objectives of Missio Dei. (shrink)