Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.

Is there a pro tanto moral reason to create a life merely because it would be good for the person living it? Proponents of the procreation asymmetry claim there is not. Defending this controversial no reason claim, some have suggested that it is well in line with other phenomena in the moral realm: there is no reason to give a promise merely because one would keep it, and there is no reason to procreate merely to increase the extent of justice (...) in the world. Allegedly, some analogs extend so far as to support a unified theory of the no reason claim and the nonidentity thesis, that is, the view that of two persons leading lives of positive wellbeing, there is a reason to create the person with higher wellbeing. I dismantle the proposed analogs and show that they fail to meet various desiderata. Moreover, I refute Johann Frick's argument that the no reason claim follows from the assumption that reasons of beneficence are reasons to act for the sake of people. By criticizing attractive defenses for the no reason claim, I weaken its plausibility. (shrink)

책임의 범위를 확대하고자 하는 근래의 시도들은 인간과 유사한 인간 아닌 존재들의 특성에 기반하여 자신의 이론을 전개한다. 목적론 역시 인간과 인간 아닌 존재들이 공통적으로 지니는 목적성에 기반하는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 이러한 목적론에 기반하여 인간 이외의 존재들에 대한 책임을 주장하는 사상가로는 한스 요나스가 있다. 아리스토텔레스의 영향을 받은 요나스의 목적론은 생명, 자연, 미래 세대의 목적성에 근거하여 그들에 대한 책임을 주장하는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 하지만 요나스의 목적론과 이에 근거한 책임은 자연주의적 오류, 목적성의 입증 등 몇 가지 이론적인 한계를 지닌다. 이러한 요나스의 한계를 (...) 극복하는 것으로 볼 수 있는 목적론에는 폴 테일러의 목적론이 있다. 그렇지만 그의 이론 역시 몇 가지 한계를 지니며, 이는 책임의 범주를 확장하려는 목적론이 극복해야 할 난점과 연결된다. 특히 최근 새롭게 등장한 합성생물학이 제기하는 문제는 목적론에 근거하여 책임의 범위를 확장하려는 시도를 어렵게 할 것으로 보인다. 결론적으로 목적론은 과학이 제기하는 문제를 이론적으로 해결할 수 있어야 책임의 근거로서 기능할 수 있다. (shrink)

Quantum theory is perhaps our best confirmed theory for a description of the physical properties of nature. On top of demonstrating great empirical effectiveness, many technological developments in the 20th century (such as the interpretation of the periodic table of elements, CD players, holograms, and quantum state teleportation) were only made possible with Quantum theory.Despite its success in the past decades, even today it still remains without a universally accepted interpretation.This book provides an interdisciplinary perspective on the question; 'What is (...) Quantum Mechanics talking about?', a question which continues to be one of the most fascinating and important questions in science.Using an interdisciplinary approach to foundational problems in Quantum Mechanics (QM), ranging from philosophical questions about the interpretation of QM to technical problems in quantum computation, this book explores quantum mechanics from different perspectives (physical, logical, philosophical and mathematical), by researchers from Europe, North America, and South America. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the precautionary principle in the discussion about the ethical status of the human embryo. In this debate, some argue that the mere probability that a human person is involved justifies the duty to refrain from harming to the human embryo; from another point of view, the respect for life and human dignity decreases if the human embryo is not respected; finally, the philosophers Hans Jonas and Jürgen Habermas have proposed the existence of responsibility towards the human (...) life beginning because it is “inviolable” and “unavailable”. (shrink)

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti-causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with (...) the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate. (shrink)

This article argues that, in order to understand Peter Winch's view of philosophy, it is profitable to read him together with R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history. Collingwood was both an important source for Winch and a thinker engaged in a closely parallel philosophical pursuit. Collingwood and Winch shared the view that philosophy is an effort to understand the various ways in which human beings make reality intelligible. For both, this called for rapprochement between philosophy and the humanities. Like Collingwood, (...) Winch wanted to reformulate philosophy as a form of human science. Both thinkers advanced a conception of logic where the validity of judgements, propositions, and thought are dependent on their function as instruments in human dialogue. In their treatments of logic, Winch and Collingwood were fleshing out their idea that questions concerning human meaningful behaviour also tie back to the question of what philosophical analysis is about. There is a deep connection between two main issues in both Collingwood's and Winch's writings: on the one hand, the need for ‘internal’ understanding of how human beings relate to reality, and on the other hand, their critique of the idea of logic as a self-sufficient system, external to historically embedded forms of life. At the core of their shared vision there was a comprehensive critique of metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Tillie Olsen (1978) drew attention to an evident, yet underappreciated fact of writing, which is that it takes time: ‘Where the claims of creation cannot be primary, the results are atrophy; unfinished work; minor effort and accomplishment; silences’ (p. 13). Drawing from our experiences as a precariously employed PhD student and a postdoc in philosophy with parenting responsibilities, we want to address this type of silencing in a manner that stylistically corresponds to the exhaustion, lack of time, and lack of (...) leisure experienced by many caregivers in academia. For this, we want to record one of the few occasions in our daily routine where there is sufficient time and mental capacity to reflect on our own situation: the conversation at the kitchen table in the evening when the chores are done. Our contribution consists in a redacted transcription of this conversation for which we propose the term ‘autotheoretical dialogue’ (see Fournier 2021; Young 1997). Our dialogue covers topics such as: care in relation to class and gender (Lightman & Link 2021); teaching in higher education as a form of care work in contrast to the more prestigious work of research (Cardozo 2017); the precarious working conditions in academia and their relation to parenting (Spina et al. 2022); the ignorance and hostility towards parenthood in academia; the effects of this marginalisation like fatigue, self-doubt, and depression, but also the ambivalence that arises from the conflict of the joy of caring; and the institutional and cultural difficulties of reconciling academic work with parenthood. (shrink)

This book is obviously about much more than education Lyle H. Rossiter, Jr, MD, forensic psychiatrist and author of The Liberal Mind: The Psychological Causes..

En la necesidad de configurar un concepto de "discurso antropológico" que desempeñe aquello que Umberto Eco ha definido como "interpretante", entendemos este discurso como una elaboración verbal y simbólica, enunciada por la comunidad antropológica como comunidad científica, que define senti..

Four papers are included in this November 2018 special issue Open Section. First is by Bjørn Hofmann and Siri Granum Carson titled _Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet: Hvordan har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? En innholdsanalyse_. Second, _Provokativ offentlig filosofi_ by Aksel Braanen Sterri. Third, Steinar Bøyum’s _The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself._ And fourth, Jonas Jakobsen and Kjersti Fjørtoft’s _In defence of moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas._.

Nous ne pouvons pas laisser l'avenir de l'humanité et les questions écologiques à l'appréciation de quelques-uns. Ce problème mérite un véritable débat scientifique, philosophique et politique. Au milieu des incertitudes grandissantes, cet ouvrage se propose comme une lecture critique d'une culture dominée par la raison technoscientifique et la puissance capitaliste. Si l'humanité doit continuer à exister, comme le pense Hans Jonas, comment la vulnérabilité peut-elle devenir une force, un levier pour sa préservation? Le devoir-être des générations futures implique un (...) devoir-agir urgent de la part des générations actuelles. Lorsque cette exigence est menacée, la responsabilité s'impose comme un devoir de type kantien. L'humanité doit redécouvrir un nouveau rapport au monde : elle doit reconnaître que la nature est limitée et qu'elle n'est pas disponible à volonté. L'amour de la nature, la sobriété, la justice semblent incontournables dans l'exercice de cet impératif: 'Agis de façon que les effets de ton action soient compatibles avec la permanence d'une vie authentiquement humaine sur terre'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Intelligence on mass media audiences was founded on representative statistical samples, analysed by statisticians at the market departments of media corporations. The techniques for aggregating user data in the age of pervasive and ubiquitous personal media build on large aggregates of information analysed by algorithms that transform data into commodities. While the former technologies were built on socio-economic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, education, media preferences, Big Data technologies register consumer choice, geographical position, web movement, and behavioural information in (...) technologically complex ways that for most lay people are too abstract to appreciate the full consequences of. The data mined for pattern recognition privileges relational rather than demographic qualities. We argue that the agency of interpretation at the bottom of market decisions within media companies nevertheless introduces a ‘heuristics of the algorithm’, where the data inevitably becomes translated into social categories. In the paper we argue that although the promise of algorithmically generated data is often implemented in automated systems where human agency gets increasingly distanced from the data collected, one can observe a felt need among media users and among industry actors to ‘translate back’ the algorithmically produced relational statistics into ‘traditional’ social parameters. The tenacious social structures within the advertising industries work against the techno-economically driven tendencies within the Big Data economy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Imperative of Responsibility, by the German philosopher Hans Jonas, is a work that aspires to a re-foundation of ethics based on an analysis of the contemporary world as well as on a prediction about the fate of globalized humanity. Through a discussion of the fundamental concepts of Jonas’ work, the essay shows that the central themes of his research, which are still very relevant today, should be addressed by moving from the ethical level to that of ontology (...) and social ontology in particular. To this end, the paper offers a definition of transgenerational action that aims to replace Jonas’ use of prevision. The transgenerational action is here considered as a particular type of social action: that which enables societies to exist over time. Finally, the essay proposes an essential taxonomy of transgenerational actions, showing how working on this notion might lead to a consciously utopian and positive social model. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-2021) a, tout au long de son chemin philosophique, maintenu le cap d'une interrogation centrée autour de la question dite de la "communauté", ou bien encore, et comme ses travaux ont incité à le dire le plus souvent, de l'"être-en-commun", de l'"être-ensemble", et finalement de l'"être-avec". Philosophe pleinement engagé dans son temps, il en a tout à la fois vécu les bouleversements et pensé les nouvelles articulations à l'ère de la mondialisation, les dérives les plus dangereuses de nos (...) jours, en réaffirmant en toute circonstance le fort caractère éthicopolitique qui caractérise sa manière unique de faire de la philosophie depuis ses premiers écrits. Fruit d'un travail collectif, cet ouvrage explore différents aspects de la question de la communauté, envisagée à la fois comme la question essentielle de la philosophie de Jean-Luc Nancy et comme la question philosophique majeure de notre temps. Au croisement de multiples voix singulières, qui font dialoguer Jean-Luc Nancy avec Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Hans Jonas, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan et bien d'autres, les essais qui composent ce volume explorent la cartographie complexe et variée des questionnements que la réflexion philosophique de Jean-Luc Nancy sur la communauté a contribué à faire émerger et à nourrir."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Smart cities build on the idea of collecting data about the city in order for city administration to be operated more efficiently. Within a research project gathering an interdisciplinary team of researchers – engineers, designers, gender scholars and human geographers – we have been working together using participatory design approaches to explore how paying attention to the diversity of human needs may contribute to making urban spaces comfortable and safe for more people. The project team has deployed sensors collecting data (...) on air quality, sound and mobility in a smart city testbed in Norrköping, Sweden. While these sensors are meant to capture an accurate ‘map’ of the street and what is going on along it, our interdisciplinary conversations around the sensors have revealed the heterogeneity both of smart city planning and spatial formulations of the city. The discussions have given rise to questions regarding the work that goes into constructing the sensor box itself, as well as the work of deploying it, and how these influence the ‘map’ that the sensors produce. In this paper, we draw on Lefebvre to explore how the sensors themselves produce smart spaces. We analyze how the box depends on perceived space to function (e.g. requiring electricity), and simultaneously it produces conceptualizations of space that are influenced by the materiality of the box itself (e.g. sensors being affected by heat and noise). Further, we explore how the (in)visibility of sensor technology influences lived space. (shrink)

In 1956, the Swedish Parliament decided to invest in a national nuclear energy program. The decision rested on the conviction that it would be in the interest of the nation to use the assets of natural uranium, the advanced reactor technology, and the expertise on nuclear physics that the country had at its disposal. Since the decision concerned the largest investment ever in Swedish industrial politics, the scientists and engineers had to promise that it would lead to a prosperous future. (...) In this article, the utopian discourse and the rhetoric that were developed to support the Swedish nuclear energy program are analyzed. An important conclusion is that the scientific, technological, political, economic, and moral discourse was not sufficient to create political and civil support. Instead, the scientists and engineers had to turn to the world of myths. Thereby, the conflicts between nuclear physics and magic, scientific objectivity and demons, and rationalistic belief in progress and irrational ideas of faith were dissolved. In Sweden, as in many other Western countries during the 1950s, the world was not disenchanted, but re-enchanted. (shrink)

The conflicts permeating the environmental debate since the 1960s have mainly involved two actors: multinational companies and international environmental organizations. Today, there are signs that the antagonism is ending with regards to co-operation and strategy. We argue that this convergence is no longer limited to specific joint projects, but is also prevalent at the idea and policy levels. Both actors have begun describing problems in similar terms, articulating the same goals and recommending the same solutions. Such convergence offers advantages in (...) efforts to counteract climate change but also some problems: declining citizen trust in ENGOs, risk of intellectually impoverished environmental and energy debates, and loss of alternate visions and values. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory Q is an alternative set-theory designed to deal mathematically with collections of indistinguishable objects. The intended interpretation for those objects is the indistinguishable particles of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, under one specific interpretation of that theory. The notion of cardinal of a collection in Q is treated by the concept of quasi-cardinal, which in the usual formulations of the theory is introduced as a primitive symbol, since the usual means of cardinal definition fail for collections of indistinguishable objects. In (...) a recent work, Domenech and Holik have proposed a definition of quasi-cardinality in Q. They claimed their definition of quasi-cardinal not only avoids the introduction of that notion as a primitive one, but also that it may be seen as a first step in the search for a version of Q that allows for a greater representative power. According to them, some physical systems can not be represented in the usual formulations of the theory, when the quasi-cardinal is considered as primitive. In this paper, we discuss their proposal and aims, and also, it is presented a modification from their definition we believe is simpler and more general. (shrink)

Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. One common motivation to the view concerns cases of contradictory concepts obtaining together. Allegedly, in these cases, such concepts lead to a true contradiction. In this paper, we argue that this path is closed as a motivation for dialetheism. There are two basic difficulties to articulate the view: i) once contradictory or incompatible concepts are granted to obtain together, there is no longer any reason to claim that they were incompatible to (...) begin with, and ii) it is not easy to go from such concepts to clear cases of negation-involving contradictions without already assuming the truth of dialetheism. Further difficulties discussed here concern the maintenance of the meaning of important concepts such as “contradiction” in a dialetheist setting. Those difficulties make the case for dialetheism hard to motivate via contradictory concepts. (shrink)

This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the a priori/a posteriori divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of a posteriori methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an a priori epistemology and a pragmatic account of logical theory (...) choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating a posteriori with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty. (shrink)

Dialetheism is the view that some true sentences have a true negation as well. Defending dialetheism, Graham Priest argues that the correct account of negation should allow for true contradictions and \) without entailing triviality. A negation doing precisely that is said to have ‘surplus content’. Now, to defend that the correct account of negation does have surplus content, Priest advances arguments to hold that classical Boolean negation does not even make sense without begging the question against the dialetheist. We (...) shall argue that Priest’s arguments may be turned upon themselves, and that he may also be accused of begging the question against the classical logician. We then advance an argument to the effect that Priest’s account of negation falls short of satisfying his own desiderata on a correct account of a negation: a theory of negation that attempts to represent contradictions cannot coherently allow surplus content, and vice-versa, a negation allowing for surplus content bans contradiction. (shrink)

We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrödinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist.We analyze that (...) claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss some of the challenges related to formulating and adopting a realist position regarding non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In a standard approach to ontology, the ontological commitments of scientific theories can be extracted from them. Scientific realism is the standpoint that our best scientific theories are approximately true, and thus, their ontological commitments, roughly speaking, correspond to reality. Quantum mechanics complicates this view by introducing an interpretational requirement that links a particular conception of how reality should be (...) to the theory. This generates comprehensive difficulties: when we separate theory and interpretation, we have a clear conception of theory but not of interpretation and how to extract its ontology. On the other hand, if we somehow identify theory and interpretation, we have a reasonably clear conception of the desired ontology but lose our best characterizations of theory, rendering our methods for extracting ontology ineffective. Our aim is to map out the challenges for future rigorous realist approaches to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory is a ZFU-like axiomatic set theory, which deals with two kinds of ur-elements: M-atoms, objects like the atoms of ZFU, and m-atoms, items for which the usual identity relation is not defined. One of the motivations to advance such a theory is to deal properly with collections of items like particles in non-relativistic quantum mechanics when these are understood as being non-individuals in the sense that they may be indistinguishable although identity does not apply to them. According to (...) some authors, this is the best way to understand quantum objects. The fact that identity is not defined for m-atoms raises a technical difficulty: it seems impossible to follow the usual procedures to define the cardinal of collections involving these items. In this paper we propose a definition of finite cardinals in quasi-set theory which works for collections involving m-atoms. (shrink)

We consider the claim by Dorato and Morganti 591–610) that primitive individuality should be attributed to the entities dealt with by non-relativistic quantum mechanics. There are two central ingredients in the proposal: in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, individuality should be taken as a primitive notion and primitive individuality is naturalistically acceptable. We argue that, strictly understood, naturalism faces difficulties in helping to provide a theory with a unique principle of individuation. We also hold that even when taken in (...) a loose sense, naturalism does not provide any sense in which one could hold that quantum mechanics endorses primitive individuality over non-individuality. Rather, we argue that non-individuality should be preferred based on the grounds that such a view fits better the claims of the theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we critically discuss the idea of a ‘philosophical interpretation’ of paraconsistent logics. We do so by considering the epistemic approach to paraconsistency, by Carnielli and Rodrigues, according to which paraconsistent logics should be interpreted exclusively in terms of non-conclusive evidence, and also, by considering counter-arguments by Barrio and Barrio and Da Re, according to whom paraconsistent logics are not specially tied to any specific interpretation. We begin by presenting the positions involved, and by arguing that the debate (...) may be profitably understood in terms of the distinction between pure and applied logics. We argue that dialetheism is not an interpretation of paraconsistent logics, but rather a view on truth and negation which requires use of paraconsistent logics. Something similar may be said about the epistemic approach itself. The result is that there is nothing distinctive to be called a philosophical interpretation of paraconsistent logics, but rather what we have are distinct applications of paraconsistent logics. Arguments by Barrio and Barrio and Da Re may be then re-framed more effectively. (shrink)

This chapter is an Introduction to this volume, presenting in brief each of the contributed chapters. We also indicate how the chapters relate to each other and how they connect to themes to be found in the philosophy of Décio Krause.

In this paper we propose to take seriously the claim that at least some kinds of paraconsistent negations are subcontrariety forming operators. We shall argue that from an intuitive point of view, by considering paraconsistent negations as formalizing that particular kind of opposition, one needs not worry with issues about the meaning of true contradictions and the like, given that “true contradictions” are not involved in these paraconsistent logics. Our strategy will consist in showing that, on the one hand, the (...) natural translation for subcontrariety in formal languages is not a contradiction in natural language, and on the other, translating alleged cases of contradiction in natural language to paraconsistent formal systems works only provided we transform them into a subcontrariety. Transforming contradictions into subcontrariety shall provide for an intuitive interpretation for paraconsistent negation, which we also discuss here. By putting all those pieces together, we hope a clearer sense of paraconsistency can be made, one which may liberate us from the need to tame contradictions. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that some objections raised by Jantzen (Synthese, 2010 ) against the separation of the concepts of ‘counting’ and ‘identity’ are misled. We present a definition of counting in the context of quasi-set theory requiring neither the labeling nor the identity and individuality of the counted entities. We argue that, contrary to what Jantzen poses, there are no problems with the technical development of this kind of definition. As a result of being able (...) to keep counting and identity apart for those entities, we briefly suggest that one venerable tradition concerning the nature of quantum particles may be consistently held. According to that tradition, known as the Received View on particles non-individuality, quantum particles may be seen as entities having both features: (i) identity and individuality do not apply to them, (ii) they may be gathered in collections comprising a plurality of them. (shrink)

In this work, we focus on a very specific case study: assuming that quantum theories deal with “particles” of some kind, what kind of entity can such particles be? One possible answer, the one we shall examine here, is that they are not the usual kind of object found in daily life: individuals. Rather, we follow a suggestion by Erwin Schrödinger, according to which quantum mechanics poses a revolutionary kind of entity: non-individuals. While physics, as a scientific field, is not (...) concerned with whether entities posited by a specific physical theory are individuals or not, answering this question is part of the quest for a better understanding of physical reality. Here lies, in large measure, the relevance of ontology. (shrink)

This paper has three aims: first, to present in a clear way Newton da Costa’s argument against the necessity of logical laws. In order to do so, we need to clearly advance his views on the idea that logic is context-relative, and not known a priori. Doing so, however, requires that we present his methodology for the development of counter-examples to logical laws: the use of hypothetical models in logic. Given that this method has been overlooked in most discussions on (...) the epistemology of logic, our second goal is to present da Costa’s views on it carefully. The discussion of some tensions resulting from the relation of a system of logic and the context it governs, in da Costa’s approach, is our third goal. Basically, da Costa seems to swing between two incompatible views on such relation, requiring sometimes that a logic is dependent on a context, and in other cases, that the nature of the context is dependent on a logic. Bringing this to light may also benefit current discussions on logical relativism. (shrink)

Informally speaking, the Principle of Identity, one of the so-called “Laws of Logic”, grants us in one of its most well-known formulations that every object is identical to itself. Non-reflexive logics, roughly speaking, are systems of logic in which this principle is not valid in general. One of the problems associated with non-reflexive logics concerns quantification: it has been argued that quantification only makes sense if we presuppose the identity concept, and consequently, non-reflexive logics employing quantifiers presuppose some form of (...) the principle of identity we wanted to restrict in their formulation. In this paper we argue that it is possible to make sense of quantification in non-reflexive logics without presupposing identity. We argue both from a syntactical as well as from a semantical point of view. We close the paper with some reflections on natural language and its relation to non-reflexive logics. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical work of Décio Krause. Non-individuality, as a new metaphysical category, was thought to be strongly supported by quantum mechanics. No one did more to promote this idea than the Brazilian philosopher Décio Krause, whose works on the metaphysics and logic of non-individuality are now widely regarded as part of the consolidated literature on the subject. This volume brings together chapters elaborating on the ideas put forward and defended by Krause, developing them in many different directions, (...) commenting on aspects not completely developed so far, and, more importantly, critically addressing their current formulations and defenses by Krause himself. Given that Krause’s ideas do connect directly and indirectly with a wide array of subjects, such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics, more broadly understood, the philosophy of logic and logical philosophy, non-classical logics, metaphysics, and ontology, this volume contains important material for the research on logic and foundations of science, broadly understood. All the invited contributors have already worked with the ideas developed by Décio (some of them still work with them), being also distinct authors and extremely relevant in their areas of expertise. The volume is aimed at philosophers, including those of physics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with two applications of the square of opposition to controversial issues in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The first one concerns the kind of opposition represented by states in superposition. A superposition of “spin up” and “spin down” for a given spatial direction, for instance, is sometimes said to originate particular kinds of opposition such as contradictoriness. The second application concerns the problem of identical particles. Identity and indiscernibility are entangled in discussions of this problem (...) in such a way that a proper conceptual treatment of those issues through the square seems profitable. (shrink)

A close examination of the literature on ontology may strike one with roughly two distinct senses of this word. According to the first of them, which we shall call traditional ontology , ontology is characterized as the a priori study of various “ontological categories”. In a second sense, which may be called naturalized ontology , ontology relies on our best scientific theories and from them it tries to derive the ultimate furniture of the world. From a methodological point of view (...) these two senses of ontology are very far away. Here, we discuss a possible relationship between these senses and argue that they may be made compatible and complement each other. We also examine how logic, understood as a linguistic device dealing with the conceptual framework of a theory and its basic inference patterns must be taken into account in this kind of study. The idea guiding our proposal may be put as follows: naturalized ontology checks for the applicability of the ontological categories proposed by traditional ontology and give substantial feedback for it. The adequate expression of some of the resulting ontological frameworks may require a different logic. We conclude with a discussion of the case of orthodox quantum mechanics, arguing that this theory exemplifies the kind of relationship between the two senses of ontology. We also argue that the view proposed here may throw some light in ontological questions concerning this theory. (shrink)

Sören Halldén’s logic of nonsense is one of the most well-known many-valued logics available in the literature. In this paper, we discuss Peter Woodruff’s as yet rather unexplored attempt to advance a version of such a logic built on the top of a constructive logical basis. We start by recalling the basics of Woodruff’s system and by bringing to light some of its notable features. We then go on to elaborate on some of the difficulties attached to it; on our (...) way to offer a possible solution to such difficulties, we discuss the relation between Woodruff’s system and two-dimensional semantics for many-valued logics, as developed by Hans Herzberger. (shrink)

Following J.-Y.Béziau in his pioneer work on non-standard interpretations of the traditional square of opposition, we have applied the abstract structure of the square to study the relation of opposition between states in superposition in orthodox quantum mechanics in [1]. Our conclusion was that such states are contraries, contradicting previous analyzes that have led to different results, such as those claiming that those states represent contradictory properties. In this chapter we bring the issue once again into the center of the (...) stage, but now discussing the metaphysical presuppositions which underlie each kind of analysis and which lead to each kind of result, discussing in particular the idea that superpositions represent potential contradictions. We shall argue that the analysis according to which states in superposition are contrary rather than contradictory is still more plausible. (shrink)