La teoría del derecho post-positivista sostiene la existencia de una conexión necesaria entre las normas de derecho fundamental, a las que caracteriza como principios, y la ponderación como método para resolver los conflictos entre ellas. Mediante la ponderación se establecen relaciones de precedencia condicionada entre principios. Una estrategia argumentativa distinta a la ponderación es la seguida por los modelos especificacionistas. En este trabajo se analizan dos de esos modelos, el “especificacionismo analítico” y el “especificacionismo aretáico”, concluyendo que, sobre todo en (...) relación con el primero de ellos, no existen diferencias profundas de tipo metodológico o conceptual entre ambas estrategias. (shrink)

RESUMEN. Este trabajo analiza la relación de la democracia y la argumentación jurídica desde diversas perspectivas. En primer lugar, desde un punto de vista externo, que apunta al fundamento político y moral de las corrientes argumentativas dentro de la Filosofía del Derecho. En segundo lugar, aborda esta relación desde un punto de vista interno, analizando el papel del principio democrático en el marco de un modelo general de racionalidad argumentativa. Y, por último, pretende hacer una caracterización de las teorías/ideologías jurídicas (...) en el contexto de la democracia constitucional. ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes from varied perspectives the relation between democracy and legal argumentation. First, from an external point of view, that points to the political and moral foundations of the argumentative currents of Philosophy of Law. Secondly, it aproaches this relation from an internal point of view, inquiring into the rol of the democratic principle within a general model of argumentative rationlity. And, last, it pretends to characterize the various legal theories/ideologies in the context of constitucional democracy. (shrink)

Background and ObjectiveThe outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 has raised increased challenges for older adults’ personal growth in diverse cultural settings. The aim of this study was to analyze negative emotions and their role on older adults’ self-growth in Mexico, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, during the COVID-19 pandemic. For this purpose, a cross-national qualitative research was carried out.MethodsData were collected from 338 community-dwelling participants aged 65 years and older, using a semi-structured interview protocol. Older adults were asked about negative emotions (...) that significantly contribute to their self-growth during the COVID-19 pandemic. Content analysis was used to identify key themes.ResultsSeven main negative emotions significantly contributed to seven themes of self-growth, across the samples: sharing difficult experiences with others, supportive partner, spiritual practices, engagement with life, generativity, volunteering activities, and intimacy and sexual satisfaction. Sharing difficult experiences with others was most pertinent to Mexican and to Italian participants, and a supportive partner to Portuguese, and to Spanish participants.ConclusionThe findings of this study indicate that negative emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to their older adults’ self-growth. This study highlighted the cultural diversity of experiences during the pandemics and underlined the upside of negative emotions and its relation to older adults’ self-growth during this period. (shrink)

A modo de hipótesis de partida, este texto cuenta como supuesto con que en el pensamiento político de Suárez, de Gracián y de Saavedra Fajardo encontramos pistas suficientes para sostener que pueden entenderse como exponentes de un ethos barroco con perfil de ethos de resistencia. Si ello es así, podemos decir que en el barroco hispano encontramos, salvando las distancias, algunos elementos, especialmente sobre la razón de Estado, que permiten ver en él lo que se presentó por el filósofo Bolívar (...) Echeverría, desde América, como ethos barroco. Y a la vez, cabrá proponer que dicho ethos barroco con esa doble apoyatura a uno y otro lado del Atlántico da pie para una relectura del mismo que permita esbozar en la actualidad aportaciones relevantes para una salida de la crisis de la modernidad que necesita otro paradigma. (shrink)

La oveja (Ovis aries) es el primer animal domesticado para consumo en un hito histórico que marca el inicio de la sedentarización de las comunidades humanas al comienzo del Neolítico. Durante milenios, fueron semejantes al muflón asiático (Ovis orientalis), su ancestro salvaje. Las razas primitivas supervivientes en el norte de Europa son oscuras, mudan el pelo estacionalmente, tienen cuernos en ambos sexos y apenas producen lana. Los ancestros de las modernas surgieron hace unos 3.500 años. Se seleccionaron para producir lana (...) blanca, que crece indefinidamente y se colecta anualmente. Este proceso coincide con la invención de las tijeras de esquilar y con el descubrimiento de tintes como la púrpura. Solo la lana blanca puede teñirse de cualquier color, permitiendo trasladar al tejido las mismas señales que quizá antes nos pintábamos con ocre sobre el cuerpo. La oveja, un herbívoro social muy manejable, sumaba al suministro de alimento el de una fibra abrigada y modificable en su color distintiva de quienes la visten. Un lienzo en blanco donde trasponer las expresiones estéticas antes restringidas al cuerpo, al arte rupestre y al mobiliar. De ahí que diversas mitologías contemplen una relación simbólica especial con ellas. La revolución estética propiciada por las ovejas blancas zozobra en el siglo XX con la aparición de nuevas fibras y el abaratamiento de otras. Hoy, los arquetípicos y blancos rebaños característicos de la iconografía occidental tienden a una coloración mixta al devaluarse la lana. Otras especies domésticas con fibras que solo recientemente se han apreciado comercialmente, como las cabras de angora (Capra hircus) o las llamas (Lama glama), siguen un proceso idéntico al emprendido con las ovejas hace milenios para tornarse blancas. Presentamos las implicaciones estéticas que han estimulado la selección artificial de ovejas con lanas blancas desde un punto de vista transdisciplinar. Siguiendo la corriente bioevolutiva, que entiende nuestra conducta estética y sus manifestaciones como parte de nuestra etología, veremos cómo ese largo proceso estuvo incentivado por nuestro deseo de teñir los tejidos para expresar un fenotipo extendido creando una nueva señal social. Esa nueva señalización, operante en el plano de la selección sexual, se va complicando al desarrollarse nuestras capacidades simbólicas y tecnológicas, siendo sintomática del entorno causal en el que se produce. (shrink)

Il volume considera la figura teoretica del valore dell’altro nel pensiero di Edmund Husserl, ponendo in connessione le analisi del filosofo sull’intersoggettività e sull’etica. Da qui le questioni fondamentali che guidano il percorso: è possibile impiegare le analisi fenomenologiche husserliane della relazione nel campo dell’assiologia e dell’etica? Può così essere fondato il valore dell’altro soggetto e della dimensione intersoggettiva e, dunque, un dovere nei loro confronti? Le analisi etiche presentano una particolare concezione dell’altro soggetto e della relazione come dotate di (...) valore? È la categoria etica dell’amore a permettere di guadagnare una prospettiva significativa rispetto a tali interrogativi, rivelando come valore e dovere siano implicati dalla dimensione intersoggettiva dell’esperienza. Si apre così un’interessante prospettiva interpretativa, secondo la quale la fenomenologia husserliana contribuisce ad analizzare la dimensione dell’alterità e della relazione intersoggettiva anche da un punto di vista assiologico ed etico. (shrink)

The paper examines the ethically relevant category of choice in Edmund Husserl’s ethics and asks whether a choice is a purely individual moment or whether it is not characterized by an intersubjective dimension. To this end, the centrality of the category of choice in Husserlian ethical reflection is considered, and its structural elements are highlighted: the subject of choice, the situation of choice, and the values in relation to which the choice is made. By analyzing these elements, especially in the (...) context of the development of Husserlian thought in the Freiburg period, it appears that choice, the most individual moment in which the subject becomes him or herself, has no less an intersubjective dimension. If this is so, then it is possible to conceive of a deep connection between ethics and intersubjectivity in the thought of Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

In this concise, witty critical study, Merquior examines Foucault's work on madness, sexuality, and power and offers a provocative assessment of Foucault as a "neo-anarchist." Merquior brings an astonishing breadth of scholarship to bear on his subject as he explores Foucault using insights from a range of fields including philosophy, sociology, and history.

While in the movies or reading a novel, how can we feel terrified by monsters, ghosts, and fictional serial killers? And how can we feel sad or outraged by depictions of cruelty? After all, we know that the imagined threats that we fear do not exist and, therefore, pose no real threat to us; and we know that the instances of cruelty that bring tears to our eyes have not happened. And yet, the fear, the sadness, or the outrage experienced (...) in our imaginations feels very real. This is the so-called paradox of "fictional emotions." This and related paradoxes have become recalcitrant problems for a purely representational approach to the imagination that tries to accommodate the imagination in a belief-desire psychology, explaining our imaginings as mental states that are similar to beliefs or desires in some ways but not others—as "quasi-beliefs" or "quasi-desires." This representational approach can be seen, for example, in Kendall Walton's influential account of the imagination as "make-believe," or in Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich's boxological account of the imagination as a "pretend box," which is in close interaction with the suspiciously similar "belief box". (shrink)

This paper describes a one-day workshop format for introducing ethics into the engineering curriculum prepared at the University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez (UPRM). It responds to the ethics criteria newly integrated into the accreditation process by the Accreditation Board of Engineering and Technology (ABET). It also employs an ethics across the curriculum (EAC) approach; engineers identify the ethical issues, write cases that dramatize these issues, and then develop exercises making use of these cases that are specially tailored to mainstream (...) engineering classes. The different activities and strategies employed in this workshop are set forth. Specific references are made to the cases and exercises developed as a result of these workshops. The paper ends by summarizing the different assessments made of the workshop by addressing the following questions: how did it contribute to the overall ABET effort at UPRM; could other universities benefit from a similar activity; and how did the participants evaluate the workshop? (shrink)

This study examines how audiovisual brand stories both invite and enable consumers to enact heroic archetypes. Integrating research on the archetypal structure of narratives with research on the event structure of narratives, we distinguish singular plot stories (i.e. stories that show a Hero’s Journey) from embedded plot stories (i.e. stories that not only show but also tell one or more Hero’s Journeys) and develop a conceptual and narratological framework to analyze their structural elements. Application of the framework to 20 brand (...) stories representing 8 different brands reveals meaningful variation in elements between the singular plot stories and embedded plot stories. Differences in the expression of archetypes and event structure are argued to evoke different types of Hero enactment which in turn result in different outcomes. We specifically hypothesize that the enactment of heroic archetypes in singular plot stories primarily results in catharsis (pleasure), whereas the enactment of heroic archetypes in embedded plot stories primarily results in an outcome we describe as phronesis: a form of moral sense making of the self that advances one’s practical wisdom and prudence. The final section of the paper discusses how cathartic and phronetic outcomes of hero enactment may foster the psychological bonding between brand and consumer, and invite consumers to align their moral values with the values that are reflected by heroic character traits. The central aims of the analysis presented are to provide an exploration of narrative phenomena in a reasonably broad range of brand story videos and foremost to provide a conceptual framework with an applicable instrument suited to analyze relevant categories in these brand stories. The present study is interdisciplinary in its approach to a contemporary, developing marketing phenomenon, applying psychological modeling of archetypes and heroic values with narratological insights on perspective-taking and story structure. Its contribution is to systemize, from a narratological viewpoint, how various narrative archetypes in brand video stories may contribute to the development of brand-consumer relations. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence (EI) stands at the nexus between intelligence and emotion disciplines, and we outline how EI research might be better integrated within both theoretical frameworks. From the former discipline, empirical research focused upon whether EI is an intelligence and what type of intelligence it constitutes. It is clear that ability-based tests of EI form a group factor of cognitive abilities that may be integrated into the Cattell–Horn–Carroll framework; less clear is the lower order factor structure of EI. From the (...) latter discipline, research linking EI with theoretical frameworks from emotion research remain relatively sparse. Emotion regulation and appraisal theory may be key to explain how EI may reflect different processes. We propose a research agenda to advance the EI study. (shrink)

Este artículo propone a la Filosofía para Niños y Jóvenes (_Philosophy for Children_) como revulsivo contra los discursos del odio. Comienza describiendo la naturaleza de estas prácticas discursivas. Posteriormente, indaga los cinco pilares de la Filosofía para Niños/Jóvenes que vacunan contra ellas: pensamiento crítico y creativo, pensamiento cuidadoso, material narrativo y comunidad de indagación. Finalmente, explora la utilidad de estos elementos para los fines propuestos.

This article studies the differences between traditional financial intermediaries (commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks) and ethical banks based on property rights, in which the owner decides the ideology, principles, standards and objectives of the organisation. In ethical banking, affinity centres on positive social and ethical values. The article consequendy focuses on an index proposed both to differentiate ethical banks from other types of banks, and also to pinpoint the differences between the various ethical banks themselves.This is the Radical (...) Affinity Index (RAI), which groups banks together in terms of their stance on ethical commitment, concentrating on ethical ideology and principles (information transparency, placement of assets, guarantees and participation) and using a sample of 114 European banks. The evidence shows that transparency of information and placement of assets are factors that differentiate ethical banks from other financial intermediaries.Guarantees and participation are characteristics specific to ethical banks; these variables, however, do not offer clear evidence to our analysis. (shrink)

1 Domains of application 2 Formulating the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction 3 Is there such a thing as nonconceptual content? 4 Developing the account of nonconceptual content .

Despite the importance of network analysis in biological practice, dominant models of scientific explanation do not account satisfactorily for how this family of explanations gain their explanatory power in every specific application. This insufficiency is particularly salient in the study of the ecology of the microbiome. Drawing on Coyte et al. (2015) study of the ecology of the microbiome, Deulofeu et al. (2021) argue that these explanations are neither mechanistic, nor purely mathematical, yet they are substantially empirical. Building on their (...) criticisms, in the present work we make a step further elucidating this kind of explanations with a general analytical framework according to which scientific explanations are ampliative, specialized embeddings (ASE), which has recently been successfully applied to other biological subfields. We use ASE to reconstruct in detail the Coyte et al.’s case study and on its basis, we claim that network explanations of the ecology of the microbiome, and other similar explanations in ecology, gain their epistemological force in virtue of their capacity to embed biological phenomena in non-accidental generalizations that are simultaneously ampliative and specialized. (shrink)

How to embed reflexivity in public participation in techno-science and to open it up to the agency of publics are key concerns in current debates. There is a risk that engagements become limited to “laboratory experiments,” highly controlled and foreclosed by participation experts, particularly in upstream techno-sciences. In this paper, we propose a way to open up the “participation laboratory” by engaging localized, self-assembling publics in ways that respect and mobilize their ecologies of participation. Our innovative reflexive methodology introduced participatory (...) methods to public engagement with upstream techno-science, with the public contributing to both the content and format of the project. Reflecting on the project, we draw attention to the largely overlooked issue of temporalities of participation, and the co-production of futures and publics in participation methodologies. We argue that many public participation methodologies are underpinned by the open futures model, which imagines the future as a space of unrestrained creativity. We contrast that model with the lived futures model typical of localized publics, which respects latency of materials and processes but imposes limits on creativity. We argue that to continue being societally relevant and scientifically important, public participation methods should reconcile the open future of research with the lived futures of localized publics. (shrink)

This paper considers how best an eliminativist might argue for the radical falsity of commonsense psychology. I will be arguing that Paul Churchland’s “official” arguments for eliminative materialism (in, e.g., Churchland 1981) are unsatisfactory, although much of the paper will be developing themes that are clearly present in Churchland’s writings. The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology. The “springs of action” are representations of features that (...) are much more finely grained than those encoded within the vocabulary that we employ to specify the content of propositional attitudes. The eliminativist’s most promising strategy is to argue that, whatever we might think about why we behave the way we do, careful experimental work will show that we are in fact acting in virtue of representations of properties and microfeatures that fall completely outside the ambit of propositional attitude psychology. The paper considers a number of examples of how this eliminativist strategy might be developed, ranging from the implications of the two visual systems hypothesis to research in social psychology into the role that situational factors play in controlling action. (shrink)

The current economic crisis is forcing us to reflect on where we have gone wrong in recent years. In the search for responsibilities some have looked to Business Schools and Administration Departments. It is surprising that this situation has come about despite the fact that Business Ethics and Social Corporate Responsibility have been taught in business schools for years. Without wanting to place all the blame on higher education institutions, but from a critical perspective and assuming responsibility, we believe it (...) is necessary to reflect rigorously on how to train leaders for the future and how we can best educate responsible Managers. In this article our objective is to reflect on the two factors which influence the training of responsible Managers: management discourse theory and the ethos of the institutions training future Managers. The central point of our article will be to argue for the need to develop an institutional ethos in Administration Faculties and business schools which is consistent with the responsibility discourse we propose and with the aim of providing high quality technical and moral training. Our central argument is that institutional ethos has enormous educational power and that the moral climate of an institution has a major influence on students' ideas, values and behaviours. The second argument for this main point is that corporate ethos can be managed and modulated. It is a process of cultural change which requires time and the setting up of specific initiatives to achieve the organisation that we want. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to define the logical system Sm4 characterised by the degree of truth-preserving consequence relation defined on the ordered set of values of Smiley’s four-element matrix MSm4. The matrix MSm4 has been of considerable importance in the development of relevant logics and it is at the origin of bilattice logics. It will be shown that Sm4 is a most interesting paraconsistent logic which encloses a sound theory of logical necessity similar to that of Anderson and (...) Belnap’s logic of entailment E. Intuitively, Sm4 can be described as a four-valued expansion of the positive fragment of Lewis’ S5 or, alternatively, as a four-valued version of S5. (shrink)

This is a critical discussion of selected chapters of the first volume of Scott Soames's _Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. It is argued that this volume falls short of the minimal standards of scholarship appropriate to a work that advertises itself as a history, and, further, that Soames's frequent heuristic simplifications and distortions, since they are only sporadically identified as such, are more likely to confuse than to enlighten the student. These points are illustrated by reference to Soames's discussions (...) of Russell's logical system and the place of the theory of descriptions in his ontological development. It is then argued that Soames's interpretation of the point of G. E. Moore's famous 'proof' of an external world, while not straightforwardly undermined by the textual evidence, is nonetheless questionable, and plausibly overlooks what is novel in Moore's discussion. This, it is argued, in his attempt to offer a common sense 'refutation of idealism', rather than (as is more commonly supposed) an antiskeptical argument 'from differential certainty'. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

Giacomo Zabarella es considerado uno de los aristotélicos más prestigiosos y más influyentes del siglo XVI. Su obra lógica, sus escritos sobre física y sus comentarios, publicados póstumamente, tuvieron un enorme impacto especialmente en las primeras décadas del siglo XVII, y sirvieron como verdaderos manuales con los que se formaron muchos universitarios europeos. Este artículo analiza la figura de Zabarella centrándose en su obra sobre física, el De rebus naturalibus libri XXX, editado en 1590, apenas unos días antes de su (...) muerte. (shrink)

Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...) metaethics and the theory of practical reasoning; this range is well represented here. (shrink)

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection (...) of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators. (shrink)

The study of the problem of argumentative bullshit can be useful to shed some light on the practice of argumentation and the essence of argumentative virtues. Since argumentative bullshit is arguably the greatest threat to argumentation, and it is characterised by an indifference to the constitutive value of argumentation (supporting a claim with reasons), argumentative virtue could be understood as the opposite to that indifference: caring about the practice of argumentation and being disposed to sustain and improve it through their (...) participation in it. Whoever produces argumentative bullshit cares more about certain external ends (reputation, political goals, making fun…) than about argumentative practice, whereas virtuous arguers never lose sight of the value of the argumentative practice. This suggests a MacIntyrean conception of the practice of argumentation, according to which argumentation is a practice with internal goods than can only be recognised and achieved through participation in it, while argumentative virtues are those traits conducive to the appreciation and achievement of argumentative goods. (shrink)

In this paper we study collective identity functions that deal with formation of clubs. Usually the choice offered to individuals is to cast a vote in favor of qualification or not, and the final outcome is qualification or non-qualification. In this context we show that independent collective identity functions are naturally characterized by voting rules, and in particular, consent rules can be represented by one single collection of weighted majorities. In addition, we consider the extended model where voters are allowed (...) to abstain and we distinguish between disqualification and a neutral outcome. We show that this environment allows agents to act in different capacities that cannot be distinguished in the original formulation of the problem. (shrink)

Habermas (2023) analisa uma nova mudança estrutural da esfera pública. Em razão disso, supomos uma esfera pública processual em mutação. Para argumentar, optamos pela leitura do Código de Processo Civil (CPC) em sintonia com Habermas (2023). No plano normativo, o processo é regulado pela Constituição Federal e pelo Código de Processo Civil. Em termos físicos, ele é composto de peças processuais redigidas em papel ou de peças processuais digitalizadas, pois a maioria dos tribunais brasileiros adotou o processo 100% digital. Em (...) termos funcionais, os tribunais adotam o processo como instrumento da jurisdição (devido processo legal). Nesse contexto, a regulação dos atos digitais importa para a existência válida e regular do processo. Por outro lado, a nova esfera pública processual regula a participação dos sujeitos processuais (autor, réu, juiz, servidores, promotores, advogados e defensores públicos, etc.). Essa participação vem sofrendo coerções normativas do tipo: interpretação conforme valores e normas fundamentais estabelecidas na Constituição Federal, solução consensual de conflitos, solução integral do mérito, comportamento de acordo com a boa-fé, dever de cooperação entre si, paridade de tratamento, ônus de argumentação das partes e ônus de avaliação dos argumentos pelo juiz. Podemos acrescentar a utilização das provas digitais e as audiências telepresenciais. Com esse aporte normativo e teórico, intuímos o processo como instrumento dessa esfera pública processual, na qual participam sujeitos com ônus argumentativos e a possibilidade de influenciar o convencimento e as deliberações judiciais. Portanto, a nova esfera pública processual denota o direito de participação e de influência, tal como deduzimos em Habermas. (shrink)

In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job has (...) ten coins in his pocket” partly depends on how Smith uses the definite description “the man who will get the job” when he utters the proposition. Since, upon uttering the proposition, Smith has in mind a particular individual, namely Jones, and not just whoever will fit the attribute specified in the definite description, Smith uses the definite description referentially. And so when it turns out that it is Smith who eventually gets the job, the definite description fails to refer to Jones as intended by Smith, thereby making Smith’s proposition false. To think that Smith’s proposition is still true, in this regard, is to use the definite description attributively—that it is about whoever will fit the definite description. Apparently, when Gettier claims that Smith’s proposition is still true, to demonstrate that it is a case of JTB, he, in effect, imposes his attributive understanding of Smith’s usage of the definite description on Smith’s own epistemic situation. (shrink)

The distinction between potentiality and possibility in Aristotle’s modal teleology is sometimes conflated by the implicative conjunction that potentiality implies possibility and possibility implies potentiality. In his unpublished doctoral dissertation Richard Rorty warns that trying to pin down Aristotle’s definition of potentiality often leads to treating the term as a “mere façon de parler.” Consonant with Rorty, this paper observes that the definition of possibility in Aristotle’s works is not without its own share of semantic snags. Subsequently, I abide by (...) Rorty’s caveat not only to resist the lure of expressive convenience some commentators have taken in describing potentiality, but also to elucidate possibility’s two-fold field of modal application. Consequently, this paper aims to present a nuanced account of how notions of potentiality and possibility are presented in Aristotle’s treatises for the sake of demonstrating that both sides of the potentiality/possibility conjunction do not mutually imply. (shrink)

The main aim of the present study is to identify which mental footnotes (related to Adam Smith’s Capitalism) have more weight in the current cognitive processing of participants. We used the “Wealth of Nations” as the main source of the concepts from this author. An experimental design (based on a previous qualitative research) was carried out to test the influence of mental footnotes on the citizens’ decision on the validity of the concepts. The findings point out that there are strong, (...) current, mental footnotes related to the Adam Smith’s concept of price. People mostly understand that, for every product, the entrepreneur has to recover their initial investment and to gain a profit. On the other hand, the fact that entrepreneurs have to pay some expenditures and they need to have profits determines the price of products. (shrink)

I aim to show how the enigmatic phrase 'Unánime noche' in the famous first sentence of “The Circular Ruins” is inextricably linked to the story’s last words. Toward this purpose, I argue—against plausible foundational interpretations of the story—for a nonfoundational reading of the text and, moreover, that Borges’s use of ‘unánime’ (one soul) can be understood as one character or one form; namely, as an archetype of “Dreamanity” that leads to a vertiginous Third Man regress.

A principal hipótese deste trabalho é a de que Sócrates, na Apologia de Platão, utiliza determinados jogos de palavras como uma específica ferramenta retórica. O intuito disso parece ser convencer o leitor de uma prevalência da verdade no conjunto do discurso socrático. Para tanto, busca-se contrabalancear um jogo entre os termos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdade (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; (...) aletheias 29e, 39b) e falsidade ou mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). Nesse sentido, a proposta é apresentar como o discurso de defesa expõe, por meio desses termos, um sentido de hermenêutica socrática, como uma forma peculiar de interpretar oráculos e enigmas. Como obra dramática, a Apologia promove com essa encenação de Sócrates diante do tribunal um efeito retórico claro, pois o foco do discurso não é o júri, mas o leitor. Portanto, é necessário, no plano do discurso de defesa, que Sócrates utilize os recursos de linguagem que o mostrem ao leitor como distinto dos seus acusadores, que “muitas mentiras disseram” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palavras-chave: Sócrates; Hermenêutica; Verdade; Discurso. Speech, Truth and Enigma in the Apology Abstract: The main hypothesis of this work is that Socrates, in Plato's Apology, uses certain wordplays as a specific rhetorical tool. The purpose of this seems to be to convince the reader of the prevalence of truth in the whole of Socratic discourse. Therefore, we seek to counterbalance a game between the terms discourse (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), truth (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) and falsehood or lie (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). In this sense, the proposal is to present how the defense discourse exposes, through these terms, a sense of Socratic hermeneutics, as a peculiar way of interpreting oracles and enigmas. As a dramatic work, the Apology promotes with this staging of Socrates in front of the court a clear rhetorical effect, since the focus of the discourse is not the jury, but the reader. Therefore, it is necessary, at the level of the defense discourse, that Socrates uses the language resources that show him to the reader as distinct from his accusers, who “told many lies” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Key-words: Socrates; Hermeneutics; Truth; Discourse. Discurso, verdad y enigma en la Apología Resumen: La principal hipótesis de este trabajo es que Sócrates, en la Apología de Platón, utiliza ciertos juegos de palabras como herramienta retórica específica. El propósito de esto parece ser convencer al lector del predominio de la verdad en todo el discurso socrático. Por lo tanto, buscamos contrapesar un juego entre los términos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdad (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) y falsedad o mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). En ese sentido, la propuesta es presentar cómo el discurso de la defensa expone, a través de estos términos, un sentido de la hermenéutica socrática, como una forma peculiar de interpretar los oráculos y los enigmas. Como obra dramatica, la Apología promueve con esta puesta en escena de Sócrates frente a la corte un claro efecto retórico, ya que el centro del discurso no es el jurado, sino el lector. Por tanto, es necesario, a nivel del discurso de defensa, que Sócrates utilice los recursos lingüísticos que lo muestren al lector como distinto de sus acusadores, quienes “dijeron muchas mentiras” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palabras-clave: Sócrates; Hermenéutica; Verdad; Discurso. Data de registro: 02/08/2023 Data de aceite: 24/01/2024. (shrink)

Since at least the second half of the 19th century, the U.S. federal government has enjoyed “plenary power” over its immigration policy. Plenary power allows the federal government to regulate immigration free of judicial review and thereby, with regard to immigration cases, minimize the Constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens. The justification for granting the U.S federal government such broad powers comes from a certain understanding of sovereignty; one where limiting sovereign authority in cases like immigration could potentially undermine its legitimacy (...) and thereby lead to something like a Hobbesian “state of nature.” One of the potential downsides of allowing the federal government to have such broad powers, however, is the potential to place non-citizens in a situation analogous to what Giorgio Agamben has called the “state of exception.” This situation appears to leave us with the following dichotomy: without something like the plenary power doctrine a political community will end up with a state of nature, but with something like the plenary power doctrine they end up with a state of exception. This essay offers a two-part response to this dilemma. First, it argues that the plenary power doctrine goes against the spirit of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Non-citizens, even undocumented immigrants, are entitled to more Constitutional protections than they currently enjoy. Second, since extending these protections is more consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, I argue that curtailing the federal government’s power over matters of immigration does not undermine its sovereignty, but promotes it. In short, with regard to immigration, it is a false but seductive dichotomy that constitutional democracies must choose between a state of nature and a state of exception. (shrink)

Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...) what, nearly enough, smacks of being one, namely the Aristotelian slogan, definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Although that may be itself a real definition (of real definition), I shall not pursue this scholastic point, preferring to concentrate on my principal task which I take to be to vindicate the feasibility of formulating a real definition of some mind-independent reality. Such a vindication can scarcely succeed today unless it is recognized from the outset that we have here at hand one of those cases where the very (logical) possibility of a problematic thing can be established only by having recourse to the modal principle that actuality entails possibility. Nothing less than a concrete instance of a real definition will then suffice, and I thus expect my sceptical reader (I count on her scepticism) to be in doubt whether the scholastic bit of jargon 'real definition' picks out one of the concepts in her repertoire. (shrink)