ExcerptWhen a student at the well-known Berlin art school Universität der Künste (UdK) used psychoanalytic terms to question her teacher’s assertion that we should listen to the “trees talking” more, she was attacked for her “colonial racist thinking,” using concepts of the white man, Sigmund Freud, to delegitimize “indigenous knowledge.”.

The continuous revaluation of rewards lies at the core of Ainslie's account of willpower. Yet, he does not explicate the underlying experiential mechanisms. We draw upon theoretical, neuroscientific, and computational evidence to demonstrate that boredom evokes revaluation. By biasing behavior toward exploration, boredom necessitates effortful willpower to balance it against exploitation, thereby rendering suppression a highly adaptive function of willpower.

... al- Ḥairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. ...

This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice, as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by raising the level of evidential support required for knowledge. We explain (...) this notion of encroachment injustice, connect it to the empirical literature on implicit bias, and defend it against important objections. (shrink)

Although it is commonly believed that the concept of brain death was developed to benefit organ transplants, it evolved independently. Transplantation owed its development to advances in surgery and immunosuppressive treatment; BD owed its origin to the development of intensive care. The first autotransplant was achieved in the early 1900s, when studies of increased intracranial pressure causing respiratory arrest with preserved heartbeat were reported. Between 1902 and 1950, the BD concept was supported by the discovery of EEG, Crile’s definition of (...) death, the use of EEG to demonstrate abolition of brain potentials after ischaemia, and Crafoord’s statement that death was due to cessation of blood flow. Transplantation saw the first xenotransplant in humans and the first unsuccessful kidney transplant from a cadaver. In the 1950s, circulatory arrest in coma was identified by angiography, and the death of the nervous system and coma dépassé were described. Murray performed the first successful kidney transplant. In the 1960s, the BD concept and organ transplants were instantly linked when the first kidney transplant using a brain-dead donor was performed; Schwab proposed to use EEG in BD; the Harvard Committee report and the Sydney Declaration appeared; the first successful kidney, lung and pancreas transplants using cadaveric donors were achieved; Barnard performed the first human heart transplant. This historical review demonstrates that the BD concept and organ transplantation arose separately and advanced in parallel, and only began to progress together in the late 1960s. Therefore, the BD concept did not evolve to benefit transplantation. (shrink)

Although it is commonly believed that the concept of brain death was developed to benefit organ transplants, it evolved independently. Transplantation owed its development to advances in surgery and immunosuppressive treatment; BD owed its origin to the development of intensive care. The first autotransplant was achieved in the early 1900s, when studies of increased intracranial pressure causing respiratory arrest with preserved heartbeat were reported. Between 1902 and 1950, the BD concept was supported by the discovery of EEG, Crile’s definition of (...) death, the use of EEG to demonstrate abolition of brain potentials after ischaemia, and Crafoord’s statement that death was due to cessation of blood flow. Transplantation saw the first xenotransplant in humans and the first unsuccessful kidney transplant from a cadaver. In the 1950s, circulatory arrest in coma was identified by angiography, and the death of the nervous system and coma dépassé were described. Murray performed the first successful kidney transplant. In the 1960s, the BD concept and organ transplants were instantly linked when the first kidney transplant using a brain-dead donor was performed; Schwab proposed to use EEG in BD; the Harvard Committee report and the Sydney Declaration appeared; the first successful kidney, lung and pancreas transplants using cadaveric donors were achieved; Barnard performed the first human heart transplant. This historical review demonstrates that the BD concept and organ transplantation arose separately and advanced in parallel, and only began to progress together in the late 1960s. Therefore, the BD concept did not evolve to benefit transplantation. (shrink)

Self-control is critical for successful participation and performance in sports and therefore has attracted considerable research interest. Yet, knowledge about self-control remains surprisingly incomplete and inconsistent. Here, we draw attention to boredom as an experience that likely plays an important role in sports and exercise (e.g., exercise can be perceived as boring but can also be used to alleviate boredom). Specifically, we argue that studying boredom in the context of sports and exercise will also advance our understanding of self-control as (...) a reward-based choice. We demonstrate this by discussing evidence for links between self-control and boredom and by highlighting the role boredom plays for guiding goal-directed behavior. As such, boredom is likely to interact with self-control in affecting sports performance and exercise participation. We close by highlighting several promising routes for integrating self-control and boredom research in the context of sports performance and exercise behavior. (shrink)

On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (...) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. (shrink)

I.-II. bd. Die welt als wille und vorstellung.--III. bd. Der satz vom grunde. Über den willen in der natur. Die beiden grundprobleme der ethik.--IV.-V. bd. Parerga und Paralipomena kleine philosophische schriften.--VI. bd. Über das sehn und die farben. Theoria colorum physiologica. Balthazar gracians hand-drakel. Über das interessante. Eristische dialektik. Über die verhunzung der deutschen sprache.

This chapter deals with the following questions: What does Michael Dummett demand of a “systematic” theory of meaning, and what understanding of Frege's “level of sense” leads him to conclude that, if Wittgenstein is correct in denying that there is such a level, then no systematic theory of meaning is possible? For Dummett, an understanding of the meaning side of language is not “systematic” if it must hold that a sentence is understood only because it has been previously learned as (...) a whole. To reconstruct how Dummett arrives at Frege's level of “sense” as crucial for a systematic understanding of complexity, we can begin with a hypothetical concrete situation and proceed step by step to rule out what is not meant by “meaning” when we speak of it as being systematically developed. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the linguistic structure to the extent that it can be understood in relation to linguistic activity. In order to arrive at an adequate, non‐formal concept of structure, the author and his colleagues oriented themselves on Frege's thought as the most plausible starting point. Wittgenstein's considerations is then taken into account, without endangering the systematic and comprehensive character of the picture as painted by Frege. The chapter highlights two central statements with which Wittgenstein contradicts Frege. First is (...) his thesis that there is no justification in the philosophy of language for isolating just one “fundamental relation” for the representation of all truth‐relevant contents. Second is the thesis that it is typical of natural languages that one and the same kind of composition of expressions can have various meanings. (shrink)

We must begin by distinguishing between sciences and empirical fields. The empirical fields are the elementary divisions of the natural world into levels for purposes of examination. The sciences consist in the method of examining those fields, together with the presuppositions and findings of such a method. Throughout this essay, we shall consider only the empirical fields as the subject-matter of the sciences, and the way in which the sciences describe their subject-matter, but not the sciences themselves. Thus the adjective (...) “physical” will be employed, for instance, to describe the physical empirical field, and not “physics” to describe the science. (shrink)

Hemiparetic stroke in adulthood often results in the grouped movement pattern of the upper extremity flexion synergy thought to arise from an increased reliance on cortico-reticulospinal pathways due to a loss of lateral corticospinal projections. It is well-established that the flexion synergy induces reaching constraints in individuals with adult-onset hemiplegia. The expression of the flexion synergy in individuals with brain injuries onset earlier in the lifespan is currently unknown. An early unilateral brain injury occurring prior to six months post full-term (...) may preserve corticospinal projections which can be used for independent joint control and thus minimizing the expression of the flexion synergy. This study uses kinematics of a ballistic reaching task to evaluate the expression of the flexion synergy in individuals with pediatric-onset hemiplegia (PH) ages six to seventeen years. Fifteen individuals with brain injuries before birth (n = 8) and around full-term (n = 7) and nine age-matched controls with no known neurological impairment completed a set of reaches in an admittance controlled robotic device. Descending drive, and the possible expression of the upper extremity flexion snergy, was modulated by increasing shoulder abduction loading. Individuals with early PH achieved lower peak velocities when reaching with the paretic arm compared to controls however no differences in reaching distance were found between groups. Relative maintenance in reaching seen in individuals with early brain injuries highlights minimal expression of the flexion synergy. We interpret this conservation of independent control of the paretic shoulder and elbow as the use of more direct corticospinal projections instead of indirect cortico-reticulospinal pathways used in individuals with adult-onset hemiplegia. (shrink)

The paper was written for and planned to be published within the present collection of papers on Mood. Due to an editorial error, it has been published in Philosophia 45:2 773-787 rather than here.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 336-341.

Wittgenstein asks himself how many types of sentences there are, and considers the traditional grammatical answer that there are assertions, questions, and imperatives. In this fictitious language game the assertion takes the form of a complex: a question coupled with a positive answer. This appears plausible when we imagine that the development of this language game began with questions, and assertions found their way into the game only later. Wittgenstein now brings to the fore the previously mentioned fact that despite (...) the situation, we cannot say that in the fictitious language game one makes an assertion by first raising a question and then giving an affirmative answer. Wittgenstein discusses the following thought, in the formulation of which he uses the word “function,” a word that was used above to determine the way in which words are to be grouped into types. (shrink)

The concept of “grammatical sense” could explain semantic complexity without positing a “sense” on the illocutionary level of “communicating something.” In order to assess the aptness of the concept of “grammatical sense” for resolving Dummett's problem, the author offers a rudimentary sketch of a solution based on Wittgenstein's very simple language games. This sketch shows what a systematic treatment of the meaning side of a language would look like once one recognizes the facts of projection and gives up the requirement (...) that forms for forming complexes must always have just one meaning and always lead the hearer to correctly grasp the “thought” expressed by the speaker. The author addresses the question of whether the recognition of projection (syntactic metaphor) and of the other frequent cases of “positive misuse” in natural languages means that our understanding of the meaning side of language is overwhelmingly unsystematic. (shrink)

In this chapter the author looks at how Wittgenstein applies his method of creating simple language games to discuss fundamental questions in the Philosophical Investigations and its preliminary works. Wittgenstein seems to think that numerals can be learned alone, demonstratively, without further linguistic context. He altogether ignores Frege's preferred interpretation “that the content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept,” which, for Wittgenstein, would mean, among other things, that numerals can only be learned and used in (...) conjunction with other words. The chapter highlights that a simple language game becomes expanded through the introduction of expressions of the category of proper names with a consideration of the Philosophical Investigations, which at first glance appears to have something to say about the interplay of proper names and concept terms in the building of a sentence. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes how Wittgenstein explicitly addresses the possibility of distinguishing between word types, and not only in the form of presentation of examples. Wittgenstein might be using the terms “kind of word” and “part of speech” in a quite unusual way. The author focuses on just one language, thus no longer being concerned with the possibility of developing diverse new languages without limit. It is not surprising that in the natural languages very many more word types than did “the (...) logicians,” above all Frege, Russell, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, particularly if one does not limit one's interest in language to the expression of a “judgeable content.”. Wittgenstein hints that the classification of words or sentences by their ways of usage on one hand and by their belonging to different types on the other, is a result of two different standpoints on the classification of elements of language. (shrink)

This chapter looks for a new understanding of the picture of a “projection”; and indeed the example of river names suggests a new way of speaking of projections. The considerations Wittgenstein discusses here indicate that the imagination (projection) is intertwined with calculation and that this should be considered a characteristic feature of natural languages: agreement about the success of the ongoing shared activities demands at every step the ability to project, to transfer – it demands creative imagination. Theoretically, an insight (...) into the workings of our language is all too often denied us because it is blocked by traditional pictures and prejudices. That is why philosophy plays such a decisive, critical role in its apparently quite conservative “mere description”: because it must point out how to distinguish those cases in which language “works properly” from those in which it leads us astray by “going on holiday”. (shrink)