Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

This volume traces the origins, contradictions and consequences of Marx's teaching on his followers. The author uses Marx to speak against the rigid dogmatism inherent in much of Marxism and concentrates on the interpretations of Marx's work by Max Weber.

After the era of nihilism, ethical issues have been gradually focused on how to rebuild a value of “Being”. Thinkers tend to reaffirm the significance of one’s own Being and try to find a way of existence in order to resist against nothingness. In such an epoch, Levinas contends that the ethics “for the Other” and the existence are inextricably linked. Furthermore, he notes that the value of existence is not revealed against the nihilism, but realized with the ethics “for (...) the Other” in one’s act of assuming the burden of existence. The meaning of “Being” is thus revealed in the effort of “for the Other” and in the noble will of making the sense of responsibility beyond ones’ own Being to reach the Other.Después de la era del nihilismo, las cuestiones éticas se han ido enfocando gradualmente en cómo reconstruir un valor de “Ser”. Los pensadores tienden a reafirmar la importancia del propio Ser e intentan encontrar una manera de existir capaz de resistir contra la nada. En dicha época, Levinas sostiene que la ética “por el Otro” y la existencia están inextricablemente unidas. Más aún, dice que el valor de la existencia no se revela frente al nihilismo, sino que se realiza en la ética “por el Otro” en el acto mismo de asumir la carga de la existencia. El sentido de “ser” es así revelado en el esfuerzo “por el Otro” y en la voluntad noble de dar sentido a la responsabilidad más allá del propio Ser para alcanzar al Otro. (shrink)

Speech comprehension across languages depends on encoding the pitch variations in frequency-modulated sweeps at different timescales and frequency ranges. While timescale and spectral contour of FM sweeps play important roles in differentiating acoustic speech units, relatively little work has been done to understand the interaction between the two acoustic dimensions at early cortical processing. An auditory oddball paradigm was employed to examine the interaction of timescale and pitch contour at pre-attentive processing of FM sweeps. Event-related potentials to frequency sweeps that (...) vary in linguistically relevant pitch contour and timescale in Mandarin Chinese were recorded. Mismatch negativities were elicited by all types of sweep deviants. For local timescale, FM sweeps with F0 contours yielded larger MMN amplitudes than F1 contours. A reversed MMN amplitude pattern was obtained with respect to F0/F1 contours for global timescale stimuli. An interhemispheric asymmetry of MMN topography was observed corresponding to local and global-timescale contours. Falling but not rising frequency difference waveforms sweep contours elicited right hemispheric dominance. Results showed that timescale and pitch contour interacts with each other in pre-attentive auditory processing of FM sweeps. Findings suggest that FM sweeps, a type of non-speech signal, is processed at an early stage with reference to its linguistic function. That the dynamic interaction between timescale and spectral pattern is processed during early cortical processing of non-speech frequency sweep signal may be critical to facilitate speech encoding at a later stage. (shrink)

This article draws on the ‘visual turn’ in legal studies to argue for the centrality of visibility in the analysis of the regulation of gay and lesbian identities, with a specific focus on Hong Kong. Part I gives an overview of the ways in which gay visibility operates within the cityscape of Hong Kong. Parts II and III then focus on the case of Cho Man Kit v. Broadcasting Authority to examine the ways in which questions of visibility emerge in (...) the courtroom. (shrink)

This article provides current Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) data from samples of business managers and professionals across 50 societies that are culturally and socioeconomically diverse. We report the society scores for SVS values dimensions for both individual- and societal-level analyses. At the individual-level, we report on the ten circumplex values sub-dimensions and two sets of values dimensions (collectivism and individualism; openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence). At the societal-level, we report on the values dimensions of embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective (...) autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony. For each society, we report the Cronbach’s α statistics for each values dimension scale to assess their internal consistency (reliability) as well as report interrater agreement (IRA) analyses to assess the acceptability of using aggregated individual level values scores to represent country values. We also examined whether societal development level is related to systematic variation in the measurement and importance of values. Thus, the contributions of our evaluation of the SVS values dimensions are two-fold. First, we identify the SVS dimensions that have cross-culturally internally reliable structures and within-society agreement for business professionals. Second, we report the society cultural values scores developed from the twenty-first century data that can be used as macro-level predictors in multilevel and single-level international business research. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Food, Gregory E. Pence brings together a collection of voices who share the view that the ethics of genetically modified food is among the most pressing societal questions of our time. This comprehensive collection addresses a broad range of subjects, including the meaning of food, moral analyses of vegetarianism and starvation, the safety and environmental risks of genetically modified food, issues of global food politics and the food industry, and the relationships among food, evolution, and human (...) history. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Luhmann’s, Bunge’s and others’ views on emergence, and argue that Luhmann’s epistemological construal of emergence in terms of Totalausschluss (total exclusion) is both ontologically flawed and detrimental to an appropriate understanding of the distinctive features of social emergence. By contrast, Bunge’s rational emergentism, his CESM model, and Wimsatt’s characterization of emergence as nonaggregativity provide a useful framework to investigate emergence. While researchers in the field of social theory and sociology tend to regard Luhmann as the (...) sole representative of systems theory, the latter has been characterized by its diversity, and the writings of such systems theorists as Mario Bunge deserve more (critical) attention from social researchers than they receive at present. Finally, this article suggests that the perennial debate over methodological individualism and holism in social science may make real progress if such ambiguous terms as reduction and reductionism are elucidated before they are employed. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Luhmann’s, Bunge’s and others’ views on emergence, and argue that Luhmann’s epistemological construal of emergence in terms of Totalausschluss (total exclusion) is both ontologically flawed and detrimental to an appropriate understanding of the distinctive features of social emergence. By contrast, Bunge’s rational emergentism, his CESM model, and Wimsatt’s characterization of emergence as nonaggregativity provide a useful framework to investigate emergence. While researchers in the field of social theory and sociology tend to regard Luhmann as the (...) sole representative of systems theory, the latter has been characterized by its diversity, and the writings of such systems theorists as Mario Bunge deserve more (critical) attention from social researchers than they receive at present. Finally, this article suggests that the perennial debate over methodological individualism and holism in social science may make real progress if such ambiguous terms as reduction and reductionism are elucidated before they are employed. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditions (...) under which inquiry erodes outright trusting belief. This congruence is easily explained abductively if we take trust to involve such a belief constitutively. While philosophers have sometimes thought that the relationship between trust and inquiry threatens or complicates the doxastic account of trust, the argument presented here suggests, surprisingly, that this relationship supports and even strengthens this account. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:59. HUME ON IDENTITY It is well-known that Hume has a quite unusual theory of personal identity. For him, personal identity is but the identity of mind. But to him mind is just a bundle of perceptions which keeps changing its constituent members; hence a mind is not something constant. In other places he also argues that mind is not a substance which unites all the perceptions which a (...) person may have. His conclusion is that cases of personal identity for ordinary people are not genuine cases of identity for him at all. This probably is a direct consequence of his unusual notion of identity. My concern then is to see what Hume takes identity to be as an idea and as a relation. The idea of identity, according to Hume, is an idea betwixt unity and number. (T 201 J1 So I want to see first how the ideas of number and unity originate. Hume says that; a single object, plac'd before us, and survey 'd for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity. For when we consider any two points of this time, we may place them in different lights: We may either survey them at the very same instant; in which case they give us the idea of number, both by themselves and by the object; which must be multiply 'd, in order to he conceiv'd at once, as existent in these two different points of time. (T 201)2 What is surveyed is a single object, i.e., an object which is neither interrupted nor varied. According to Price, "At this stage of [Hume's] inquiry, he ought only to be talking of sense-impressions ( 'perceptions ')," so, here instead of talking about a single object, I shall talk about a single perception, i.e., an uninterrupted, unchanged perception which persists through a certain period of time. Roughly speaking, a perception is interrupted if it is not temporally 60. continuous; it is varied, if it changes either its sensible qualities, or its spatial characteristics, viz., shape, size, pattern. But what is a single perception which is uninterrupted and unchanged? This question as stated is misleading, for it suggests that there may be a single though interrupted or varied perception. The question I am now asking is the question of individuating perceptions. It is clear that for Hume the principle of individuation of perceptions is their invariableness and uninterruptedness through a supposed variation of time. (T 201) Hence there would be no such thing as a single but interrupted or varied perception. Since Hume gives us no example of an uninterrupted and unchanged perception, let us choose an example for ourselves. Suppose we have nothing but twelve eggs in front of us, and suppose that the eggs and their immediate environment do not change during a certain period of time. Then the perception we have of these twelve eggs during this period of time would be an uninterrupted and unchanged perception. Let P be 4 this perception. What Hume wants to do is to consider two points of time t ^ and t2 in this period. Let P1 and P2 i,s the perceptions we have of the twelve eggs at t, and t2, respectively. P ^ and P2 are then two stages of the perception P. Since P is uninterrupted and unchanged, its 'content' at each point of time during this period should remain the same. As Hume puts it, we suppose the change to lie only in... time (T 203); and the change in time, when applied to an unchangeable object, 'tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the coexistent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions. (T 200-201) We now are told to survey P. and P. at once. But this can only be done at a time t- which is 61. later than both t ^ and t 2·How can we survey them after t ^ and t2? Presumably by memory we may recall P1 and P 2 at t3. Now Hume tells... (shrink)

Diese Arbeit widmet sich einem Hauptproblem der kantischen Pflichtensystematik in der Tugendlehre: Der Unterscheidung von vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Pflichten und der resultierenden Spannung zwischen Einleitung und Elementarlehre. Während in der Einleitung in die Tugendlehre Tugendpflichten begrifflich nur als unvollkommene Pflichten eingeführt und abgeleitet werden, beginnt die Elementarlehre mit einem extensiven Abschnitt über vollkommene Pflichten, die dennoch Tugendpflichten sein sollen. Nach einer kurzen Betrachtung einschlägiger Vorschläge der Literatur zu diesem Problem, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit aus dem Konzept der Weite von Pflichten (...) Kriterien für die Zuordnung der verschiedenen Tugendpflichten zu gewinnen. Im Lichte dieser Kriterien erscheint Kants Beurteilung mancher verhandelter Pflichten als ‚vollkommen’ gerechtfertigt. Abschließend wird gezeigt, inwiefern sie dennoch zu den Tugendpflichten gehören können, indem Kants eher beiläufige Unterscheidung von Strebens- und Erhaltungspflichten in den Mittelpunkt gerückt wird. Unvollkommenheit einer Pflicht folgt nur aus ethischen Strebenspflichten, nicht aus gebotenen Maximen überhaupt. Das Ziel der Exposition aller relevanten Merkmale, die zu einer Tugendpflicht gehören können, lässt verstehen, warum die Einleitung nur auf Strebenspflichten zentriert ist.This essay is concerned with one of the main problems in Kant’s system of duties in the Tugendlehre: the difference between perfect and imperfect duties and the resulting inconsistency between introduction and Elementarlehre. Even though the introduction establishes and derives duties of virtue as imperfect duties only, the Elementarlehre begins with a long section concerning perfect duties, which nevertheless are supposed to be duties of virtue. After a brief consideration of other interpreter’s views on this topic, this essay tries to develop criteria for the categorisation of the different duties of virtue from the concept of a duty’s latitude. In light of these criteria, Kant’s categorizing some of the discussed duties as perfect seems justifiable. Finally I will show, why they can nevertheless be ‘duties of virtue’, by emphasizing Kant’s distinction between duties to strive and those to conserve. Imperfection of a duty follows from duties to strive only, not from obligatory maxims per se. The goal of introducing all relevant characteristics, a duty of virtue may have, can explain, why the introduction is only concerned with duties to strive. (shrink)

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse (...) ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a neurological condition in which a sensory or cognitive stimulus consistently co-activates another sensory/cognitive quality in addition to its usual qualities. For example, synaesthetes might see colours when they read words. Coloured language is one of the most common and most studied types of synaesthesia. The processes that govern the associations of colours and language have been linked to the mechanisms underlying the processing of language more generally. This chapter reviews evidence from current psycholinguistic synaesthesia research in Chinese, (...) focusing in particular on how synaesthetic colouring works in Chinese characters, the basic writing units in Chinese. I consider this in relation to the psycholinguistic processes of character recognition. This chapter reviews evidence for the following facts: that synaesthetic colouring of Chinese characters is a genuine phenomenon in the Chinese population and may affect as many as 1 in 100 in the Chinese population, with a non-significant difference across the sexes that the colouring of characters is rule-based and influenced by a number of linguistic factors; and that synaesthetic colouring can transfer across Chinese and English in bilinguals. These findings are discussed in relation to native versus non-native Chinese synaesthetes, and to the Chinese versus English systems. (shrink)

I first characterize a moral mistake in coercion. The principle of independence with which I criticize coercion seems also to condemn exchange. I propose an account of exchange from which it follows that exchange upholds independence after all. In support of that account I argue that, of the accounts of exchange that occur to me, only this one has the consequence that, on general assumptions, a person can take part in exchange while acting, intending, and believing with sufficient reason. I (...) argue that the hiring of very poor people by very rich people for labor from which the rich draw a substantial surplus does not give rise to an exchange of this kind. These instances of the wage labor relation resemble coercion insofar as they violate independence. (shrink)

Integrative social contracts theory is a novel approach to normative questions and has been widely evaluated, discussed, and applied by academics and practitioners alike. While the "I" in ISCT leads the title, it has not received the analytical attention it deserves, especially since the "integrative" component in ISCT is multifaceted and at the conceptual core of the theory. In this paper we therefore take a closer look at two facets of integration. First, we examine the normative integration that takes place (...) in ISCT. For our analysis we draw on theories of legitimacy and obligation. Second, given that empirical inquiry is an important part of the normative integration, we take a closer look at how research that has applied or used ISCT has embraced the empirical components of the theory. This analysis of the normative–empirical integration focuses on problems and realities of empirical inquiry in ISCT. (shrink)

Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the forswearing view plausibly allows for forgiveness in cases where the victim (...) lost resentment before she had a reason to forgive. Third, only the forswearing view can show why victims of an offense are usually able to know whether they are in a position to forgive. (shrink)

Christina Landman is a professor of Theology at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa. As an East African serving under her as a research fellow at the Research Institute of Theology and Religion since 2014, and as somebody whose articles have been published in the two journals where she has been the editor, I can only honour her by contributing to her festschrift and in basing my reflections on my understanding of theological education in tropical (...) Africa, where she plays a critical role – despite my bias towards East Africa, and Kenya in particular. In other words, the goal of this article is to focus on the future of theological education in Africa, with special reference to Eastern Africa, and Kenya in particular. How has Africa journeyed with theological education since its inception in the 19th and 20th century? How is it reflected in the academic institutions of higher learning, in ministerial training, in general academic contexts and in local congregations? Is it Africanity without ethics? Does it have a future? In addressing these concerns, the article employs historic-analytical design in its endeavour to assess the efficacy of theological education as an agent of social transformation in 21st-century Africa. Considering that Africa cannot be identified as a single geocultural context and/or as a monolithic entity, the article builds its case by mainly referring to the Kenyan context. Its methodology includes an extensive literature review of some materials that are connected to theological education, participant observation and personal reflections as an educationist in an African context. The methodology will also include the Protestant divinity school that was established in Frere Town, Mombasa, and later shifted to Limuru, Central Kenya, in 1929. It is set on the premise that the future of theological education in Africa is guaranteed by the growing interest in theological education among the youth, especially in the 21st century. (shrink)

In this comment I respond to the criticisms put forth by Muller et al. It is my assessment that the authors’ make useful suggestions for future analyses. However, their conclusion regarding the invalidity of my results are based on a misconception of the goals and data used in my article.

The election of President Donald Trump, through his campaign of race-baiting, sexual harassment, and blatant disregard for human decency, lowered the moral bar of American public discourse. Julius Bailey’s latest book discusses the current state of hypocrisy and mistrust in the American political system, especially as these affect ethnic minorities and low-income groups. In powerful and inspiring prose, Bailey writes with a voice well informed by current events, empirical data, and philosophical observation. Bailey looks at the causes and consequences (...) of this new era and applies his passionate yet astute analysis to issues such as hate speech, gerrymandering, the use of the Confederate flag, and America’s relationship with the gun. _A percentage of the revenue from this book’s sales will be donated to two organizations: The Movement for Black Lives and Color of Change._. (shrink)

Desire-based concepts of practical reason are generally considered incapable of grounding the normativity of universalistic and egalitarian moral rules. This explains the popularity of both non-universalistic conceptions of morality, such as contractarianism, and emphatic notions of practical reason, as in the Kantian tradition. In contrast, I argue that the move from desire-based concepts to universalism is possible if altruistic/benevolent desires are adequately taken into account. Due to the nature of benevolent preferences, which virtually everybody has, far more people than usually (...) thought at least have pro tanto reasons to obey universal and egalitarian norms, moral weakness in many cases resulting only from cognitive deficiencies. I put forward a concept of external reasons compatible with a desire-based theory of practical rationality, which proves a usefull tool in the conceptualization of moral rationality as distinct from prudential rationality. Moral rationality, I argue, is based on the desires of the proponent of a moral claim, not on the desires of its addressees. (shrink)