The COVID‐19 pandemic has reinforced the critical role of ethics and community engagement in designing and conducting clinical research during infectious disease outbreaks where no vaccine or treatment already exists. In reviewing current practices across Africa, we distinguish between three distinct roles for community engagement in clinical research that are often conflated: 1) the importance of community engagement for identifying and honouring cultural sensitivities; 2) the importance of recognising the socio‐political context in which the research is proposed; and 3) the (...) importance of understanding what is in the interest of communities recruited to research according to their own views and values. By making these distinctions, we show that current practice of clinical research could draw on anthropology in ways which are sometimes unnecessary to solicit local cultural values, overlook the importance of socio‐political contexts and wider societal structures within which it works, potentially serving to reinforce unjust political or social regimes, and threaten to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the research. We argue that more discerning anthropological engagement as well as wider collaboration with other social scientists and those working in the humanities is urgently needed to improve the ethics of current biomedical and pharmaceutical research practice in Africa. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice, as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by raising the level of evidential support required for knowledge. We explain (...) this notion of encroachment injustice, connect it to the empirical literature on implicit bias, and defend it against important objections. (shrink)

According to Dummett's interpretation, one finds Wittgenstein denying the existence of a general linguistic action of “communicating something” at many places in the Investigations. In Wittgenstein's view, however, the author errs when (in philosophical contexts) he ignores the projective step and concludes from the meaningful applicability of the expression that he is speaking here of an “inner object of feeling” that should arouse the epistemological interest. The author proposes the middle passage of § 363, which is so important for Dummett's (...) interpretation: Wittgenstein certainly does not want to deny that linguistic actions do include speech acts of communicating something or informing. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Newton" verfügbar.

Mit der Begründung dieser Schriftenreihe im Jahre 1966 ging es dem Berliner Handels- und Wirtschaftsrechtler Ernst E. Hirsch, wie er damals schrieb, um den Nachweis, »daß die Wiederaufnahme der durch die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft unterbundenen Bemühungen von Arthur Nussbaum um Erforschung der Rechtstatsachen für eine Rechtswissenschaft stricto sensu ebenso unentbehrlich ist wie die im deutschen Rechtskreis von Eugen Ehrlich begründete, aber noch immer vor allem von Juristen teils abgelehnte, teils beargwöhnte Rechtssoziologie.« Entsprechend dieser (unveränderten) Aufgabenstellung ist die Schriftenreihe zum einen der (...) Beschäftigung mit den Klassikern der Vergangenheit und ihrer Relevanz für das Heute und zum anderen aktuellen Fragestellungen der Gegenwart gewidmet. (shrink)

This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory of meaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of the kind developed (...) by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

The concept of “grammatical sense” could explain semantic complexity without positing a “sense” on the illocutionary level of “communicating something.” In order to assess the aptness of the concept of “grammatical sense” for resolving Dummett's problem, the author offers a rudimentary sketch of a solution based on Wittgenstein's very simple language games. This sketch shows what a systematic treatment of the meaning side of a language would look like once one recognizes the facts of projection and gives up the requirement (...) that forms for forming complexes must always have just one meaning and always lead the hearer to correctly grasp the “thought” expressed by the speaker. The author addresses the question of whether the recognition of projection (syntactic metaphor) and of the other frequent cases of “positive misuse” in natural languages means that our understanding of the meaning side of language is overwhelmingly unsystematic. (shrink)

This chapter looks for a new understanding of the picture of a “projection”; and indeed the example of river names suggests a new way of speaking of projections. The considerations Wittgenstein discusses here indicate that the imagination (projection) is intertwined with calculation and that this should be considered a characteristic feature of natural languages: agreement about the success of the ongoing shared activities demands at every step the ability to project, to transfer – it demands creative imagination. Theoretically, an insight (...) into the workings of our language is all too often denied us because it is blocked by traditional pictures and prejudices. That is why philosophy plays such a decisive, critical role in its apparently quite conservative “mere description”: because it must point out how to distinguish those cases in which language “works properly” from those in which it leads us astray by “going on holiday”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein′s early philosophy of language is shown to be inspired by the idea of a notation in Nelson Goodman′s sense. Seeing this allows us to reject the thesis that for the sole reason that they do not represent 'states of affairs′, ethical statements must be nonsense. Positively, by exploring his Lecture on Ethics as well as the linguistic means provided in his later Philosophy, it is shown that what he had called 'the Ethical′ can be an object of communication. The (...) ethical position reached is a kind of cognitivism without metaphysics. (shrink)

Taking up some of W.’s paradoxical remarks about the existence of ‘mental things’ the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one’s own ‘mental events’ W.’s general criticism of the ‘object-and-name model’ is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between ‘things’ (...) and ‘objects of reference’: With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional ‘something’ a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.’s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of ‘the higher’ are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz reagiert auf Peter Bieris Kritik der analytischen Philosophie und plädiert dafür, die systematischen sprachphilosophischen Einsichten des späten Wittgenstein als dauerhaft und weiterführend anzusehen, was insbesondere für unser Verständnis des Mentalen weitere Fortschritte verspricht. Er wendet sich gegen rein ,therapeutische Lesarten' von Wittgenstein und gegen die Streichung des erkenntnistheoretischen Impulses aus der Sprachphilosophie.