A short story exploring cloning and the Teletransporter Thought Experiment. Rather than abstract consideration, the focus is on the first-personal experience.

May lethal autonomous weapons systems—‘killer robots ’—be used in war? The majority of writers argue against their use, and those who have argued in favour have done so on a consequentialist basis. We defend the moral permissibility of killer robots, but on the basis of the non-aggregative structure of right assumed by Just War theory. This is necessary because the most important argument against killer robots, the responsibility trilemma proposed by Rob Sparrow, makes the same assumptions. We show that the (...) crucial moral question is not one of responsibility. Rather, it is whether the technology can satisfy the requirements of fairness in the re-distribution of risk. Not only is this possible in principle, but some killer robots will actually satisfy these requirements. An implication of our argument is that there is a public responsibility to regulate killer robots ’ design and manufacture. (shrink)

In this empirical paper, we present a model of the dynamic legitimizing processes involved in the receiving and giving of compassion. We focus on the idea of being ‘worthy of compassion’ and show how ideas on giving and receiving compassion are highly contestable. Recognition of a worthy recipient or giver of compassion constitutes a socially recognized claim to privilege, which has ethical managerial and organizational implications. We offer a model that assists managers in fostering ethical strength in their performance by (...) encouraging reflection on the ethical complexity involved in compassion relations. The model emphasizes the dynamics of both the givers and receivers of compassion and so can also be used by organizations to both assess how others may view the legitimacy of their compassion relations and also to develop a positive organizational ethic of compassionate conduct. (shrink)

There are several important conceptual issues and questions about the practice of healthcare ethics that can, and should, inform the development of any practice standards. This paper provides a relatively short overview of seven of these issues, with the invitation for further critical reflection and examination of their relevance to and implications for practice standards. The seven issues described include: diversity (from the perspective of training and experience); moral expertise and authority/influence; being an insider or outsider; flexibility and adaptability (for (...) local contexts of practice); the relative weighting of procedural and normative aspects of ethics practice; making mistakes or errors; and conflicts of interest in practice. (shrink)

We examine the concept of almost everywhere domination from the viewpoint of mass problems. Let AED and MLR be the sets of reals which are almost everywhere dominating and Martin-Löf random, respectively. Let b1, b2, and b3 be the degrees of unsolvability of the mass problems associated with AED, MLR × AED, and MLR ∩ AED, respectively. Let [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w be the lattice of degrees of unsolvability of mass problems associated with nonempty Π01 subsets of 2ω. Let 1 (...) and 0 be the top and bottom elements of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w. We show that inf, inf, and inf belong to [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w and 0 < inf < inf < inf < 1. Under the natural embedding of the recursively enumerable Turing degrees into [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w, we show that inf and inf but not inf are comparable with some recursively enumerable Turing degrees other than 0 and 0′. In order to make this paper more self-contained, we exposit the proofs of some recent theorems due to Hirschfeldt, Miller, Nies, and Stephan. (shrink)

I address the assumption that communicative interaction is made possible by knowledge of a language. I argue that this assumption as it is usually expressed depends on an unjustified reification of language, and on an unsatisfactory understanding of ‘knowledge’. I propose instead that communicative interaction is made possible by (Rylean) know-how and by the development of (Davidsonian) passing theories. We then come to see that our focus ought to be, not on propositional knowledge of a language which we internally represent, (...) but on the practical application of know-how in our understanding and interpretation of others. (shrink)

A well known fact is that every Lebesgue measurable set is regular, i.e., it includes an F$_{\sigma}$ set of the same measure. We analyze this fact from a metamathematical or foundational standpoint. We study a family of Muchnik degrees corresponding to measure-theoretic regularity at all levels of the effective Borel hierarchy. We prove some new results concerning Nies's notion of LR-reducibility. We build some $\omega$-models of RCA$_0$which are relevant for the reverse mathematics of measure-theoretic regularity.

Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the (...) motivations for truthmaker theory. Moreover, deflationists can consistently articulate and accept such motivations. Deflationism has no bearing on the plausibility of the truthmaker principle. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the ethical implications of emerging Nanotechnologically Enhanced Combat Systems (or 'NECS'). Through a combination of materials innovation and biotechnology, NECS are aimed at making combatants much less vulnerable to munitions that pose a lethal threat to soldiers protected by conventional armor. We argue that increasing technological disparities between forces armed with NECS and those without will exacerbate the ethical problems of asymmetric warfare. This will place pressure on the just war principles of jus in bello, (...) by encouraging the resort to tactics that either (i) make it more difficult to respect these principles or (ii) directly violate them, by virtue of attacking non-combatants or creating disproportionate numbers of casualties without a clear military goal. (shrink)

Several themes can be identified in the commentaries. The first is that the climbing fibers may have more than one function; the second is that the climbing fibers provide sensory rather than motor signals. We accept the possibility that climbing fibers may have more than one function consequence(s)’ in the title. Until we know more about the function of the inhibitory input to the inferior olive from the cerebellar nuclei, which are motor structures, we have to keep open the possibility (...) that the climbing fiber signals can be a combination of sensory and motor signals. (shrink)

Based on mirror neurons' properties, viewers are emotionally engaged when observing others infant interactions.

This paper investigates aspects of measure and randomness in the context of locale theory . We prove that every measure μ, on the σ-frame of opens of a fitted σ-locale X, extends to a measure on the lattice of all σ-sublocales of X . Furthermore, when μ is a finite measure with μ=M, the σ-locale X has a smallest σ-sublocale of measure M . In particular, when μ is a probability measure, X has a smallest σ-sublocale of measure 1. All (...) σ prefixes can be dropped from these statements whenever X is a strongly Lindelöf locale, as is the case in the following applications. When μ is the Lebesgue measure on the Euclidean space Rn, Theorem 1 produces an isometry-invariant measure that, via the inclusion of the powerset P in the lattice of sublocales, assigns a weight to every subset of Rn. When μ is the uniform probability measure on Cantor space {0,1}ω, the smallest measure-1 sublocale, given by Theorem 2, provides a canonical locale of random sequences, where randomness means that all probabilistic laws are satisfied. (shrink)

Recent studies have yielded new insights into the critical importance of adequate vitamin D3 intake and metabolism. Investigations of the actions of 1,25‐dihydroxyvitamin D3 (calcitriol) on novel target tissues has revealed that this hormone has functions other than its recognized action in regulating blood calcium and phosphate levels. Reports have characterized calcitriol receptors and activities in organs and tissues as diverse as pancreas, skeletal and heart muscle, blood cells, brain, skin, pituitary, parathyroid, kidney, bone and intestine. These studies suggest functions (...) for calcitriol as varied as the regulation of insulin and prolactin secretion, muscle contractility, immune cell metabolism, melanin synthesis and differentiation of blood cells. This information may ultimately help us to understand the etiologies of several kinds of organ dysfunction and lead to the development of tissue‐specific agents for new therapies. (shrink)

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. 178.Hb. £15.95.

The text of Aristotle'sEthica Eudemia is often in need of emendation, especially because of the particular fault in the manuscripts of misreading one letter for another or misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in correcting many of these errors, but more needs to be done. A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or grammar, but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, as scholars have noted, theEEis marked (...) by considerable compression of thought, and this compression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration, it can be shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed. (shrink)

This piece is a side-by-side review of two books: Strangers Drowning, by Larissa MacFarquhar, and Doing Good Better, by William MacAskill. Both books are concerned with the question of whether we should try to live as morally good a life as possible. MacAskill thinks the answer is 'yes', and his book is an overview of how the Effective Altruist movement approaches the problem of how to achieve a morally optimal life. MacFarquhar's book is a more descriptive account of the lives (...) of people who aim to live in a morally optimal way. Her discussion is nuanced, and somewhat ambivalent about the merits of this aim. My review brings out some commonalities and differences between the two books, and critically digests the arguments on offer. (shrink)

Robert Kane provides a critical overview of debates about free will of the past half century, relating this recent inquiry to the broader history of the free will issue and to vital currents of twentieth century thought. Kane also defends a traditional libertarian or incompatibilist view of free will, employing arguments that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary developments in physics and biology, neuro science, and the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and (...) accessible roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic. (shrink)

_A philosophical analysis of free will and the relativity of values._.

Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.

Accessible to students with no background in the subject, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will provides an extensive and up-to-date overview of all the latest views on this central problem of philosophy. Opening with a concise introduction to the history of the problem of free will--and its place in the history of philosophy--the book then turns to contemporary debates and theories about free will, determinism, and related subjects like moral responsibility, coercion, compulsion, autonomy, agency, rationality, freedom, and more. Classical compatibilist (...) and new compatibilist theories of free will are considered along with the latest incompatibilist or libertarian theories and the most recent skeptical challenges to free will. Separate chapters are devoted to the relation of free will to moral responsibility and ethics; to modern science; and to religious questions about predestination, divine foreknowledge, and human freedom. Numerous down-to-earth examples and challenging thought experiments enliven the text. The book is an ideal addition to introduction to philosophy, metaphysics, and free will courses. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility … [he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its (...) role – “both of which have helped fan the flame of the luck argument”. In this paper, I respond to Franklin's criticisms, arguing that, so far from making it significantly more difficult to answer objections about luck and control, as he claims, giving indeterminism the location and role I do makes it possible to answer such objections and many other related objections to libertarian free will. A central theme of this paper will emerge in my responses: In order to make sense of freedom of will... (shrink)

This book brings together essays on themes of human rights and legal history, reflecting the long and distinguished career as academic writer and human rights activist of Brian Simpson. Written by colleagues and friends in the United States and Britain, the essays are intended to reflect Simpson's own legal interests. The collection opens with biography of Simpson's academic life which notes his major contribution to legal thought, and closes with an account of his career in the United (...) States and a bibliography of his writings. As a tribute to Simpson's varied interests in the law, the collection is grouped around themes in human rights, legal philosophy, and legal history. The human rights papers are concerned with the history of the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights, and recent successes in which Brian Simpson played a part; the evolution of a transnational common law of human rights; the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the interpretation of the provisions on identity in France and England; the suspension of human rights which would have occurred, had the emergency War Zone Courts scheme been brought into effect during wartime; historical resistance to colonial laws in Papua New Guinea; and the ratio decidendi of the story of the Prodigal Son. Historical themes are found in essays concerned with three nineteenth-century Lord Chancellors; in two essays relating to the fate of the civil jury on either side of the Atlantic which provide a fascinating comparison; in the 'battle of the books' which led to changes in eighteenth-century copyright law; and judicial rivalry between King's Bench and Common Pleas in the early modern period. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation that (...) cannot be accounted for by ordinary modes of explanation familiar to the natural and human sciences. Doing this, I argue, requires piecing together a “complex tapestry” of ideas and arguments that involve rethinking many traditional assumptions about free will. The paper also argues that one cannot get to the heart of historical debates about free will without distinguishing different kinds of freedom, different senses of will, and different notions of control, among other distinctions. I especially focus here on different notions of freedom and control that are necessary to make sense of free will. (shrink)