Published in 1933, at a time of widespread unemployment and bank failures, this book by the young Sidney Hook received great critical acclaim and established his reputation as a brilliant expositor of ideas. By "revolutionary interpretation" Hook meant quite literally that Marx's main objective was to stimulate revolutionary opposition to class society. Hook later abandoned the revolutionary views expressed in this volume, but he never abandoned his warm positive views of Marx as a thinker and a fighter (...) for freedom. He eventually concluded that 20th century history had proved both him and Marx wrong about the necessity of revolutionary means to achieve their mutual social goals. But, says his son Ernest B. Hook in an introduction, this concession of error "he did not see... as an admission of intellectual weakness, but the natural position of a reasonable person when, in the light of observation and experience, he concludes he has erred." This expanded edition makes readily available for scholars an influential work long out of print and provides critical insight into the intellectual development of one of the 20th-century's great thinkers. (shrink)

In this brilliant work, first published in 1936, Sydney Hook seeks to resolve one of the classic problems of European intellectual history: how the political radicalism and philosophical materialism of Karl Marx issued from the mystical and conservative intellectual system of G.W.F. Hegel. This edition contains a forward by Christopher Phelps discussing Hook's career and the significance of "From Hegel to Marx" in the history of ideas.

In this fascinating work, Sidney Hook critiques "scientifically inadequate ways of belief" in the hope that, if we recognize the ways in which they are confused with "genuinely scientific ways of belief," society will be better positioned to assess rationally the social, political, and economic belief systems that vie for our allegiance. In reviewing the powerful ideas of Christianity, mythology, Marxism, nationalism, democracy, and other belief systems, Hook remains firm in his conviction that no such system can long (...) survive if it resists the rational dictate of true scientific method - testing and reformulating beliefs based upon the ability to reach concrete solutions to human problems. (shrink)

Entre os anos 1920 e 1940, aproximadamente, Sidney Hook, filósofo universitário e ativista político norte-americano, procurou desenvolver e aplicar uma leitura pragmatista e revolucionária das concepções de Marx, sob a influência do “instrumentalismo” de John Dewey, defendendo a ideia de uma coincidência essencial e de uma complementaridade – digamos, compensatório – entre as duas linhas de pensamento. O artigo trata de apresentar tal projeto filosófico hookiano, com referências histórico-biográficas, desde seus primeiros ensaios até o ápice de sua realização, passando (...) pelas polêmicas envolvidas e, finalmente, chegando ao seu gradual e – quase – completo abandono. Trata-se de uma narrativa que acompanha pari passu os desenvolvimentos da própria esquerda norte-americana no período e os cruzamentos, com ela, do pensamento e da atividade do próprio Dewey. (shrink)

Одной из особенностей прагматизма является, как известно, трактовка познания, свободная от апелляции к корреспондентной теории истины и постулирования независимой (от человека) реальности. Все прагматисты, к каким бы воззрениям по частным вопросам они ни склонялись, придерживаются операциональной концепции познания. Согласно этой концепции, достаточным основанием знания является его применимость на практике. Данный аспект неоднократно затрагивался в ходе дискуссий о сходствах и различиях марксизма и прагматизма. Несмотря на существенное расхождение между прагматизмом и марксизмом в понимании природы знания, многие исследователи пытались провести параллели между (...) этими двумя интеллектуальными традициями. В частности, Бертран Рассел указывал на близость философии Дьюи «доктрине другого экс-гегельянца, Карла Маркса, как она была сформулирована в его “Тезисах о Фейербахе”». По мнению Рассела, если не придавать слишком большого значения терминологическим нюансам, Марксова теория деятельности, или праксиса, в главных моментах «едва отличима от инструментализма». Этот взгляд получил распространение даже среди прагматистов, а также американских марксистов (точнее, троцкистов), которые в конце 40-х годов прошлого века трактовали прагматизм Дьюи как прямое продолжение и развитие марксизма. Дж. Новак, к примеру, утверждал, что «самым выдающимся современным мыслителем, впитавшим в себя все лучшее, что было у Маркса, является Дьюи». В. Ленина — как практика, а не теоретика — Новак считал, в свою очередь, «скрытым последователем» Дьюи. Согласно бывшему марксисту С. Хуку, прагматизм — это философия «экспериментального натурализма», т. е. теория, «развивающая наиболее здравые и продуктивные идеи Маркса о мире». В статье (с опорой главным образом на аргументацию советских марксистов) критически пересматривается философский диалог между марксизмом и прагматизмом. Основное внимание уделяется понятию деятельности, или праксиса, а также взаимосвязи субъекта и объекта в познании. // It is well-known that pragmatism advocates an approach on cognition without appealing to man-independent reality and truth as correspondence with reality. Instead, pragmatists, notwithstanding the diversity of their particular views, hold an operational conception of knowledge, according to which all that is needed is knowledge to have a suitable kind of correspondence with practice. This point has been scrutinized in the long standing discussion about the convergences and deviations between Marxism and pragmatism. The profound divergence between Marxism and pragmatism with regard to the aforementioned issues was not enough to prevent philosophers from attempting to trace affinities between these two distinct intellectual trends. For example, Bertrand Russell pointed out the “close similarity” of Dewey’s doctrine to “that of another exHegelian, Karl Marx, as it is delineated in his Theses on Feuerbach.” Russell thinks that Marx’s concept of activity or praxis is in spite of differences in terminology “essentially indistinguishable from instrumentalism.” This line of reasoning seems to be quite influential, even among pragmatists. Notably, some American Marxists (especially Trotskyists, to be exact) at the late 40’s overemphasized the affinity between Dewey’s pragmatism and Marxism, and even understood Dewey’s pragmatism as a continuation of Marxism. For example, G. Novack comments that “[t]he most outstanding figure in the world today in whom the best elements of Marx’s thought are present is John Dewey,” and presents Lenin as “an unavowed disciple of Dewey in practice.” According to S. Hook, a former Marxist who turned to pragmatism and became one of the most influential philosophers who discussed the relation between Marxism and pragmatism, the latter is “the philosophy of experimental naturalism” which can be regarded “as a continuation of what is soundest and most fruitful in Marx’s philosophical outlook upon the world.” In this paper, I intend to critically reassess this philosophical dialogue between Marxism and pragmatism, by further deploying the argumentation provided mainly by Soviet Marxists with regard to the aforementioned issues, focusing especially on two of them: the concept of activity (or praxis) and the interrelation of subject and object in cognition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 153 These objections to one side, one must compliment Anglin on the thoroughness with which he pursues his points. He almost always provides several arguments for the same point. So we get eight arguments for libertarianism, five for how natural evil comports with the existence of a benevolent, all-powerful God, and so on. These arguments carefully avoid the repetitiveness one might expect and rather skillfully succeed in (...) revealing a mind concerned with mapping out all the knolls and hollows on the intellectual terrain of the particular issue under consideration. Almost inevitably, any one hook's discussions of such disparate topics will vary in both quality and depth. Some parts of this hook (for example, the chapters on the existence of God and the problem of evil) should he generally accessible to the interested beginner in the philosophy of religion. Chapters 5 and 6 on the goodness of God and the problem of evil are especially well done. Anglin honestly and squarely faces the standard objections and manages to produce as complete and compelling a defense as one is likely to find anywhere in the literature. His use of the Principle of Double Effect to exonerate God from blame for creating creatures who may freely do evil was effective and innovative. Other parts of Free Will and The Christian Faith (say, the chapter defending God's foreknowledge featuring the rather paradoxical concept of "backwards causation " in which future free choices cause past foreknowledge) seem to require and presuppose a more thorough immersion in the recent scholarly literature. Some readers may find the author's use of logical notation to explicate his arguments distracting or alienating, though he takes great pains to explain the symbols he employs in the prose he uses. In addition, he is quite helpful to the reader at the start of each chapter in providing concise previews of the arguments to come. On the whole, this is a hook with occasional flashes of insight and innovation, hut with tangles and tensions in the arguments in other parts. JOSEPH M. INCANDELA Saint Mary's College Notre Dame, Indiana Quest for the Absolute: The Philosophical Vision of Joseph Marechal. By ANTHONY MATTEO. De Kalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 1992. Pp. xi + 173. $30.00 (cloth). The Belgian Jesuit Joseph Marechal (1373-1944) is little known in North American philosophical circles. Indeed he is simply little known outside the somewhat small circle of scholars interested in the history 154 BOOK REVIEWS of twentieth century Roman Catholic theology. There Marechal's work, in particular his five volume Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique (PDM) has a special place of honor. One need but think of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan among his intellectual heirs to recognize the impact of the thinker and of the volumes. The service of Anthony Matteo's Quest for the Absolute (QA) is to provide a clear and concise study of Marechal's thought. It makes a valuable companion to Joseph Donceel's A Marechal Reader (1970). To my knowledge, the only other full-length discussion in English is Otto Muck's The Transcendental Method (1968), a book which is nearly unreadable in its Eng· lish translation if not in its German original. Marechal was a committed and convinced Thomist, but discussing him under the rubric " transcendental method " brings home a critical conjunction between his Thomism and certain strategies more characteristic of Immanuel Kant and his followers. Instead of seeing Kant simply as undermining the objectivity of metaphysics and of natural theology, he came to believe it possible to take the Kantian "turn to the subject" and to show that it had possibilities not dreamed of by Kant himself. One early indication of Marechal's revisionary approach appeared in his notes for a 1914-1915 course on epistemology: "Kant deceives himself in recognizing, in the operations of spirit, only the pure synthesis of an empirical given. The human spirit is at once an empirical faculty and a faculty of the Absolute. This second aspect was only imperfectly grasped by the author of the Critique of Pure Reason." Thus Marechal was already on his way to answering his opening question for volume I of PDM... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:156 BOOK REVIEWS of theological method in Aquinas (p. 193; see also pp. 57 and 173). But this is not sufficient. Farthing should have acknowledged that Biel's recurrent critique of the supposed ' positive ' use of reason in Aquinas is beside the point and that, by thinking that Thomas is trying to ' demonstrate ' the faith, Biel has carelessly dismissed much that is interesting and valuable in (...) Aquinas. By bringing Biel's error to the fore, Farthing would have made clear to the reader that in this crucial respect, the dialogue between these two thinkers has completely broken down. University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana JOSEPH WAWRYKOW The Reshaping of Catholicism: Current Challenges in the Theology of Church. By AVERY DULLES. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988. Pp. 276. $19.95 (doth). Each of Dulles's twelve articles commends itself no less as a chapter in this collection than when it first appeared separately between 1984 and the end of 1987. In ensemble, " they give," Dulles remarks in his Preface, " a fair sampling of the issues the Catholic Church has had to face in the two decades since the Council." Whatever the leading Catholic ecclesiologist in America has to say about specific problems in Church renewal deserves careful attention. A positive general evaluation of the book is all hut a foregone conclusion. Still, a review can perform that opening survey of contents that will lend precision to a reader's anticipation of what the author has singled out as the current challenges. Four chapters take up the task of interpreting the texts of Vatican II, not as a species of source-criticism but in light of post-conciliar difficulties. Chapters 2 ("The Basic Teaching of Vatican II "), 5 ("Vatican II and the Recovery of Tradition"), and 8 ("Vatican II and the Purpose of the Church") emerge from a situation of divided opinion. They also apply the Council's teaching as a solution. Chapter 7 ("The Church and Communications") likewise engages conciliar texts, along a more speculative line. Chapter 1 ("American Impressions of the Council") joins with 2 in opening the book at a somewhat more popular level. The other chapters employ conciliar teaching to formulate theological answers to some important questions. These are questions which trouble not only the hierarchy and the theologians but also ordinary BOOK REVIEWS 157 members of the Church, as they come to terms with the Church's renewed self-understanding. Chapter 3 (" The Emerging World Church and the Pluralism of Cultures") picks up where Karl Rahner's wellknown address at the Weston School of Theology in 1979 left off. Dulles accepts Rahner's argument that Vatican II achieved the first official self-actualization of Catholicism as a world church. Taking the resulting problem of inculturation as the current phase in the relation between Christianity and culture, Dulles specifies the relation between two cultures as "cultural reciprocity." He leaves behind the simple, familiar contrast between classicism and a non-normative concept of culture. His ecumenical research enters into Chapter 4 ("The Meaning of Catholicism: Adventures of an Idea "), which places Vatican II in the context of two centuries of Protestant-Catholic discussion on the essence or basic idea of Catholicism. Intra-Catholic pluralism turning into opposition underlies most of the hook, hut Chapters 5 and 6 ("Authority and Conscience: Two Needed Voices") treat two such polarizations thematically. In 5 Dulles finds Dei Verbum open to an understanding of tradition as the handing on from generation to generation of the " tacit knowledge " whose content is the lived awareness of the God of Jesus Christ. Chapter 6 does not admit a second, alternative magisterium, hut it does situate hier· archical teaching amid the several sources of authority accepted by Catholicism-Scripture, tradition, the whole People of God, and theologians along with the hierarchy. And, in the formation of personal judgments and decisions, conscience has its own authority. A theology of communication follows from each of five models of the Church. Chapter 7 shows how this, in turn, implies a distinct approach to evangelization, use of mass media, and episcopal and papal teaching. Chapters 8 and 9 {"The Church, Society, and Politics") discuss the tensions inherent in the Church's mission... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 165 arguments. He meets them head on, on their ground; whether or not he is deemed successful, he presents a challenge not only to the philosophers he adduces but also to anyone in the Thomistic tradition who has judged confrontation with contemporary critics to he fruitless. JANICE L. SCHULTZ Canisius College Buffalo, New York Authority and Leadership in the Church: Past Directions and Future Possibilities. By THOMAS (...) P. RAUSCH, S.J. Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1989. Pp. 158. $15.95. Rather than offering a sustained study of the question of authority and leadership in the Church, Rausch presents a collection of essays related to the topic. The format reflects the book's genesis: much of the material was developed for the 23rd Faith and Order Conference of the Texas Conference of Churches on the subject "Authority in the Body of Christ." Although the title does not reflect the hook's ecumenical focus, readers who want a general introduction to the present status of agreement in ecumenical discussion of authority and ministry may find Rausch's hook helpful. In " Authority in the Ecumenical Dialogue " Rausch reviews and summarizes the ARCIC Final Report, the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Dialogue, the WCC Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry text, and the Consultation on Church Union. The emerging consensus on the value of ordained ministry in these documents indicates that this ministry is permanent, although the threefold ministry of bishop, presbyter, and deacon stands in need of reform. Rausch notes that the documents do not limit " valid " ministry to ordained ministry in communion with the historic episcopate. As for the shape of ministry in the church of tomorrow, not surprisingly, he identifies shared responsibility and collegiality as the marks of the future exercise of authority. Among the important issues still unresolved by the churches are Petrine ministry and primacy and the problem of the " reception " of ecumenical documents. The chapter on authority and reception, originally published in Theological Studies, may well be the most original contribution of the book. It broadens the discussion of reception from its historical " classical " understanding as " the acceptance by local churches of particular ecclesiastical or conciliar decisions " to an ecumenical understanding of the concept as " the acceptance by one church of a theo- 166 BOOK REVIEWS logical consensus arrived at with another church, and ultimately, the recognition of the other church's faith and ecclesial life as authentically Christian (p. 103)." He concludes that (1) reception is more properly understood as a process rather than as a juridical determination, (2) it also involves formal decisions on the part of church authorities, (3) it cannot be reduced to the acceptance of doctrinal formulations, and (4) the norm for recognizing a common faith is not agreement with a particular ecclesial position but agreement with the apostolic tradition. Ultimately, reception involves the whole church and is not the sole product of theologians or church authorities. Ecumenical dialogues will only be effective when they enter into the practical life of the churches. In "Imaging Tomorrow's Church: Models of Christian Unity" Rausch summarizes four models of church unity: organic union, conciliar fellowship, reconciled diversity, and communion of Churches. He opts for the fourth model. The chapter does not offer any new information to someone familiar with ecumenical discussions, but it does serve as an introduction for the neophyte. Rausch's image of authority in the future lies somewhere between a strictly hierarchical or institutional model and a more egalitarian model. His final chapter, " Authority in Tomorrow's Church," predicts that the church of the future will be " ordered " in the sense that it will combine an authoritative ordained ministry (based on the church's apostolic office) with a recognition of multiple and diverse charismatic gifts. He retrieves Karl Rahner's suggestion that recognition of charism for leadership in an individual may result in that person's " relative" ordination for a particular local community. Authority of the future will be collegial with a more participatory style of decision-making. The renewed papacy will encourage not only a more participatory style of decision-making but also a broader participation in the formulation of church teaching. He suggests that representatives of particular churches could elect the Bishop... (shrink)

The readings collected here—of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Antonio Gramsci— reflect the experience of the labor, socialist, and communist movements that did so much to shape modern history. A dedication to working-class revolution gives coherence to the influential philosophical, economic, sociological, and historical works of these writers. Paul Le Blanc's introductory essay probes the structure and dynamics of Marxism as a political orientation, tracing connections among components that can be found in (...) the readings: the theory of capitalist development, the theory of the labor movement, the strategy of revolution, the conception of the transition to socialism. Others identified with the Marxist tradition—such as Plekhanov, Kautsky, Stalin, Mao—are also discussed, and attention is given to perspectives of such varied critics of Marxism as Sidney Hook, Bertram D. Wolfe, James Burnham, Daniel Bell, Robert Heilbroner, and C. Wright Mills. Historical reflections are blended with discussion of the durability of capitalism, the disappointment of hopes for workers' revolution, the "collapse of communism," issues of race and gender, the environment, and challenges of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nietzsche in the Light of his Suppressed Manuscripts WALTER KAUFMANN SINCE THE EIGHTEEN-NINETIES there has been considerable discussion about the adequacy of the editing of Nietzsche's late works, and occasionally bitter polemics about suppressed material have appeared in German newspapers and periodicals as well as in a few books. In the mid-fifties the controversy was revived in the wake of a new three-volume edition of Nietzsche's works, edited by (...) Karl Schlechta, ~ but the acrimonious debate was not very illuminating, and the sensational claims that traveled across the ocean were largely misleading. More and more often it was asked how reliable our printed texts are; also, what new revelations may be expected from unpublished manuscripts. I shall try to answer both questions. The discussion will revolve largely around a recent German work by Erich F. Podach 2 who makes sensational claims about The Antichrist and, above all, Ecce Homo, and who wants to supersede all previous editions of these works, including Schlechta's. 3 II Erich Podach holds a unique place in the Nietzsche literature: nobody else has contributed five genuinely important books. Yet Podach is not a philosopher, and he has never shown any profound understanding of Nietzsche 's thought. The point is that all of his books make use of unpublished documents. His study of Nietzsches Zusammenbruch (1930) was translated i Werke in drei Biinden (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954-1956), 1282, 1276, and 1476 pp..2Friedrich Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruehs (Heidelberg: Wolfgang Rothe Verlag, 1961), 432 pp. and 24 plates with 29 facsimiles of MS pages. 3My article was completed before two reviews of Podach's book appeared in The Philosophical Review, April 1964, pp. 282-285, and in The Journal ot Philosophy, April 23, 1964, pp. 286-288. Both reviews are by Henry Walter Brann; both accept uncritically Podach's editing and Podach's claims; and both add original errors. Brann says that Podach tells "the amazing story of the most brazen literary fraud committed in recent times," and he quotes Podach as saying that "Nietzsche is the most brazenly falsified figure of recent literary and cultural history with regard both to his life and to his works." (The last sentence is rendered into smoother English in The Philosophical Review, and the two reviews arc altogether slightly different.) I shall try to show how Podach and Brann themselves have contributed to this "amazing story" by trying to convince us that one of Nietzsche's best hooks was not written by him. [2051 206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY into English in 1931. Gestalten um Nietzsche (1932) 4 is his most interesting book and deserves to be translated: it offers chapters on Nietzsche's mother, Rohde, Gast, Bernhard and Elisabeth F6rster (Nietzsche's sister and her husband), and Julius Langbehn. In 1937 Podach published Der kranke Nietzsche : Briefe seiner Mutter an Franz Overbeck, and after that Friedrich Nietzsche und Lou Salom& All of these volumes are important for the biography of Nietzsche. The fifth book aims to offer philologically reliable texts of Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruchs, i.e., Nietzsche contra Wagner, Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, and Dionysos-Dithyramben. All of these were first published after Nietzsche had become insane (in January, 1889), and while no philosophically important changes were made, the early editors were not greatly concerned about philological exactitude. Nietzsche contra Wagner, for example, as published first in 1895 and reprinted many times since, differs quite strikingly from the final version of which Nietzsche himself was reading proofs in January, 1889, when he collapsed. Yet a very few copies of the original version were actually printed in 1889. This version contained a third chapter, "Intermezzo," deleted in 1895 and ever since, and this, a page and a half long, ended with the poem variously called, in later collections of Nietzsche's verse, "Venice" or "Gondola Song." The reason for this omission was not at all sinister. Nietzsche was working on several books late in 1888. Initially, this section formed part of Ecce Homo; then he inserted it in Nietzsche contra Wagner; then he wrote his publisher that after all he preferred to move it back into Ecce Homo; but when soon thereafter he received proofs of... (shrink)

A spectre is haunting linguistics and education: the prematurely buried legacy of Basil Bernstein, Michael Halliday, Ruqaiya Hasan and Karl Marx. On the one hand, this spectre seems to demand that we treat both language and learning as natural wholes, instead of reducing them to natural sciences like phonetics or neuroscience and social sciences like discourse analysis and curriculum studies and then trying to hook them up again through interdisciplinary links. On the other, this spectre requires us to (...) work in a world where knowledge is already profoundly fragmented, where choosing to learn one fragment rather than another does make a difference in the health and welfare of the teacher and especially of the learner. Let this paper serve as a manifesto defending the maligned work of Halliday and Hasan, and also as a manual to demonstrate how their analytical approach exposes the fragmentation of knowledge and shows how it can be overcome. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Critical Pedagogies for Social Work traverses new territory by providing a cutting-edge overview of the work of classic and contemporary theorists, in a way that expands their application and utility in social work education and practice; thus, providing a bridge between critical theory, philosophy, and social work. Each chapter showcases the work of a specific critical educational, philosophical and/or social theorist including: Henry Giroux, Michel Foucault, Cornelius Castoriadis, Herbert Marcuse, Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Joan Tronto, Iris (...) Marion Young, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and many others to elucidate the ways in which their key pedagogic concepts can be applied to specific aspects of social work education and practice. The text exhibits a range of research-based approaches to educating social work practitioners as agents of social change. It provides a robust and much needed, alternative paradigm to the technique-driven ‘conservative revolution’ currently being fostered by neoliberalism in both social work education and practice. The volume will be instructive for social work educators who aim to teach for social change, by assisting students to develop counter-hegemonic practices of resistance and agency, and reflecting on the pedagogic role of social work practice more widely. The volume holds relevance for both postgraduate and undergraduate/qualifying social work and human services courses around the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 321 metaphysical conclusions: " It was assumed by the medieval theists •.• that there is something inherently inferior about the temporal compared with the timeless. Being temporal was an infliction, a sort of body odor from which everything of this world reeked. For a complex set of reasons, some psychological having to do with the fear of death and decay, others socioeconomic concerning their disdain for the (...) inferior class of people who were forced to manipulate changing objects, they assumed that true being must he found in what is immutable..." (p. 54). Gale's hook is quite thorough in its review of the relevant literature of contemporary analytical philosophers on the existence of God and affords a rich feast for anyone looking for an almost boundless supply of carefully fashioned logical arguments questioning the conclusions of those who have used analytic philosopy to defend theistic tenets. For philosophers hungering for a truly insightful contemporary approach to the question of God's existence and nature, however, the hook provides hut meager fare. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California MICHAEL J. DODDS, 0.P. Die Gnade vollendeter Endlichkeit: Zur transzendentaltheologischen Auslegung der thomanischen Anthropologie. By RICHARD SCHENK, O.P. Freihurg: Herder, 1989. Pp. 638. 98 DM. The title of this hook, which could he rendered into English as, roughly, The Grace of Perfect Imperfection, could strike one as ironic, and yet it intrigues by promising a new way of looking at a fundamental anthropological problem. The hook delivers on this promise hut, in so doing, creates difficulties for the reviewer. For this new way of looking is so thoroughly grounded in the history of philosophy and theology, its scope is so broad, its implications so profound that it demands a greater arena than a hook review to do it justice. There· fore, I will content myself with introducing its structure and content as well as indicating to whom this hook may appeal. The work is the doctoral dissertation of Schenk, done at the University of Munich. It is an attempt to develop an historically grounded, yet transcendental interpretation of Thomistic anthropology which avoids the experiential supernaturalism of Karl Rahner's theology. Schenk demonstrates the possibility of an alternative reading by developing the differences between Heidegger and Rahner in their respec· 322 BOOK REVIEWS tive notions of transcendence. These three, Thomas, Heidegger and Rahner, are the chief discussion partners for Schenk, although the foot· notes and bibliography reveal a familiarity with the secondary literature that is breathtaking. The first chapter is Schenk's exploration of twelve antitheses. Its purpose seems more negative than positive in that it prevents the reader from simply categorizing Schenk's work and interpretation as either " history " or a " new interpretation," as either " perennial " or " contemporary ", to mention just two of the antitheses. The second chapter is the longest, most difficult and, from a systematic viewpoint, most important of the work. Schenk lays out the alternative views, stemming from Porphyry's and Proclus' schools of Neoplatonism respectively, of the theodicy problematics, which were available to Thomas in constructing his anthropology. Schenk's choice of the theodicy problem as a focus is particularly fruitful, since it allows him to show how all of the fundamental theological anthropological issues, such as nature and grace, death, epistemology and freedom are involved and affected. The fundamental question can he formullated thus: Is the perfection of the human being accomplished in his or her own subjectivity or in its being surmounted? It is also here that Schenk's work shows its power in areas beyond the merely speculative. His concentration on the theodicy problem brings an almost " pastoral " side to the work, in that it seeks to avoid easy answers to the difficult question of why God allows human suffering. This question is not put aside by the Gospel hut made more pointed. Thomas seeks to follow and enhance what went before him (and here we have moved into the third chapter) by not functionalizing suffering and yet maintaining the call of the individual to salvation. It is precisely in this place, in this antinomy between the pri· mordial hope for perfection and the equally primordial doubt of ever attaining it, that... (shrink)

It can be useful to sort out the debates over Hegel’s political philosophy in political terms. The early post-war debates took place on essentially liberal grounds, as Hegel’s adherence to free speech and constitutional government had to be defended against cold warriors such as Karl Popper and Sidney Hook. I think it is obvious to everyone that the liberals won. Nevertheless the liberal vision of Hegel gave way to what is really a social-democratic vision - though due to (...) the anachronism and implausibility of calling him a social-democrat, the social-democratic Hegel is called “modern.” The point is that he recognized that capitalism was crisis-prone and that political response was required, yet he had no designs on the private ownership of the means of production, and he would not condone repression. To 20th century ears, Hegel’s position resonates most sympathetically with the position of a social democrat. (shrink)

Sidney Hook on Pragmatism, Democracy, and Freedom collects twenty-five of Hook's most incisive essays in political philosophy, written throughout his lengthy career. Clustered into five main sections, the essays discuss pragmatism and naturalism, Marx and Marxism, democratic theory, democratic practice, and the defense of a free society.

If one formulates Helmholtz's ideas about perception in terms of modern-day theories one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on (...) Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain's organisation and responses. In this paper, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one emergent property of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimise free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception, respectively, and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system's state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimisation of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure. (shrink)

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, through it, we see why the (...) activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason also reads Kant as presenting us with a compelling picture of the role that reason (as a capacity or power) should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats as fundamental neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality, but instead a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity — namely, the capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of “rational constitutivism” – one which contrasts both with the forms of “reasons fundamentalism” that are currently fashionable and the forms of “agency-first constitutivism” that have dominated much of Kantian metaethics. In this sense, the aim of the book is to vindicate Kant’s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason’s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while Kant insists that we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational for us to assert that we are noumenally free from a practical one. This much is uncontroversial. What is controversial is the cognitive relation (...) to things-in-themselves that is possible from a practical point of view. Interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart — as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. Recent work on these issues has begun to shift this picture. But this reassessment is in its early stages and remains highly controversial. My aim here is to take this tendency and push it farther than most have generally been willing to go - at least with respect to our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. Indeed, I believe that, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these terms, albeit on practical grounds. Thus, it is no surprise that Kant is willing to speak of our consciousness of the moral law as enabling genuine cognition of noumenal freedom. (shrink)

“There could be no fairer destiny for any. . . theory than that it should point the way to a more comprehensive theory in which it lives on, as a limiting case.” ALBERT EINSTEIN..

Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many classes of (...) reasons, while also offering a new way of understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The chapter concludes by arguing that the resulting view is best understood, not so much as an alternative to autonomy-first constitutivism, but as a complement to it. (shrink)

The development of robots that closely resemble human beings can contribute to cognitive research. An android provides an experimental apparatus that has the potential to be controlled more precisely than any human actor. However, preliminary results indicate that only very humanlike devices can elicit the broad range of responses that people typically direct toward each other. Conversely, to build androids capable of emulating human behavior, it is necessary to investigate social activity in detail and to develop models of the cognitive (...) mechanisms that support this activity. Because of the reciprocal relationship between android development and the exploration of social mechanisms, it is necessary to establish the field of android science. Androids could be a key testing ground for social, cognitive, and neuroscientific theories as well as platform for their eventual unification. Nevertheless, subtle flaws in appearance and movement can be more apparent and eerie in very humanlike robots. This uncanny phenomenon may be symptomatic of entities that elicit our model of human other but do not measure up to it. If so, very humanlike robots may provide the best means of pinpointing what kinds of behavior are perceived as human, since deviations from human norms are more obvious in them than in more mechanical-looking robots. In pursuing this line of inquiry, it is essential to identify the mechanisms involved in evaluations of human likeness. One hypothesis is that, by playing on an innate fear of death, an uncanny robot elicits culturally-supported defense responses for coping with death’s inevitability. An experiment, which borrows from methods used in terror management research, was performed to test this hypothesis. [Thomson Reuters Essential Science Indicators: Fast Breaking Paper in Social Sciences, May 2008]. (shrink)

In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be (...) expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality. (shrink)

A common complaint about Kantian ethics is that it cannot do justice to the social or intersubjective dimensions of human life – that, unlike Fichte, Hegel, or Marx, Kant remains caught within a fundamentally individualistic perspective on practical or moral questions. In this way, the objection goes, Kantian ethics leaves agents alienated from others around them and their larger community. While not entirely unnatural, I argue here that such concerns rest on a mischaracterization of where the most serious problems in (...) this region for Kant lie. Far from being too individualistic, the real worry about Kantian moral theory is that it may not be individualistic enough. In a contemporary context, where Kantian ethics is associated with the “self-constitution” of agents or the “separateness of persons”, the idea that it is insufficiently concerned with individual persons may come as a surprise. But it would not surprise Kant’s immediate successors like Fichte and Hegel. For this is where they often located the deepest problems facing Kant’s moral philosophy. As we will see, in making such points, they were in some ways closer to Kant’s own views than they recognized. Nonetheless, if this is right, Kantian ethics may in fact more anti-individualistic than many of the ethical systems that followed in his wake. And the most radical elements in Kant’s ethics might point, less to Fichte and Hegel, and more to figures like Schopenhauer who sought to develop a synthesis of Kant and ideas from South Asian philosophy. Perhaps, we might say, Kant has been sitting under the Bodhi tree all along? (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in a philosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem, we contend, is more aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought to change one’s credence in an event’s taking place even though one gains no new information or evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence other than 1/2 in the outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. In this (...) paper we argue for two claims. First, that Sleeping Beauty does gain potentially new relevant information upon waking up on Monday. Second, his credence shift is warranted provided it accords with a calculation that is a result of conditionalization on the relevant information: “this day is an experiment waking day” (a day within the experiment on which one is woken up). Since Sleeping Beauty knows what days d could refer to, he can calculate the probability that the referred to waking day is a Monday or a Tuesday providing an adequate resolution of the paradox. (shrink)

Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research presents a compilation of six decades of Basic Income literature. It includes the most influential empirical research and theoretical arguments on all aspects of the Basic Income proposal. -/- Includes six decades of the most influential literature on Basic Income Includes unpublished and hard-to-find articles The first major compendium on one of the most innovative political reform proposals of our age Explores multidisciplinary views of Basic Income, with philosophical, economic, political, and sociological views (...) Features contributions from key and well-known philosophers and economists, including Atkinson, Simon, Friedman, Fromm, Gorz, Offe, Rawls, Pettit, Van Parijs, and more Presents the best theoretical and empirical arguments for and against Basic Income -/- . (shrink)