In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija’s book Democracy and Truth, and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

Knowledge can be acquired through the processes of listening or reading testimonies of other agents. How and, particular, to whom, one ascribes trustworthiness when listening or reading a testimony is of special interest in this paper, especially in terms of societal-epistemic deviations that appear in the form of epistemic injustice. Neurotypicals, individuals with typical neurological states and developmental pathways, perceive individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder as an aberration from neuro-normativity, unable to contribute on an equal basis to the pool of (...) epistemic resources and shared meanings. The latter is related to the stereotypes of the unreliability of autistic persons’ testimonies about their own experiences and conditions. Given that atypical social and behavioural conditions autistics share are clinically classified as a disorder, the question of whether we can justify the failure to extend trust to the autistics arises. (shrink)

awls’ theory of justice is the subject of numerous criticisms due to the impossibility of adequately including people with mental disabilities, either as legislators or as beneficiaries of the principle of justice. Martha Nussbaum’s criticism is directed at the question of the legislative group and the possibility of including the interests of persons who, due to the criteria of rationality and reasonableness, are excluded from the process of forming fundamental principles of justice. In this paper, I recognize the problems that (...) Rawls’s theory faces in light of the above criticisms, and as a solution, I propose a constructive and positive interpretation of his theory of justice. Such an interpretation will allow us to expand the group of legislators through the inclusion of those individuals with mental impairments who, according to Nussbaum, are capable of participating in the selection of principles of justice. Furthermore, the offered interpretation will include people with the most severe forms of mental disorders within the scope of justice, through an extended list of reasons relevant to the justification of fundamental rights and principles of justice. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or reduced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabilities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification (...) of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be caused both by problems in the internal characteristics of a person as well as by unfairness or a lack of hospitality in external circumstances. This is why the method of justification is applied to the assessment of those circumstances as well. If social or environmental circumstances cannot be justified through the convergence of reasons accessible to all persons involved in the process of justification, we have reasons to exclude the presence of a disability and ascertain the presence of inadequate external conditions. (shrink)

The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of “we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders. The paper will argue (...) that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism. (shrink)

This paper is about conflicts of rights, and the particularly difficult challenges that such conflicts present when they entail women’s equality and claims of cultural recognition. South Africa since 1994 has presented a series of challenging—but by no means unique—circumstances many of which entail conflicting claims of rights. The central aim of this paper is, to make sense of the idea that the institution of traditional leadership can be sustained—and indeed given new, more concrete powers—in a democracy; and to explore (...) the implications that this has for women’s equality and equal human rights. This is a particularly pertinent question in the South African context, and I think it is worth reiterating from the outset that there is a distinct impression that women’s equality is always “up for grabs” when other, perhaps more powerful interests, come into play, in a way that would be unacceptable for other aspects of identity, and therefore signifiers of equality. It would be inconceivable, for example, to countenance a claim for a hierarchical racial arrangement in a given community, no matter how deeply culturally entrenched that arrangement was, and regardless of how much support it (ostensibly) had from the community concerned. I think therefore that we are obliged to ask difficult questions about the new legislation on traditional leadership, and to put it under the microscope of political theory in assessing the claim that this is one way of recognizing people’s rights and freedoms in a new democracy. (shrink)

This article presents a typology of discursive discrimination, discrimination carried out through the use of language. It is argued that such a typology should fulfil certain criteria in order to be useful for empirical research. The proposed typology consists of four main concepts: (1) exclusion from discourse; (2) negative other-presentation; (3) objectification; and (4) proposals pointing towards unfavourable non-linguistic treatment. The related concept of othering - the creation of a psychological distance to people understood to belong to groups others than (...) ‘us’ - is also presented. The manner in which the different forms of discursive discrimination and othering can be operationalized is demonstrated through examples from empirical studies of discourses of people categorized as mentally deficient, as deaf, and as immigrants in public debate in Sweden in the past 75 years. (shrink)

Friedrich Hölderlin's 1802 “Patmos” poetically answers a theological challenge. Dedicated to the Landgraf von Homburg, it responds unsolicited to the count's call for a poem that might counter contemporary Biblical exegesis, originally addressed to Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock. And indeed, a poetic refutation could hardly be more appropriate, when it comes to Enlightenment theologians : One of the most scandalous texts of the era, Hermann Samuel Reimarus' fragment, “Über die - XVIIIe siècle – Nouvel article.

Introduction. The paper considers a wide range of monetary policy rules: integral stabilization, NGDP targeting, price level targeting, raising the inflation target, introducing negative nominal interest rates etc. The author also considers discretionary policy used by central banks when the nominal rate is close to zero, such as dramatic preventive cut of the key interest rate and interventions in the open markets with the aim of cutting long-term interest rates. The relevance of this problem is supported by global long-term macroeconomic (...) and demographic factors, such as the dynamics of oil prices and the aging of the population. The aim of the paper is to identify the most effective monetary policy rules in order to reduce the risk of a nominal interest rate falling to zero. Methods. Analysis of the background and the results of general equilibrium models modeling monetary policy is carried out. Analysis of the role of current global trends (based on statistics) in aggravating the problem of declining interest rates. Scientific novelty of the research. The author systematizes the conclusions of modern macroeconomic theory, which offers a number of monetary rules making it possible to reduce the likelihood of falling into the zero bound of interest rate. Results. The effectiveness of monetary rules such as targeting nominal GDP and price levels in preventing the nominal interest rate from falling to zero is shown, primarily due to more efficient public expectations management which is a weak point of discretionary intervention. Conclusions. Under the current global factors for many developed countries and some oil-exporters, the downward trend in nominal rates persists. Combined with slowdown in economic growth, such threat may have negative consequences for the Russian economy. In this case, it seems reasonable to stick to the inflation target above 2% per year and in the future to consider switching to targeting the price level or nominal GDP. (shrink)

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first 3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others (...) to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerner’s (1980) just-world theory and J. Piaget’s (1932/1965) immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes. (shrink)

This paper explores the development of an ethical guardrail framework for AI systems, emphasizing the importance of customizable guardrails that align with diverse user values and underlying ethics. We address the challenges of AI ethics by proposing a structure that integrates rules, policies, and AI assistants to ensure responsible AI behavior, while comparing the proposed framework to the existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By focusing on practical mechanisms for implementing ethical standards, we aim to enhance transparency, user autonomy, and continuous improvement in (...) AI systems. Our approach accommodates ethical pluralism, offering a flexible and adaptable solution for the evolving landscape of AI governance. The paper concludes with strategies for resolving conflicts between ethical directives, underscoring the present and future need for robust, nuanced and context-aware AI systems. (shrink)

It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.

In artificial intelligence (AI), responses generated by machine-learning models (most often large language models) may be unfactual information presented as a fact. For example, a chatbot might state that the Mona Lisa was painted in 1815. Such phenomenon is called AI hallucinations, seeking inspiration from human psychology, with a great difference of AI ones being connected to unjustified beliefs (that is, AI “beliefs”) rather than perceptual failures). -/- AI hallucinations may have their source in the data itself, that is, the (...) source content, or in the training procedure, i.e. the way the knowledge was encoded in the model’s parameters, so that errors in encoding and decoding textual and non-textual representations can cause hallucinations. In this paper, we will observe how such errors come to life and how they might be mitigated. For this purpose, we will analyze the usability of justification logics, to behave as a proof checker for validating the correctness of large language models’ (LLM) responses. Justification logic was developed by S. Artemov, and later on mostly by Artemov and M. Fitting, deriving its main idea from the logic of proofs (LP): knowledge and belief modalities are seen as justification terms, i.e. t:X stands for t is a (proper) justification for X. Justification logic originated from attempts to create semantics for intuitionistic logic where proofs were the most proper justifications, but in further development, justification logic could be applied to different kinds of justifications). With the recent attempts to mitigate incorrect LLM responses, we will analyze various guardrails that are currently used for LLM responses, and see how the logic of justification may provide its benefits as an AI safety layer against false data. (shrink)

An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...) and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable. (shrink)

At the beginning of his book Body, Community, Language, World, Jan Patočka claims that the human body has never been considered worthy of reflection throughout the entire (Western) philosophical tradition. Human corporeity has been largely excluded from philosophical reflections since the times of Plato’s conception of the human as a being divided between a mortal body and an immortal soul. Yet there is one thinker who had, as early as the nineteenth century, described the history of philosophy, from Plato to (...) Hegel, as a history of the loss of human corporeity. This philosopher was Ludwig Feuerbach. While Patočka follows the path of phenomenological anthropology, Feuerbach tries to return the sense of corporeity to the human being through the rehabilitation of sensuous perceptions and emotions. Despite their different approaches to the problem, Patočka and Feuerbach both agree with the notion that intersubjectivity, based on the corporeity of two autonomous subjects, stands outside of any cognitive pattern. They both persist in their efforts to bring the human body back into philosophy as a relevant source of experience because they both understand that the human body remains a universal symbol across all cultures and societies. (shrink)

When forecasting their own behavior, people are often inaccurate and tend to predict that they will engage in more socially desirable behavior than they actually do. The problem with inaccurate behavioral forecasts is that they can lead to negative consequences both for the self and for others. One particularly negative consequence may be that such errors can produce overly harsh evaluations and condemnation of others who do not act in a way that most people predict they themselves would act. This (...) paper identifies these common behavioral forecasting errors, why they occur, and the negative interpersonal and unintended, unethical consequences they can have. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to do the following: I will discuss the notions of intentionality and self-understanding of Dasein as developed in Heidegger's Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In doing so, I will try to show the interrelation of Dasein's always being intentionally directed towards something and its self-interpretation. As we will see, the everyday world has, for Heidegger, a character of "equipmental contexture." This means that Dasein returns to itself from out of things, equipment, tools, or - quite differently (...) - the work of art. In a word, Dasein is mirrored back toward itself from the things made, from the products of techne. From this will follow the important distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. There is a sense in which the following pairings could be discerned: tools or pieces of equipment link up with inauthenticity, while the work of art links up with authenticity. I will say more on the subject of tools a bit later in the essay. Both kinds of things are things insofar as they are entrenched in techne. The common root seems almost inexplicable in the light of the vast difference between tools and the artwork. Moreover, both Dasein and techne seem to have another equally enigmatic common root: that of temporality. Temporality is the essential bond between Dasein and the double sense of techne, which suggests the double-sidedness of temporality itself. It is precisely this doublesidedness that I would like to have as the backdrop to my discussion as a whole. Finally, I will turn to a few pages of Heidegger's Being and Time and Bernard Stiegler's book Technics and Time I in order to complicate this notion of the two senses of temporality, the owned and disowned, originary and everyday, and its relation to work and techne. The overarching question here will be: Can the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity be sustained? (shrink)

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Kritik und spezifischer um verschiedene Begründungsformen der kritischen Theorie spielt die kritische Theorie der Anerkennung, wie sie von Axel Honneth über die letzten 25 Jahre entwickelt worden ist, eine zentrale Rolle. Diese Theorie soll im vorliegenden Beitrag vorgestellt werden. Um den Aufbau und die Funktionsweise dieser Theorie richtig zu verstehen, ist es unabdingbar, sich zunächst zu vergegenwärtigen, wie sich Honneth in der Tradition der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie positioniert, also innerhalb jenes Theorieprojekts, das seine Wurzeln bei Hegel (...) und Marx findet und durch Horkheimer in den 1930er Jahren Programm geworden ist. Nach der Lesart, die ich vertreten möchte, entwickelt Honneth seine Anerkennungstheorie vor dem Hintergrund eines wahrgenommenen Scheiterns der ersten und zweiten Generation der Frankfurter Schule an der methodischen Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, die für das Projekt einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie definierend ist. Beides – die methodische Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, wie sie Honneth begreift, und das Scheitern, das Honneth bei Horkheimer, Adorno und Habermas wahrnimmt – wird Gegenstand des ersten Teils (1) dieses Beitrags sein. „Anerkennung“ wird von Honneth als der Begriff eingeführt, mit dem das Kernproblem einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie gelöst werden soll. Mit dem Begriff der Anerkennung soll es nämlich, wie wir im zweiten Teil (2) eingehender nachvollziehen werden, möglich sein, Zugang zu konkreten Ansprüchen auf Befreiung zu finden, die von der Gesellschaft geschaffen und zugleich verletzt werden. In einer Diskussion ideologischer Anerkennung werde ich zuletzt (3) mögliche Grenzen der kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung Honneths aufzeigen, die sich unmittelbar aus dem Erbe der Frankfurter Schule, wie Honneth es begreift, ergeben. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 231-238.

This article examines the discursive practices evident in Whole-Class Text-Response Discussion as a pervasive curriculum activity in secondary English classrooms in Australia. This site was selected as an important one in the social construction of adolescents as apprentice citizens capable of reasoning from text in culturally valued ways. Bernstein's model of pedagogic discourse provides a sociologically principled framework within which the construction of particular forms of argumentative reasoning can be examined, as these forms are regulated either through visible or invisible (...) pedagogies. Halliday's model of social semiotics provides the linguistic tools for the examination of how institutionally privileged values and ways of reasoning are realized in the micro-semantic exchanges of two such whole-class text-response discussions; one regulated through a highly visible pedagogy and the other through a relatively invisible pedagogy. (shrink)

The article addresses the production of reproducibility as a topic that has become acutely relevant in the recent discussions on the replication crisis in science. It brings the ethnomethodological stance on reproducibility into the discussions, claiming that reproducibility is necessarily produced locally, on the shop floor, with methodological guidelines serving as references to already established practices rather than their origins. The article refers to this argument empirically, analyzing how a group of novice neuroscientists performs a series of measurements in a (...) transcranial magnetic stimulation experiment. Based on ethnography and video analysis, the article traces a history of the local measurement procedure invented by the researchers in order to overcome the experimental uncertainty. The article aims to demonstrate how reproducibility of the local procedure is achieved in the shop floor work of the practitioners and how the procedure becomes normalized and questioned as incorrect in the course of experimental practice. It concludes that the difference between guidelines and practical actions is not problematic per se; what may be problematic is that researchers can be engaged in different working projects described by the same instruction. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses role functionalism about color and suggests that it is not such a sui generis position as it is often considered to be. The discussionfocuses upon one, hopefully, central point. The main proponent of the idea of role functionalism is Jonathan Cohen who in his book The Red and the Real (2009)suggests a Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. Namely, his proposal implies that color ontology should be divided into relationalist and non-relationalist accounts. Generally, he endorses (...) the relationalist theory of color which roughly claims that colors are constituted in terms of some relation between objects and subjects (inter alia). Specifically, Cohen defends Role Functionalism as the best version of relationalism according to which the relations that constitute colors are functional relations. Based on his role functionalist stance, he distances himself from dispositionalists. However, in this paper I show that he could be interpreted as one and therefore needs to reconsider his Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. (shrink)

This collection of essays offers twelve innovative approaches to contemporary literary criticism. The contributors, women scholars who range from undergraduate students to contingent faculty to endowed chairs, stage a critical dialogue that raises vital questions about the aims and forms of criticism- its discourses and politics, as well as the personal, institutional, and economic conditions of its production. Offering compelling feminist and queer readings of avant-garde twentieth- and twenty-first-century texts, the essays included here are playful, performative, and theoretically savvy. Written (...) for students, scholars, and professors in literature and creative writing, Reading and Writing Experimental Texts provides examples for doing literary scholarship in innovative ways. These provocative readings invite conversation and community, reminding us that if the stakes of critical innovation are high, so are the pleasures. (shrink)

Corpus surveys have shown that the exact forms with which idioms are realized are subject to variation. We report a rating experiment showing that such alternative realizations have varying degrees of acceptability. Idiom variation challenges processing theories associating idioms with fixed multi-word form units, fixed configurations of words, or fixed superlemmas, as they do not explain how it can be that speakers produce variant forms that listeners can still make sense of. A computational model simulating comprehension with naive discriminative learning (...) is introduced that provides an explanation for the different degrees of acceptability of several idiom variant types. Implications for multi-word units in general are discussed. (shrink)

This paper inquiries into the complex issue of informed consent applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. The aim is to expose the main ethical and legal concerns of the New Health phenomenon, powered by intelligent machines. To achieve this objective, the first part of the paper analyzes ethical aspects of the alleged right to explanation, privacy, and informed consent, applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. This analysis is followed by a legal analysis of the limits and requirements for (...) the explainability of artificial intelligence. Followed by this analysis, recommendations for action are given in the concluding remarks of the paper. (shrink)

In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. -/- Examining theories (...) of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. -/- After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel. (shrink)

In today’s pandemic, many countries have experienced shortages of medical resources and many healthcare providers have often been faced with dramatic decisions about how to allocate beds, intensive care, or ventilators. Despite recognizing the need for triage, responses are not the same everywhere, and opinions and practices differ around what guidelines should be used, how they should be implemented, and who should ultimately decide. To some extent, triage issues reflect community values, revealing a given society’s moral standards and ideals. Our (...) goal is to study two countries which share many common features—Italy and France—as they deal with the pandemic, revealing the moral organization of medicine and healthcare, the power structures, and the nature of the disruptions in each context. (shrink)

Does matter consist of the simple or is it divisible into infinity? This is the question posed by the second antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. In this first comprehensive systematic study of the antinomy of division, its derivation, the proofs for thesis and antithesis as well as the resolution are analysed. The developmental and historical dimensions of the topic are also discussed. The study shows that although the antinomy of division is on the one hand a critique of (...) metaphysics, it nevertheless achieves a positive result for Kant's transcendental philosophy: On the one hand, the resolution of the antinomy represents a conceptual sharpening of realism and idealism as well as of the transcendental concept of appearance. On the other hand, it shows that the structure of matter is conditioned by a priori determinations of reason and understanding. These insights are highly relevant not only for Kant's enterprise of an a priori foundation of the natural sciences, but also for the problem of the soul. (shrink)

Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two (...) arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representations one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation. (shrink)

Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...) are properly understood to be extrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that promote the attainment of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...) called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible. In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question. In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed. I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants. (shrink)