An increasing number of drugs removed from the market because of unacceptable toxicity raises concerns regarding preapproval testing of drug safety. In the present paper it is postulated that the non-inferiority type of trial should be abandoned in favor of the superiority trial with active controls and less stringent (p<0.1, both for efficacy and toxicity) statistics. This approach will increase sensitivity of detection of drug-induced adverse effects at the expense of increasing false positive results regarding the difference in efficacy between (...) the tested and reference drug. Such a move will increase the protection of future patients. In addition, the proposed design is far more acceptable from the clinical (e.g. no need to specify the statistically expected “unimportant” number of deaths) and ethical points of view, as well as being favored by the strong incentive of involved parties. In the second part of this paper arguments are presented in favor of the hypothesis that placebo (still used in some superiority trials) does not induce adverse effects. The assertion that placebo may induce adverse effects is probably biased by the nature of the clinical experiment. Such a conclusion is supported by studies indicating that placebo-induced adverse effects are disease — and treatment — specific. The modification of clinical trials according to the proposed changes may increase the trials’ sensitivity at detecting adverse effects of drugs. (shrink)

The book presents a variety of philosophical and socio-political perspectives related to the relationship between persuasion and compulsion in democracy. It meets the need of the present time, in America and in Europe, to re-read and discuss the basic assumptions of democracy and the role of individual within it in the context of institutional persuasions that can become factual compulsions for other institution and, first of all, individuals.

Many contemporary students feel as though they are always waiting for the future—for their next test, their next grade, and their next class. Many contemporary teachers feel as though they are always preparing students for the future—for their next stage of schooling, their careers, and the rest of their lives. With all their anxiety about what lies ahead, both students and teachers might be perplexed by the suggestion that the best preparation for the future is living in the fullness of (...) the present.JeffFrank reminds readers that this idea permeates Dewey's educational thought. In particular, he argues that the significance of the present is a key theme in two of Dewey's most important works on education, Democracy... (shrink)

Tekst analizuje problem wielorakiej realizacji warunków doboru naturalnego: zmienności, reprodukcji i dziedziczności, przy czym główny nacisk położony zostaje na trzecią z wymienionych cech. Głównym celem prowadzonych analiz jest chęć pokazania, że możliwość wielorakiej realizacji doboru istniałaby nawet wówczas, gdyby pominąć argumenty z zakresu astrobiologii i sztucznego życia i skupić się wyłącznie na analizie genetyki znanych nam form życia. Tekst omawia również konsekwencje powyższej konkluzji, wskazując jak teza o wielorakiej realizacji warunków doboru wpływa na rozważania o takich zagadnieniach, jak: redukcjonizm w (...) biologii, definiowanie życia, badania dotyczące epigenetyki oraz autonomia biologii. Zaznaczone zostaje także jej znaczenie dla badań nad poziomami selekcji i wielkimi przełomami ewolucji. (shrink)

Artykuł przedstawia historię archiwów Jana Lechonia w Polskim Instytucie Naukowym w Ameryce z siedzibą w Nowym Jorku oraz Kazimierza Wierzyńskiego w Bibliotece Polskiej w Londynie, zwracając uwagę na zasadniczo odmienny sposób ich powstania. Omawia też znajdujące się w obu zespołach inedita, wskazując z jednej strony, dlaczego warte byłyby publikacji po latach, z drugiej – sygnalizując wielorakie problemy, o różnym stopniu trudności, z którymi musiałby zmierzyć się edytor. Dotyczy to nieznanych tekstów Wierzyńskiego z cyklu radiowych gawęd Listy z Ameryki oraz powieści (...) o charakterze autobiograficznym Aurora. Inedita Lechonia to powieść Bal u senatora, znana w niewielkich fragmentach, oraz szkic biograficzno-polityczny o Henryku Floyar-Rajchmanie, czy satyry polityczne pisane w stylu warszawskiego Wiecha. Osobny problem stanowi dziennik Lechonia, którego wydanie krytyczne wymagałoby przede wszystkim ponownego odczytania arcytrudnego rękopisu. (shrink)

Sixteen years ago, Prahalad and Hart introduced the possibility of both profitably serving the poor and alleviating poverty. This first iteration of the Bottom/Base of the Pyramid approach focused on selling to the poor. In 2008, after ethical criticisms leveled at it, the field moved to BoP 2.0, instead emphasizing business co-venturing. Since 2015, we have witnessed some calls for a new iteration, with the focus broadening to a more sustainable development approach to poverty alleviation. In this paper, we seek (...) to answer the question: How has the BoP approach evolved over the past 16 years, and has it delivered on its early promise? We conducted a systematic review of 276 papers published in journals in this period, utilizing a rigorous correspondence analysis method to map key trends, and then further examined the 22 empirical studies conducted on the BoP approach. Our results suggest that the field has evolved, passing through a number of trends and coming full circle—with our analysis pointing to more recent BoP literature emphasizing similar themes to those espoused in the initial BoP iteration, rather than reflecting the principles espoused in either BoP 2.0 or BoP 3.0. Our analysis also points to a lack of clear evidence that the BoP concept has delivered on its promise either to businesses or to BoP participants. (shrink)

Hobson & Friston (2014) outline a synthesis of Hobson's work on dreaming and consciousness with Friston’s work on the free energy principle and predictive coding. Whilst we are sympathetic with their claims about the function of dreaming and its relationship to consciousness, we argue that their endorsement of the Cartesian theatre metaphor is neither necessary nor desirable. Furthermore, if it were necessary then this endorsement would undermine their positive claims, as the Cartesian theatre metaphor is widely regarded as unsustainable. We (...) demonstrate this point and then develop an alternative formulation of their position that does not require the Cartesian theatre metaphor. Our positive goal is to clarify Hobson & Friston’s confusing usage of philosophical terminology, replacing it where possible with the more transparent language of the forward models framework. This will require some modifications to their account, which as it stands is philosophically and empirically unsustainable. (shrink)

According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual analysis. However, in our paper, we argue that closer scrutiny reveals not only the falsity but also the inherent ambiguity of this narrative. We explore four interpretations of the "Anti-Novelty Claim", the claim that conceptual engineering is not a new way of doing philosophy. Discussing the Anti-Novelty Claim from the perspective of a text’s producer, the text’s consumers, and the exegetical potential of the text, we (...) examine each perspective’s metaphilosophical implications and demonstrate that taking each perspective requires different methods. Adopting these different methods, we argue that the different interpretations of the Anti-Novelty Claim range from nearly trivially true to unlikely but untested. Importantly, we emphasize that each interpretation offers unique philosophical insights, yet addressing them requires diverse types of evidence, preventing a singular, straightforward answer to whether conceptual engineering is new. (shrink)

The paper explores the relationship between conceptual engineering and the methodology of the Lvov-Warsaw School. While conceptual engineering is commonly seen as rooted in Rudolf Carnap's works and his method of explication, this paper argues that LWS predates and informs contemporary understanding of this methodology. The paper establishes that LWS not only engaged in but also systematically developed a method of conceptual revision aimed at enhancing clarity, precision, and coherence with specific theoretical frameworks. The analysis shows that LWS's approach to (...) concepts combined both descriptive and normative methodologies to improve and adapt philosophical concepts to better address actual phenomena and certain theoretical or practical needs. This method, described by LWS members as 'analysis and construction', parallels contemporary conceptual engineering practices, particularly its so-called 'narrow' understanding focused on revising existing concepts rather than on merely introducing new ones. By tracing the historical trajectory of conceptual engineering back to LWS, this paper provides a deeper understanding of its foundational strategies and suggesting that LWS's methodology could serve as a guide for current and future philosophical projects. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the problem of animal consciousness. Our folk interpretations and explanations of animal behaviour appeal to conscious mental states like e.g. fear or anger. Scholars, however, do not agree as to whether animals do in fact have conscious mental states similar to humans. According to Shettleworth, one may distinguish three positions in relation to this problem: radical opponents of the concept of animal consciousness who claim that animal are not conscious in any interesting sense; sceptics (...) who believe that some species probably do have consciousness yet it cannot be subject to scientific investigations due to subjective nature of conscious mental states; cognitive ethologists who believe that most species are potentially conscious and the central task for behavioural biologists is the investigation of the nature of their consciousness ; cognitive ethologists argue that their claims are supported by four arguments connected with gradual evolution; flexible and complex behaviour; animal communication, and neurophysiological similarity. These arguments have to face strong philosophical counter-arguments, especially the one from multiple realizability and the zombie hypothesis. In response, a new methodological approach is proposed to avoid these difficulties. It is based on Morgan’s Canon, interpreted here as a kind of zoo-psychological Ockham’s razor. Key words ANIMAL, CONSCIOUSNESS, SHETTLEWORTH. (shrink)

We will prove that there exists a model of ZFC+"c = ω 2 " in which every $M \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ of cardinality less than continuum c is meager, and such that for every $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ of cardinality c there exists a continuous function f: R → R with f[X] = [0, 1]. In particular in this model there is no magic set, i.e., a set $M \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ such that the equation f[M] = g[M] implies f = g for (...) every continuous nowhere constant functions f, g: R → R. (shrink)

Tak bogata, wielowątkowa i wewnętrznie zróżnicowana tradycja problematyki świadomości, jak i jej wyjątkowa złożoność i trudność, jednoznacznie „podpowiada” oraz uzasadnia nieodrzucanie zaraz na początku, z góry, jakichkolwiek możliwości podejścia do tego szczególnego przedmiotu i jakichkolwiek sposobów jego ujmowania; w tym możliwości podejścia apofatycznego i apofatycznego sposobu ujmowania go. Ich poznawcze walory zdaje się sugerować możliwa, przynajmniej możliwa, interpretacja: zasady ekonomii wyjaśniania – podstawowej zasady określającej tryb wyjaśniania realizowany z perspektywy trzecioosobowej – w kategoriach negatywnych i pozytywnych momentów/wątków jej zawartości, Ayera (...) eksplikacji fenomenu prywatności oraz Marcela propozycji ukazania specyfiki świadomości przy pomocy idiomu over and above, wskazującego nie tylko na nie-zwyczajność świadomości jako konstruktu wyjaśniającego, lecz także odsyłającego do nie-zwyczajności wyjaśnianego przezeń zachowania. Takie apofatyczne podejście – najpierw do zachowania, a potem jego mechanizmu – i takie ich najpierw apofatyczne ujęcie zdaje się naprowadzać tak na samą możliwość, jak i na kierunek oraz sposób pozytywnego do nich podejścia i zawartość pozytywnego ich ujęcia; i taki zdaje się być ich podstawowy poznawczy walor. To, czy ten tryb roboty, zastosowany do pewnej postaci prywatności – wyróżnionej jeszcze na etapie negatywnego do niej podejścia i jej negatywnego jeszcze ujęcia – pozwoli później, na etapie pozytywnego już do niej podejścia i pozytywnego już jej ujęcia, w pewnym momencie na jej identyfikację z najmocniej rozumianą świadomością, to najważniejsza, ale zarazem i najtrudniejsza, z pozostających do rozważenia spraw. (shrink)

The return rate is considered here as a fuzzy probabilistic set. Then the expected return is obtained as a fuzzy subset in the real line. This result is a theoretical foundation for new investment strategies. All considered strategies result of comparison profit fuzzy index and limit value. In this way we obtain an imprecise investment recommendation. Financial equilibrium criteria are a special case of comparison of the profit index and the limit value. The following criteria are generalized here: the Sharpe's (...) Ratio, the Jensen's Alpha and the Treynor's Ratio. Moreover, the safety-first criteria are generalized here for the fuzzy case. The Roy Criterion, the Kataoka Criterion and the Telser Criterion are also generalized. Obtained results show that proposed theory is useful for the investment applications. (shrink)

Choć koncepcje wolności Spinozy i Leibniza wyrastały w dobie powszechności tezy determinizmu mechanistycznego, którego powszechność została w ubiegłym wieku podważona, ontologiczna argumentacja obu filozofów pozostaje aktualna i warta nie tylko rewizji, a nawet porównania. Poddam pod rozwagę dwa stanowiska na rzecz wolności: Spinozjańskie utożsamienie wolności z wiedzą i Leibnizjańską obronę zasady alternatywnych możliwości. Oba stanowiska rozważę z perspektywy argumentacji kompatybilistycznej, wskazując, że rozumienie konieczności w myśli Spinozy i Leibniza nie wyklucza istnienia wolności.

The paper defines dialogic rationality and shows a rational path and understanding from the individual point of view. A separate discipline or discourse should coordinate the urgent need of deeper emotional transformation (metanoia) and explore the appearance of inner spiritual connectedness. This will establish the importance of every unique creature in the universe. Consequently in postmodernism, epistemology can no longer be accomplished by a “clear” cognitive theory, separated from ontological and anthropological elements. Cognition can no longer progress to an unchangeable, (...) non-falsifiable knowledge, because of changes within the object’s inner ontological level. Thus an observer can only interpret the phenomena but can never say “the last word”. Human cognition is based on time-coordinates when an observer tries to make a projection before the future has come. Yet existing now, it also contains the step back to the past as a shore of memory, experience, and knowledge. In this view history is considered to be non-linear—it is a complicated forward process, still continuously going back to the origin of human correlations with nature. A dialogic approach does not reject the importance of self-organizing processes, but tries to compose a sphere of acknowledgeable co-existence with the other to save the whole specter of human physical and mental, existential and creational features. Facing rational or mystical, but still radical, transformation, we get a sense of self-existence and can actively work and challenge ourselves to realize this in every-day life and in communication with the other. (shrink)

To understand globalization, one needs to examine its provenance within the metaphysical tradition and, in particular, in relation to the ways in which power tends to operate in modernity. While its operations are necessary for shaping relations, the pervasiveness with which power invests beings tends to obscure the event, and in particular, temporality and historicity, which mark the possibility of undoing power's formative influence on beings and relations. The event becomes the site of a specific tension between power and the (...) power-free, between changes intrinsic to power's intensification and a transformation indicative of a letting-go of power. In the face of our (post)modern tradition of increasingly intense macro and microflows of power, the power-free calls into question the metaphysical tradition of power that has underwritten the development of modernity. This transformation is neither a destruction nor an abandonment of modernity, but indicates an alternative to the prevalent and pervasive practices of power. (shrink)

Porter and Kramer :78–92, 2006; Harv Bus Rev 89, 62–77, 2011) introduced ‘shared value’ as a ‘new conception of capitalism,’ claiming it is a powerful driver of economic growth and reconciliation between business and society. The idea has generated strong interest in business and academia; however, its theoretical precepts have not been rigorously assessed. In this paper, we provide a systematic and thorough analysis of shared value, focusing on its ontological and epistemological properties. Our review highlights that ‘shared value’ has (...) spread into the language of multiple disciplines, but that its current conceptualization is vague, and it presents important discrepancies in the way it is defined and operationalized, such that it is more of a buzzword than a substantive concept. It also overlaps with many other concepts and lacks empirical grounding. We offer recommendations for defining and measuring the concept, take a step toward disentangling it from related concepts, and identify relevant theories and research methods that would facilitate extending the knowledge frontier on shared value. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to determine the role of intuitions in Gettier cases. Critics of the Method of Cases argue that arguments developed within this method contain a premise that is justified by its intuitiveness; they also argue that intuitions are unreliable sources of evidence. By contrast, Max Deutsch argues that this critique is unsound since intuitions do not serve as evidence for premises. In Gettier cases, an intuitive premise is justified by other arguments called G-Grounds. I propose (...) a different view on the role of intuition in Gettier cases. I introduce a distinction between concept-revision arguments and concept-application arguments. On the basis of this distinction and Craig's and Spicer's distinction between intuitions of intension and intuitions of extension, I show that (1) intuitions of extension do not serve as evidence for any G-Grounds; (2) intuitions of intension do play an evidential role for all G-Grounds, but (3) in the case of G-Grounds which are used as concept-application arguments, they are a poor source of evidence, while (4) in the case of G-Grounds used as concept-revision arguments, they could be a reliable source of evidence if they are intuitions of intension of a speaker immersed in philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Several authors have investigated the question of whether canonical logic-based accounts of belief revision, and especially the theory of AGM revision operators, are compatible with the dynamics of Bayesian conditioning. Here we show that Leitgeb's stability rule for acceptance, which has been offered as a possible solution to the Lottery paradox, allows to bridge AGM revision and Bayesian update: using the stability rule, we prove that AGM revision operators emerge from Bayesian conditioning by an application of the principle of maximum (...) entropy. In situations of information loss, or whenever the agent relies on a qualitative description of her information state - such as a plausibility ranking over hypotheses, or a belief set - the dynamics of AGM belief revision are compatible with Bayesian conditioning; indeed, through the maximum entropy principle, conditioning naturally generated AGM revision operators. This mitigates an impossibility theorem of Lin and Kelly for tracking Bayesian conditioning with AGM revision, and suggests an approach to the compatibility problem that highlights the information loss incurred by acceptance rules in passing from probabilistic to qualitative representations of beliefs. (shrink)

Author: Rogucki Krzysztof Title: PERFORMATIVES IN PHILOSOPHY LANGUAGE OF EUGENIUSZ GRODZIŃSKI (Wypowiedzi performatywne w filozofii języka Eugeniusza Grodzińskiego) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 123-137 Keywords: JOHN L. AUSTIN, EUGENIUSZ GRODZIŃSKI, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGAUAGE, PERFORMATIVES Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article is focused on the works of Eugeniusz Grodziński that concern performatives. The problem is if Austin’s theory of illocution is continuation of his theory of performatives (...) or to a degree contradicts it. Grodziński took the second. He claimed that the first theory is logically independent from the second and that it is possible to distinguish utterances that are informative (reporting, descriptive) from these that are performatives. (shrink)

The proposal that probabilistic inference and unconscious hypothesis testing are central to information processing in the brain has been steadily gaining ground in cognitive neuroscience and associated fields. One popular version of this proposal is the new theoretical framework of predictive processing or prediction error minimization, which couples unconscious hypothesis testing with the idea of ‘active inference’ and claims to offer a unified account of perception and action. Here we will consider one outstanding issue that still looms large at the (...) core of the PEM framework: the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones. In order to fulfill the promise of becoming a unifying framework for describing and modeling cognition, PEM needs to be able to differentiate between conscious and unconscious mental states or processes. We will argue that one currently popular view, that the contents of conscious experience are determined by the ‘winning hypothesis’, falls short of fully accounting for conscious experience. It ignores the possibility that some states of a system can control that system’s behavior even though they are apparently not conscious. What follows from this is that the ‘winning hypothesis’ view does not provide a complete account of the difference between conscious and unconscious states in the probabilistic brain. We show how this problem for the received view can be resolved by augmenting PEM with Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness. This move is warranted by the similar roles that attention and internal competition play in both the PEM framework and the multiple drafts model. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about (...) truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs. (shrink)

This paper is obituary of Leszek Nowak, one of the greatest Polish philosophers of the XX century.

Provides a systematic introduction to the theory of logic programming and shows how this theory can be applied to reason about pure Prolog programs. The text includes an introduction to programming in Prolog and deals with such programming issues as determination, occur-check freedom and absence of errors. It covers both the natural interpretations of logic programming, as declarative specification and as procedure for computer execution.

Reviews/interviews Capital Ellowen Deeowen: A Review of The Making of London: London in Contemporary Literature by Sebastian Groes - Adam Sumera Deconstruction and Liberation: A Review of Simon Glendinning’s Derrida - Wit Pietrzak Authenticity, Transdifference, Survivance: Native American Identity Masked: A Review of Native Authenticity: Transnational Perspectives on Native American Literary Studies, ed. Deborah L. Madsen - Monika Kocot Literature, the Arab Diaspora, Gender and Politics - Fadia Faqir Speaks with Maria Assif Absent Fathers, Outsider Perspectives and Yiddish Typewriters - (...) Norman Ravvin Talks to Krzysztof Majer. (shrink)