English summary: The freedom potential of modern societies, above all the justification of political authority, is today linked to a democratically constituted order. What is meant by the idea of being democratic seems, however, to be anything but clear. Is it only a question of representing the people through elections, ballots, and political parties, or does it include institutional culture, the division of powers, and the legal regime within a community? A "philosophy of the republic," as developed in this volume's (...) contributions, shows that the current "dominance of the democratic" falls short of accounting for the independent significance to the republican self-organisation of state and society. German description: Das Freiheitspotential moderner Gesellschaften, vor allem die Rechtfertigung politischer Herrschaft, wird heute mit einer demokratisch verfassten Ordnung verknupft. Was eine demokratische Ordnung ausmacht, was also die Idee des Demokratischen meint, scheint aber alles andere als klar zu sein. Soll es nur um Fragen der Reprasentation des Volkes durch Wahlen, Abstimmungen und Parteien oder daruber hinaus auch um die institutionelle Kultur, die Gewaltenteilung und das Rechtsregime innerhalb eines Gemeinwesens gehen? Eine "Philosophie der Republik," wie sie in den Beitragen dieses Bandes entwickelt wird, kann zeigen, dass die aktuelle "Dominanz des Demokratischen" keine eigenstandige Bedeutung der republikanischen Selbstorganisation von Staat und Gesellschaft beimisst. Mit Beitragen von: David Abraham, Andreas Anter, Susanne Beck, Jochen Bung, Daniela Demko, Horst Dreier, Andrea Marlen Esser, Helmut Goerlich, Bernd Grzeszick, Klaus Gunther, Matthias Kaufmann, Jean-Francois Kervegan, Thomas Khurana, Stephan Kirste, Oliver Lembcke, Rochus Leonhardt, Georg Lohmann, Wolfgang Schild, Christian Schmidt, Thomas Schmidt-Lux, Kurt Seelmann, Hannes Siegrist, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Trevor Wedman, Marc Andre Wiegand, Benno Zabel, Sabrina Zucca-Soest. (shrink)

Ce qui suit tente de reconsidérer –contre la légende colportée par Auguste Cornu, entre autres , d’un «jeune Marx» encore «idéaliste»,– la conception de la philosophie sans laquelle Marx n’aurait à l’évidence pas pu être amené à affirmer, comme il le fait expressément dès 1843-44, la nécessité d’une «Aufhebung» de celle-ci entendue comme sa «négation […] en tant que philosophie». Conception déjà très fermement esquissée dans les Cahiers qu’il rédige vers 1840 en vue de la Doktordissertation de 1841, et qui (...) l’amène dès cette époque-là à une critique déjà très «radicale» –d’une radicalité que la découverte du «prolétariat» le conduira seulement à accentuer,– d’un idéalisme qu’il voit alors justement révéler au grand jour ce qu’il aurait de «contradictoire» dans la prétention des «jeunes-hégéliens» à «réaliser effectivement» dans le «monde» ce que «le maître», Hegel, serait parvenu à concevoir au titre de «l’Idée», à savoir: rien de moins que le moteur du processus historique tel qu’en sa processualité même. Dont acte pour qui se demanderait quelle pourrait encore être la portée de la philosophie aujourd’hui! (shrink)

Sporthandeln ist Körpertechnik, Einsatz und Inszenierung des sportlichen Körpers (zur zunehmenden Bedeutung des Körpers in der Sportphilosophie vgl. Caysa 2003a, b; Seewald 1996). Aber was ist unter diesem „Körper“ zu verstehen? Ist denn überhaupt der Singular – „der“ Körper – angemessen oder brauchen wir – wie wir am Beispiel der „zwei Körper des Königs“ (Ernst H. Kantorowicz) gelernt haben – mehrere Körper bzw. mehrere unterschiedliche Sprechweisen über diesen Körper des Athleten, der noch dazu – um die Fragestellung zu komplizieren – (...) als des Dopings überführter Teilnehmer an einem Wettbewerb des organisierten Sports angesetzt wird? In diesem Beitrag, der sich daher nicht mit dem Freizeit- oder Schulsport oder mit Fitnesspraktiken oder mit Bodybuilding befasst, sondern sich auf den sich dem Publikum präsentierenden Wettkampfsport beschränkt, werden vier Körper unterschieden und dargestellt. (shrink)

The article argues that feminist emancipation, understood as practices and discourses of self-development and of solidarity as empowerment, has become entangled with the neoliberal project. Indeed, emancipation as self-improvement has become synonymous with moral regulation projects that seek to adapt women to global capitalism. The article explores the relation between emancipation and neoliberal regulation from a situated approach by addressing the experience of Latin American feminisms, with a particular focus on Chile. This approach recognizes by implication that Latin American feminisms (...) are co-extensive, or coeval, with North American and European ones, and are not merely derivative forms. (shrink)

We describe the state of the Talmudic Logic project as of end of 2019. The Talmud is the most comprehensive and fundamental work of Jewish religious law, employing a large number of logical components centuries ahead of their time. In many cases the basic principles are not explicitly formulated, which makes it difficult to formalize and make available to the modern student of Logic. This project on Talmudic Logic, aims to present logical analysis of Talmudic reasoning using modern logical tools. (...) We investigate principles of Talmudic Logic and publish a series of books, one book or more for each principle. The series begins with the systematic analysis of Talmudic inference rules. The first book shows that we can present Talmudic reasoning intuitions as a systematic logical system basic to modern non-deductive reasoning, such as Argumentum A Fortiori, Abduction and Analogy. The second book offers a systematic common sense method for intuitively defining sets and claims that this method adequately models the Talmudic use of the rules Klal uPrat. These books also criticize modern Talmudic research methodology. Later books deal with additional topics like Deontic logic, and Temporal logic, Agency and processes in the Talmud and more. The aims of the project are two fold: 1. To import into the Talmudic study modern logical methods with a view to help understand complicated Talmudic passages, which otherwise cannot be addressed. 2. To export from the Talmud new logical principles which are innovative and useful to modern contemporary logic. (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of how to evaluate an offender’s criminal record. This evaluation is part of the sentencing process carried out by a judge, and may be complicated in the case of offenders with a heavy record. We give a comprehensive overview of the approach to an offender’s past record in various (Western) countries, considering the two major approaches: desert-based and utilitarian. The paper describes the determination of the parameters involved in the evaluation, and the construction of a (...) decision support system to be used by a judge about to pass sentence in a criminal case. The system may be used as a stand-alone system, but can also be integrated as a component of a general sentencing support system, e.g. a statistical sentencing information system. The system is a knowledge-based system. The knowledge base (in rule-form) was created primarily by eliciting knowledge from experts (judges, lawyers, academics and probation officers), but also by applying statutory law, case law and legal authoritative texts. It is flexible in the sense, that a user can introduce his1 own preferences (expressed as numerical coefficients) and thereby apply different sentencing principles. The prototype is at present undergoing testing by some of the participating judges. (shrink)

Much legal research focuses on understanding how judicial decision-makers exercise their discretion. In this paper we examine the notion of legal or judicial discretion, and weaker and stronger forms of discretion. At all times our goal is to build cognitive models of the exercise of discretion, with a view to building computer software to model and primarily support decision-making. We observe that discretionary decision-making can best be modeled using three independent axes: bounded and unbounded, defined and undefined, and binary and (...) continuous. Examples of legal tasks are given from each of the eight ensuing octants and we conclude by saying what this model shows about current legal trends. We should stress that our taxonomy has been based on our observations of how discretionary legal decisions are made. No claim is made that our model is either complete (providing advice in every domain) or exact, but it does help knowledge engineers construct legal decision support systems in discretionary domains. (shrink)

According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemologists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value by standing in certain instrumental relations—namely, by tending to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instrumental relations to fundamental value. Veritists, I believe, can and should follow suit. After (...) setting the stage in §1, I explain in §2 why Veritism should not take an Instrumentalist form. Instrumentalist Veritism faces a generalized version of the swamping problem. But this problem undermines Instrumentalism, not Veritism: granting Instrumentalism, similar problems arise for any economical epistemic axiology. I show in §3 how Veritism can take a less narrow form and solve the swamping problem. After answering some objections in §4, I consider in §5 what some would regard as a less radical alternative solution and argue that it either fails or collapses into mine. I close in §6 by taking stock and re-evaluating the overall prospects for Veritism, suggesting that it is a highly promising epistemic axiology when divorced from Instrumentalism. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

First English translation of revolutionary paper that established that even in elementary parts of arithmetic, there are propositions which cannot be proved or disproved within the system. Introduction by R. B. Braithwaite.

This paper argues that the historical conception of knowing as a presentational factive mental state (‘presentationalism’) is not best understood as an alternative to belief-based and knowledge-first epistemology, but rather as an account of epistemic architecture that is compatible with these paradigms. To defend this claim, the paper focuses on a challenge to presentationalism raised by inferential knowledge and argues that the problem can be solved only if presentationalism is understood as I suggest. The paper is structured as follows. §1 (...) explains presentationalism and its recent revival. §2 considers a flat-footed argument that presentationalism cannot get any cases of inferential knowledge right. §3 suggests that this problem can and should be solved by drawing a distinction between two kinds of epistemic priority, and by holding that inferential knowledge can be immediate in an epistemologically significant sense. But §4 argues that this only goes so far, since not all inferential knowledge is alike. This further problem can also be solved, but only if presentationalism is reframed as a proposal about epistemic architecture that does not compete with belief-based and knowledge-first accounts, §5 concludes. (shrink)

The world famous Eltroxin saga of 2009–2011, which ignited heated public debates in Europe, Canada, and Australia, reveals the problematic nature of standalone autonomy protection cases. Eltroxin is a life-sustaining thyroid hormone replacement medicine used by millions worldwide; it was reformulated in 2008, and around 10% of patients were badly affected. Poor communication and lack of professional information triggered public hysteria as a global wave of complaints about harmful side effects, including hair loss, weight gain, extreme fatigue, headaches, diarrhoea, and (...) heightened heart rates, flooded the media. Israeli Eltroxin users (around 250 thousand people) were similarly unaware. Following many media reports and ministerial regulations, a high-profile consumer class action was launched against Perrigo, the distributor. Ten years of court proceedings culminated in a compensation settlement of approximately US$ 14 million. This relatively low sum covered the injuries of those patients who were physically affected; compensation for standalone autonomy injuries to all patients (who were denied information about changes to their life-sustaining medicine) was refused. The monetary settlement and court decision were hugely disappointing to the class plaintiffs, and a negative signal was sent to the proponents of consumers' and patients' personal autonomy. However, the class action still marked a positive change in pharmaceutical protocols for relations between health authorities, commercial pharmacy entities, and patients/consumers as seen by the proactive communication around a subsequent Eltroxin reformulation in 2020 in Israel, Europe, and South Africa (Aspen Pharmacare, 2020).1 This paper highlights the vast potential value of consumer class action proceedings, and pharmaceutical consumer (patient) class actions in particular, for public welfare and private autonomy. The paper will explain leading Israeli case law related to consumer autonomy protection in tort law and will argue that this law still holds the unique protection of autonomy as a basic human right and accordingly recognises harm to autonomy as a viable form of damage. Additionally, it illustrates why and how consumer protection class actions are an important tool for protection of human rights in general and of patients' rights in particular. (shrink)

According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency but increases perceptions of experience. These effects were found (...) when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics. The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible but more sensitive to harm. These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa (1940-) is a central figure in contemporary epistemology. He is best known for pioneering the subfield of virtue epistemology, as well as developing across four decades his own distinctive framework in this tradition. Besides providing an overview of this work, this article offers a guide to Sosa’s other contributions to epistemology, stretching back to his first publication in 1964. The organization is as follows. §1 reviews Sosa’s distinctive brand of virtue epistemology and its development since 1980. §2 provides (...) a fuller synopsis of Sosa’s contributions to epistemology in five parts, covering his work on (i) the structure of justification and knowledge, (ii) the dawning of knowledge and understanding, (iii) skepticism and the possibility of empirical knowledge, (iv) methodology and the possibility of philosophy, and (v) the relationship between mind and world. Our aim is to encourage renewed appreciation of the full scope and depth of Sosa’s epistemology. We hope the reader will benefit from (re)exploring Sosa’s work guided by the map detailed below. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide new foundations for experientialism about perceptual knowledge, the view that all perceptual knowledge derives from experience. §1 introduces the basic template for experientialism about perceptual knowledge and considers how recent work on perceptual justification encourages giving special attention to less intuitive ways of filling in the template. §2 and §3 draw attention to ways of filling in the template that are more compelling, including versions from the history of epistemology that are still taken seriously elsewhere (...) (e.g., in philosophy of mind and cognitive science). §4 spotlights one neglected kind of approach—anti-Humean experientialism—and highlights some of its attractive features. §5 concludes by noting how anti-Humean experientialism dissolves an influential problem for experientialism that originates in Sellars (1956). (shrink)

Some say the swamping problem confronts all who believe that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. This, I say, is mistaken. The problem only confronts T-Monists if they grant two teleological claims: that all derived epistemic value is instrumental, and that it is the state of believing truly rather than the standard of truth in belief that is fundamentally epistemically valuable. T-Monists should reject and, and appeal to a non-teleological form of value derivation I call Fitting Response Derivation (...) that obviates swamping. Since, alas, simple reliabilists can’t apply this model to knowledge, the problem remains for them, and is local. (shrink)

Ordinary thought recognizes many ways of knowing. Not all are epistemologically fundamental. Nevertheless, it is standard to think there is more than one fundamental way—call this view access pluralism. Access monism opposes access pluralism. This paper defends a version of access monism I call presentationalist monism (§1), on which the sole fundamental way of knowing is presentation. I defend presentationalist monism in three stages. Firstly (§2), I suggest that it is compelling about four central ways of knowing—viz., perceiving, episodically remembering, (...) introspecting, and intuiting. Then (§3) I argue that presentationalist monism also explains ostensibly less straightforward cases, including inference, testimony, semantic memory, and practical knowledge. After working through cases in this way, I show how this enumerative argument can be secured by understanding the view as a kind of formal foundationalism about ways of knowing. I conclude by addressing an objection (§4) and considering whether presentationalism about ways of knowing supports a presentational account of knowledge, cautioning against this inference (§5). (shrink)

Describes in text and photographs mitzvos that Jewish children can do.

This research examines the relationships between education in business ethics, Reynolds’s (J Appl Psychol 93:1027–1041, 2008) “moral attentiveness” construct, or the extent to which individuals chronically perceive and reflect on morality and moral elements in their experiences, and Singhapakdi et al.’s (J Bus Ethics 15:1131–1140, 1996) measure of perceptions of the role of ethics and social responsibility (PRESOR). Education in business ethics was found to be positively associated with the two identified factors of moral attentiveness, “reflective” and “perceptual” moral attentiveness, (...) and with the PRESOR “stakeholder view” factor. Also, reflective moral attentiveness was found to act as a mediator in the relationship between education in business ethics and the PRESOR stakeholder view factor. Evidence of gender and social desirability bias effects was also found. The implications of these relationships and social cognitive theory for improved understanding of the mechanisms by which a variety of variables have their effects on PRESOR in business are discussed. (shrink)

Judgment and Agency contains Sosa’s latest effort to explain how higher epistemic value of the sort missing from an unwitting clairvoyant’s beliefs might be a special case of performance normativity, with its superior value following from truisms about performance value. This paper argues that the new effort rests on mistaken assumptions about performance normativity. Once these mistaken assumptions are exposed, it becomes clear that higher epistemic value cannot be a mere special case of performance normativity, and its superiority cannot be (...) guaranteed just by truisms about performance value. Sections 1 and 2 set the stage, clarifying the thesis and the relevant features of Sosa’s strategy, and explaining why the strategy requires the mistaken assumptions. Section 3 presents a dilemma for the new account of higher epistemic value. Section 4 deepens the case for one of the horns. Section 5 takes stock and draws some broader morals. (shrink)

Annie Besant has rarely been identified as a philosopher. Her work as an ethicist has been obscured by the reaction of critics to her abandonment of Anglican Christianity for serial eng...

Whereas in the first half of the 20th century, proclamation was the focal point of pastoral care in Germany, the 1970s witnessed an embracing of the American pastoral care movement. From then on, pastoral care was increasingly understood as accompanying patients whilst adopting the spiritual dimension. Nowadays, Christian chaplains are encountering an increasing number of patients from different religious communities. Various models have been proposed to help Protestant chaplains find an authentic form of pastoral care suitable for all religions. Until (...) a clear position is assumed with regard to Christianity's demands of absolutism, however, none of these approaches can be satisfactory. (shrink)

It is widely recognised that mainstream economics has failed to translate micro consistently into macro economics and to provide endogenous explanations for the continual changes in the economic system. Since the early 1980s, a growing number of economists have been trying to provide answers to these two key questions by applying an evolutionary approach. This new departure has yielded a rich literature with enormous variety, but the unifying principles connecting the various ideas and views presented are, as yet, not apparent. (...) This 2005 volume brings together fifteen original articles from scholars - each of whom has made a significant contribution to the field - in their common effort to reconstruct economics as an evolutionary science. Using meso economics as an analytical entity to bridge micro and macro economics as well as static and dynamic realms, a unified economic theory emerges. (shrink)

The directionality of space-number association (SNA) is shaped by cultural experiences. It usually follows the culturally dominant reading direction. Smaller numbers are generally associated with the starting side for reading (left side in Western cultures), while larger numbers are associated with the right endpoint side. However, SNAs consistent with cultural reading directions are present before children can actually read and write. Therefore, these SNAs cannot only be shaped by the direction of children’s own reading/writing behavior. We propose six distinct processes (...) – one biological and five cultural/educational – underlying directional SNAs before formal reading acquisition: (i) Brain lateralization, (ii) Monitoring adult reading behavior, (iii) Pretend reading and writing, and rudimentary reading and writing skills, (iv) Dominant attentional directional preferences in a society, not directly related to reading direction, (v) Direct spatial-numerical learning, (vi) Other spatial-directional processes independent of reading direction. In this mini-review, we will differentiate between these processes, elaborate when in development they might emerge, discuss how they may create the SNAs observed in preliterate children and propose how they can be studied in the future. (shrink)

In early German ecology, the key concept used to refer to a synecological unit was Biozönose. Taken together with the concept of the Biotop, it was also understood as an integrated higher-order unit of life, sometimes called a “Holozön”. These units were often perceived as having properties similar to those of individual organisms, and they informed the mainstream of German ecology until at least the late 1960s. Here I ask how “organismic” these concepts really were and what conceptual problems they (...) entailed. To do so, I focus on some almost forgotten dissident positions, especially those of Friedrich Simon Bodenheimer and Fritz Peus, which I contrast with the mainstream German ecology of the time. In a radical paper published in 1954 that postulated the “dissolution of the concepts of biocoenosis and biotope”, Peus in particular elicited a forceful response from many prominent German ecologists. An analysis of the ensuing debate, including especially a colloquium held in 1959 that was partly inspired by Peus’ paper, is helpful for sifting the various arguments proffered with respect to a quasi-organismic perception of the biocoenosis in German speaking ecology. Although German mainstream ecologists rejected the notion of the biocoenosis as a superorganism, ontological holism was quite common among them. Additionally, the mainstream concept of the biocoenosis was plagued by several methodological problems and much conceptual confusion, to which the “dissidents” rightly pointed. Some of these problems are still pertinent today, e.g. in connection with more modern concepts such as “ecosystem”. (shrink)

I give a semantics for a logic with two pairs of doxastic modals and an indicative conditional connective that all nest without restriction. Sentences are evaluated as accepted, rejected, or neither. Certainty is the necessity-like modality of acceptance. Inferences may proceed from premises that are certain, or merely accepted, or a mix of both. This semantic setup yields some striking results. Notably, the existence of inferences that preserve certainty but not acceptance very directly implies both failure of modus ponens for (...) the indicative conditional in the logic of acceptance and failure of the deduction theorem for the material conditional in the logic of certainty. The latter failure dissolves, in the logic of certainty, the much - discussed tension between modus ponens and the law of import-export. (shrink)

This article introduces the theory of cognitive spacetime. This account allows us to go beyond the space–time dichotomy that is commonly employed in psychology and cognitive science. Linguistic analysis and experimental review is provided to support the notion that what is commonly referred to as spatial cognition (or mental space) in the cognitive sciences always contains time, and that what is commonly referred to as temporal cognition (or mental time) always contains space. For “spatial cognition” the term object-spatiotemporal cognition (or (...) object spacetime) and for “temporal cognition” the term event-spatiotemporal cognition (or event spacetime) is introduced. In order to exemplify the virtue of the new spacetime account (with its two subdomains, object spacetime and event spacetime) with a specific example, it is investigated how this new notion can substantially refine our understanding of space–time conceptual metaphor. A new conceptual-metaphor spacetime typology for cognitive processing underlying fictive motion and non-fictive motion is also proposed. Implications of the new spacetime account are discussed for metaphorically mapped mental perspective, metaphorically mapped embodiment, and cognitive science in general. Finally, specific reasons are given why the current proposal of cognitive spacetime cannot be equated with the concept of spacetime in modern physics. (shrink)