Seeking to better understand how nonprofit organizations (NPOs) manage hybridity, we investigated what distinguishes NPOs that combine multiple logics in productive and unproductive ways. We collected and analyzed data from six case studies of NPOs delivering social services in Australia. Our findings reveal that organizational members of NPOs take a _perspective_ on their hybrid nature which comprises four elements: motivational framing, actor engagement, resourcing attitude, and governance orientation. NPOs that combine multiple logics in productive and unproductive ways, respectively, are distinguished (...) by (1) a compelling or confused motivational framing for combining logics; (2) actors having active and shared, or passive and isolated, engagement with multiple logics; (3) attitudes toward resourcing multiple logics that are either coherent or competitive; and (4) a governance orientation toward multiple logics as opportunities to leverage or problems to resist. Our findings contribute to the literature by deepening understanding of the interplay between complex constellations of multiple logics in NPOs, including religious and professional logics. We also develop a model of organizational perspectives on hybridity and their implications for distinguishing NPOs that productively harness tensions between logics. (shrink)

Seeking to better understand how nonprofit organizations (NPOs) manage hybridity, we investigated what distinguishes NPOs that combine multiple logics in productive and unproductive ways. We collected and analyzed data from six case studies of NPOs delivering social services in Australia. Our findings reveal that organizational members of NPOs take a perspective on their hybrid nature which comprises four elements: motivational framing, actor engagement, resourcing attitude, and governance orientation. NPOs that combine multiple logics in productive and unproductive ways, respectively, are distinguished (...) by (1) a compelling or confused motivational framing for combining logics; (2) actors having active and shared, or passive and isolated, engagement with multiple logics; (3) attitudes toward resourcing multiple logics that are either coherent or competitive; and (4) a governance orientation toward multiple logics as opportunities to leverage or problems to resist. Our findings contribute to the literature by deepening understanding of the interplay between complex constellations of multiple logics in NPOs, including religious and professional logics. We also develop a model of organizational perspectives on hybridity and their implications for distinguishing NPOs that productively harness tensions between logics. (shrink)

1. Overview -/- 1.1 Main Divisions When, if ever, is it morally permissible to end the life of a human embryo or fetus, and why? As regards the first of these questions, there are extreme anti-abortion views, according to which abortion is prima facie seriously wrong from conception onwards – or at least shortly thereafter; there are extreme permissibility views, according to which abortion is always permissible in itself; and there are moderate views, according to which abortion is sometimes permissible, (...) and sometimes not. -/- Moderate views appeal to a variety of considerations in support of the view that abortion is sometimes justified, but these fall into four main categories. First, there are cases where the developing human is seriously defective in some way – perhaps such that it will not have a life that is worth living. Secondly, there are cases where continuation of pregnancy would involve serious risks to the life or health of the woman. Thirdly, there are moderate positions according to which the developing human initially does not have serious moral status, or a right to life, but acquires such status at some point before birth. Finally, it is often held that abortion is justified in the case of rape. -/- With the exception of the last consideration, moderate views assume that the moral status of the developing human is crucial with respect to the permissibility of abortion. Moreover, this is a natural assumption that was shared by all sides until the publication in 1971 of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article “A Defense of Abortion,” in which she argued that abortion is permissible even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that human embryos and fetuses have a right to life. Thus we have one of the great divides in the philosophical discussion of abortion: Is the moral status of the developing human generally decisive with regard to the moral permissibility of abortion or not? -/- 1.2 The Moral Status of the Developing Human: Thomson and Boonin Thomson’s article evoked many critical responses, along with some defenses, which I have described elsewhere (2013; “Thomson’s Attempt to Defend Abortion in General”). Crucial, however, is David Boonin’s defense (2003), which contains responses to all of the important objections directed against the attempt to show that one can defend abortion while granting that human embryos and fetuses have a right to life fully on a par with that of normal adult human beings. -/- Boonin’s impressive efforts notwithstanding, I do not think that this way of defending an extreme permissibility view is successful. The crucial issue is whether it is morally permissible intentionally to bring into existence an entity with a right to life in a situation where one knows that it will not survive without one’s assistance, and then to refrain from providing that assistance. An especially forceful way of arguing that this is not permissible is found in an article by Richard Langer (1993, 351-2), who argues that if this were permissible, it would follow not only that abortion was justified, but also that it is permissible to allow one’s children to die, some years after birth, simply because one no longer wishes to care for them. -/- 1.3 Moderate Views Moderate positions on abortion raise a number of issues that, for reasons of space, I cannot address here. Some of these depend on the issue of the moral status of the developing human, and defending a moderate view requires showing that both extreme anti-abortion and extreme moral permissibility views concerning the moral status of humans before birth are incorrect. I have argued elsewhere (1983, 285-302, and 2009, 59-63) that the prospects of doing this are not promising. -/- As regards permissibility in the case of rape, everything depends upon whether, as Thomson contends (1971), there is no obligation to be a good Samaritan, rather than merely a minimally decent one, and so no obligation for a woman to remain pregnant to save the life of a being that she was not responsible for bringing into existence. Finally, on the one hand, in cases where the woman will die if an abortion is not performed, virtually all moral philosophers, with the exception of those who embrace the moral view advanced by the Catholic Church in encyclicals by Pope Pius XI (1930) and Pope Paul VI (1968), agree that abortion is morally permissible, while, on the other hand, if the situation is one where there is only some risk that the woman will die if an abortion is not performed, or where the threat is not to the woman’s life, but only to her health, then the situation does seem clear-cut if one assumes that the embryo or fetus has a right to life. -/- 1.4 Extreme Anti-Abortion Views Very different arguments are offered for the view that abortion is in itself never permissible. First of all, in popular discussions, appeal is frequently made to the mere fact of membership in the biologically defined species Homo sapiens, but among those who are philosophically knowledgeable, this line of argument is almost invariably rejected, for reasons that I have set out elsewhere (Tooley, 2009, 21-35). -/- Secondly, appeal is also made to the idea that humans have immaterial minds, or souls – for example, by Stephen Schwartz (1990), J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae (2000), Norman Ford (2002), and Francis J. Beckwith, (2005). The postulation of immaterial minds or souls is, however, open to strong objections, since there is excellent evidence that human psychological powers have their categorical bases in neural structures, rather than in an immaterial substance (Tooley, 2009, 15-19). In addition, the postulation of an immaterial soul, conceived of along Thomistic lines, is on a collision course with biology, since such an immaterial soul is held to govern a human’s life processes and biological development. -/- Thirdly, there is the ‘substantial identity’ argument, advanced for example by Patrick Lee (2004), and which claims that an entity possesses a right to life by virtue of the type of substance it is. This view is exposed to a number of strong objections, however, among them the fact that it leads to the unacceptable consequence that a human that has suffered upper brain death still has a right to life (Tooley, 2009, 51-9). -/- The upshot is that most philosophers do not find any of the preceding three lines of argument for an extreme anti-abortion position promising. The focus, accordingly, has been elsewhere – namely, on arguments claiming that human embryos and fetuses have serious moral status, or a right to life, because they have the potentiality for developing those psychological capacities – for thought, self-consciousness, rationality, and so on – that seem clearly relevant to a being’s moral status. -/- In what follows, then, I shall confine my discussion to what seems to me the most crucial issue bearing upon the moral status of abortion, namely, that between, on the one hand, a potentiality account of moral status, and, on the other, the type of approach most commonly appealed to in support of an extreme permissibility position on abortion, namely, a personhood account of the right to life. -/- One of the earliest defenders of the view that potentialities give something a right to life was Jim Stone in his article, “Why Potentiality Matters,” where Stone argues for the conclusion, “we have a prima facie duty not to deprive them of the conscious goods which it is their nature to realize” (1987, 821). Stone’s discussion, however, attracted much less attention than an article published two years later by Don Marquis, entitled “Why Abortion is Immoral.” The latter is one of the most interesting articles on abortion, as well as one of the most discussed––and deservedly so. In what follows, then, I shall focus upon it. -/- My discussion is organized as follows. In section 2, I summarize Marquis’s account of the wrongness of killing. Then, in section 3, I set out an alternative account, one in which the concept of a neo-Lockean person is central. Sections 4, 5, and 6 are then devoted to criticisms of Marquis’s approach, all of which also support the alternative, rights-based, neo-Lockean personhood account. (shrink)

Inspired by Patrick Lee’s “A Christian Philosopher’s View of Recent Directions in the Abortion Debate,” this essay raises the question of how effective philosophical arguments can be in determining the moral status of legalized abortion. On one hand, Christian philosophers have been successful in explaining both the humanity and the personhood of the unborn child, as well as exposing the incoherence of those who would deny the unborn child’s humanity or personhood. Nevertheless, in order to confront the pro-abortion position in (...) its most radical form, a much more complex philosophical argument must be given. Following thinkers such as Alasdaire MacIntyre, Christian philosophers must articulate and promote a philosophical position according to which morality is conceived in richer terms than the mere respecting of individual rights. The social dimension of human nature must be rediscovered in order that the happiness and welfare of others becomes a desirable goal in and of itself. According to a morality where individual rights is the bottom line (for example, that of Judith Jarvis Thompson), women very well may have the right to “extricate” themselves from their pregnancy even when doing so will result in the death of their child. What must be explained, therefore, is the more profound insight that social morality is equally concerned with obligations to others, including those who are most helpless and unable to speak for themselves. (shrink)

Although there are compelling reasons for believing otherwise, compassion cannot provide a basis for grounding a viable theory of civil and political society. Firstly, it is often irrational or personally irresponsible to be compassionate. Secondly, relations based on compassion do not require characteristics that are essential for a viable civil and political society. Thirdly, the unpredictable consequences of compassion are such that compassion alone is not sufficient for grounding a viable civil and political society. Finally, obligating people to be compassionate (...) is antithetical to what is required for being compassionate. (shrink)

In this article Judith Jarvis Thomson's Good Samaritan Argument in defense of abortion in the case of rape is defended from two objections: the Kill vs. Let Die Objection, and the Intend to Kill vs. Merely Foresee Death Objection. The article concludes that these defenses do not defend Thomson from further objections from Peter Singer and David Oderberg.

I argue that naturalistic pictures provide a guide and a justification for our concept of colour. The crucial relation between pictures and colours is to be brought out, not by reference to the ‘internal’ relations between colours (for example, what differentiates green from red), but by considering how colours are differentiated from the wider range of visually discriminable qualities. Naturalistic pictures effect such a differentiation by simulating colour-like qualities such as gold, amber, and blond, while requiring nothing beyond the three-dimensional (...) manifold of colour space. The seeming simplicity and salience of colour in our visual experience should be recognized as depending on our familiarity with this reductive power of naturalistic pictures. While some sense of these issues has been given expression by many thinkers, the idea is significantly articulated in remarks of Wittgenstein's that were prompted by his reading of a letter the painter Runge wrote to Goethe. (shrink)

No exact definition of an “organic” substance has been agreed upon by the chemical community and textbook definitions vary substantially. The question of what exactly constitutes an “organic” substance is explored in this paper. Various carbon-containing substances that have been by some considered to be “inorganic” are examined in an attempt to ascertain whether carbon in these compounds display different chemical behavior than what is expected of carbon in an “organic” substance. Types of substances considered are carbon allotropes, carbides, carbonates (...) and bicarbonates, cyanide and cyanate ions, carbido clusters, carbon oxides, and compounds without hydrogen.Graphic abstract. (shrink)

A solution to the problem of “overcriminalization” appears to be decriminalization of certain crimes. This Essay focuses on a group of crimes that has been labeled “proxy crimes” as a candidate to be eliminated. What are proxy crimes? Douglas Husak defines them as “offenses designed to achieve a purpose other than to prevent the conduct they explicitly proscribe.” Michael Moore describes them as involving situations where we “use one morally innocuous act as a proxy for another, morally wrongful act or (...) mental state.” Put that way, proxy crimes seem highly problematic, and Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan bluntly put it, “We reject proxy crimes.” This Essay asks whether we should reject proxy crimes by presenting and evaluating Alexander and Ferzan’s treatment of the subject. After describing several different types of crimes that may be characterized as proxy crimes and Alexander and Ferzan’s rejection of most of them and their arguments for doing so, this Essay argues that their rejection of proxy crimes is incomplete, which leaves their theory open to a range of possibilities regarding the proper place of proxy crimes in criminal law. This Essay concludes that getting a handle on the problem of proxy crimes and overcriminalization requires a theory of the state and an articulation of the proper relationship between the state and its citizens that can give guidance on when the state can demand obedience from citizens to support the state and when failures to comply with such demands render one criminally culpable. Without such a theory, proposals to address overcriminalization cannot travel very far. (shrink)

One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be (...) enough to register all aspects of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We claim this problem can be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that differ in strength from belief. The resulting alternative picture, a kind of doxastic states pluralism, retains the central features of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an emphasis on truth as a kind of objective accuracy—while adequately accounting for rational action. (shrink)

Political character, the dynamic intersection of personality and public performance within a cultural and historical context, is appropriately the subject of news reports. The article provides journalists with an ethical rationale for covering political character while acknowledging the human need for privacy and then outlines a set of characterrelated issues that journalists should explore. It concludes with the suggestion that journalists should once again begin to cover the public record of political figures in-depth and that this public record be linked (...) with deeper, psychologically based explorations of character. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Doxxing is a form of online abuse where doxxers deliberately seek and publish their targets’ personal information without consent, often with malicious intent such as ruining their reputation. Despite its prevalence, doxxing has received little scholarly attention compared to other forms of online aggression, and almost no study has approached doxxing from a language and discourse perspective. This exploratory study analyzes 464 online forum posts and comments related to doxxing during the on-going pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, addressing the (...) overarching question: In what ways is doxxing a discursive action? More specifically, how is doxxing realized intertextually? What are the discourse strategies that forum participants employ to legitimize doxxing? Informed by Critical Discourse Analysis, the analysis begins by illustrating doxxing as an intertextual and recontextualized social practice, focusing on a forum thread that discloses a police officer’s personal information. The core part of the paper discusses four key legitimation strategies of doxxing identified in the data, rationalization, definition, construction of negative-Other, and victimizing ‘Us’. The paper concludes by considering the role of doxxing in the Hong Kong social movement, and outlining some directions for future research. (shrink)

Eric Voegelin’s Asian Political Thought brings together scholars from both Asia and the West to reflect upon the political philosopher’s thought about China, Japan, Korea, Central Asia, and India, showing how Voegelin’s approach can illuminate the region but also what are the possibilities that Asia offers in the twentieth-first century.

What aspects of philosophical style really count? What aspects of philosophical writing count only as matters of style? Some features of philosophical writing and talking do seem to be of merely ornamental significance, worthy subjects only of gossip or banter. We are familiar with the academic sneer with which poor Professor Kluck is charged with having “somehow managed to confuse” one thing with another. A more serious stylistic matter, of course, would be Professor Kluck’s own willingness to use the apparatus (...) of modal logic in his pathetic endeavors. Or is that a matter of style? If so, does the same concept apply to such amusing and affective phenomena as accent and cadence? We have heard Professor Chisholm’s rising terminal voice inflection, if only because it is so widely imitated. One thinks of Professor Earle’s favorite condemnation “boring” pronounced with an “o” which seems to touch base on every vowel sound known to man. We are impressed by Goodman’s pithiness, and we register his penchant for alliterative triples. We compare Bergmann’s Laocöonian baroque prose with Quine’s soothing urbanity. It is an interesting fact that these are the features which come to mind when we begin to consider the whole question of philosophical style. Have we so internalized the parts that really count that they seem “white,” neutral, style-free? There might well be historical factors which encourage such blindness. Varying degrees of lingering transcendentalism about philosophical method would not be easily reconciled with the awful idea that one is merely speaking a local dialect. Of course the transcendentalism itself is rarely owned up to as such, as if it is assumed that it is Reason which speaks but that it is in poor taste to say so. Alternative methods, when confronted, generate distaste, horror, or the head-shaking sort of wonderment of the Eighteenth Century Parisian who wondered how on earth anyone could be a Persian. (shrink)

인간에 대한 과학적 묘사로 인간들 사이의 관계를 인지하는 것과는 반대로, 본 논문은 Emmanuel Levinas와 Iris Murdoch이 제시한 상상적이고 비논리적 형식을 통해 인지 가능한 인간관계를 살펴본다. 레비나스와 머독은 형이상학적 사유를 옹호함으로써 인간의 관계를 연구하면서, 통찰력을 가지고 이 관계를 이야기처럼 전개한다. 동시대 인물인 머독과 레비나스는 서로 다른 공간에 존재하며 피차의 존재를 알지 못하였으나 윤리 문제, 얼굴에 대한 생각, 셰익스피어 등에 대한 이해에 대해 흥미로운 유사점이 있다. 이 논문은 이 두인물이 형이상학에 대한 독서 측면에서 공유하는 윤리에 대한 비교 인식을 제시한다.

ABSTRACT ‘Mind moment analysis’ is a professional counselling technique rooted in early Buddhist teachings. Employing the process of cognition discussed in Madhupiṇḍika Sutta as its theoretical foundation, mind moment analysis takes form in seven iterative steps for the therapeutic practitioner to help clients deconstruct disturbing mental phenomena, detach from mental turbulence and discern wholesome and unwholesome mind acts. After cultivating stability and clarity of mind, practitioners collaborate with clients to investigate the root causes of craving beneath conceptual proliferations and mindfully (...) choose constructive thoughts, thereby resulting in reduced suffering. This paper introduces the theoretical background of mind moment analysis, uses a case example of this therapeutic intervention with sample transcript verbatim to illustrate each step, and discusses the treatment components of the intervention. (shrink)

The wrongfulness constraint, as a principle of criminalization, is supposed to preclude criminalization in the absence of wrongfulness. Crimes that look especially problematic from the perspective of the wrongfulness constraint are mala prohibita offenses. The aim of this Essay is to consider the question whether the wrongfulness constraint can serve as an effective tool to curb overcriminalization by looking at the case of mala prohibita offenses. This Essay defends the following propositions. First, because of the availability of an array of (...) tools to defend various mala prohibita offenses as satisfying the wrongfulness constraint, it is often not a straightforward matter to demonstrate that committing a malum prohibitum offense is not wrongful. Second, as a result, the wrongfulness constraint is of limited use as a way of stemming the tide of overcriminalization. The Essay concludes by suggesting, more broadly, that the problem of overcriminalization is not that too many crimes violate the wrongfulness constraint but that criminal laws, even those that satisfy the wrongfulness constraint, can easily become a source of oppression, and that asking whether crimes violate the wrongfulness constraint may be counterproductive because the question misdirects our attention. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just Sustainability: Technology, Ecology, and Resource Extraction eds. by Christiana Z. Peppard and Andrea ViciniTallessyn Zawn Grenfell-LeeJust Sustainability: Technology, Ecology, and Resource Extraction Edited by Christiana Z. Peppard and Andrea Vicini maryknoll, ny: orbis, 2015. 304 pp. $42.00Just Sustainability offers a detailed journey through various Catholic contextual understandings of what ecological sustainability means today in light of the demands of justice. In the first section of the book, (...) called "Locations" (11–53), the contributors put concepts of sustainability into dialog with concerns of socioeconomic, gender, and racial justice from contexts as diverse as Europe, East Asia, India, Africa, and North America. The various locations share common themes, such as the importance of deep meanings of the term "sustainability," the priority of education and advocacy, the resource and energy challenges behind structures of injustice, and the primary role of economics. Yet distinctive emphases emerge from the diverse contexts as well. Examples include the [End Page 200] need for humility instead of the ironic arrogance of nuclear energy in Japan, the widespread challenges of corruption in Africa and Mexico, and the problem of the agriculture lobby in the United States.The second section, "Structures" (57–156), steps back from specific cultural contexts and explores various systemic approaches to the challenge of just sustainability. Using Catholic social teachings, the authors again often speak from diverse global contexts, but with reference specifically to economic and societal systems such as politics, measurements of well-being, urban planning, food and agriculture, and health care. In this section the authors speak of which structures have worked and which have failed to build just and sustainable societies. For example, in the Philippines, more accountability through transparency and regular reporting helped impact energy efficiency. In Kenya and Chad, the authors highlight the need for reliable social systems of access, communication, collaboration, and government in order to counter corruption and build sustainable programs to address HIV, hunger, employment, and food sovereignty. Several authors also describe the positive impact of more democratic and egalitarian participatory structures that involve the people most affected by ecological decisions and policies.The last section, "Theological Stances and Sustainable Relations" (159–268), delves more deeply into Catholic theological resources to provide both a foundation as well as specific practices of just sustainability. The authors wrestle with theocentric, biocentric, and anthropocentric concepts of humanity and the imago Dei, the Eucharist as a potentially powerful way to connect ideas of inequity, the promise of ecofeminist theologies in elevating the wisdom of local peoples to build just sustainability practices, and virtue ethics and Catholic social teachings to foster ecological conversion and build solidarity, hope, and efficacy.The book sets itself a challenging task, to provide a coherent picture of Catholic approaches to building just sustainability while presenting a spectrum of not only diverse cultural and geographical contexts but also diverse theologies. In the end, the book reveals the ways in which Catholic laity and leaders are creatively responding to the challenge of just sustainability across much of the globe by using a combination of ecclesial, theological, and social scientific resources. The book would have benefited from a concluding essay to tie together some of the salient themes from the numerous, somewhat disparate essays, and a chapter from South America would have strengthened the global orientation of the collection. Nonetheless, the reader is left with a more holistic understanding of the difficult task of just sustainability as well as the wealth of work toward this goal from many parts of the Earth. [End Page 201]Tallessyn Zawn Grenfell-LeeBoston University School of TheologyCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

James K. A. Smith’s Awaiting the King is the most effective popularization of Augustine’s political thought currently available, but its reliance on the work of Oliver O’Donovan obscures uncomfortable elements of Augustine’s thought, and it does not adequately address how the racial and socioeconomic composition of Christian communities is itself formative.