Obra epistologràfica / introducció de J. Estellés -- Obra filològica / introducció de J. Pérez Durà -- Obra filosòfica / introducció de C. Mínguez -- Obra jurídica / introducció d'I. Roca -- Obra religiosa / introducció d'I. Roca -- Sobre ciència i medicina / introducció de J. Ll. Barona i V. Navarro -- Sobre la dona / introducció de N. Campillo -- Obra pedagògica / introducció d'A. Mayordomo -- Obra psicològica / introducció de F. Tortosa.

According to Essentialism, an object’s properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. While being human is commonly thought to be essential to Socrates, being a philosopher plausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing—as we just did—to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion of essential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a given property. In this paper, I elaborate on these (...) issues and explore the way in which essential properties behave in relation to other related properties, like sufficient-for-existence properties and individual essences. (shrink)

Abstract.The biological and cognitive approach to religion has matured somewhat and reveals interesting results. Nevertheless, some questions arise about its foundation and development. The essay offers a review of current research in the cognitive field, focusing on its conclusions, the internal discussions, and the problems that need more study or correction. Emphasis is placed on a more intricate account of the factors involved in religious experience, discussing the proper use of the discoveries of biocognitive research and the limits that should (...) be placed on said conclusions. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the Epistemic Challenge for mind-independent accounts of modality. The challenge can be formulated as an inconsistency problem among three premises and, therefore, any strategy to meet the challenge will require the negation of (at least) one of its premises. The aim of the paper is not to offer a positive solution to the challenge, but rather to argue for the claim that to follow a hybrid strategy is probably the best way to meet it. With some (...) qualifications, reasons are given as to why empiricism should be the way to meet the challenge as far as de re modality is concerned, whereas rationalism might be the correct way of addressing it for the case of de dicto modality. (shrink)

The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to.

This article echoes those voices that demand new approaches and ‹senses’ for management education and business programs. Much of the article is focused on showing that the polemic about the educative model of business schools has moral and epistemological foundations and opens up the debate over the type of knowledge that practitioners need to possess in order to manage organizations, and how this knowledge can be taught in management programs. The article attempts to highlight the moral dimension of management through (...) a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom. I defend the ideas that management is never morally neutral and that Aristotelian practical wisdom allows the recovery of moral considerations in management practice. I analyze the impact and implications that the introduction of practical wisdom in business schools entails for the conception and objectives of management education. This view reconfigures management education in terms of attention to values, virtues and context. Therefore, management programmes should prepare students to critically evaluate what they hear and to make decisions coherent with their values and virtues. In the final section, I reflect on the pedagogical implications of this approach. I point out that an integrated model of ethics and practical wisdom promotes education of cognition and education of affect as well. I provide an example to illustrate my perspective and to support my conclusions. (shrink)

The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

Podríamos definir el autoconcepto como el proceso a través del cual se va adquiriendo una imagen que acaba condicionando nuestra conducta. Las prostitutas inmigrantes viven en una situación de especial vulnerabilidad, este aspecto puede inferir en la configuración de su autoconcepto dificultando su bienestar social.//////////We could define self concept as the process through which we acquire our self image that ends up conditioning our conduct. Immigrant prostitutes live in a situation of special vulnerability, this aspect can interfere in the process (...) of building their self concept, making their social well-being difficult. (shrink)

A partir del diagnóstico de que la globalización socio-económica y la mundialización cultural están cambiando la forma de vivenciar el mundo, el autor señala que la espiritualidad representa la posibilidad de dar más de sí, y explora desde allí el ecosistema humano, preguntándose si éste puede dar más de sí. Afirma que la espiritualidad requerida por la situación actual se despliega en el ejercicio de la ciudadanía activa.

The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily (...) elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W). (shrink)

New scientific approaches to religion have delivered a considerable number of theories aimed at explaining it, despite its cognitive and adaptive oddities. These efforts were built on available theoretical frameworks, including those from cognitive science, biology, and anthropology. Many voices have raised criticism against several aspects in the cognitive and evolutionist program, even if recognizing their legitimacy and the fruits collected to date. A pressing issue is whether the problem with the new scientific study of religion is related, to some (...) extent, to the use of outdated views on human evolution, mind, and behavior. If this is the case, then a deep revision concerning current models is required. The new direction proposed should account for more complex aspects of human nature following multilevel models, and a specific human feature—language—that could better explain religion as a meaning system. Understanding religion as a language might open an alternative path inside cognitive studies that is closer to how it is lived by believers. (shrink)

Evolutionary studies have provided several explanations about how pain and suffering can be fitted into that framework, which tries to make sense of every biological and human feature in terms of evolution, survival, and fitness. These explanations point usually to how such apparently negative aspects become useful and contribute to an evolution that after all has delivered good outcomes. Such an approach might eventually render the theodicy question less sharp and critical for believers who are trying to cope with the (...) scandal of so great suffering in our world and history. Theologically we can welcome such new insights, less noticed in former tradition, but at the same time we need to be cautious before a development which could render less clear the message of Christian salvation. In any case, the new data and knowledge clearly invite to revise and reformulate the Christian salvific message, to better answer before the mystery of evil and suffering. (shrink)

Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we will briefly (...) see the challenge that arises against S4 from flexible essential properties; as well as the moves available to block it. After this, the emphasis is put on the Barcan Formula (BF), and on why it is problematic for essentialists. As we will see, Necessitism can accommodate both (BF) and essential properties. What necessitists cannot do at the same time is to continue to understanding essential properties as providing necessary conditions for the existence of individuals; against what might be for some a truism. (shrink)

The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support (...) Peacocke's moderate rationalism. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza el hilo conductor que va de Pierre Hadot a François Jullien pasando por Michel Foucault, y que se sostiene en el papel de la filosofía como transformador de sí para alcanzar una vida verdadera. Hadot y Foucault buscan referentes en las escuelas antiguas grecorromanas, mientras que François Jullien lo hace en la sabiduría tradicional china. Pero en todos los casos es una búsqueda del pasado para volver al presente y así actualizar este diálogo con los antiguos. Pierre (...) Hadot hablará de la filosofía como ejercicio espiritual; Michel Foucault, como del cuidado de sí, y François Jullien, como del aprendizaje del vivir existiendo. La continuidad está en esta voluntad de hacer de la filosofía un instrumento para construirse como sujeto ético, cuyo resultado es otro modo de vida, una vida verdadera. (shrink)

This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not only (...) accidental to the method but also virtuous. Additionally, the scrutiny suggests a recipe for increasingly pushing back, as modal enquirers, some of these limits. Limits will irremediably remain. But, as modal epistemologists, it is to explain what lies beyond these irremediable limits (not within) that we should look somewhere else. (shrink)

Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding (...) their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins. (shrink)

Es bien conocida la primera filosofía de Ortega y Gasset en torno al "raciovitalismo" y al liberalismo. En cambio, su segunda navegación, en expresión suya, no ha alcanzado aún perfiles precisos ante el público interesado. Nada mejor para ello que revisitar la obra póstuma que mejor representa tal vez la tarea filosófica del último Ortega: "La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva". En este libro, por un lado se examinan las raíces alemanas con especial (...) atención a Fichte y a Heidegger y la teoría del conocimiento que Ortega va diseñando. Por otro, se analiza la estructura textual del libro mientras se profundiza en algunos de los logros más generales de la "segunda navegación" de Ortega, como el tema de "ideas y creencias", el constructivismo cognitivo y la teoría de la historia. En una tercera parte, se incide en diversas consecuencias de la obra de Ortega, en la hermenéutica y en el pensamiento cívico sobre España, así como en la crítica filosófica. (shrink)

Fundamental Theology has undergone a slow evolution, as many other theological disciplines, since its inception in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. The lapsed time invites us to reflect about the current situation in this field and to what extent that theological section is pursuing its main objectives, especially for its teaching at different levels. After examining several issues that could have influenced that development, some suggestions for advancing the field and its teaching will also be given. Indeed, both (...) the internal and external contexts have changed quite a lot in the last 60 years, and this probably will influence a treaty that should be more contextually sensitive and very bound to developments in religious education. (shrink)

En este escrito están en juego dos modelos teológicos: uno está más en sintonía con las teologías de la encarnación que identifican todo lo que es bueno como relacionado con Dios o que participa de lo divino; el otro está arraigado en una teología de la redención y siente que la mayoría de las realidades humanas y sociales están corrompidas y necesitan ser rescatadas y restauradas, de forma sólo sobrenatural. La dualidad descrita justifica un pluralismo inevitable y un discernimiento que (...) no se puede completar a priori, ya que depende profundamente de las creencias y valores que se albergan. Quizás debamos asumir una actitud de «esperar y ver» y confiar más en los resultados, para juzgar después de evaluar hasta qué punto un desarrollo refleja claramente el plan de Dios o se aleja definitivamente del mismo. Por esta razón, no creo que sea el mejor planteamiento teológico sea uno que traza «líneas rojas» y rechaza cualquier desarrollo en ese campo, pero al mismo tiempo eso no justifica una actitud fácil e ingenua hacia esos intentos, que podrían traer —a pesar de su aparente buena voluntad— consecuencias catastróficas. La teología puede ilustrar el camino y ofrecer buenos criterios, pero difícilmente puede ayudar a tomar las decisiones necesarias o establecer una línea de acción de manera irrefutable. La teología tiene el derecho de equivocarse y el deber de evaluar sus errores y corregirlos. (shrink)